Air University Review, March-April 1980
Captain Daniel T. Kuehl
Among the truly unique source documents on World War II is the set of diaries kept by Colonel General Franz Halder while he was Chief of the German General Staff (Oberkommando des Heerleitungs, or OKH) from 1938 until his dismissal in September 1942. Published as The Halder Diaries,* these journals present a detailed insight into the operations of, the German General Staff during the early years of World War II. They also yield a glimpse into the mind of the last true Chief of the General Staff as it was created by Scharnhorst, for those who followed Halder were either not intellectually capable of acting in this mold or were faced with a military and political situation (as was General Heinz Guderian) that was utterly hopeless.
*Arnold Lissance, editor, The Halder Diaries: The Private War Journals of Colonel General Franz Halder, 2 vols. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977, $120), 1594 pages.
At first glance, Halder would not appear to have been cut from a soldier's cloth at all; with close-cropped hair and wearing a pince-nez, he seems more in the image of a pedant. Yet the Diaries reveal a man of honor and great intellectual stature, an excellent soldier who time after time directed quantitatively inferior forces to victory through exploitation of their qualitative superiority. His military achievements stemmed not so much from genius as from hard work and a clear understanding of strategy. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein described him with Moltke's term: "Genius is diligence." Prior to World War I, he was appointed to the Bavarian General Staff and later to the German Great General Staff. Selected after World War r as one of the few officers in the small 100,000-man German army permitted by the Treaty of Versailles, Halder rose through positions of importance until he again became a member of OKH in 1938. When General Ludwig Beck resigned in 1938 in protest of Hitler's aggressive policies, Halder was appointed Chief of OKH, partly because of Hitler's belief that Halder was apolitical. Hitler was badly mistaken, however, for Halder had opposed Hitler since the early 1920s. During the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis of 1938, Halder had pushed Beck to act against Hitler, only to be told later by Beck "I now realize you were right at the time. Now all depends on you." Although Halder actively opposed Hitler, he was still the Chief of OKH, and, as such, he directed the German army to many of its greatest triumphs until, in September 1942, he was sacked by Hitler for opposing his strategy in Russia. After the failure of the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler, Halder was arrested, along with the members of his family, and spent the remainder of the war in a concentration camp. His survival can probably be attributed to the successful concealment of his activities during 1938-39.
Halder's role in the operations of the German army encompassed two broad phases: the planning and operations in Poland and France during 1939-40 and the German offensives in Russia in 1941-42. The Diaries contain little concerning the planning of the Polish campaign, since they do not begin until 14 August 1939, by which time the preparations had been completed. Following the end of the fighting in Poland, Germany had to answer certain questions concerning its remaining enemies, England and France: Could the war be won by remaining on the defensive in the West, or must Germany attack? If Germany must strike, where and when must the attack be made? In the past, OKH would have been responsible for answering questions of such far-ranging strategic importance, and Halder did try to provide Hitler with his views. But Hitler had already reached his decisions, independent of OKH guidance; he was resolved to attack at the earliest possible date, and he directed OKH to prepare the plans for attack.
The initial OKH plan was merely an updated version of the 1914 Schlieffen plan calling for a drive through Belgium into northern France, then wheeling south to pin the bulk of the French army against the Maginot Line and Swiss border. This proposal was immediately attacked by the advocates of the panzer forces, who believed the only way a decisive victory could be won was through the use of the armor's mobility. General Guderian and Field Marshal von Manstein were the champions of this view. The question was debated countless times until the plan of attacking with the armor through the woods and hills of the Ardennes, across the Meuse River, and into northeastern France was finally adopted.
