Document created: 14 February 02
Air University Review, March-April 1980

Basing the A-10 in Europe

strategic and mobility problems

THE A-10 is a unique weapon system. It is built with yesterday's technology to meet tomorrow's threat. Representing a significant departure from the Air Force's historic "faster, higher, farther," traditions, this unusual weapon requires a certain reconsideration of fundamentals such as the threat, basing, deployment, and employment.

Colonel Robert D. Rasmussen has presented an excellent commentary on some of these novel implications.^l He articulated a comprehensive concept for employment and basing that included a wide array of considerations: forward basing, turnaround, tactical employment, allocation of sorties, command control, geography of the battle area, interface with the customer, training, logistics, theater level strategy, and more. This is a particularly useful analysis for the A-10 because of its novelty, but it sets an example that might be instructive for other' weapon systems. It is also possible that some of Colonel Rasmussen's arguments might be extended further.

As military professionals, we should first examine the threat. The specifics of any conflict will be dependent on the actual scenario that develops at the time; obviously, airtight predictions cannot be made. A review of Soviet military literature provides one useful insight into provisions of their military doctrine pertinent to a NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation.

Pact forces mayor may not follow their own script. However, a review of the close correspondence between doctrine, force structure, and training exercises suggests we should pay more attention to what they teach themselves. We should not assume they will be inhibited by the same constraints or values we hold; if they were, there would be no need for NATO in the first place. In a society as dedicated to doctrinaire thinking as the Soviets', deeply imbedded doctrines simply cannot be disregarded regardless of the repugnance of those concepts treating volatile questions such as theater nuclear weapons.

The primary conclusion to be drawn from Soviet books and articles translated and published in the USAF "Soviet Military Thought" series and "Soviet Press Selected Translations" is that the Soviet expectation, in the event of crisis and confrontation, is to fight a decisive war in Europe to achieve their objectives. Their strategy is offensive. Their forces are designed and equipped for tactical nuclear weapons to playa leading role if deemed necessary.

Thus, it would appear that the Soviets perceive a reduced possibility of escalation into a strategic nuclear exchange because of the current balance of strategic forces. This is a change from the early sixties. The achievement of parity in the strategic balance during the late sixties and early seventies has, in their eyes, significantly lowered the risk of escalation and led to a new perspective of the theater environment detached from the general war context. A tactical nuclear exchange, limited to Western and Central Europe, offers three potential advantages to the Soviets that could justify a significant risk: (a) the conquest of Western Europe could be expedited, (b) damage could be restricted, essentially, to non-Soviet areas, thereby (c) leaving much Soviet power intact with reduced threat of Chinese intervention or Warsaw Pact defections.

The most disquieting scenario in Soviet doctrine calls for a surprise "preemptive" attack against the NATO "aggressor." Such an attack would, presumably include massive, in-depth theater nuclear strikes accompanied by blitzkrieg air and ground exploitation. Although a war could begin conventionally, the Soviets see escalation to nuclear levels as a logical eventuality. They apparently intend to strike first to destroy NATO nuclear capabilities, main combat forces, and command, control, and communications (C³). This would isolate the battlefield and prepare main attack corridors. The importance they place on surprise calls for using forces in place and giving minimum warning, perhaps only a few hours.

A major nonnuclear war plan in Europe apparently does not appeal to the Soviets unless NATO's nuclear capabilities could be disposed of, e.g., through political actions or conventional attack, because the threat of a NATO theater nuclear initiative would hang over all operations. One possibility, wisely rejected by the Western allies, would be an agreement whereby the parties declared their intention not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This would expose NATO to the numerically superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact, reduce the uncertainties of Pact war planning, and yield only a Soviet assurance of restraint of dubious value.

The now-credible threat of a Soviet-initiated theater nuclear war has an impact on tactical and strategic planning comparable to the achievement of Soviet strategic parity. It is a "new ball game," only more so, because a NATO monopoly on realistic theater nuclear capabilities was a stabilizing deterrent. The reverse is not true. A realistic Soviet theater nuclear threat reduces the risk to the Pact, rather than increasing it. It compounds the potential shock effects of a surprise attack, reduces the likelihood of effective early resistance of NATO forces, and increases the difficulty of effective reinforcement of NATO from North America. Moreover, the impact on the political decisions of noncommitted Western nations is very difficult to anticipate in advance.

How should we counter this Soviet military strategy? What are the basing, mobility, and deployment implications of a highly thinkable theater nuclear war? Our first imperative is to defeat the combined arms forces ground offensive that will attempt to occupy large areas of NATO territory. The initial use of Pact forces in place, to achieve surprise, suggests that a major weakness would be the transportation requirements at second echelon and reserve units. Effective close air support (CAS), as described by Colonel Rasmussen, is imperative to blunt the major thrusts while coordinated NATO interdiction strikes could cause wide-scale disruption of transportation capabilities for secondary forces. Can we deploy and protect our forces for this task?

