Air University Review, May-June 1980

Challenges and Uncertainty

NATO’s Southern Flank

AT A TIME when the United States is making concerted efforts to bolster the NATO defense effort, especially on the central front, the southern flank of the alliance has fallen into disrepair. On the one hand, bilateral relations between the United States and Greece and Turkey, since the late 1940s, have evaporated for the most part. The U.S. embargo on arms to Turkey in 1975 contributed very little toward solving the Cyprus problem. The situation continues to fester and poison relations between Greece and Turkey, and it, in turn, exacerbates tensions over issues in the Aegean Sea. On the other hand, Greece has withdrawn from NATO's military structure, and Turkey questions its commitments to the alliance and its tilted position toward the West. Finally, domestic trends in both countries raise fundamental questions regarding the viability of their democratic institutions and the possibility of military intervention.¹

The Military Balance

These developments are primary factors in the disarray of NATO's southern flank in the last decade. However, the changing military balance has added a new dimension to the problem.

From the standpoint of security, geographic characteristics between NATO's central front and its southern flank make sea power a critical component for resupply and reinforcement of ground forces. This circumstance, of course, underlines the need for effective sea control; otherwise, coherent defense of the southern flank is difficult, if not impractical.

For many years, the U.S. Sixth Fleet operated virtually unhindered in the Mediterranean. In the late 1960s and 1970s, however, the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet, or the Fifth Escadra,² has greatly expanded its presence in the Mediterranean, and this presence, in turn, has facilitated promotion of Soviet diplomatic objectives in the region. From a coastal navy with a principal mission of showing the flag, the Soviet navy has developed significant sea-denial capabilities.³ In short, the Soviet naval buildup has produced an uneasy balance in the Mediterranean in the sense that the United States no longer exercises undisputed control in the area. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is not in a position to deny the United States the use of maritime routes in the Mediterranean or in the Near East. Control or denial of the sea-lanes by the United States or the Soviet Union ultimately hinges on land-based air power.

Although the Soviet navy could inflict major damage in the event of general war, it has lacked effective sea-launched and land-based air power in the area. But with the introduction of the Backfire bomber to Soviet naval aviation, the Mediterranean basin has become vulnerable to attack. This underscores the importance of land-based tactical aircraft stationed in Europe, particularly in Greece and Turkey. Although the Warsaw Pact far exceeds the NATO countries in total numbers of tactical aircraft, the Western alliance still has the edge in equipment and fighting capabilities. NATO today is currently bringing many new types of fighter aircraft (e. g., Tornado) into service, and the United States has recently augmented its F-15, F-16, A-10, and F-111 squadrons and equipped them with advanced laser-guided and precision-guided munitions.⁴ This level of modernization was necessary because of the introduction of new Soviet tactical aircraft (e.g., MiG-23/27 Flogger, Su-17/20 Fitter, and Su-19 Fencer).⁵ Without the protection provided by tactical aircraft, the Sixth Fleet is even more vulnerable.

A further complicating factor is the expansion and modernization of Soviet and Warsaw Pact land forces on the southern flank. This development gives the Warsaw Pact both numerical and technological advantages.⁶ Current estimates are that the Warsaw Pact nations have deployed some 33 divisions on the northern Greco-Turkish borders in contrast to NATO forces numbering some 25 divisions. Most of the Warsaw Pact divisions are mechanized and armored, and they possess a favorable tank ratio of three to one.⁷ Additionally, the Soviets have deployed intermediate-range ballistic missiles (lRBMs), including the 3-MIRV SS-20, in the northwest Crimea and in the northern fringes of the Transcaucasian Federation. Presumably, some of these missiles would be targeted on NATO's southern flank. In response to this Soviet action, the United States, with the approval of NATO, has proposed to deploy medium-range Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles in the territory of several allies (e.g., West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Great Britain, Netherlands) by the mid-1980s.

In contrast, much of the equipment used by Greek and Turkish forces is rapidly approaching obsolescence, and both countries have begun massive modernization programs. But shrinking U.S. congressional support of federal military assistance credits and increased direct commercial sales have hindered these programs. This development imposes additional burdens on both countries, particularly Turkey, which has faced one of the severest economic crises in its modern history.

Furthermore, the arms embargo compounded these conditions and reduced the effectiveness of Turkey's armed forces in some areas by as much as 80 to 90 percent according to some estimates.⁸ The lifting of the arms embargo in September 1978 alleviated some of the most serious military problems facing Turkey. However, the need for modernization is so great that, even with full-scale resumption of U.S. military assistance, significant military weaknesses are likely to continue.⁹

The Political Dimensions

Despite shifts in the military balance on NATO's southern flank, military power may be irrelevant in resolving the problems facing the region. The Soviet Union, for the most part, has merely responded and reacted to the problems, which it did not create and has not resolved. The problems stem from social, economic, and political changes in Greece and Turkey and in the international environment over the past decade. An examination of these problems should aid in understanding the disarray on the southern flank of NATO and the Soviet Union's improved position in that area.

