Air University Review, March-April 1980

Some Thoughts on
 Air Force Doctrine

HAVE you read the latest version of AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, published in February 1979? Have you ever held a discussion with other Air Force members about Air Force doctrine? Could you explain to your Soviet or NATO counterpart the purpose of doctrine or, more specifically, the essence of Air Force doctrine? If your answer to any of these questions was, at best, a hesitant "Well, maybe," I would suggest that a closer look at Air Force doctrine is in order.

A fundamental problem with Air Force doctrine is the absence of any real consensus as to what doctrine is and just what it is supposed to do. We want doctrine to reveal not only the capabilities of air forces but also to offer guidance on how best to use these capabilities. We demand that doctrine be both enduring and flexible, that it be valid over time yet responsive to change. We look to doctrine to provide guidance to Air Force personnel, while insisting that it remain open to interpretation. We want it to provide direction, yet not be too restrictive in its direction. We expect doctrine to guide research and development while at the same time it adjusts to technological innovations. And we insist that doctrine set out the fundamental principles for the employment of air forces, while demanding that it remain subordinate to national policy.

By trying to stretch a single term, "doctrine," to accommodate all things, we wind up with an amorphous concept that falls short in all areas. This criticism is not merely quibbling with semantics: The inability of Air Force people to understand the essence and purpose of doctrine is largely the result of trying to include too much under one umbrella word. This article offers a more limited and more manageable concept of doctrine. In doing so, it suggests a more restricted definition of doctrine, analyzes the derivation of doctrine, and suggests ways to make our doctrine more useful.

What Air Force
Doctrine Should Be

Air Force doctrine is the body of enduring principles, the general truths and accepted assumptions, which provide guidance and a sense of direction on the most effective way to develop, deploy, and employ air power. It should not .encompass either political influences or specific instructions on the execution of these principles.

Air Force doctrine actually includes two groups of fundamental assumptions. The first consists of the principles of war, the axioms that have proved over time to apply in one way or another to all types of warfare. They include such concepts as mass, surprise, concentration of effort, and security.

The second group of principles that comprise Air Force doctrine consists of those which, derived largely from the demonstrated and often unique capabilities and qualities of air forces, specifically refer to the best ways to develop, organize, and employ air forces as opposed to ground or naval forces. Just what these principles are is a matter of some dispute even within the Air Force. The following are examples of axioms that are generally considered to constitute fundamental assumptions about air power:

• Air superiority is essential to the successful conduct of combat operations in any sphere (land, sea, or air).
• Strategic bombing can bring about the defeat of the enemy by destroying his capability to wage war.
• Air forces can best be employed offensively.
• Air forces can best be employed according to the principles of unity of command and decentralization of control.

Of what use is doctrine? Doctrine offers a conceptual framework and way of thinking that provides general guidance to use in specific situations. It provides the foundation, the starting point, on which every aspect of the Air Force should be based, including force structure, strategy and tactics, training, and functional procedures. Even the roles and missions of the Air Force" currently established by such administrative arrangements as the Key West and Newport Agreements of 1948 and 1949 and DOD 5100.1, should be derived from doctrine rather than through bureaucratic compromise.

Doctrine also provides guidance for establishing priorities for the employment and development of air forces. For example, one of the principles of air power is that air superiority is a prerequisite for the successful conduct of other missions. The necessity to achieve air superiority dictates the need for an air superiority fighter, which in turn has ramifications on both the development and acquisition processes. Obviously, the establishment of priorities is especially important when financial resources are limited.

Similarly, doctrine acts as a sounding board, as a frame of reference for testing, evaluating, and employing not only new concepts but also new technological developments and new policies. If, for example, we accept the idea of unity of command as a fundamental principle for the organization and employment of air forces, one way to evaluate a new suggestion for the restructuring of our forces is to determine whether it increases or reduces unity of command.

