Air University Review, January-February 1980
Wing Commander Jeremy G. Saye, RAF
For three decades, the NATO alliance has provided the framework for commitment of national forces to the security of Western Europe. During the same period a generation of Europeans, ignorant of war, has enjoyed economic growth and prosperity, lulled by the insidious appeal of a welfare-oriented society. Years of peaceful coexistence have mesmerized Americans and Europeans alike into believing that the Soviet military build-up, which has no parallel in peacetime since that of the Nazis in the 1930s, can be ignored in an era of détente. Thus it has not been recognized that the Soviets are buying time to reach a favorable correlation of forces, both nuclear and conventional, by concentrating simultaneously on quantitative and qualitative improvements.l These improvements have given the Soviets a military capability that is substantially in excess of any legitimate needs for self-defense. The purpose of this capability is quite clear: it is to force Europe either to become a hostage to Soviet intentions or to engage in outright war. This aim is entirely compatible with the view that "both in political and military terms, the Soviets regard Europe as a single geographic entity over which they feel a historical mission to exercise hegemony, if not suzerainty."2
From a NATO standpoint, there is, of course, no question of Soviet aspirations’ being realized without resorting to military force. When this occurs, we must be confident that we have assessed correctly the capabilities and intentions of the Warsaw Pact forces in the European arena. This article attempts to make that assessment and suggest how NATO's tactical air forces (Tacair) should be employed in support of the air-land battle. We are not concerned here with the wider aspects of tactical air operations but only with those elements that directly relate to Tacair's primary job--to help blunt and stop the armored thrust.3 In this context close air support (CAS) may have to play a vital role, but we cannot discuss the nature of that role without first examining how and where modern warfare is likely to be fought. A look at Soviet doctrine may help us grasp the implications of the continuing increase in Warsaw Pact warfighting capability, both nuclear and conventional. The pace, quality, and scope of these improvements are derived from fifteen years of steady annual increments in military expenditure--a trend that shows no sign of abating. Even so, it is possible to identify a number of suspect areas in the Pact's war machine. While we may be able to exploit some of these areas, they make it more difficult to divine Soviet intentions--an essential requirement if we are to understand fully the nature of the modern air-land battle.
Against this background, the requirements, characteristics, and capabilities of Tacair in the CAS role are closely examined. The most important criteria are seen to be responsiveness; effectiveness, and survivability. Related to all of these is the forward operating base (FOB) concept as exemplified by the Harrier and to a lesser extent the A-10. In the process of this examination, some cherished beliefs are challenged, and the expectations that both airmen and soldiers have of CAS forces may turn to bitter disillusionment if we do not configure, task, and train in a realistic wartime environment. These difficulties may be compounded by some fundamental differences in American and European perceptions of the concept of Tacair operations. In the context of a common NATO doctrine , we examine whether it is practicable or even desirable to reconcile these differences.
Any definition of modern warfare is driven by the actual, or perceived, combat capability of the Soviets. From a doctrinal viewpoint , it is clear that they emphasize the primacy of the offensive, this having been well documented by other authors in this magazine. Less well documented, perhaps and certainly often underplayed in the West, is the Soviet commitment to electronic warfare (EW).
Warsaw Pact Military
doctrine and capabilities
To put the Warsaw Pact capability in perspective, we should note that, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Soviets intend to destroy 30 percent of NATO's electronic emitters by firepower and another 30 percent by jamming. There are currently 1000 ground-based radar jammers in the Soviet EW inventory intended for use against the navigation and bombing systems of intruding aircraft. In addition, the Soviets are said to have 1200 ground-based communication jammers in the high-frequency (HF)/very-high frequency (VHF)/ultra-high-frequency (UHF) range, 180 helicopters equipped for jamming communications (COMMJAM), and 250 dedicated EW aircraft.4 This jamming capability is supported by a substantial surveillance and tracking capability, characterized by increased density, diverse frequency range, redundancy, and mobility.
This formidable capability, together with the increased production and deployment of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) systems, is certain to characterize modern warfare. The precise consequences for NATO of each of the improved Soviet capabilities remain speculative, however. Taken together, they have fundamentally altered the character of the threat and create an awesome picture.
This picture of modem warfare can be summarized quite simply. We note that Soviet capabilities are characterized by a doctrine that emphasizes offensive operations based on surprise, shock, exploitation, and combined arms. Tactical advantages would be gained by using nuclear and chemical agents for which the Soviets are well equipped and trained. The Group of Soviet Forces in (East) Germany, supported by four tactical air armies totalling some 1700 aircraft, together with the most formidable array of low-level air defenses and EW equipment seen anywhere in the world, should leave little doubt of the Pact's capability to attempt "to defeat. . . the enemy forces in West Germany, secure Rhine crossings and drive to the English Channel."5
Reality, however, suggests that the Soviet Bear is somewhat less than ten feet tall. The continuing loyalty of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces under pressure must be questioned, as must the ability of a mainly conscript army to operate without a credible NCO corps. Their exceptionally cumbersome command and control (C2) system inhibits initiative--a disadvantage that will be severely limiting in a fast-moving airland battle. We may also reasonably doubt the combat capability of frontal aviation aircrews and the ability of their logical infrastructure (given a measure of disruption from our own interdiction efforts) to support the anticipated advance. Of intentions we can say little beyond noting that the capability for attack most certainly exists and that any attempt to pursue it on one front only seems incompatible with their stated objectives. Their relentless drive toward a decisive military superiority has the ultimate domination of Europe in mind, but any further attempt to deduce Soviet intentions would require a clairvoyance that eluded even Sir Winston Churchill: "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma."6 We can say, however, that modern warfare against the Soviets is going to require the total efforts of all the armed forces. In the context of the NATO air-land battle here defined, Tacair has a principal part to play. With a clearer idea now of the nature of modern warfare, we are able to discuss the role of CAS and examine critically its relevance to today's battlefield.