In the first place, Greece and Turkey perceive that the immediate Soviet threat has declined in the eastern Mediterranean. Both countries generally view Soviet objectives in the area as primarily political and the expanded Soviet naval presence as a natural extension of superpower interests. In fact, neither Greece nor Turkey perceives an immediate Soviet threat to its vital national interests.¹⁰ They have reasons of their own for downgrading the Soviet threat.

Their historical animosity surfaced over the Cyprus question in July 1974, and it has continued to simmer ever since. In their preoccupation with each other, their differences with the United States, and their disappointment in Western Europe's level of assistance, Greece and Turkey cast about in the international arena for supporters. Neither country presently fears a Soviet attack. Instead, both have responded favorably to Soviet overtures for improved relations, and high-ranking Greek and Turkish officials visited the Soviet Union in 1978 and 1979. Moreover, both Ankara and Athens advance the argument that, if the United States can seek detente with the Soviet Union, they can likewise seek detente. Thus, for the past decade, Greece and Turkey have experienced steadily improving relations with all their Communist neighbors.¹¹

Greece, for example, has intensified its relations with Yugoslavia at all levels, particularly in trade, tourism, industry, and economics. Relations with Bulgaria have been normalized and will continue to move in a positive direction as long as the borders remain quiet and the Soviet Union stations no troops there. Relations with Albania are cool but correct.¹² If the Albanians do not invite the Soviets to return to the naval base at Vlorë (their "window" on the Mediterranean until May 1961) and if Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia does not endanger the peace and security of the area, Greek officials will take a relaxed attitude toward Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, both Greece and Turkey will be outflanked and isolated from NATO if Moscow secures a foothold in Yugoslavia.

One can interpret Greece's relations with the Soviet Union in the last two years as part of an effort to diversify Greek foreign policy and reduce Greek dependence on the United States. Several high-level visits in the last two years culminated in September 1979 with Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis's visit to Moscow.¹³ These visits brought no fundamental changes in the Soviets' posture: they would not support the issue of Cyprus or the question of airspace and seabed jurisdiction in the Aegean Sea. However, an agreement with Moscow does admit Soviet commercial and auxiliary combat ships for repairs at the Neorian Shipbuilding Company on the Island of Syros. Although this development has raised some consternation in Washington and NATO circles,¹⁴ Greek officials view Soviet naval deployment in the Mediterranean as part of U. S. -Soviet strategic rivalry in the Middle East and Africa and not as a direct threat to Greece's security.

To a greater extent than Greece's problems, recent troubles between Turkey and the United States have brought speculation about a possible "Soviet option." Historically, relations with the Soviets were a cornerstone of Kemal Atatlirk's foreign policy, and Moscow constantly reminds Turkey of that fact. However, Turkey still remains wary in the light of centuries of hostility, thirteen wars, a common frontier, and Moscow's undiminished ambition to control the Dardanelles. But it is true that the Soviet Bear has been almost benign in their relations. Since the mid-1960s, Turkey has maintained good relations with Moscow; economic relations have greatly expanded, and government-to-government ties have improved.¹⁵ All major Turkish political parties have supported the conscious receptivity to Soviet overtures. The economic gains resulting from improved Turkish-Soviet relations represent one of the outstanding successes of Ankara's politics. Turkey presently receives more Soviet aid than any other Third World nation, and Soviet aid compares favorably with aid currently given to Turkey by any Western nation.¹⁶

To date, Moscow has avoided linking economic aid to specific political demands. However, the 1978 Turkish-Soviet agreement, entitled The Principles of Good-Neighborly and Friendly Relations, did state that neither nation would allow the use of its territory". . . for the commission of aggression or subversive actions against the other state. . . ." Literal interpretation of this clause would prevent the operation of U.S. and NATO surveillance bases along Turkey's northern frontiers. Turkey's sensitivity to these principles has surfaced in connection with verification flights by U-2s to monitor Soviet missile testing in compliance with SALT II. Ankara has sought U.S. assurances that flights over Turkey would be consistent with both American and Soviet interpretations of the" letter and spirit" of the agreement.¹⁷

Turkey bases its perception of a Soviet threat not only on Moscow's moderation but also on U.S. vacillation. Turkey has never forgotten President Johnson's warning to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü during the Cyprus crisis in 1964 that, if Turkey did not desist, it could not expect U.S. support in the event of a Soviet attack. During the late sixties and seventies, a host of issues have caused even more strained relations with the United States: port visits of the Sixth Fleet; differences over the pace and methods of modernizing the Turkish armed forces; and the progressive reluctance of the U. S. Congress to fund Turkish military and economic aid programs. The most serious cause of friction was the arms embargo in the aftermath of the Cypriot crisis of 1974. The Turks interpreted this congressional action as an unjustified slap at a NATO ally that has contributed heavily to collective defense over the years.