In a broad sense, doctrine provides the rationale behind both the organization and employment of air forces. It explains what air forces are capable and incapable of doing and why they should be structured and used in certain ways. In doing so, it provides only general guidance. Doctrine is a compass, not a road map. It gives us the general heading, but it does not give us detailed instructions on how to get there. It provides direction but not the details of how to meet the demands of a particular situation.

Of those elements we now try to include in the omnibus term "doctrine," how many qualify for inclusion within this more restricted definition? Very few. What we currently refer to as "doctrine" contains not only the principles of air power (real doctrine) but also two other related, but nevertheless separate, elements. The first group falls under the category of "political guidance"; the second may be classified as "howto directives" or "procedures."

The first of these external elements does, in fact, affect every aspect of the Air Force and in a very definite sense guides those responsible for its activities. Political guidance arises out of national policy (the political framework within which the military services operate) and national objectives (the purposes for which our forces are deployed and, if necessary, employed).

Certainly, the military services need to understand and accept these policies and objectives. We should not, however, cloud the issue by referring to these potentially changing political positions as doctrine. Inherent in the concept of "fundamental principles" is the idea that they are fairly stable, enduring rather than transient, and capable of providing guidance for more than a short time. The idea that these truths will change with every political decision contradicts the view that doctrine establishes stable and guiding principles.

The basic truths that constitute air doctrine describe the best way in which to prepare and employ air forces. Whether or not these fundamental principles are adhered to and policies, objectives, and missions established accordingly, they still exist. At the same time, to argue that there are fundamental principles that underlie air forces is not to advocate that these principles are the sole guide for those involved in the decision-making processes. Since military forces exist--or should exist--only to serve political ends, those responsible for such forces must recognize and ultimately be guided by political considerations.

Are we, then, justified in separating doctrine from national policy? We are, for several reasons. Because the external factors, including political considerations, that influence the preparation and use of air forces are subject to change, those responsible for the Air Force should have a frame of reference or a standard to guide them. They should be aware of the best way to organize and employ air forces, since the politically acceptable way may change and conditions may at some time permit a shift closer to this best way. Moreover, the frame of reference doctrine provides can help to determine how far from the optimum method we can drift and still have a feasible course of action.

In addition, the National Command Authorities are responsible for the ultimate decisions regarding all American military forces. To make correct decisions, they need to be aware of the capabilities and limitations of these forces. By referring honestly to doctrine, Air Force leaders can say to the government, "We will try to do what you ask of us, but you should be aware that this is not the most efficient or effective way to organize and employ air power. We could be much more effective if we were allowed to operate according to these principles." It is the prerogative of the civilian leadership to overrule this advice, and there may be good reasons for doing so. This does not, however, obviate the need to proffer such counsel.

One characteristic of our current approach to Air Force doctrine is an effort to make doctrine "do something," to "give it teeth." Consequently, there is an increasing tendency among those responsible for doctrine to include in it specific directions on how to implement the fundamental principles that form the basis of air power. These how-to directives, while based in part on the principles of air power, are not themselves doctrine. They are directives for the organization, training, support, and employment of air forces. They are procedures rather than principles; that is, they tell how to do something. These elements also direct what steps must be taken by whom to implement the fundamental guiding principles.

It is difficult to determine exactly where principles end and procedures begin. In a general sense, that which refers to what air forces can do constitutes doctrine; that which directs how to carry out these principles, how to implement the general guidance, is procedural. Put another way, what we can do with air power remains relatively fixed; precisely how we are to do it changes more frequently. The principles for the employment of air forces in a limited war might include such considerations as the gaining of air superiority, effective close support for ground forces, and a unified command structure for all forces employed.. The manner in which these considerations are put into practice would fall within the realm of procedures.

Why should we not consider: these procedures a part of doctrine? Primarily because they lack the time-enduring quality, the aspect of general truth, that is the hallmark of doctrine. They are not only guided by doctrinal principles; they are also affected by more transitory political and technological considerations.