The Diaries clearly reveal the strategic abilities of Halder and shortcomings of Hitler during that crucial period. While Halder calmly directed the advance into France and steadily pursued the strategic objectives, Hitler hesitated at critical moments, worried about his flanks, and finally made the disastrous decision to halt his forces just short of Dunkirk. Halder commented bitterly on Hitler's interference. Two entries on 17 May 1940 are illustrative. At noon Halder noted: "Apparently little mutual understanding. The Fuhrer insists that main threat is from the south. (I see no threat at all at present!)" Later in the day Halder noted: "Rather unpleasant day. The Führer is terribly nervous. Frightened by his own success, he is afraid to take any chance and so would pull the reins on us." The climax of this interference was the British army's escape at Dunkirk.1
The conclusion of the offensive, the drive to the Swiss border and the capitulation of France, must have been tremendously satisfying to Halder, who had endured the humiliation of 1918-19 and the Treaty of Versailles. Yet within the fruits of this overwhelming triumph were the seeds of disaster. In spite of his hesitancy and strategic bumbling, Hitler was convinced that the victory had been achieved only because of his genius and ruthless drive. He was unwilling or unable to see his mistakes and failures and above all could not profit from them. The results of this fatal hubris would arise in The Steppes of Russia.
Planning for Operation Barbarossa, the attack on Russia, began in, mid-1940, when Halder directed some members of OKH to prepare basic thoughts on how a German offensive against the U.S.S.R. could be mounted. In the initial planning, Halder and his assistants (including, ironically, Field Marshal Friedrich von Paulus, who was to surrender at Stalingrad thirty months later) envisioned a series of "limited" objectives, such as the seizure of the Ukraine and White Russia. Hitler had no less than the utter destruction of the Russian state and culture as his objectives, however, and the resultant divergence of opinion over the objectives of the attack seriously weakened it.
On 6 September 1940, Halder directed that substantive plans for the attack be prepared, and by mid-November the plans and outline maps were ready. Shortly thereafter the planners conducted a war game, a simulation that produced results indicating that the German forces would achieve a line Leningrad-Smolensk-Dnieper River by midsummer but that the central group of armies would then come under pressure from its flanking armies to halt and support them. At that time a critical decision would have to be made as to the direction the advance would continue. Prophetically, this was exactly what would happen the coming summer. In early December, Halder discussed the plan with Hitler, and they disagreed over its basic objectives. Halder stressed the importance of Moscow as a transportation, psychological, and political center and argued that its capture should be the primary strategic objective of the attack. Hitler insisted that the attack should be directed toward Leningrad and the Ukraine. This disagreement went unresolved, a situation that would have extremely unfortunate consequences the next August. Nonetheless, Halder and OKH were confident that Russia could be defeated.2
Operation Barbarossa was launched on 22 June 1941, and initial results were excellent. Although Russian resistance was dogged and in some cases fanatical, the panzer columns slashed deeply into the Russian interior. It quickly became apparent, however, that much of OKH's confidence was based on a gross underestimation of the Russian strength. By 8 July 1941, OKH estimated that the Russians had only 46 combat-worthy divisions left; by 23 July this figure had risen to 93 divisions, and by mid-August Halder was to note that: "We reckoned with 200 divisions; now we have already counted 360." In spite of the tremendous losses the Russians were suffering, their strength seemed to increase steadily, and Halder realized that the three divergent attacks along the Leningrad-Moscow-Ukraine axes were spreading the German front far too thin. It was at this point, in mid-August 1941, that the crucial decision predicted months earlier by OKH came due, and on it would hang the fate of the campaign.