The embargo convinced Turkey that it must reduce its dependence on the United States and pursue a more multifaceted foreign policy that would consider Turkey's unique geographic position and historical role as a bridge between East and West.¹⁸ In essence, U.S. foreign policy raised questions in the minds of many Turkish leaders regarding the reliability of the United States in the future. They felt that Turkish security was held hostage to the vagaries and peculiarities of U.S. domestic politics.

Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, in September 1978, questioned the excessive relationships between U.S. internal and external politics:

Her external politics are very much (too much for a world power) influenced by the ethnic lobbies so that when an allied country has problems with the mother country of one of these lobbies, she finds herself in a hopeless situation vis-à-vis her relations with the United States, and sometimes even the United States Administration itself cannot help such a situation. I am not mentioning this peculiarity of American politics as a criticism, I am just stating a reality of our present day world which we have to learn to live with.¹⁹

One should view recent and future developments in Turkish foreign policy against this background. Although lifting the embargo has removed the most important irritant in U.S.-Turkish relations, additional adjustments in Turkey's foreign and defense posture vis-à-vis the United States are likely. One Turkish official described the situation in these terms:

The United States, through an arms embargo that was imposed on an ally for reasons that had little to do directly with the needs of the alliance, had done more to unhinge NATO's eastern flank than anything that the Soviet Union has done; and it has done so at a time when Washington has been trying to heighten concern and generate increased defense expenditures to counter the Soviet military buildup in central Europe.²⁰

A second problem that contributes to a favorable environment for Soviet diplomacy is the pervasiveness of petty domestic politics. The internal struggle for power in Greece and Turkey overshadows Soviet expansionism. In both Greece and Turkey, foreign policy is only an extension and reflection of domestic bickering and alignments. It revolves around the Greek-Turkish conflict and numerous complex and interrelated political, economic, and military strands. For the most part, politicians give strategic considerations a low priority and rarely mention them in or out of office. Thus, the cohesion of NATO is seldom discussed in political circles. Each party has some legitimate grounds for dissatisfaction with NATO members, especially the United States. "NATO is more a cudgel wielded by domestic opponents to embarrass and weaken the group in power than a shield against the Soviet Union, which, in any event, appears less a threat than one's neighboring ally."²¹

Greece. Andreas Papandreou, the leader of the opposition Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), openly exploits foreign policy for domestic purposes. He advocates total withdrawal from NATO and urges a policy of "anti-imperialist" nonalignment, coupled with a hard line toward Turkey over Cyprus and the ancillary issues pertaining to the Aegean Sea. He also rejects Karamanlis's total commitment to membership in the European Economic Community and tends to favor a loose association.²² Papandreou's militancy feeds his anti-Americanism and propensity toward nonalignment, which he sees as the proper affiliation for Greece. In a recent statement, he referred to the Syros Island affair as confirming". . . in the bluntest way, US intentions against our country's national sovereign rights and against our national independence."²³

More specifically, deterioration of U.S. Greek relations and the rise of anti-Americanism stems from two basic causes. The first was U.S. policy toward Greece under the junta. No evidence exists that the United States engineered the 21 April 1967 coup d'etat failure. The fact that the United States Government did not exert more energetic efforts to restore democracy undermined support for both the United States and NATO. The Johnson administration did suspend heavy arms and equipment shipments to the junta, but spare parts and light arms and munitions continued to flow. President Nixon's administration resumed shipments of heavy arms and equipment and sought to "homeport" elements of the Sixth Fleet in Piraeus. At the same time, high-level officials of the administration, including Vice President Spiro Agnew, visited Greece and received pronounced coverage in the local Greek newspapers. All of these elements contributed to the impression that the United States supported the junta, and this view is still widely held in Greece.