These procedural directives are essential to the effective operation and organization of the Air Force. If there were no way to translate principles into practice, doctrine would be of little value. To include these under the rubric of doctrine, however, is to confuse the issue. To understand the interrelationship of these three elements-principles, procedures, and political policy-we need to keep in mind that the fundamental principles which make up doctrine are those that tend to persist over time, while the methods of applying them may change, as may the political considerations that may override the "best way" guidance doctrine offers.

The Sources of Doctrine

What are the bases for the accepted assumptions that comprise doctrine? Doctrine evolves from three sources: theory, technology, and historical experience.

Theory, without the leavening of experience, lacks substance and foundation; experience, without theory, does not permit us to take adequate account of the change that will surely come.¹

Our Air Force and the concept of air power were born in the minds of theorists, of visionaries who believed that past experience was not applicable to warfare waged in the new dimension of the air. These men looked beyond the here and now and refused to allow their vision to be limited by the constraints of their day. When Douhet, Mitchell, Trenchard, and their associates began to preach their theories of air power and to develop a supporting doctrine, they did so not on the basis of what air power had done in World War I but on their interpretation of what air power could do if properly developed and employed.

Obviously, air forces today owe a great deal to these men. They provided a rationale for the existence of air forces and gave a sense of direction to the more pragmatic processes of organizing, controlling, and employing air forces. They encouraged military aviators to look into the future and set their sights beyond the confines of the moment. We still need individuals with this frame of mind, this sense of tomorrow. Without continued efforts to envision the future, military forces would be forever trapped in the past and the present, ready to fight the last war but totally unprepared for the next one.

Yet there are serious problems with basing doctrine too completely on theory. The guidance that doctrine should provide must enable us to fight the war of today as well as point us in the proper directi6n to prepare for the war of tomorrow. Doctrine consists of general principles; but if these principles are to be of value, they must be capable of being put into effect. A doctrine founded primarily on vision runs the risk of being irrelevant, even dangerous, if technology has not caught up with it by the time that next war breaks out.

Had America's national leaders been contemplating war in the 1920s and 1930s, a significant part of the doctrine Mitchell and others in and out of the Army Air Corps espoused would have been worse than useless as a guide to action because the state of the art rendered impossible many of their claims' for air power. While far-reaching conceptual thinking is a necessary element of the doctrinal process, theory is, after all, hypothetical. Doctrine must be grounded in something more substantial than vision alone.

To determine the exact relationship between technology and doctrine is a little like trying to answer the riddle: which came first, the chicken or the egg? One of the criticisms leveled against the air power theorists of the 1920s and 1930s is the charge that much of their doctrine was too far ahead of technology. On the other hand, to carry this criticism to its logical conclusions--that technology alone determines doctrine and that doctrine will change with each technological development-negates the idea of elementary truths which remain valid over time.

In one sense, doctrine must lead technology. Those responsible for research and development should use these fundamental principles as guidelines for the development of new weapon systems for better--and, if necessary, different--ways to put these principles into effect. The recognition of the need to attain air superiority to conduct either air or ground operations in the combat zones was certainly one of the driving factors behind the development of the F-15. Such a situation reflects one side of the relationship of doctrine and technology; most research and development results from requirements generated by doctrine.

Nevertheless, not all technological developments are the result of specific requirements levied by doctrinal demands. Technological developments do occur independently of specific military guidance. (The development of nuclear bombs, for example, stemmed initially from experiments and pressures by "pure scientists," not military sources.) In this case, an understanding of the principles of air power can provide a broad perspective for evaluating the possible utility and potential effectiveness of new or improved systems.

Finally, there may be times when a technological breakthrough forces a change in doctrine or even the establishment of new doctrine. The invention and subsequent development of aeronautical devices are a case in point. By extending warfare into a third dimension, the airplane forced military theorists (and doers) to derive from experience, the principles of war, and the characteristics of this new technology, a doctrine that would guide the effective employment of the new weapon.