In 1970 Air Vice-Marshal P. de L. Le Cheminant wrote, "I believe that a great deal, indeed the major part of what has appeared in writing on this subject [CAS] during the last few years shows a lack of understanding of the real issues."7 This view of CAS is, perhaps, equally valid today, and we may suggest reasons ranging from ignorance of the enemy's capabilities and hence the nature of the air-land battle (a matter this article has attempted to correct), to single service prejudices and doctrinal differences.
It is also true that the very term itself has been open to misconceptions, not only by the various services that provide CAS but also by some of those on the ground whose understanding of Tacair is limited by the concept of "keeping the enemy off our backs." We must, therefore, start with some clear definitions of terms.
NATO's Tactical Air Doctrine Manual (ATP-33) notwithstanding, all army and air force organizations in the Central Region now recognize that the generic term for all air operations in direct support of armed forces operating on land is offensive air support (OAS). This includes CAS, battlefield air interdiction (BAI), and tactical air reconnaissance (T AR). CAS is defined as air action against hostile targets which requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. These air missions are tasked against those enemy forces that are located between the front line of own troops (FLOT) and the fire support coordination line (FSCL). This distance will vary according to the nature of the army units' artillery, but for all practical purposes we can say 15-25 kms. Battlefield air interdiction is defined as that category of air interdiction that is flown in the battlefield area and can have a direct effect on the enemy's ability to continue operations. Battlefield air interdiction is subject to joint army/air force planning and is flown beyond the FSCL and up to the reconnaissance and interdiction planning line. This distance is 80-100 kms beyond the FSCL. We must be clear that battlefield air interdiction does not require "integration" with the ground commander's fire support and maneuver plan but does require coordination with his overall plan of operations to ensure that air interdiction is applied to the best effect. Armed recce, a traditional but sometimes misunderstood term, is not officially embraced by OAS, but for all practical purposes BAI and armed recce are synonymous, each requiring search and destroy tactics in designated areas beyond the FSCL. The distinction applied to BAI is that it requires firmer intelligence on the battlefield situation and is thus more specific in its application. In practical terms this is pure semantics.
Tactical air reconnaissance, the third type of OAS mission, is the acquisition of intelligence information employing aerial vehicles. Despite the importance and difficulty of TAR, it is, nonetheless, a complete study in itself and beyond the scope of this article. We are concerned essentially with the roles of offensive air support, i.e., CAS (and BAI). In discussing the requirements and capabilities of Tacair forces assigned to the battlefield, we consider first the requirement for CAS.
NATO Tactical Air Doctrine Manual is quite clear about the requirement: "The firepower and mobility of CAS aircraft (and helicopters) can make an immediate and direct contribution to the land battle, particularly against those targets which may be inaccessible or invulnerable to available surface-based weapons."8 Analysts from the United States Strategic Institute put the requirement more forcibly:
Against the numerically superior forces of the Warsaw Pact, and in the event that an offensive were launched in place, it is probable that Alliance airpower would be forced into a close support role because of the intensity with which the first echelons could be expected to attack. Heavy CAS would be indispensable to a successful defense of NATO.9
Both doctrinal and professional sources thus foresee a clear requirement for CAS particularly in breakthrough and counterattack operations. If this is true, what capabilities do we require of Tacair's forces for the CAS role?
responsiveness
When the army calls for immediate CAS missions, it needs them now. Too often in the past, command and control have been bedeviled by poor communications and micromanagement of resources at too high a level. Despite the aspirations of ATP-33, it may be argued that there is no common, or even interoperable, NATO doctrine on CAS C2. Broadly stated, United States Air Forces, Europe (USAFE) subscribes to centralized high-level C2 at the tactical air control center (TACC), which assists in developing target lists, processing CAS requests, determining force requirements, and publishing the detailed tasking orders necessary for mission execution. In the chain of command, this is at the allied tactical air forces (ATAF)/ army group level, below which we have the direct air support center (DASC), which initiates the planning and coordination necessary to process the CAS mission.10 To the European NATO reader these terms may appear confusing because ATP-33 refers to joint command operations centers (JCOCs) and air support operations centers (ASOCs). Of course, the various perceptions of C2 difference in terminology--the point we are looking for is the effect of these C2 differences on responsiveness. Experience suggests that the higher the C2, the less the response once the initial decision of allotting CAS to the army commander has been taken by the air commander. Once assigned (for whatever period the air and army commanders agree on), the CAS units must work directly with the corps, division, or brigade ASOC. In this manner, CAS units can achieve the direct interface essential for rapid response to battlefield requests. These requests may originate at any level of command within the supported land forces, but the ability of CAS forces to respond to such requests depends not only on command, control, and communications (C3) but also on where and how the air forces are based.
Rapid response or "alert" sorties may be on either ground or airborne alert. In theory, airborne alert provides greater responsiveness to the needs of the ground commander but must depend on an airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC) or the airborne warning and control system (AWACS), a concept that a gutfeeling for the flexible needs of CAS rejects absolutely. Airborne alert may also require the use of air refueling and secondary preplanned targets to optimize effectiveness. On balance, most NATO planners accept that airborne alert wastes scarce resources and may be an additional burden to an already overloaded C3 system. The primacy of ground alert is therefore generally conceded as best for the rapid response of CAS aircraft, but NATO has been slow to recognize the need for forward operating bases, except for the A-10 concept of operations and the Harrier. A secondary, but nonetheless important, advantage that can be attributed to the FOB concept is that it alleviates the problems of airspace management and missile engagement zone (MEZ) coordination problems linked with the basing of aircraft to the rear.
The premise may be invalid, however, if Tacair is unable to disperse its aircraft to FOBs—and operate effectively therefrom.