A second cause for the deterioration in relations was U.S. policy during the Cyprus crisis of 1974, particularly in the sense that many Greeks perceived a U.S. "tilt" toward Turkey, and this perception led to Greece's withdrawal from the NATO military structure. Today, many Greeks feel that the United States could and should have prevented the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was responsible for the slow U. S. reaction to the impending disaster. In part, this is a correct perception. Secretary Kissinger was so engaged in the events in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Watergate that positive and effective responses were too late. In fact, the Greek government under General Demitrios Ioannides was in such a precarious political and economic state that any firm U.S. action within the first three days of the ill-fated coup d'etat and the assassination attempt on Archbishop Makarios would have easily toppled the Ioannides regime and, in turn, spared Cyprus of the Turkish invasion. This was not to be! The result was an outbreak of virulent anti-Americanism and an unavoidable response by the newly installed democratic government of Karamanlis. Under much public pressure, Karamanlis withdrew from the military structure of NATO and began a reassessment of U.S. relations. The reassessment led to the termination of the home-porting agreement and initiation of bilateral discussions ,over the future of U.S. installations in Greece.

These discussions culminated in the signing of a new Defense Cooperation Agreement in 1977. The Greek government has yet to sign the agreement, and it appears that it may not sign it. Apparently, Greece is using the bilateral agreement as a means of influencing the United States to find an acceptable plan for Greece's reintegration into NATO's military wing and to move Turkey toward some resolution of the Cyprus controversy.

The U.S. decision to lift the embargo on arms to Turkey, however, justified in terms of U.S. strategic interests has considerably complicated relations with Greece. And it has strengthened the domestic position of Andreas Papandreou and PASOK. Papandreou now argues that lifting of the embargo further confirms the pro-Turkish stance of the United States and the general bankruptcy of the Karamanlis government. A recent poll in the Athens and Piraeus²⁴ areas indicates that voters in these areas are undecided as to the future of Karamanlis and his government.²⁵ These findings are more pronounced for the 15 to 39-year-old group, the largest sector of the electorate.²⁶ Current speculation is that Karamanlis and his New Democracy party would be further eroded if elections were held within a year and if the present political climate remains the same.²⁷

In addition to the Cyprus question, two other issues further complicate Greece's relations with the United States, NATO, and Turkey. The first issue concerns the right to explore for minerals, primarily oil, beneath the Aegean Sea. Under international law, nations have the right to explore for mineral wealth on their continental shelf, but the Greek islands and the Turkish mainland share the same shelf. The second issue concerns the right to control the air space over the Aegean. This latter issue was partially resolved when both Greece and Turkey, in February 1980, lifted restriction on civil aviation flights over this area. The question of the two countries' military flights in the area still remains deadlocked, awaiting settlement within the framework of NATO. These issues are more serious and potentially more explosive than the Cyprus dispute because they directly affect the sovereignty and vital interests of both countries.

There appears to be little question of Karamanlis's desire to return to the military wing of NATO. It is a feeling shared by Greece's military leaders. But Greece's relationship in NATO remains²⁸ at best uncertain, and solution depends on a number of factors.

The first requires the approval of Turkey, which to date has been unwilling to agree to the proposed terms of reintegration.²⁹ In large part, this is an attempt by Turkey to put pressure on Greece to resolve bilateral issues. Second, Greece's domestic political situation of anti-United States sentiment remains strong and has to some extent even intensified since the lifting of the embargo.

 Papandreou's electoral victory in 1977 continues to limit Prime Minister Karamanlis's flexibility in negotiating through this impasse. Papandreou has sharply attacked Greece's ties to NATO on the grounds that they result in a "loss of national independence" and make Greece "subservient to an outside power center."³⁰ As an alternative, Papandreou advocates close ties with the Third World and the development of an indigenous arms industry, and he has even suggested that Greece should consider acquiring nuclear weapons.³¹

A more basic question is this: What happens after Karamanlis? Karamanlis is now 76 years old; and, like a number of older men in power, he is either reluctant to train an heir apparent or is indifferent to the need for an heir. No clear successor is evident. The second most prominent person in Greece, in terms of public visibility, is Andreas Papandreou. If Papandreou's strength continues to grow, Greece's reintegration into NATO will be difficult. Karamanlis has stated that his aim is to

tie Greece to the West in a way that those who follow me can't break. This is why I worked so hard to get Greece into the Common Market and why I want us back in NATO. But I'm getting no support from Washington, and in Greece, opposition pressure against strong ties with the West is growing all the time.³²

If Papandreou comes to power in the near future, Greece would probably withdraw from NATO. One cannot exclude this possibility.

Turkey. Turkey is passing through one of the most difficult periods in its history. It has been wracked internally by crises that have severely tested its social order and democratic institutions. And, as pointed out elsewhere, it has become increasingly disillusioned with its Western ties--especially with the United States--and has considered reorientation of its foreign policy.