By mid-August the front defending Moscow had been cracked open, and the. German armored columns were eager to begin the drive toward the capital. But the basic question that had been raised the previous winter still had not been settled: Was the objective to be Moscow or the Russian troop concentrations in the Ukraine? In spite of all the arguments Halder and the commanders in Army Group Center could muster, Hitler chose to execute the maneuver that would envelop some 500,000 Russian troops in the Kiev pocket. This operation was not completed until mid-September, and even then additional time was required for mopping-up operations and to return the panzer forces to the positions they had occupied two months earlier. On paper the Kiev envelopment seemed a great victory, if only because of the capture of great concentrations of troops and materiel, but Halder knew that a strategic mistake of the greatest magnitude had been made. Where once the way to Moscow had been open, the German forces would now have to contend with stronger Russian defenses and with Russia's greatest allies: time and weather.3
The attack toward Moscow could not begin until the end of September, but initial progress was excellent, renewing Halder's hopes that Moscow would be taken before the onset of winter. But this was not to be. The German forces ground to a halt, with both men and machines worn to the breaking point. Worse, the autumn rains turned the so-called roads into quagmires, stopping all movement. In early November, Halder met with the principal field commanders to discuss a continuation of the offensive. Slowly, and at a terrible cost in casualties, the advance was resumed. By the end of the month, Halder realized that the attempt had failed, and he favored moving into strong defensive positions for the winter. Before this could be done, however, the Russian winter counteroffensive broke like a steel blizzard onto the unprepared, ill-equipped German forces.4
While the German troops in the field were going through this desperate period, Halder was beginning his own personal purgatory. On 19 December 1941, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, the Commander in Chief of the German army, resigned his position, partly because of a heart attack and partly because he could no longer face Hitler. Hitler then announced that he would personally assume the position of Commander in Chief of the Army, in addition to his powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Halder considered resigning, but decided to stay, hoping to lessen the impact of Hitler's mistakes. The strain on Halder during this period must have been tremendous, since he well realized that Hitler's indecisive strategy spelled doom for Germany. He had to deal with both sides, Hitler and the field commanders, yet he lacked the authority to convert the field generals' proposals to action. Ignored by Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) and disliked and insulted by Hitler, Halder was unable to influence events, as was apparent to the leaders in the field, and they began to lose confidence in him.5
Halder's role in the 1942 German offensive in Russia was primarily that of a voice crying for strategic sanity, a voice that cried in vain. He wanted to stand on the defensive in the east but was overruled by Hitler, who had decided to attack toward the oil fields beyond the Caucasus. Halder had the central armies hold back while the Russians attacked in the Ukraine, then used his forces' superior mobility and tactical handling to smash the Russian flank and drive toward the Volga and the Caucasus. Halder frantically argued against the attempt to take both Stalingrad and the oil fields, but he was rebuffed by Hitler.
Finally the storm broke. On 24 September 1942.Halder again tried to warn Hitler of what the Russians would do to the long, overextended German flank once winter came, but Hitler had had enough of Halder's cautionings and dismissed him. Thus ended Halder's four years as Chief of OKH. With him, perhaps coincidentally, passed the period of German triumphs. Halder's successors would ply their trade only in retreat.6
When Halder became Chief of OKH in 1938, he told General Beck that the only reason he accepted the position was to work against Hitler's policies. At the time of the Czech crisis in 1938, Halder had already made plans for overthrowing the regime. By September 1938 many of the army's high command were ready to mutiny. The implications of the Blomberg-Fritsch affair deeply troubled the officer corps. Hitler's policy toward Czechoslovakia seemed destined to lead to war not only with the Czechs, toward whom few Germans held any animosity, but also with England and France, which the officer corps felt would be fatal for Germany. In spite of his belief that the rank and file of the army would not support a coup, Halder realized that this was probably the most opportune moment for an attempt on the government. Halder was the man who had to coordinate the actions of the military men who would actually remove Hitler and the civilians who would form a new government. On 28 September 1938, Halder set the proposed coup in motion but was forced to cancel it hurriedly when word was received of the Allied submission at Munich. Hitler's diplomatic victory over the English and French cut the ground from beneath the conspirators; his prestige was suddenly so great that it would have been suicidal to try and rally the nation against him.7