Achieving the proper balance between doctrine and technology is not easy, and there are pitfalls on both sides of the center line. Adherence to a given doctrine may have a positive effect on technological progress. The doctrine of strategic bombing, for instance, which dominated the Army Air Corps in the interwar period, helped push the research and development of the B-17 and B-29. Conversely, the commitment of the Luftwaffe to blitzkrieg warfare worked to prevent the development of strategic bombers, the absence of which proved crucial in the Battle of Britain and in the invasion of the Soviet Union.

Here, as with so many aspects of doctrine, there are no pat answers. If a service uses a static doctrine as the sole basis for the evaluation or development of new systems, "new" might well come to mean no more than "improved" rather than "different." Conceptual thought and research and development will then have difficulty breaking out of established patterns.²

The French reliance on a defensive doctrine after, World War I prevented senior army officers from understanding the advantages of employing tanks in mass rather than parceling them out among infantry units. Conversely, the German Army, not hampered by a commitment to the defensive and forced to search for alternatives to sheer mass, was more receptive to new ideas. The results of doctrinal closed-mindedness versus conceptual receptiveness were conclusively demonstrated in the summer of 1940.

On the other hand, to assume doctrinal changes with each new weapon development is to run the risk of too hastily discarding doctrine or ignoring parts of it each time a new system appears. The result would be a lack of stability and guidance. In the employment of air forces, it would seem that technological developments will impact more on procedures than on doctrine, more on the method of implementation than on the principles themselves. For example, the unsuccessful Schweinfurt raids of 1943 did not in themselves demonstrate the ability or inability of strategic bombing to destroy the enemy's warmaking capabilities. They did, however, disprove the idea that unescorted bombers could always get through with acceptable losses. The result was a change in procedure that involved the P-51 as a long-range escort. Doctrine (the idea of strategic bombing to defeat the enemy) remained unchanged, but procedures (the method of execution of strategic bombing attacks) adjusted to the current state of the art.

In trying to assess the relationship of technology and doctrine, we should begin by determining where new developments might fit into accepted doctrine; then, if necessary, we should adjust doctrine accordingly. At the same time, in allowing doctrine to guide not only the employment of existing systems but also the development of new ones, we must guard against becoming so rigid that we allow either doctrine or the manner in which we implement it to ossify into dogma.

What of the argument that doctrine should be drawn from past experience? Of what value is the past in determining doctrine for modern war?

To be valid, the fundamental assumptions that comprise doctrine must be grounded in experience. Without an awareness of what air power has done--and has not been able to do-doctrine would have to be derived solely from hypotheses, from educated guesses about the capabilities of air forces. Past experience provides the substance for doctrine. It supplies the "proof' on which to base fundamental assumptions as well as educated guesses. Experience makes doctrine practical rather than merely theoretical.

Certainly, too slavish a devotion to the past can lead to antiquated doctrine. In the years after the Franco- Prussian War, the French military theorists, seeking a way to reverse that ignominious defeat, looked all the way back to the Roman Republic and Empire. Interpreting victory in this earlier period as the result of courage and élan coupled with a reliance on offensive action, French theorists derived the doctrine of the offensive à outrance, a fanatical commitment to an offensive relying on mass and superior morale. Wedded to this doctrine and thus paying insufficient attention to the technological developments in the century following Waterloo, the French Army marched off to war in 1914 with fixed bayonets, legions of cavalry, and relatively few machine guns. The result was near-defeat in the opening weeks of the war and the decimation of the French male population over the next four years.

Such an example, however, is not an argument for ignoring the past. Rather, it suggests the need to approach the past with a sense of objectivity and a clear awareness of the changed conditions of the present. To derive the proper principles on which to base the development and employment of air forces, the evaluation of past experience must be detailed, objective, and committed to an understanding of what really happened and why. Doctrine must be based on a critical analysis of what air power did and did not do in specific situations rather than on institutional shibboleths, widely accepted but not really proved.

What to Do with Doctrine

To be of value, doctrine must meet three criteria: it must be understood; it must be valid; and it must be translated into action. How can we make doctrine meet these criteria?