The fact that RAF Harriers have successfully demonstrated this concept for the past ten years seems to be conveniently overlooked by those seeking to justify their own entrenched positions. Indeed, the widespread ignorance surrounding the contribution of vertical or short takeoff and landing (V /STOL) is surprising considering a decade of operational experience with this aircraft. A recent study of the effectiveness of the Harrier employed at FOBs showed:
The writers view the [FOB) concept as being too fragmented to be effective . . . it requires what appears to be unnecessary redundancy of costly resources. . . the Harriers could not be individually scattered about the country-side; some method of centralization would be necessary for adequate control.11
If correct, these observations completely undermine the premise that ground-based alert at FOBs is the solution to the responsive requirement of CAS in modern warfare. The authors have drawn conclusions unsupported by facts, and it is sufficient to put the record straight by referring to someone with operational experience--Air Commodore P. B. Hine, a former RAF Germany Harrier force commander.
In this vital area [referring to the FOB logistic support system], and in other areas such as mission effectiveness and the ability to survive, the RAF Germany Harrier Force has been awarded the highest possible marks by the multi-national Tactical Evaluation Teams of AAFCE.12
As all NATO units know, the annual tactical evaluation is a most rigorous and realistic test of that unit's ability to fight in war. Implicit in the assessments given to the Harrier force is the conclusion that the FOB concept is operationally effective. Even so, many air staff planners who have not experienced a FOB at firsthand still think that logistics are the downfall of dispersed site operations. As with main bases, FOBs depend on logistics reaching the primary airhead or logistics depot. Given this, the additional task is only that of moving supplies out to the FOB site or between sites, a procedure that with many years of experience has been refined to an art. Given the choice, the force commander would naturally ease his logistics problem by selecting a site as close to the main airhead as survival allows (say 15 kms). Being further displaced poses additional delays inherent in surface transport. For this reason the coordinated use of heavy lift helicopters is desirable and, in the event of a rapid dispersal, essential. If the location of a FOB is compromised or if the battlefield situation requires it, a site can be vacated with all essential equipment in well under one hour, while the new location can be ready to accept aircraft within two to two-and-a-half hours.13 The logistic premium to guarantee a viable FOB concept is remarkably small: "A rough estimate shows that fully dispersed operations cost between ten and fifteen percent more in logistic support, communications facilities, site protection, etc."14
When this is weighed against the ability to respond rapidly and to continue operations long after conventional airfields have been rendered useless, it seems a premium worth paying.
Looked at in terms of responsiveness and survivability, the FOB concept thus seems to be essential for the employment of CAS aircraft in modern warfare. Even so, the concept does not of itself guarantee the high sortie rates that are necessary to support the ground forces. We have already identified the need for the C2 system to be simple, flexible, and responsive. These principles will be negated if the system is reactive only. That is, there must be no question, in a modern war, of CAS aircraft awaiting tasking on the ground. The ferocity with which we expect the first echelons to attack is not likely to create a dearth of targets either on the FEBA or beyond it.
Unfortunately, our peacetime training in this area rarely follows our doctrine, "Train for war as a daily diet. Reliable, demanding training. Realistic exercises. Maximum combat capability."15 Our OAS exercises tend to be neatly game-planned to follow an operations order largely devoid of reality and emphasixing the primacy of flight safety. For these reasons, missions are most carefully preplanned to avoid airspace conflictions: Red forces' capability is consistently underplayed; Blue forces are restricted in height and maneuver; and C3 and tactical radar systems are largely blessed with immunity to electronic warfare. That is not to say that electronic warfare is totally ignored, but rather that it creates such chaos when it is employed that the players plead for its withdrawal. The purpose of this indictment is to focus the mind on an important area of realism and on the need to have CAS aircraft responsive in the sense of generating high sortie rates and tasking them as we would so expect in war. With this in mind, the conclusion is that the effect of Tacair will be dissipated by holding aircraft on the ground. In a target-rich environment we must hammer the enemy hard--and often.
Before discussing how we are going to achieve that, we will broaden our look at responsiveness to discuss an alternative concept--the forward operating location (FOL). General William Momyer, USAF (Ret), when Commander of Tactical Air Command defined it in the context of TAC's primary CAS aircraft, the A-10:
We would base [A-10s] further to the rear on a main operating base (MOB); and then we would have a forward operating base where we would come in periodically with a squadron and then advance as far as we thought the situation would permit. I would call it a Forward Operating Location (FOL) at which we would have a flight based, and we would then rotate through it. This will significantly reduce en-route time to target . . . the expenditure of airborne alert time is not justified.16
This concept is being implemented in Europe where we note that the FOL is a combat staging and turnaround base with limited personnel and facilities--substantially different from the fully manned and supported dispersed site FOB used by the Harrier. By contrast, the USAF foresees the FOB as a forward base in West Germany to which the A-10 aircraft have deployed from their main operating base (MOB) in Great Britain. On the other hand, the Harrier dispersed-site concept of a FOB embraces a number of sites, each containing six to eight aircraft. Each site is virtually autonomous and is linked via secure communications to the force commander's headquarters and to their own and adjoining corps' ASOCs. The A-10 FOL, then, requiring a strip of some 2400 feet,17 is quite different from a Harrier FOB both in concept and in practice. They both serve the same ends, however: responsiveness to the needs of the land battle and high sortie rates. In February 1977, for example, two A-10s flew 17 sorties each during an 11-hour period. These were 120-nautical mile (nm) missions, dropping four 500-pound bombs and making 2 X 30-mm strafe passes each sortie.18 On a somewhat larger and more regular basis, Harriers, both RAF and U.S. Marine, frequently achieve high sortie rates from dispersed sites.
It is regular practice on field deployments for 30 Harriers to fly over 200 sorties per day on something like an hourly cycle: 30 minutes sortie and 30 minutes turnaround. . . the pilots remaining in the cockpit debriefing and rebriefing via a telescramble line to Squadron Operations.19
In terms, then, of the first requirement of CAS, responsiveness, we have identified the need for a C2 system that is secure, flexible, and effective and one that allows delegation down to the lowest practicable ASOC. Highly structured and automated systems would it was argued, work against responsiveness, particularly if micromanagement from the TACC resulted. In noting the Warsaw Pact overall capabilities, specifically in the electronic warfare environment, we appealed for realism in training to demonstrate the capability, or otherwise, of C3 systems in a wartime situation. In addition, the need for FOBs and FOLs to support the ground-based alert concept was noted. It was argued that in a target-rich environment CAS aircraft must not await tasking but must hit hard and often. For this, high sortie rates were essential, but, with the exception of the Harrier force, this capability was infrequently demonstrated. Responsiveness, then, is an important requirement in the CAS role and leads to the discussion of how such missions can be effective.
effectiveness
It is, of course, futile to be able to respond quickly if the aircraft cannot then attack and destroy the required battlefield targets. Thus four questions must be asked: What? Where? When? and How? In answering these questions, we define first the CAS profile and then consider factors that influence it: the forward air controller (FAC), target acquisition, weather, and aircraft/weapon mix. Pervading all this is the rhetorical question: Can we operate in the kind of EW /COMMJAM environment that we are certain is going to be a part of modern warfare over the battlefield?
USAF Tacair doctrine defines the CAS mission as, inter alia, the following:
Once airborne, fighters are handled by control elements of the TACS, which may include the Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Pilots will be provided with radar vectoring to a rendezvous point, updated strike information, target area weather, and forward air controller call signs and frequencies.Upon arrival at the designated holding or rendezvous point, CAS flights contact an airborne or ground FAC who will control the strike. If an airborne FAC is used, he will be in contact with friendly ground forces. . . . The FAC will also be coordinating defense suppression artillery, tactical fire, beacons, ground laser designators, and friendly air defense with the local maneuver unit com-mander.20
The reader will at once be impressed by the smooth flow of the mission and by the almost incredible capabilities of the FAC; incredible because the doctrine assume that the Warsaw Pact will oblige us by discontinuing radio electronic combat (REC) so that our CAS mission can follow the neat profile defined for it. Nothing could be further from the truth, and the point is so fundamental to the role of CAS in modern warfare that it is worth discussing further. It would be less than honest to say that doctrine does not recognize the importance of electronic warfare--indeed, much emphasis is placed on it.
Any commander is prone to defeat, whatever his strength in numbers and weapons, if EW denies him the means to convey orders, provide for fire support. . . EW is now a form of combat power, and battles may be won or lost by the fight in this medium.21
The problem arises in trying to relate doctrine to reality. Practical experience teaches us some important lessons, particularly if taken from modern conflict. An experience from the Yom Kippur War warned us that:
Tests against captured Soviet equipment are said to indicate that . . . [tactical aircraft] would be seriously degraded by this [EW] capability and that the communications required for close air support will be denied within [5 nms of the battlefield].22
Confirmation of this capability was brought home starkly to the Israeli pilots who found that their ground-to-air communications were jammed on all UHF/VHF frequencies within one minute of pilot-FAC coordination.23 There can be little doubt, therefore, that not only will our battlefield C3 systems be jammed extensively but also that these systems can scarcely be integrated into a combined arms/coalition war situation.24
Against this background, we must now examine what role the FAC can play in the CAS mission.
The FAC is the direct interface between the forward tactical ground commander and the supporting CAS forces. In addition to the battlefield control and coordination functions already discussed, the FAC is responsible for briefing CAS pilots on the targets identified for attack and assisting the pilots in target acquisition. To an extent, he relies on information provided by ground-based forward observers (FOs), but it is not clear, in the electronic warfare environment we anticipate, how such information is going to be passed. In this situation, it is apparent that the ground-based FACs and air liaison officers (ALOs) are largely superfluous in their primary roles. The airborne FAC, on the other hand, having gleaned what slender information he can before takeoff, is forced to a position beyond the effective REC/SAM/AAA envelopes to communication with his fighters. This can be broadly defined as a contact point about 10 nms back from the FLOT. Since he can neither identify nor mark the required battlefield targets from this position, we may conclude that the primary role of the airborne FAC is also defunct and that he is now relegated to the role of relaying the general battlefield situation to CAS aircraft.
This question may now be asked: What confidence do we have that Warsaw Pact radio electronic combat will not prevent air-air communications behind the FLOT or even beyond it? The capability to COMMJAM depends primarily on three things: the output of the jammer, the proximity line of sight of the jammer to its intended "victim, " and the sensitivity of the "victim's" receiver. It can be stated that current mobile Warsaw Pact jammers have a capability out to about 20 nms. They are integral to Warsaw Pact signals regiments, however, and they would expect to be deployed at a position of relative safety, say at the FSCL. Hence our conclusion that battlefield communications will be extensively jammed but that we may reasonably expect minimum interference at a contact point some 10 nms behind the FLOT.25 It may further be argued from this evidence that communications beyond the FSCL will also be difficult, depending on the deployment and capability of the individual jammers. This is an important consideration for BAI, and the question has to be asked whether we can coordinate some of the proposed attack profiles with no communications. The answer to this question will involve a degree of heart-searching amongst those who have forgotten one of the basic precepts of Tacair--keep it simple.
The conclusion we draw is that the FAC is unable to fulfill the roles necessary for the success of the CAS mission and that, by inference, the success of the mission itself is questionable. It depends, ultimately, on whether we can acquire the correct target with only a possibly inaccurate brief at the contact point and without the advantage of a designator to assist in solving the major problem of the CAS attack—target acquisition.
target acquisition
Even under the most favorable conditions, target acquisition has always been a problem for fixed-wing aircraft in the close air support role. For reasons of weather, weapons effect, and survival (aspects of which are discussed in detail later), we are required to fly low and fast--the two factors that compound the difficulties of target acquisition. On this subject, analysts can prove many things with statistics. Personal experience of many years, however, is convincing proof that the chances of a successful first run attack (FRA), in the low, fast, minimum exposure, minimum steady-state flight path necessary for survival against a specific, undesignated battlefield target are extremely poor. Given a second chance or given a generous exposure time, the probability is much improved--but few will live to tell the tale. The conclusion is clear: specific targets must be clearly designated for a successful close air support attack by fixed-wing aircraft. Without this, the mission is doomed to failure. Technology, if it can be harnessed to a world of economic and operational reality, can provide some answers. Various systems, including helmet-mounted sights, beacons, and lasers, have all been used successfully. Laser designation has, of course, tremendous potential, offering pinpoint accuracies without the need for visual acquisition by the pilot. But here, as with many other designators, coordination has proved extremely difficult in a COMMJAM environment. Individual squadrons may have some simple and flexible tactics that will prove effective, but we are a long way from reaching a solution that will be interoperable within all of the national corps areas.
In the future we may see mini-remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) in this role.26 The mini-RPV we need must simple, rugged, mobile, and flexible. It need to be no more than a truck-mounted rotary wing platform with sensors for battlefield surveillance and target designation. The extension of this concept to allow the airborne FAC to fulfill the essential roles of target identification and designation from a remote position at the contact point seems to be innately costly, technologically vulnerable, and operationally suspect. We thus cannot tell whether technology will be applied realistically to the needs of close air support. For the moment we can only conclude that target acquisition remains one of the major problems for fixed-wing aircraft in this role. Moreover, the problems are compounded in poor weather and at night—aspects that we now examine in the broader context of the role of close air support in modern warfare.
all-weather, day and night capability
The weather in northern and central Europe has such an effort on air operations that it might also be considered a part of the threat. Pilots familiar with flying in Europe hardly need reminding of the limitations that weather can impose, the subject being documented from many sources. In terms that are easily understood, it can broadly stated that over the north German plains in winter the cloud base is less than 100 feet and the visibility less that 5kms on one day in three; on the northern flank and over the highland, such conditions may exist on one day in two.27 It is, of course, misleading to apply ratio terms, since weather patterns do not necessarily fluctuate on such a daily basis. For example, winter weather on the northern flank can "ground" air forces for a week at a time, but this may be followed by a week of near-perfect flying conditions.
The unique problem of weather for close air support aircraft is that battlefield targets are not, for all practical purposes, radar identifiable. Thus, even if CAS aircraft can reach the battlefield will all-weather navigational aids, the pilot may still have to use the "Mk 1 eyeball" for targets acquisition. It is, therefore, visibility rather than cloud base that is the limiting weather factor. This observation applies also to helicopters, although their weather minima are substantially lower than those for fixed-wing aircraft. For example, attack helicopters (AHs), have a proven CAS mission effective-ness in weather conditions as low as 100 feet and 1500 meters visibility, whereas few fixed-wing aircraft can attack effectively in conditions worse than 500 feet and 21/2 kms. The A-10, for example, has demonstrated a capability for visual attacks down to 11/2 miles (21/2 kms),28 although aircraft with faster attack speeds would be lucky to acquire specific and nondesignated targets at such short range. The conclusion we draw from this is that CAS aircraft require not only all-weather, day and night penetrating aids but also special sensors for target acquisition.
This leads inevitably to the sophistication of aircraft such as the F-111 and the Tornado aircraft assigned primarily to the counterair and deep-interdiction roles. Alternatively, we can equip our single-seat CAS aircraft with high technology, rapid, automatic data processors to reduce pilot workload sufficiently to cope with the low-level, all-weather day and night CAS mission. This solution sounds credible in cost-effective terms: smaller, cheaper aircraft (and thus, perhaps, more of them) and reduced manpower and training costs. In real terms, however, this solution reflects a dangerous, and possibly suicidal, preoccupation with technology. The most important link in the chain is the pilot. It is he who must have blind faith, on a dark and stormy night flying at 600 knots and 200 feet, that his equipment will be not only totally capable but also totally reliable. The aerospace industry may be convinced of this capability, but the single-seat close air support pilot most certainly is not!
These perceptions, however, must not lead to the conclusion that a return to the "ring and bead" sight is recommended. There is middle ground on which technology can be applied cost effectively and practically. We can identify here some minimum requirements for the daytime, poor-weather CAS mission: a digital inertial navigation and attack system, a combined moving map display, a total heads up display (HUD), a radar altimeter, and additional sensors for target acquisition, including laser. The list is probably open to endless debate, and if we extend the requirement to all-weather day and night, we must have terrain avoidance radar and a two-man crew.
We also have yet to discuss the requirements for survivability. The point we are driving at here is that, recognizing the need for CAS in support of the land battle in all weathers and at night, Tacair cannot meet that requirement with its primary single-seat, day, visual flight rules (VFR) aircraft. Indeed, it is arguable that, even given the equipment and the two cockpits, the manning ratios on frontline squadrons are woe-fully inadequate to support 24-hour operations over anything more than a short surge period. In short, it has to be concluded that CAS squadrons do not have all-weather day and night capability, and that if we do go to the expense of providing that capability, both in sophisticated equipment and manpower, it is going to mean fewer aircraft. Given a fixed defense budget, the problem revolves around the quality versus quantity argument. The evidence shows, unfortunately, that we do not have enough of either commodity.
aircraft and weapon capability
Thus far, we have not recognized fully the capabilities of the attack helicopter in the CAS role. The AH must first be placed in the electronic warfare environment already defined and may thus be subject to the same communications problems that we have identified for the FAC. The advantage of the AH lies in the fact that it is similar in type to the FAC's aircraft, a light observation helicopter (LOH), and that voice jammers can be overridden by achieving antennae overlap. This unique advantage allows the AH pilot and gunner to obtain the necessary target details without having to rendezvous at the contact point--a restriction that applied to fixed-wing aircraft, as has already been explained. The attack helicopter pilots, then, based close to the FLOT and thus immediately responsive to the needs of the tactical ground commander, work as part of a combined arms team on the battlefield. Even without a FAC, AHs are able to survive flying nap-of-the-earth (NOE) and to acquire their targets from a treetop hover. Limiting their exposure to the minimum necessary for missile or rocket launch, AHs can be expected to make significant contributions to stopping the armored thrust. On balance, the AH is probably the ideal airborne tank killer.29 Noting also its capability in exceptionally poor weather and at night, the AH is essential to the success of the CAS mission. Regrettably, on the central and northern flanks of NA TO, this capability exists in totally inadequate numbers.
In considering the mission effectiveness of fixed-wing aircraft (as distinct from their survivability aspects, which we discuss later), we can summarize by referring to the problems already identified in pilot/FAC coordination. We concluded that, without positive target identification and designation, the chances of a successful FRA would be remote. Given a solution to those problems, the success of the attack will depend on the weapon used, being either forward firing (rockets/guns), laydown (cluster munitions/retard bombs/napalm), or precision-guided munitions (PGM). The last category includes air-surface missiles of the Maverick family and laser-guided bombs (LGB).
The scope of this article does not include a detailed assessment of each type of weapon, but it is pertinent to note some broad characteristics. Forward-firing ordnance requires at least a five-degree dive angle for weapon effectiveness. In addition, the need to clear the debris hemisphere, either vertically or horizontally, demands a minimum firing range that, when added to the minimum tracking time necessary for accuracy, (extends the minimum range by which the target must be acquired for a successful attack. This, in turn, increases the exposure time. Precision-guided munitions and laser-guided bombs can be extremely effective, given the weather (or communications) necessary for successful delivery. The main reservation is that of cost and, by implication, sufficient numbers in the front line. On balance, area cluster munitions in the BL 755 family, delivered in a level laydown mode, have proved cost-effective against armor. From the pilot's viewpoint, they are preferred because weapon aiming is less critical, exposure is reduced, and a successful attack can be made from a late target acquisition. Even so, none of this is help to the CAS mission unless sufficient numbers of weapons can be carried to the target. The logistics aspects of this problem are not discussed here, for they are not unique to the role of CAS. Rather, we are looking at whether CAS aircraft have the capability to deliver effective weapons loads on the target. Despite the clear-cut advantages of the Harrier in other aspects of the CAS mission, many observers have reservations about the payload and range of this aircraft.
In 1972 General Momyer said, "With today’s technology we have not been able to reach a happy position where we can have a vertical takeoff and landing aircraft with a significant armament load and acceptable operating ranges."30 The general emphasized the vertical takeoff (VTO) configuration, but the question has to be asked: "Why VTO?" The Harrier can lift its operational warload of six cluster bomb units plus two 30-mm cannon in under 1000 feet of any suitable road, planking, or field (such areas have, of course, already been surveyed in detail in the European theater). From its site some 50 kms behind the FLOT, the Harrier can attack well into the second-echelon divisions and be rearming again within 30 minutes. Combine this with the demonstrated capability for exceptionally high sortie rates, and it is then difficult to understand how such performance can be considered insignificant and unacceptable. The USAF tends to "damn with faint praise" the Harrier concept—often, it is felt, from a position of ignorance and prejudice. On the other hand, Europeans, possibly equally ignorant and prejudiced, have a number of reservations over the USAF Tactical Air Command’s primary CAS aircraft, the A-10. Principal amongst these is the question of survivability, an aspect that we now examine in its wider context.
survivability
A responsive or an effective mission is of little use if the aircraft cannot survive, both in the air and on the ground.
Survival in the air.
Many people still believe that air power will achieve air superiority over the battlefield, a myth that we attempted to dispel earlier in this article. This belief, however, leads to the assumption that our CAS aircraft will be involved in evading Warsaw Pact frontal aviation in the battlefield area. On the contrary, the Soviets have nothing to gain by placing their own aircraft at risk near the battlefield. First, their organic SAM/AAA is already capable of controlling the air, and second, they must recognize the enormous problems of lower airspace management. How much simpler for them to assume that attack aircraft over the battlefield are hostile! Of course, this approach is too simplistic in ignoring the coordination required for their own CAS aircraft. Even so, it seems logical to argue that the Pact nations will not compound their difficulties by drawing down their interceptors into the CAS arena. The conclusion is that we are unlikely to have to worry about being "bounced" in the battlefield area, providing, of course, that we stay low. This is just as well, for we will have enough problems trying to survive against Soviet SAM/AAA.These systems can, of course, be destroyed, suppressed, confused, or evaded, according to mission capability. The CAS role, however, has to concentrate on the threat to the ground forces and not to air forces. Thus CAS aircraft must rely on a combination of suppression, confusion, and evasion. Technology, in the form of electronic countermeasure (ECM) pods, infrared (IR) flare and chaff dispensers, and other countermeasures, is essential to the suppression and confusion requirements, but evasion is largely a matter of tactics and pilot skill. Opinion on this is divided, but experience on Red Flag missions and elsewhere indicates conclusively that survival lies in minimum exposure and minimum steady-state flight path. Minimum exposure for AHs is NOE flight, but with fixed-wing aircraft we must fly as fast and as close to terra firm as safety allows. It is a practical law, however, that these two requirements tend to be mutually exclusive, in that the faster we fly, the more the difficulty in remaining really low. By analogy , one can hover ten feet above the ground, but no pilot can maintain this height over uneven ground at 500 knots. A compromise has been found through many years of training and experience. Low and fast means in the order of 100-150 feet and 450-500 knots. It may be possible, in certain terrain, to go faster and lower, but if we do not train to do this in peacetime, we should not expect to be able to achieve it in war. The element of risk, however, is increased proportionally, and it is a fact of life that we simply cannot afford to lose expensive aircraft and pilots. Even so, a number of air forces remain preoccupied with unblemished flight safety records, principally because a bad record carries a stigma of failure and poor supervision (even if unjustified). This, too, is a fact of life for the commander with conflicting priorities: the survival of his forces in war or the survival of his job in peacetime.
The A-10 aircraft has been designed to absorb battle damage, and it may well survive against calibers as high as the ZSU-23-4. It is not very likely to survive a direct hit by SAMs, however, and its limited speed (say 350 knots in the attack) may make it vulnerable to future-generation IR missiles. For reasons already outlined, extra emphasis must be placed on the other component of the survival equation. Evasion must be achieved by terrain masking and flight at minimum altitudes. In addition, maneuver is an extremely important requirement--one that is well within the capabilities of the aircraft, if not the pilot. Above all, if the A-10 is to survive in the modern battlefield, the pilot must have more help than is available to him at present. We note that the "USAF plans to equip [the A-10] with advanced threat warning receivers, jamming pods, a chaff/flare system and an inertial navigation system that will reduce its exposure to enemy fire by allowing accurate low-level navigation in a high-threat environment."31 Such equipment is not a requirement for the A-10 only--all CAS aircraft need it. The limitations in speed, however, indicate the additional emphasis that must be placed on the other components of the survival equation. Given the capabilities in the other important areas, the A-10 may survive better than faster, but less-well-equipped CAS aircraft.
Survival on the ground.
General Richard Ellis, former commander AAFCE, identified both the problem and the solution: "The vulnerability of NATO's airfields, especially runways, is becoming one of the major problems facing the Alliance today. The solution is to develop a new generation of V /STOL aircraft. . . ."32 A Strategic Institute report argues that ". . . it is likely that many of NATO's tactical aircraft would be destroyed on the ground during the opening stages of the conflict. Of those which escaped preemption, a large number would not be able to take off because of enemy interdiction of airfields."33 Therefore, to survive on the ground and to continue operations--Tacair must disperse, but without at least STOL-capable aircraft, we can identify a fatal flaw in NATO's capability.34 We can summarize quite simply: the role of CAS in modern warfare (if indeed we foresee any role) will be severely degraded unless aircraft assigned to that role can disperse forward to, and operate from, FOBs/FOLs. Apart from AHs, the only STOL aircraft following this concept are Harriers and A-10s (assuming that one can truly define the A-10 as STOL). It would be less than fair not to mention the dispersal capability of the Swedish Air Force, one of the most efficient and operationally capable in Europe. Unfortunately, it is not clear how their aircraft will contribute CAS to the air-land battle defined for the scope of this article.Thus far, then, we have examined the need for "responsiveness, effectiveness, and survivability" in the CAS role in modern warfare. There exist, however, some fundamental differences in American ( 4ATAF) and European (2ATAF) perceptions of how Tacair forces should be employed. Since both ATAFs subscribe to a common NATO tactical air doctrine in manual ATP-33, it is important to identify these differing perceptions.
employment
The major difference between European and American perceptions of the role of Tacair centers around the nature of warfare in Europe. The USAF views Tacair as a centralized reserve for delivering firepower to supplement that of the army; the Europeans view Tacair as assisting the ground force commander's scheme of maneuver. These differences in style, driven in part by cost and technology, have led to different views on C3, operations, and munitions.
The Europeans view the American approach, with its emphasis on electronic warfare, sophisticated C3, and composite forces, as costly, inflexible, technologically vulnerable, and thus operationally suspect. A common perception in Europe is that, "The nature of the Vietnam experience may have led the USAF into techniques and approaches inappropriate for Europe. . . the USAF has erroneously accepted the plausible conclusion that the greater tempo of armored warfare could be matched by the even greater speed of modern data processing machinery. "35 Europeans believe that:
In a benign environment, current surveillance, communications, and data processing technologies are just sufficient to allow elaborate systems to work. When that environment changes from benign and static to hostile and adaptively dynamic, the assumption that the technology will work properly becomes questionable.36
These differing perceptions have led to fundamental opposites in concepts of operation. Whereas the Americans tend to emphasize PGMs, medium-level flight (above 10,000 feet), and real-time surveillance and C2 for diverting in-flight aircraft, the Europeans emphasize area submunitions cluster bomb unit (CBU), on-the-deck altitudes, and autonomous operations. In the wider application of Tacair, the USAF would consider using composite forces--raids of some 20 aircraft of which only some 12 would be "attackers," the remainder being employed in the defense suppression, escort, and ECM roles. Europeans, perhaps guilty of making a virtue out of economic necessity, reject both the American tactical air control system (TACS) with its reliance on jammable radar control and the composite force concept, which requires a high degree of aircrew and unit specialization with commensurate high costs. In the European view, flexibility is not gained by diverting airborne aircraft under a suspect and vulnerable AWACS but by generating high sortie rates from FOBs with "2-ship" on-the-deck autonomous operations. Survival relies more on evasion and minimum exposure than on defense suppression, confusion, or destruction. Americans, on the other hand, question the qualitative advantages that Europeans tend to assume for their own operations and consider that European reluctance to get more involved in ECM is a fundamental error.