Halder's hope for peace was short-lived, and by early summer 1939 he was trying to warn the British and French of Hitler's intentions regarding Poland, urging them to take a firm stand against Hitler. Resistance elements in the Foreign Office also tried to warn the Allies. Once the war did break out, Halder was on the horns of a dilemma: Although he opposed Hitler and his policies, he was also a German soldier. Even though Germany was engaged in a war that he had tried to prevent, his moral and military duty was clear, and he worked for victory. After the fall of Poland, he was hopeful that the lack of Allied intervention on the Western Front signaled that the war could be ended.8
This hope quickly died, for on 10 October 1939 Hitler declared that Germany must attack the Allies as quickly as possible. Four days later, Halder and von Brauchitsch met to discuss how they could prevent this, thereby setting in motion the series of events that would culminate in the debacle of 5 November 1939. Yon Brauchitsch told Halder that he was opposed to overt action against Hitler; it would be a negative act that would expose the country in a moment of weakness. He was almost certainly correct, for there is little doubt that the Allies would have taken some action if the German army and Nazi party had suddenly gone after each other's throats. Together, von Brauchitsch and Halder decided to try and delay the attack as long as possible. Halder, however, was quite prepared to do away with Hitler, and he began to prepare new plans for a coup. Halder was afraid that an elaborate plan to arrest and publicly try Hitler, as some civilian members of the Resistance wanted to do, would only make the situation worse. He often said Bringt dochendlich den Hund um ("Cannot someone finally put an end to this dog!"), and he felt that Hitler's death would solve many of the Resistance's problems, such as the soldiers' oath sworn to Hitler. Halder favored some form of "accident" to kill Hitler, yet by October 1939 he starting carrying a pistol, and after the war he stated that there were a number of times over the next three years on which he almost used it against Hitler. He did not use it because he could not bring himself as "a human being and a Christian to shoot down an unarmed man."9
By mid-October 1939 the weight of the world was seemingly on Halder's shoulders. Because of von Brauchitsch's unwillingness to act, Halder bore full responsibility for making the decision if and when to act against Hitler. He also realized how dangerous a coup would be: after polling the three army group commanders, he found that Field Marshals Karl von Rundstedt and Fedor von Bock were opposed to it; Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb was only moderately in favor of such an undertaking. On 23 November 1939, he and von Brauchitsch toured the front to gather military arguments they could use to convince Hitler to postpone the attack, now scheduled for 12 November 1939. Unbeknownst to von Brauchitsch, Halder had determined that the attack must be stopped the only way possible: the coup would be executed on 5 November. Here occurred one of those events so typical of the German Resistance. On the afternoon of that day von Brauchitsch met with Hitler to suggest a postponement of the attack. Halder, knowing that even at that moment the coup was under way, impatiently awaited von Brauchitsch. Hitler, sensing von Brauchitsch's opposition to his plans, grew increasingly furious with him until he screamed that he knew very well that the generals were planning something other than what he, Hitler, had ordered. Hitler was almost certainly referring to military affairs and the planned attack, but when von Brauchitsch, who emerged white and shaking from his "talk" with Hitler, mentioned this remark to Halder, it struck him like a sledgehammer between the eyes. He naturally assumed that Hitler knew of the plot, and the ride back to Zossen was filled with visions of the Gestapo. Halder immediately called off the coup, which required some frenzied scrambling by the conspirators, and attempted to cover his tracks. By the time he realized that Hitler did not know about the coup, he was in no psychological state to try it again. At least twice, and possibly three times, Halder tried to lead a move against Hitler only to be forced to call it off in mid-stroke. Never again would he involve himself with an attempt on Hitler, and he played no role in the 20 July 1944 plot.10
It would be easy to fault Halder for a lack of nerve in 1939, for we have the gift of hindsight and know what was to follow: Halder did not. Two things probably combined to remove him from the active Resistance. The first was the debacle of 5 November 1939, whose psychological effects must have been devastating. The other was Halder's military background. He was, after all, a German soldier on the Great General Staff. After November 1939, he realized the increasingly better chances Germany had for winning a war against the French and British, and having endured the humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles, he regarded such a prospect with some favor. This was borne out by the brilliant victory gained in May 1940. His unwillingness to act personally against Hitler did not stem from cowardice, for a number of fellow inmates at Flossenburg, where he was imprisoned after the 20 July 1944 plot, ascribed to him the strongest nerves in camp.
Von Manstein credited Halder's downfall to his divided allegiance. He was an enemy of Hitler who worked for his downfall, yet he was also Chief of OKH for three years of war, during which time he worked unceasingly for German victory. Certainly he was more than just a capable soldier. He was a man of honor who tried to stop Hitler and convince his fellow soldiers to help him oppose the Fuhrer. He was loyal to his country and to his fellow officers. Indeed, he faced up well to the enormous responsibility he bore, for he was placed in what was perhaps an impossible situation.