It is virtually impossible to assign priorities to these three requirements for useful doctrine; each is critical. Nevertheless, the first step toward understanding doctrine is to determine just what it is and what it does. As I have suggested, our current use of the term "doctrine" is too inclusive. Rather than providing guidance and rationale, this conglomeration of concepts, principles, practices, and policies confuses, then exasperates, and finally drives Air Force people to ignore doctrine. I have suggested that we reserve the term "doctrine" for the fundamental principles that underlie the development and use of air forces. Even accepting this approach, however, does not solve the problem; we must still agree on just what these fundamental principles are.

Having once determined the fundamental principles which constitute doctrine, we need to get the word out to the Air Force. This does not mean merely putting out a pamphlet or manual and suggesting that everyone read it. Reading is not understanding. Doctrine, as well as the procedures that are derived from it, needs to be studied, analyzed, and debated.

The Air Force must put more emphasis on doctrine. It should be, after all, the foundation for everything the Air Force does; and every member should be aware of the basis of .the profession to which he or she belongs. An introduction to doctrine should begin on entry into the Air Force, and careful study of Air Force doctrine should be a significant portion of every professional military education (PME) curriculum. This instruction should delve into such questions as: Where did these principles come from? How have they been proved in the past? What makes them still applicable in the present and in the future? How are they to be put into action? How might they be affected by technological, political, and economic conditions? How do joint and combined operations affect the implementation of these principles?

We should give greater attention to stimulating debate on doctrine. The limited number of articles on this subject in Air Force journals, especially from officers in the field, is indicative of the level of current interest in doctrine. One way to stimulate this interest would be to inform people as to how doctrine is formulated and implemented and then to tap resources outside the Air Staff for assistance. Another would be to encourage informal (and voluntary) professional study groups throughout the Air Force, perhaps with recent PME graduates forming the core of such informal meetings. We might even consider an "Air Force Now" on doctrine.

Doctrine must be valid, sound, and well-grounded. It must, in short, be true. One important way to assure that the principles which comprise our doctrine are correct is \ to base them on an objective analysis of a broad range of historical experience. Only by such an evaluation can we identify elements or conditions unique to specific wars and thus separate enduring principles from temporary procedures.

To improve the firmness of our historical base, we need to establish a stronger link between those responsible for the development and implementation of doctrine and those agencies within the Air Force involved in historical research. This would provide a clearer, more specific, more pragmatic focus for the Air Force historical community and would result in valuable assessments for those responsible for doctrine. In addition to having better access to work already available, those who develop and implement doctrine could provide guidance to historians on topics the analysis of which would aid doctrinal development.

In using history as a basis for validating and implementing our doctrine, we must be wary of the pitfalls of a too facile acceptance of parallels and lessons from the past. History rarely, if ever, provides clear-cut lessons that can be lifted out of whole cloth from one era and applied to another. Rather, it offers a feel for the types of approaches that have or have not worked in similar situations. Those who would seek to use history must approach the task with the understanding that what the past provides are guidelines, general trends, and suggestions on how to approach the present and future.

History "ought to tell how changes happen, what are the likely developments today and tomorrow, what 'patterns' are likely to be repeated. ..or can be made to repeat themselves with changed colors or in some new shape. "³ Such an approach entails not a blind adherence to the past but an intelligent and judicious analysis of the guidelines offered by past events, coupled with an imaginative evaluation which tries to extrapolate these suggestions to the particular conditions of the present and foreseeable future. If nothing else, history can show us what questions to ask--of theory, technological developments, trends, and new possibilities.⁴

Both doctrine and the implementation of doctrine are dependent on history. The broad perspective that history can provide enables the astute observer to differentiate more clearly between the fundamental principles and the more transitory methods for putting them into effect. The analytical approach to history leads to a more complete and accurate understanding of both principles and procedures, while the application of imagination--the ability to take suggestions from the past and apply them to the present and future--lies at the heart of the successful implementation of these principles.