Turning our focus back to the basing strategies for the A-10, we note that one of the disturbing characteristics of many discussions of tactical air basing in Central Europe is the hidden, but apparently implied, assumption of a relatively static battle. Admittedly, we should be able to count on using some of the existing USAF installations, at least for the first few days, unless the Warsaw Pact mounts an extremely successful Pearl Harbor-like surprise attack. But the Soviet nuclear option increases the probabilities and extent of serious base destruction.

How long can we count on fighting from Ramstein, Bitburg, Hahn, or Spangdahlem? What will be the degree of initial battle damage and remaining operational capability? If there is anything resembling a rapidly moving blitzkrieg with concentrated highly mobile armor, one wonders what might be the operational expectancy of our access to Hahn, Bitburg, Sembach, or Rhein-Main. One week? Two weeks? Two months?

NATO is relatively short of airfields now, so we must question where all of the aircraft from U.S. based units will go that will converge on Europe. Current planning must assume availability of virtually all existing fields to absorb the base loading requirements we anticipate. If we make bold assumptions regarding our ability to hold the Pact attack at, or near, the NATO-Pact border and assume only minimal or no early damage to bases, the airfield problem is serious enough. If we accept, alternatively, authoritative forecasts of a rapid Pact armored advance, possibly following a. "corridor" cleared of resistance by nuclear attacks, we have an extremely serious issue. If we grant that it may not be wise to leave the surviving F-15, F-16, and A-10 assets exposed to such rapidly moving Soviet armor, we have an even more critical problem of airfield capacity in rear areas. Will we be able usefully to deploy enough air power to Europe and redeploy (where necessary), to play the timely role needed from Tacair? Are we looking at another Dunkirk?

There is, of course, no simple, single answer. As always, it depends on the conditions. France--in or out? Spain and Portugal--in or out? What is the level of battle damage on existing fields? What unique problems did nuclear weapons cause? How well do the anti armor and Tacair forces operate against the Pact? What kind of weather?

What we need is not, necessarily, a set of pat answers but deployment mobility concepts that can survive both strategic uncertainties and battlefield damage. Colonel Rasmussen's forward A-10 bases, widely scattered, are a healthy partial answer. At present, however, it is not difficult to find work areas on typical bases that offer vulnerable, crucial bottlenecks to operational readiness. Take, for example, the munitions and avionics shops, petroleum, oil, and lubricants, runways, taxiways, etc. We have done a good job of getting aircraft under hardened shelters, but if the readiness of munitions or sensitive avionics depends on quality maintenance, parts or equipment housed in soft unhardened shelters, we may have operationally ready aircraft incapable of flying effective missions for the lack of essential support.

Colonel Rasmussen's concept was based on highly flexible and highly mobile deployment concepts. One would not expect F-15s to be flown from forward operating locations (FOLs), but do we have realistic "redeployment" concepts for F-15s, F-16s, and A-10s? Do they include reconstitution of battle-damaged critical maintenance and turnaround facilities? Can we rapidly redeploy an F-15 wing to a base not currently programmed for F-15s, with the surviving maintenance facilities, and expect it to be fully operational?

IN ANY EVENT, Rasmussen's concepts are headed in a welcome direction. He might have added an additional argument for the FOLs, beyond improved pilot familiarity with the terrain, in the enormous advantage of proximity for the pilot trying to locate a target visually in submarginal weather. We would assume that armored targets will be relatively fleeting in a firepower-heavy environment (concentrating, dispersing, reconcentrating) and that rapid reaction for CAS is going to be an absolute "operational necessity," not a "nice-to-have." The local FOL-based A-10 is going to have a much higher probability of being able to stay under the weather, in the marginal conditions so common in Europe, and kill the target quickly than his counterpart tooling in from an FOB several hundred miles away. Further, the very concept of the FOL implies high mobility and flexibility in temporary "basing." This could be useful m the tactical advance as well as in retrograde. If we do not have comparable concepts for all weapon systems in Europe, we need them. The years of emphasis on economies m facility planning and standby maintenance capabilities (spares, back-up equipment, mobility of maintenance operations) may have led us into habits of thinking that we need to correct.

1. Colonel Robert D. Rasmussen, USAF, "The A-10 in Central Europe: A Concept of Deployment-Employment," Air University Review, November-December 1978, pp. 26-44.

Colonel Orin C. Patton (Ph.D., University of North Carolina) is Director of Personnel Procurement, Hq Air Force Military Personnel Center (AFMPC), Randolph AFB, Texas, Colonel Patton was Commander, Detachment 90, Air Force ROTC (ATC), Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, prior to his assignment to AFMPC.

Major Kenneth W. Engle (M.A., American University) is Assistant Professor of Aerospace Studies, Colorado State University, assigned to Detachment 90, Air Force ROTC (ATC). He was Director of Operations, Iraklion AS, Crete, Greece, USAF Security Service. Major Engle is a Distinguished Graduate of Officer Training School.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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