After the war, he was interrogated extensively by the Allies, and it was during these interrogations that the Diaries were first translated into English by the Office of the Chief Counsel for War Crimes. Although a German edition of the Diaries was published in 1960, the few mimeographed copies of the English translation were one of the most important sources of information on the operations of the German army between the outbreak of World War II and Halder's dismissal in 1942. The Diaries consist primarily of notes Halder made while listening to briefings, conferences, telephone calls, and so forth, and, as such, do not form a unified narrative but rather a collection of notes and references to myriad items. Their content runs the gamut from operations and tactics to logistics and personnel matters. There is relatively little mention of political matters; since the Diaries were available for use by the OKH staff, this is not surprising, as it would have been extremely unwise to include political opinions. Halder did not attempt to conceal his growing dislike of Hitler's interference in operational matters, nor did he hide his low opinion of Hitler's ability as a strategist. An entry dated 23 July 1942 is a good example: "The situation is getting more and more intolerable. This 'leadership,' so called, is characterized by a pathological reacting to the impressions of the moment and a total lack of understanding of the command machinery and its possibilities."
The Diaries also reveal a great deal about the state of the German army during the early part of the war. Halder realized that its strength rested in superior mobility and the tactical ability of its leaders, but he also recognized that this applied only to the motorized forces. Even during the blitzkrieg in France, the infantry was hard-pressed to keep up with the panzers, and the' problems caused by this lack of mobility would be increased tenfold in the vast spaces of Russia. The importance that modern armies place on complete motorization of their infantry forces is in recognition of this problem. On the eve of the French campaign, Halder noted that the army was unable to replace even its peacetime attrition of trucks, and he worried about what would happen when they began taking losses in battle. Industrial production was another item frequently mentioned in the Diaries, since German industry in 1939 fell far short of meeting the needs of the armed forces. Halder clearly saw the danger of a long war, and he knew that the lack of industrial resources could place Germany in a perilous position.
The Diaries also illustrate the problems caused by interservice rivalry. Cooperation between the army and Luftwaffe on the lower levels was excellent, but at the highest levels cooperation among all three services was poor, due in part to the systematic fragmentation caused by the Nazi regime. The Diaries point out numerous instances of the lack of coordination and cooperation between the services. Operation Sealion, the proposed invasion of England, was at best a desperate venture, depending on intimate and continuous cooperation of the army, navy, and Luftwaffe. Yet this cooperation was never exhibited, each service establishing conditions which the other services had to meet before it proceeded with its part of the plan. In contrast to this was the cooperation exhibited by the United States and Great Britain, where the three services of both countries worked in very close coordination with their counterparts.
The Diaries provide a detailed picture of the daily operations of OKH, and they are quite possibly the best available record of the functioning of the high command of a modern military force. The editor of the 1948 English language edition stated that ''as such records go, the Halder Diary is unique in scope and continuity, and probably has few equals in importance among the individual contributions to the records of this war." The Diaries are probably too expensive for 'most personal libraries, but no institutional library that hopes to have an authoritative collection on World War II or European history can afford not to obtain them. The publication of the Halder Diaries in a form obtainable and usable by most libraries and researchers is a very significant step forward for the English language documentation of the war.
Grand Forks, North Dakota
Notes
1. An excellent discussion of this can be found in Sir Basil Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War (New York, 1970), pp. 79-83.
2. Robert Cecil, Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia, 1941 (New York, 1975), pp. 111-12, 124-25; Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945 (New York, 1953), pp.385-87.
3. Ibid., pp. 399-405; David Downing, The Devil's Virtuosos: The German Generals at War, 1940-1945, (New York, 1977), pp. 74-77.
4. Earl Ziemke, "Franz Halder at Orsha: The German General Staff Seeks a Consensus," in Military Affairs, December 1975.
5. Goerlitz, pp. 405-9.
6. Ibid., pp. 414-20; Field-Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Chicago, 1958), pp. 261-62.
7. Goerlitz, pp. 331-37; Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolis, 1968), pp. 37-38.
8. Goerlitz, pp. 350-55.
9. Deutsch, pp. 196-97.
10. Ibid., pp. 215, 228-29; Goerlitz, pp. 364-65.
Contributor
Captain Daniel T. Kuehl
(M.A., Temple University) is assigned to the 321st Strategic Missile Wing at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, as a Minuteman missile crewmember. Past assignments include Incirlik, Turkey, where he was Command Historian for the United States Logistics Group (TUSLOG), and Maxwell AFB, Alabama, where he was a staff historian at the Alberts F. Simpson Historical Research Center. Captain Kuehl is a previous contributor to the Review.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor