Air University Review , July-August 1980

The Case for the MX

Editor’s Note

The preferred MX deployment mode changed from racetrack to linear during article processing. Since details of the linear deployment option had not been released by presstime, our lead-in art depicts the original racetrack deployment.

DEVELOPMENT of the MX mobile missile began approximately a decade ago when the Strategic Air Command documented the need for an advanced intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The primary impetus for developing this new system was to provide a hedge against Soviet development of a countersilo potential. Secondary but important considerations included increasing the hard-target kill potential and overall firepower and' accuracy of our own land-based missile force to balance predicted Soviet gains in those areas. The original timetable called for beginning production of the missile in FY 1978 and initial deployment in FY 1984. Had this timetable been followed, the MX would have been deployed 15 years after Minuteman II and 10 years after Minuteman III.

At the time the Soviets were not expected to develop a countersilo potential until the late 1970s or early 1980s. However, strides by the Soviets in that area more rapid than anticipated led former President Gerald R. Ford to move up both the production and deployment schedules by a year. Had the Ford program been implemented, more than 100 MX missiles would have been in place by the mid-seventies and approximately 300 by the end of the decade at a total cost of $35 billion. This schedule would have solved the short-term vulnerability problems of our ICBM force and arrested the rapid deterioration of the strategic balance that has occurred over the past decade.

Shortly after coming into office, President Carter decided to reserve judgment on whether to procure such a weapon system pending the Soviet reaction to his proposal to ban mobile missiles. In addition, he reduced the funding level for the development of the MX by 85 percent, thus effectively slowing the program down by at least three years. However, two and one-half years later, in June 1979, the President announced that he would now support building the system. Three months later, on 7 September 1979, Mr. Carter revealed that he had approved a plan for building 200 MX missiles on public land in Nevada and Utah in a horizontal racetrack basing mode, that is, in horizontal shelters surrounding separate circular runways, at a cost of $33 billion in FY 1980 dollars. The following spring, on 6 May 1980, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown ruled out the racetrack basing mode in favor of a linear alternative with a plow out launch mode; that is, the missile will be deployed in a series of straight roads in a grid pattern and will be moved out of its protective shelter prior to being raised into a launch position and fired. This alternative will reduce the miles of road that have to be built by 20 percent and reduce the cost by $2 billion. Assuming no further delays caused by funding reductions, unforeseen technological problems, or environmental difficulties, the first MX will become operational sometime in FY 1986. Within the next two years, approximately 100 of these missiles will come on-line, and the entire 200-missile force should be operational by the end of the decade.

In order to evaluate the President's decision on the MX, there are at least five interrelated questions that must be addressed:

• Do we need a new mobile ICBM?
• Is the MX the most cost-effective option for a mobile ICBM? . Is the linear grid concept the most feasible basing mode for the mobile ICBM?
• Can we afford MX?
• Is MX viable without SALT II limits on Soviet missile development?
• To each of these questions, the answer appears to be in the affirmative.

If we do not make our ICBM force mobile, it will not be able to withstand a preemptive first strike by the ICBM force of the Soviet Union. Presently, 15 percent of our fixed silo Minuteman force may be able to survive a Soviet attack that targets each silo with two warheads. (See Table I.) Within the next few years, the number of surviving silos could drop to about 5 percent. Not even the current Air Force program of hardening our Minuteman silos to withstand pressures up to 2000 psi can alter this situation. Moreover, the Soviets can inflict this vast damage upon our ICBM force by firing only one-third of their own supply of ICBM warheads. Therefore, unless one is willing to adopt the destabilizing launch on warning or launch under attack strategy, the ICBM force must be made mobile if it is to survive a preemptive Soviet strike. Mobility will make it impossible for the Soviets to destroy the entire ICBM force even if they use all their warheads with hardtarget kill capabilities.

If we allow our ICBM force to remain this vulnerable, we in effect give up the most accurate, reliable, ready, and powerful portion of our strategic triad. Such a course of action would have three undesirable effects. First, by eliminating diversity in our strategic deterrent, it would weaken the bomber and submarine portions of the triad. Second, it would undermine the doctrinal concepts underpinning our strategic forces, that is, the countervailing strategy and essential equivalence. Lack of a survivable ICBM force would no doubt be perceived by our adversaries and allies as an indication that the strategic forces of the United States were not in fact essentially equivalent to those of the Soviet Union. Similarly, lack of a secure, effective ICBM force would make it almost impossible for this nation to respond adequately to different levels of nuclear attacks and control escalation, that is, implement the countervailing strategy. Without essential equivalence and the forces to implement the countervailing strategy, the whole idea of deterrence would be in jeopardy. Third, we set the dangerous precedent of allowing the enemy to dictate our force posture and strategy. We now know that as far back as 1962, the Soviets embarked on a policy of building up their forces to be able to launch a preemptive attack against U. S. intercontinental ballistic missiles.¹ Abandoning the ICBM in effect rewards the Soviets for this policy.

Many of those who agree with the idea of maintaining the ICBM portion of the triad argue that there are alternatives which are more cost-effective than the MX, specifically the modified Minuteman III or Trident II or the Submersible Underwater Missile (SUM) system. The evidence does not appear to support such contentions.

Taking the existing 550 Minuteman III missiles from their fixed silos and making them mobile would be only 10 percent cheaper than MX if one wished to ensure that 1000 warheads survived a Soviet preemptive strike.² This is considered the minimum number of warheads necessary to ensure that we have the capability to destroy most industrial targets in the Soviet Union or attack a large portion of Soviet military targets. But if we wish to have the capability in our ICBM force not only to attack most industrial targets but also to destroy some military targets (for example, 1500 surviving warheads), Minuteman III is three times more costly than MX. Finally, if we desire to increase the number of survivable warheads to 2000, it simply cannot be done with Minuteman at any price.

The modified Minuteman III approach has three other disadvantages. First, its warheads are not as powerful or accurate as those of MX. Second, the 10 percent cost saving for Minuteman III is predicated on basing these missiles in the north central portion of the United States near the areas where the fixed silos are presently located. However, land in this area is predominantly privately owned agricultural land, and the section is more heavily populated than Nevada and Utah. In addition, the severe weather in this area would hinder construction and operations. If any or all of these reasons prevented Minuteman III from being placed in that area, the 10 percent cost saving would disappear. Third, using existing missiles would deny this nation the opportunity to incorporate several technological improvements into a new missile, for example, improved retargeting capabilities.

The cost of placing the Trident II, or the common missile, in a mobile land-based mode is almost 10 percent less expensive than MX if one wishes to ensure 1000 surviving warheads. The savings accrue from joint development of a single new missile for both the ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force. However, if one desires to increase the number of surviving warheads to 1500, the costs of Trident II and MX are approximately the same; and if the desired number is deemed to be 2000, MX is slightly cheaper than Trident II. Moreover, if anything, the cost projections for a common missile are less reliable than for a single-purpose one. Unforeseen complications and coordination problems arising from the development of a missile designed for comparability with two entirely different basing modes are far more likely than for a missile designed specifically for one basing system. (The cost growth on the last major joint program, the TFX or F-111, was 525 percent!) Furthermore, use of a common missile for both the ICBM and SLBM force would increase the risk that unanticipated reliability or aging problems could jeopardize, two legs of the triad simultaneously. Finally, the common missile would have less than half the throw-weight of the MX.

Proponents of the Submersible or Shallow Underwater Missile system argue that this system could be deployed more quickly and more cheaply than MX and would be just as effective.³ According to advocates of SUM, 550 Minuteman III missiles could be placed on 138 small diesel submarines that would be deployed in U. S. coastal waters at a cost of $12 billion, 63 percent less expensive than MX. Initial deployment could be achieved two years before MX while the entire force would be operational by 1986, four years ahead of MX.

At first glance this option appears quite attractive. Not only does SUM appear to save time and money but it avoids the environmental problems that will no doubt plague the MX program. However, close analysis indicates that SUM is not a more cost-effective option than MX.

While the initial costs for constructing SUM are somewhat less than those of MX, total system costs are about the same for the two systems.⁴ The SUM would require the procurement of new antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces for protection and the construction of several new submarine bases for homeporting. (The 139 new submarines will more than double the size of the current U.S. submarine force.) In addition, the annual operating and support costs of SUM are much larger than those for MX. Over a 15-year period, the total costs of SUM would be about four times higher than those for MX. Similarly, SUM could not be as powerful, accurate, or as responsive as MX. As noted, the MX missile is three times more powerful and technologically more advanced than Minuteman III. Thus, it can carry more or larger warheads and can be retargeted more easily. Since SUM is an SLBM, it probably will not have the same accuracy as an ICBM on land, nor can its alert rate be as high. For example, MX will have an alert rate of 90 percent while the alert rate for SUM will probably be closer to the 50 percent rate of our Poseidon submarines. Furthermore, SUM is not technologically as feasible as MX. Expecting a 450-ton submarine to hold 3 Minuteman III missiles weighing 100 tons is a somewhat risky endeavor.

Finally, and perhaps more important, SUM could be rendered totally useless relatively easily. Simply by exploding a single nuclear warhead in the ocean, the Soviets could generate a 50- to 100-foot tidal wave. This same kind of wave would race under the sea, building such tremendous destructive force that it would turn over the small submarines and destroy them.⁵

Many of those who accept the idea that we need to preserve the land-based portion of the triad and that MX is the most cost-effective way to do that express grave concern about the linear concept. Construction of the 200 sites, each with 23 blast-proof shelters and a road network, will require approximately 600,000 tons of cement, 32 to 48 million tons of sand, 210 million gallons of liquid asphalt, 125 million gallons of petroleum fuel, and 17.9 billion gallons of water.⁶ Moreover, although MX will remove only 25 square miles of government land from public use once the project is completed, the MX system itself will be built on about 5000 square miles of land and will require some 8000 miles of roadway. Finally, the MX in the linear mode will cost approximately $32 billion in FY 1980 dollars. Based on the projected rate of inflation during the eighties, the actual cost will most probably be at least $50 billion.

Critics from all points of the political spectrum have belittled the scheme with such words as crazy, insane, goofy, and Rube Goldberg.⁷ There is no doubt that the MX could be built more cheaply and with less environmental disruption. For example, placing the MX in the vertical Multiple Protective Structure (MPS) mode would be 25 percent cheaper and use much less land and consume much smaller amounts of our perishable and scarce resources. However, MX in that mode would present severe verification problems for the Soviets and could undermine whatever faint hopes that might still remain for meaningful arms limitations between us and the Russians. Two-thirds of the cost of MX goes for basing, primarily to ensure verifiability. (See Table II.) Similarly, the air mobile mode, while costing about the same as the racetrack and somewhat more than the linear mode, would have far less impact on the environment. However, placing MX on airplanes would degrade its accuracy, reliability, and explosive power significantly and would increase the risk of a disastrous nuclear accident.

Thus, building an MX in the linear mode is the most cost-effective and safest way to enhance the survivability and increase the destructive power of our ICBM force as well as minimize the risks to potential arms control agreements and lessen the chances of a nuclear accident. Accomplishing all these seemingly contradictory but important objectives will not be cost free; achieving important goals never is. The environmental costs, if handled orderly and thoughtfully, do not have to be catastrophic. Moreover, these environmental costs must be balanced against the potential gains for our national security.

On the surface the MX appears to be the most expensive and technologically risky project ever undertaken by the Department of Defense (DOD). MX will probably cost at least $50 billion before it is completed and will involve a complicated collection of machinery to make the rocket simultaneously concealable, movable, survivable, and detectable. However, when adjusted for inflation, the MX will cost no more than the Polaris program, which was started in 1955 and completed a decade later at a cost of $13.5 billion for 41 fleet ballistic missiles and 656 launchers. However, measured in FY 1980 dollars, that program would have cost $38.5 billion, 16 percent more than the price of MX in FY 1980 dollars. Moreover, when we began to pour large sums of money into the Polaris program, the system did not possess a workable fire control system or even an accurate navigational system. The program was so risky that it was opposed by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert Carney, on technological grounds and by the Rand Corporation on cost-effective grounds.⁸ Yet, today, Polaris is widely cited as the most successful weapon program in the history of DOD. There is no reason why MX cannot be just as successful.

Even at a cost of $50 billion, MX will not pose a severe burden on the defense budget or the economy. At the present time, strategic expenditures account for less than 8 percent of the overall DOD budget. Twenty years ago they constituted 27 percent of the budget; a decade ago, 10 percent. Between 1961 and 1970, measured in FY 1981 dollars, DOD spent an average of $23 billion per year on strategic programs. Over the last decade, the Pentagon has spent about half that amount, about $11.8 billion. Even with MX, expenditures on our strategic forces will consume less than 10 percent of the defense budget between now and FY 1985.

Doubtless a large program like MX will have some impact on our economy. However, the impact will not be severe. If MX were considered as a total add-on to the defense budget over the next decade, that is, it does not take the place of any other program, it will add less than one-tenth of 1 percent to our projected inflation rate over this period and will increase defense-related employment by only 6 percent.

The real question should be, can we afford not to build MX? For two reasons the answer appears to be no. First, MX will help restore the strategic balance with the Soviets. When fully deployed in 1990, it will increase the number of warheads in our arsenal by 20 percent, our throw-weight by 30 percent, our equivalent megatonnage (EMT) by 40 percent, and our hard-target kill potential by 300 percent. At the present time, an adverse strategic balance exists; that is, the U.S. is far behind the Soviets in every static measure of the balance except warheads, where we enjoy a 35 percent advantage. The Soviets have an advantage of 18 percent in the number of delivery vehicles, 38 percent in throw-weight, 40 percent in EMT, and 60 percent in hardtarget kill potential. Over the next five years, we will fall farther behind the Soviets in throw-weight, EMT, and hard-target kill potential and allow them to draw even in the number of warheads. By the end of the decade, even with MX the situation will not improve appreciably. Without MX the static balance would be catastrophic.

MX will also add significantly to the more dynamic indicators of the balance, for example, the percentage of forces available to achieve our strategic objectives in both a preattack and postattack mode. Currently, the Soviets have an edge whether we are considering a preattack or postattack situation. As indicated in Table III, after a Soviet counterforce first strike or after a U.S. counterforce retaliation, the dynamic indicators will become less favorable between now and 1985. However, primarily because of MX, the United States could be slightly ahead in the early 1990s in both postattack situations.

Second, MX needs to be developed because of recent decisions that have been made concerning the other two legs of the triad. In the past three years, the Carter administration has canceled the B-1 bomber and slowed down the construction rate of the Trident submarine by one-third. Consequently, in the early part of the nineties, we may well be faced with a situation in which age or technological obsolescence forces us to retire the B-52 bombers and Poseidon submarines before adequate replacements are available. If we do not move ahead with the MX now, our ICBM force will be in a similar position.

Is MX viable without SALT II limits
on Soviet missile development?

There is no doubt that the Soviets have the potential to overwhelm the MX if they go beyond SALT II limits for MIRVing and fractionating their ICBM force. Theoretically, with a vast and unprecedented effort, they can increase the number of warheads on their ICBM force to 23,000 by the end of the decade.

If the Soviets should expand their ICBM force to 23,000 as indicated in Table IV, we could counter that development by increasing the number of silos by 388 percent and the number of missiles by 160 percent. This would mean spending an additional $40 billion or 80 percent on the program. However, such an effort on the part of the Soviets is quite unlikely, primarily because of the expense. Expanding to 23,000 warheads would cost them $93 billion. If the Russians choose to go beyond the SALT II limits, it is much more likely that they will have somewhere between 8000 and 10,000 warheads on their ICBMs. Expanding their force to this level could be countered by doubling the number of silos and missiles for an additional expenditure of $10 billion or 20 percent. However, if the Soviets should undertake such a vast expansion, it would signal the end of any hopes for meaningful arms control. Thus, the United States could go back to the initial Multiple Protective Structure mode, which was discarded because of potential verification problems. A complete MPS system with 520 missiles and 21,000 silos could be built for less than the 200-missile, 4300-silo horizontal system. Or the U.S. could abrogate the ABM Treaty and build an ABM system to defend MX. (By 1990, ABM technology may be advanced enough to incorporate lasers and particle beams.) For a cost of $83 billion, the U.S. could convert a 23,000-warhead Soviet response with a complete ABM system defending a force of 400 missiles in 9200 silos.⁹

However, for two reasons it is most unlikely that the Soviets would initiate a warhead vs. shelter race. First, they know that such a massive investment in high technology products could be offset by investment of a much smaller fraction of our gross national product (GNP) in concrete and earth moving. Second, they would be committing their new missiles and warheads to basing in fixed silos, where they would be highly vulnerable.

WE can and must move forward with the MX as rapidly as possible. We have already delayed too long. Further procrastination can only make the situation worse.

The tables accompanying this article are derived in whole or in part from information adapted by the author from the FY 1981 Department of Defense Annual Report, pp. 87, 123-30.

1. Cost figures on MX and its alternatives are derived from two Congressional Budget Office Studies: The MX Missile and Multiple Protective Structure Basing, June 1979, and SALT II and the Costs of Modernizing US. Strategic Forces, September 1979.

2. Richard Burt, "Brown Says Soviets Long Sought Way to Knock Out U.S. Missiles," New York Times, May 31, 1979, p. 4.

3. See, for example, Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R-Oregon), "SUM Strategy," Armed Forces Journal, January 1980, p. 35, and "SUM: It Adds Up," Armed Forces Journal, February 1980, p. 66.

4. Cost figures are based on Senator E.J. Garn (R-Utah), "SUM: It Doesn't Add Up," Armed Forces Journal, January 1980, p. 36. Hatfield challenges Gam's article by contending that the Utah senator has underestimated MX costs.

5. Testimony of Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering William Perry to the House Appropriations Committee on 25 March 1980. Cited in George Wilson, "Pentagon Gives a Picture of Tidal Assault on SUM," Washington Post, March 26, 1980, p. 3.

6. Hatfield, "SUM Strategy," p. 36.

7. For example, see James J. Kilpatrick, "Nuclear Sanity and Goofy," Washington Star, November 20. 1979, p. 11.

8. See Harvey Sapolsky, The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972).

9. John Fialka, "Air Force Has New Idea for Hiding Missiles," Washington Star, February 6, 1980, p. 1.

Lawrence J. Korb (Ph.D., State University of New York at Albany) is Director of Defense Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington. Until this summer he was professor of management at the Naval War College. He has been a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and a naval flight officer. He has also served as consultant to the Office of Education, National Security Council, and President’s Carter’s Commission on Government Reorganization. Dr. Korb is the author of books and monographs and has published articles in Perspective, Foreign Policy, History, Naval War College Review, World Affairs, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, and American Political Science Review.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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