Validity, however, stems from more than past experience alone. Since doctrine must be a synthesis of experience, technological developments, and hypotheses, we can maintain its applicability only by a constant reassessment of each of these factors. Only thus can we ensure that our doctrine--and the procedures by which we implement it--does not degenerate into antiquated dogma.

A doctrine that is not used is worthless. If we wish the principles comprising doctrine to be of more than academic interest, we must translate into action. We must convert the general guidance that doctrine provides into specific directives.

To accomplish this demands a great deal from those charged with the task. They must possess a firm grasp of the principles of air power, an awareness of man's historical experience with military--especially air--forces, an understanding of current and projected technological developments and trends, a knowledge of national policy, and, finally, the ability to synthesize all of these elements into something that works. In addition, the Air Force must provide centralized direction for this implementation process to assure that these procedures, in fact, stem from our doctrinal principles and that they agree with each other where applicable. In implementing our doctrine, we must avoid the temptation to focus our attention too closely on the type of war we anticipate and are most capable of fighting and to ignore those types in which we do not expect to become involved. The desire not to engage in another Vietnam, for example, is not sufficient insurance that we will not do so. To ignore that experience and neglect to reanalyze doctrine and the implementation of doctrine accordingly would be tragic and very dangerous. Our doctrine and the procedures for implementing it must prepare us for a full spectrum of conflict.

Moreover, the procedures developed to implement doctrine must take into account the joint or combined nature of most military operations in which the Air Force might be involved. We must avoid the tendency to establish procedures for the development and employment of our air forces as if they will exist and operate in a vacuum. Air Force procedures must be specific and emphatic on the joint nature of military operations and on the relationship of air forces to other elements of the American military establishment and to the military forces of our allies.

Finally, we must rid ourselves of the notion that air power can do anything and everything. Accepting the premise that "the inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset"⁵ must not blind us to the realization that air power does have limits. One of the problems with the American military has been the tendency of services to adopt or accept missions and roles to justify their existence or increase their portion of the defense budget rather than because a particular service is inherently best suited to perform that mission. To the extent that any of the services engage in such politicking, we do ourselves, the National Command Authorities, and the American people a disservice.

ACCORDING to the "Doctrine Development Initiative" written by what was then the Doctrine Development Branch of Headquarters USAF (AF/XOCDD), the general problem with Air Force doctrine is that "there are simply no 'handles' on doctrine."⁶ One way to provide such handles is to identify more precisely both the content and purpose of doctrine. Only if the development and employment of our forces are grounded firmly in a doctrine understood and used by professional airmen can the Air Force properly help to provide the best possible, defense for the United States.

1. "Perspectives on Basic Air Force Doctrine" (undated paper in AF/XOCDD file entitled "AFM 1-1 Briefing Material"). p. 3. 2. In a paper presented at the USAF Academy's Eighth Military History Symposium. Robert Perry suggests that too often a psychological commitment to "improvements" rather than "new departures" has hampered Air Force Research and Development efforts. Robert Perry, "Technology, Doctrine, and Military Requirements,." in Air Power and Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 386-400.

3. Thomas H. Wintringham and John Blashford-Snell, Weapons and Tactics (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 17.

4. In a recent Harmon Lecture, Philip A. Crowl offered a lucid argument on the value of history as a guide to asking the right questions. "The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions without Answers," Twentieth Harmon Memorial Lecture (USAF Academy, Colorado, 1978).

5. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power,1943.

6. "Concept for Reasoned Change in Air Force Doctrine," AF/XOCDD (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF, 4 July 1977), p. 2.

Major Robert C. Ehrhart (Ph.D., University of Texas, Austin) is Associate, Professor of History at the USAF Academy, where he has taught courses in general military history and the history of military thought. He is currently attending Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia. He has been a weapons controller in TAC, Vietnam, and in EC-121s. Major Ehrhart is editor and coauthor of Modern Warfare and Society (USAFA, 1979) and coeditor of Air Power and Warfare: Proceedings of the Eighth Military History Symposium. He has previously contributed reviews to this journal.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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