More specifically, the loss of 2100 lives in terrorist activities during the last two years has required imposition of martial law in 19 of the country's 67 provinces. Economic disorder is rampant as manifested in a 25 percent unemployment rate, an inflation rate of 70 percent, and an acute shortage of foreign currency reserves. This shortage has restricted importation of goods and raw materials and has cut industrial production to only 50 percent of capacity.³³ Kurdish and other ethnic and religious armed uprisings have undermined the viability of the political institutions.³⁴ Finally, prolonged parliamentary deadlocks threaten at times to make Turkey all but ungovernable, and the specter of military intervention looms on the horizon.³⁵

These acute problems surfaced in the late 1960s. Thus, a polarization of Turkish political life has hindered the formation of stable and effective governments for more than a decade. The military ultimately entered the arena with the "coup by communiqué" in March 1971, and, from 1971 to 1973, military commanders approved the ruling governments of Turkey. Not until the fall of 1973 did the military withdraw into the wings and permit parliamentary elections. Since that time, two personalities and their followers have dominated Turkish politics: Bulent Ecevit's Republican People's party and Suleyman Demirel's Justice party.

Ecevit's party is the larger of the two parties and is supported by trade unions, small farmers, and urban intellectuals. His party favors a program of democratic socialism that emphasizes economic planning and elements of a welfare state. Demirel's party, on the other hand, is supported by business groups and large commercial farmers who emphasize laissez-faire in theory but, in practice, favor concrete benefits to various economic groups. Both parties continue to support Turkey's role within NATO, but this stance is subject to serious questions. In fact, all parties are closely scrutinizing Turkey's entire foreign policy toward the United States and the West in the light of the arms embargo and resulting economic problems.

Both Ecevit and Demirel harbor deep personal antagonism that compounds basic differences between the major political parties. These differences make it almost impossible to create a "grand coalition" for solving complex problems, and neither party alone can muster a parliamentary majority. Consequently, minor parliamentary groups exercise disproportionate influence and, even worse, cause deadlocks and ensuing paralysis in the legislative process.³⁶

The elections of October 1979 brought about the ouster of Ecevit and his replacement by a parliamentary minority led by Demirel and his Justice party.³⁷ To gain a parliamentary majority, Demirel invited the "unconditional support" of the National Salvation party, the National Action party, and the National Order party. All of these are more hawkish on the Cyprus and Aegean Sea questions. This development will naturally affect a quick solution to the Cyprus issue and the return of Greece into NATO's military structure. But, in the final analysis, it will not bring ready solutions in either the domestic or foreign policy arenas.

An underlying factor in Turkey's reassessment of its Western orientation is the economic consequences of its Cyprus invasion.³⁸ Although justification for the invasion is still a matter of contention, the resulting impasse in Turkish-Western relations is unquestionable. The arms embargo imposed by the U.S. Congress on military aid caused, inter alia, a crisis in Turkey's modernization program and the closure of 26 U.S. defense installations on Turkish soil. Other contributing factors in Turkey's economic plight resulted from the financial reversals flowing from the economic recession of 1973-74 in Western Europe and, in the same period, the oil crisis that quadrupled oil prices and led to a sharp rise in Turkey's trade deficit (approximately $3 billion in 1977). By 1979, Turkey found it difficult to meet payments for its monthly petroleum imports, and coffee, filter cigarettes, and similar goods had become black market items. Another by-product of the economic crisis is the curtailment of military purchases, which, in turn, has sapped Turkey's military potential. And the West has been slow in providing assistance partly because of the political impact of certain measures on Turkey's domestic problem³⁹ and political squabbling within Parliament.

Further alienation from the West came as a result of Greece's entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). Turkey contends that she should also be considered for membership. Now that Greece has joined the EEC, how can the West European allies justify the inclusion of Greece in the EEC without also including Turkey? What will be the impact of this development of Greece's reentry into the military structure of NATO?

The United States has been slow in providing aid to Turkey because of disagreement between the Carter administration and Congress about the size of the American contribution and the amount that should be provided as aid and as a loan. Other differences have also arisen in the negotiation of a new economic and defense agreement. Turkey insists on a foreign aid agreement amounting to $2.5 or $3 billion, but the United States maintains that it cannot commit itself for a five-year period demanded by the Turks.⁴⁰ They have not forgotten the arms embargo, and, for this reason, they insist on clear U.S. commitments to provide uninterrupted and unreduced aid over a five-year period. Negotiations were consummated in January 1980 for continuing use by the United States of some 26 military and intelligence installations. This agreement also calls for approximately $450 million for military and economic aid. These bases have assumed added significance with the verification of SALT II and loss of monitoring sites in Iran.⁴¹

These factors have raised questions in the minds of Turkey's political and economic elites concerning the wisdom of exclusive orientation toward the West.⁴² The Turks have gained some flexibility by reorienting their political and economic relations with neighboring states,⁴³ and this reorientation is the basis of Turkey's regional approach in solving its problems. Each step forward naturally challenges the soundness of Turkey's post-World War II relations with the West.

the politics of "benign neglect"

The third problem contributing to Moscow's improved position in the eastern Mediterranean is the feeling of neglect that permeates the Greek and Turkish societies, Most political leaders in both countries are convinced that NATO headquarters is so preoccupied with the central front and the ominous military buildup by the Warsaw Pact that it regards the southern flank as an ancillary theater of operations. Both countries believe that statements of concern voiced by NATO leaders are prompted by Greco-Turkish differences, namely, the Cyprus issue and the concomitant arms embargo on Turkey, The latter issue has affected Turkey's combat readiness.

Both Athens and Ankara are convinced that NATO does not take a serious view of the Soviet military buildup in the eastern Mediterranean. This perception can be understood in light of the decision regarding the allocation of AWACS (airborne warning and control system) aircraft. Although the exact figures are classified, NATO originally planned to purchase between 24 and 32 AWACS, the number considered as sufficient to guard against a surprise attack and provide surveillance over the entire defensive arc from Norway to Turkey.⁴⁴ But budgetary constraints permitted the purchase of only 18 AWACS aircraft.⁴⁵ Since only one aircraft in four is airborne at anyone time, the reduced number will shortchange some sectors of NATO's defense perimeter. Speculation is that the eastern Mediterranean is the lowest sector on the priority list.⁴⁶ Further proof of American preoccupation with the central front is a paper prepared by the Congressional Budget Office which assumes that a Soviet attack will be launched through the northern German plains, the Fulda gap, and the Hof corridor. The report does not mention the southern flank.⁴⁷ Additionally, most scenarios played out by U.S. and NATO military forces place major emphasis on the central front and show little concern for the flanks, particularly the southern flank.

Other developments have reinforced this Greco- Turkish perception of NATO's benign neglect. A report prepared by the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Department of Defense in 1978 suggests that "the outbreak of a war on either of NATO's flanks is either unlikely or impossible to successfully defend against. . . . and severely downgrades the possibility of any NATO war lasting longer than six months."⁴⁸ Several weeks later, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, in testimony before a congressional committee, made this comment about the above report: "The commitment of the United States to Israel's security is unquestionable." He added, "If control of the Mediterranean were judged an appropriate planning objective."⁴⁹ Such an offhanded remark did very little to assure either Greece or Turkey regarding the intensity or reliability of U. S. commitments in the eastern Mediterranean. Professor Nermin A. Unat, a member of the Turkish Senate, commented on Turkey's treatment as an equal in NATO: "It is not a question of Turkey Wanting to go neutralist, or be a neutral, or pro-Soviet. We belong to the West. But now we want to speak up as an equal partner in the Alliance and share full responsibility for its action."⁵⁰ If Greece and Turkey ultimately perceive that they are expendable or that they have no reliable allies, what will prevent them from seeking rapprochement with the Soviet Union? In that case, a "Finlandized" southern flank could become a new reality.

As indicated earlier, Moscow's policy toward Greece and Turkey has been a combination of olive branch and checkbook diplomacy--a disarming reasonableness and nonthreatening posture. Even so, the Soviets are not firmly entrenched in the Mediterranean.⁵¹ However, they could achieve a breakthrough if a succession crisis in Yugoslavia should bring Pro-Soviet leadership to power or if some Arab leader decided to grant them the privileges they enjoyed for some ten years in Egypt. If either scenario comes to pass, it might Spur Greece and Turkey toward a reconciliation, and NATO would respond with intensified rearmament, an alternative that Moscow seeks to prevent.

ALTHOUGH six years have elapsed since the Cyprus dispute, the southern flank is still marred by fissures. Despite major concern voiced by political and military leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, there is little evidence that the problems are receiving systematic and creative attention. Many of the concepts and axioms that lay at the heart of the U.S.-NATO-West European approach to the region are carry-overs from the late 1940s and 1950s. Today, they do not provide an adequate foundation for policy toward a region in a state of rapid social, economic, and political change.

In the complex milieu of the late 1970s and 1980s, alarmism regarding the growing Soviet threat is not an effective Source of policy. This does not imply that the Soviet threat no longer exists, but the threat today is less immediate and less direct. More important, neither Greece nor Turkey regard it as the principal Source of their insecurity. A need for an assertive and cooperative policy among the Allies spills over into the Greco-Turkish imbroglio. This type of assistance will blunt any Soviet attempt to exploit the instabilities, both real and latent, on the southern flank. Such a policy is even more important in view of the potential for instability elsewhere in southern Europe, namely, in Yugoslavia following Tito's demise.⁵² If Yugoslavia "tilts" toward the Soviet Union, the southern flank would be isolated from its other NATO members.

The domestic political scene in Greece and Turkey does not permit imaginative moves by their political leaders in reconciling differences. In fact, the leaders of both countries are quite likely to seek greater autonomy in foreign relations, much to the dislike of NATO and the United States. The United States can hardly prevent this development, and it should not attempt to prevent it. Any such action would further alienate Greece and Turkey and further weaken their ties with the West. U.S. leaders should recognize these shifts in policy as concomitant developments resulting from an ever-changing domestic and international environment. How can the United States and NATO channel and guide these efforts in directions that will enhance the security of both nations without undermining the alliance as a whole? The key to an effective NATO and a viable southern flank is to ensure smooth and harmonious relations among all components of the alliance.

Although lifting the arms embargo was the first step toward achieving harmony with Turkey, the action did very little to reassure Greece that the United States was still not continuing to "tilt" toward Turkey. Perhaps a lesson in Camp David diplomacy would be appropriate! The differences between the two countries are so deep and politically motivated that only intensive and sustained negotiations can resolve them. Resolution of such intractable issues cannot be achieved on a sporadic, piecemeal basis.

Both Greece and Turkey must be assured that they are valued members of the Western community, and they must share goals that include but extend beyond the narrow boundaries of national security and regional settings. Only under such conditions will both countries make positive contributions to collective defense, and only under such conditions will the United States be able to repair the fissures in the southern flank and reestablish genuine cooperative relations with both allies.

We may now be at the watershed when NATO objectives in the eastern Mediterranean are better served by greater attention to political, rather than military, means. This is especially significant because of the potentially explosive situation in the Middle East. As a result, the eastern Mediterranean now takes on additional significance as one of the most strategically important sea areas, and any reduction in U.S. or NATO strength shifts the balance of power toward the Soviet Union. The key to a secure Mediterranean rests in a stable and durable southern flank.

A special note of thanks to John C. Smith for his invaluable comments and suggestions.

1. Both nations have experienced military intervention in the last ten years: Greece, 1967-74; Turkey, 1971-73.

2. The typical naval force varies from 10-12 surface ships, 8-12 submarines, 15-20 auxiliary ships, and 5-7 intelligence ships. See Ken Booth, "Superpower Naval Disengagement in the Mediterranean," Journal of the Royal United States Institute for Defence Studies, June 1979, pp. 28-35.

3. While the Soviet navy could inflict great damage on the NATO naval forces in the event of general war, it lacks effective sea-launched and land-based air power in the area. So long as the Western powers control the "choke" points in the Mediterranean and possess strong land-based air power, the Soviet naval forces will find it difficult to survive in any kind of military showdown. For a detailed discussion of Soviet naval buildup, see Barry M. Blackman, The Changing Soviet Navy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973); see, also, Maurizio Cremasco, "NATO's Southern Flank in the East-West Balance," Lo Spettalore Internazionale, January-March 1979, pp. 13-23.

4. The Military Balance, 1979-1980 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), p. 111.

5. Ibid.

6. "Instability and Change on NATO’s Southern Flank," International Security, Winter 1978, p. 151.

7. Ibid.

8. New York Times, May 23, 1978; Chicago Sun-Times, April 5, 1979.

9. Negotiations between the United States and Turkey are now taking place on a revised Defense Cooperation Agreement. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, October 17, 1979, p. T-1.

10. If we extend the definition of the southern flank to include France and Italy, the generalization still holds. The French are concerned about the influx of weapons into Algeria and Libya, but it is not perceived as a "clear and present danger." The Italians believe that the Soviet Union has received little advantage in the area after twenty years of attempted posturing.

11. Greece spearheaded the convocation of an inter-Balkan conference in Athens in January 1976.

12. New York Times, April 21, 1979.

13. In 1978, Foreign Minister George Rallis visited Moscow. This was a first for a Greek foreign minister. The major accords signed during the visit were a scientific and cultural cooperation agreement and a convention establishing a Soviet consulate in Thessaloniki and a Greek one in Odessa.

14. New York Times, November 4, 1979. Athens and Moscow have increased their contacts in the fields of energy, shipping, tourism, and sports.

15. This rapprochement began in December 1975, when Prime Minister Kosygin arrived in Ankara in the company of 40 Soviet financial and political experts.

16. Total Soviet aid to Turkey to date totals $1. 75 billion. This aid includes the expansion of the Iskenderum Steel complex and the Izmir refining complex. See Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal 1980-81 (Part 3), 96th US Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979).

17. New York Times, September 13, 1979.

18. International Security, Winter 1978, p. 167.

19. Bulent Ecevit, "Turkey's Security Policies," Survival, September-October 1978, p. 204.

20. Cited in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Soviet Union and the Eastern Mediterranean: 1968-1978," Orbis, Summer 1979, p. 308.

21. Ibid., p. 311.

22. Greece will become a full member of the EEC on January 1, 1981.

23. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, September 26, 1979, p. S-4.

24. The Athens metropolitan area, which includes Piraeus, contains one-third of the 8.7 million inhabitants of Greece.

25. Foreign Broadcast Information Services, August 28, 1979, p. S-l.

26. Ibid., p. S-2.

27. In the November 1977 election Constantine Karamanlis's New Democracy party retained 177 seats, losing 48 seats. PASOK increased its seats from 12 to 93.

28. Greek participation was limited to naval and air units and was made possible by the manipulation of the NATO command structure. Usually, exercises would have been directed out of NATO's headquarters in Izmir, Turkey. Instead, to lessen Greek sensitivity, they were directed from NATO AFSOUTH headquarters in Naples (Italy). This put the exercises under the command of an allied admiral rather than a Turkish one.

29. The actual terms of the negotiations have not been revealed. However, Greece is thought to be seeking a special status within the alliance in which its armed forces would come under NATO command only in case of major conflict. With this arrangement, a new allied headquarters under a Greek commander would be established in Larissa (central Greece) similar to the headquarters in Izmir. Each of the two headquarters would have a national commander and an American deputy commander. Structurally, they would be subordinate to NATO's headquarters in Naples (CINCSOUTH). Part of this plan has already been implemented. At the end of June 1978, a Turkish general took over command of the allied headquarters at Izmir, which, until then, had been under the control of a U.S. general.

30. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, September 26, 1979, p. S-4.

31. New York Times, April 12, 1978.

32. New York Times, November 4, 1979.

33. Christian Science Monitor, December 17, 1978; Wall Street Journal, April 24, 1979.

34.Foreign Broadcast Information Services, October 23, 1979, p. T-2.

35. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Turkey’s Travails," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1979, p. 90.

36. On the right is the National Salvation party, which tries to keep alive religious issues but also embraces economic development and intransigence on the Cyprus issue. At the extreme right is the National Action party, which advocates Pan-Arabism and an uncompromising hostility to communism. On the extreme left is the Turkish Labor party, a Marxist group oriented toward Moscow. Other groups exist that are oriented to Peking and Tirana, plus a variety of terrorist groups aligned with the PLO.

37. For detailed election results see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, October 22, 1979, p. T-2; November 8, 1979, p. T-1.

38. Presently, Turkey occupies some 35 percent of the island.

39. The International Monetary Fund in May 1978 consummated an agreement with Turkey for a $450 million loan. The second installment was held up over disagreements over devaluating the Turkish lira, wage freezes, deficit budgets, and slashing of government expenditures. Also, in January 1979, President Carter and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt agreed on an aid package totaling some 380 million deutsche marks. The OECD in an agreement with a consortium of 12 nations is also putting together a major aid package for Turkey.

40. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, October 19, 1979, p. T-l.

41. There are four major intelligence bases: Diyarbakir, Sinop, Karamürsel, and Belbosi. Christian Science Monitor, May 1, 1979. The United States has scrapped the idea of using U-2 reconnaissance planes to monitor Soviet compliance of the SALT agreement.

42. Michael M. Boll, "Turkey between East and West: The Regional Alternatives," The World Today, September 1979, p. 36.

43. Economic and cultural ties have been consummated with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

44. Washington Post, March 2, 1978.

45. Washington Post, December 7, 1978.

46. Rubinstein, p. 309.

47. Ibid., p. 310.

48. Ibid., p. 311.

49. "The Strategy of the Unspeakable," New York Times, April 9, 1978, Section 4. Emphasis added. If the recently published volume, The Third World War: August 1985, by General Sir John Hackett and colleagues, reflects any part of reality, then it is readily apparent that NATO's southern flank is short-shrifted in most vital planning and strategic scenarios.

50. Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1979.

51. Since the Soviet expulsion from Egypt, the Soviet military has lacked air bases, and its use of Syrian ports is less than adequate for major naval operations. Access to Yugoslavian ports is subject to regulations that apply to all foreign navies. There are possibilities along the North African littoral, notably Libya.

52. For a detailed discussion, see F. Stephen Larrabee, "Balkan Security," Adelphi Papers, Number 130 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), Summer 1977.

James Brown (B.A., Texas Christian University; Ph.D., State University of New York at Buffalo) was Professor of National Security Affairs at Air Command and Staff College before recruiting as Associate Professor of Political Science at Southern Methodist University where he has been since 1962. He is Associate Chairman, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and has published articles on military and political subjects in Armed Forces and Society, Polity, the International Journal of Public Administration, etc.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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