These general observations should not, however, be universally applied to the CAS role. USAFE A-10 CAS operations, for example, are now much closer to the European concept, although USAFE doctrine could still consider using strategic bombers (B-52) in the CAS role, if circumstances demanded. From a historical perspective, Americans would argue that all-weather beacon bombing, as close as 3000 meters to the FLOT, saved the garrison at Khe Sanh toward the end of the Vietnam conflict. Europeans, on the other hand, find it difficult to reconcile their own concept with the use of strategic bombers in the CAS role. Thus fundamental differences remain, and the opposing concepts of operations make interoperability difficult if not impossible. Nonetheless, for NATO the present diversity in doctrine and tactics is not altogether bad. The alternative options present a longer term fall-back capability should one or the other be foreclosed. Further, the two approaches have a synergistic effect in forcing the enemy to second-guess NATO's tactics and thus dissipate his defenses against the full spectrum of attack options. Although it would, therefore, be a mistake for AAFCE to try to impose a standardized concept of operations on both ATAFs, it would also be a mistake not to recognize that basic differences exist and that these differences may have a significant impact on the role of CAS in modern warfare.
Since we have covered much ground here, it would seem useful to summarize the problems that have been identified.
problems
The first requirement of aircraft assigned to the support of the battlefield in the CAS is responsiveness. This requirement can satisfactorily be met only by ground-based alert aircraft dispersed forward at an FOB site or an FOL, a fact, which, in itself, is not panacea unless high sortie rates can be maintained. Unfortunately, NATO has been slow to recognize the advantages of STOL and short takeoff and vertical land-capable aircraft and has thus immensely complicated, if not defeated, its dispersal options. It can be stated that only attack helicopters, Harriers, and A-10s meet this requirement, but they are so thinly spread along the front line as to be of only marginal effect against the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces.
An effective attack, however, must be more than responsive; it must be successful in the face of an intensive electronic warfare threat, COMMJAM, and the most formidable array of battlefield air defenses in the history of warfare. It is generally accepted that the FAC or ALO is essential to the CAS mission, but he can neither communicate nor survive in the battlefield area. As a FAC, then, his role is defunct, and so, by implication, is the role of CAS. Other major problems include those of targets identification and acquisition, and even modern sensors such as lasers may be defeated if communications to coordinate the attack are denied.
It must further be argued that the tempo of modern warfare will not slacken in bad weather or at night. It may also be argued that NATO's primary CAS aircraft (which are day VFR only) will contribute nothing to the war under these conditions. Assuming that the other problems can be solved, NATO's all-weather aircraft may be employed in the CAS role but at the expense of their primary counterair and interdiction roles. The immediately attractive answer of procuring all-weather-capable CAS aircraft has always been defeated by the quantity versus quality argument. The problem is that we do not have enough of either.
Further problems exist for the survivability of CAS aircraft. In the face of Warsaw Pact SAM and AAA, they must carry advanced threat-warning receivers coupled to automatic active jamming pods. Chaff and IR decoys are essential, and CAS aircraft must have the flexibility to incorporate the latest technology electronic warfare systems. European air forces have been particularly slow to so equip their aircraft, relying instead on evasion and minimum exposure rather than on defense suppression. Survival in modern warfare is going to require the synergistic advantage of all three capabilities. Nonetheless, it still seems clear that CAS aircraft will be forced into minimum altitude, high speed, and maximum maneuver profiles for survival. The problems of training safely in peacetime to guarantee survival in war have never been more real.
On the ground, survival and the ability to continue operations when conventional airfields have been subjected to heavy and continuous attack depend absolutely on the ability to disperse. Harriers and AHs are the only forces with a proven capability in this area.
Taken separately, each problem might have been subject to an optimistic assessment of the role of CAS in modern warfare. Taken collectively, however, the problems for fixed-wing aircraft appear insurmountable. Only the AH seems capable of making an effective contribution to the CAS role, particularly in poor weather and at night. If this is so, how then can we employ CAS aircraft whose primary role is now defunct?
solutions
To find a solution, we must return to basics and ask whether we accept the premise that it is necessary for Tacair to "destroy in the first echelons" or "disrupt in the second echelons." If we accept the plausible conclusion that we cannot do the former, we must examine whether a solution can be found in the latter. Relating these concepts to roles, it becomes a question of CAS or BAI. Air Commodore P. B. Hine, a former Harrier force commander in 2ATAF, commented: "BAI is a role that can be sustained in a confused situation where communications have broken down. The interdiction of enemy armor of the second tactical and successive echelons is perhaps the [Harrier's] most effective contribution to the land battle."37 A similar view, reflecting the lessons of the Yom Kippur War, was expressed by General Chaim Herzog:
The proliferation of 1ight, portable missile launchers in the front line means that close support will be the exception of the rule in future, with the air force being obliged to concentrate on isolating the field of battle, maintaining supremacy of the air, and destroying the forces in and near the battlefield.38
Countering the inevitable riposte of making a virtue out of necessity is the view of Terrell E. Greene, a director of Tactical Studies at Rand, "If Tacair can survive and penetrate, it can hurt [through BAI] the follow-on echelons of a Pact invasion enough to slow and disrupt the attack to the point where NA TO ground forces can hold against assault divisions."39
The primacy of BAI in the author's experience, lies in the fact that:
In my opinion, BAI can solve many, if not all, of the problems we identified for CAS. Implicit in this solution is the ability of BAI-role aircraft to meet the requirements states in terms of responsiveness, effectiveness, and survivability. Also implicit in this solution is the unproven (and probably unprovable) premise that BAI can fulfill the same role as CAS—to help blunt and stop the armored thrust. Differing doctrinal perceptions on this point are irrelevant if the CAS mission is based on a concept of operations totally unsuited to modern warfare.
IF this assessment of modern warfare is accepted, it is clear that the role of CAS requires a fundamental reassessment. It has become increasingly evident that CAS aircraft cannot achieve an "effective" mission in the COMMJAM/SAM/AAA environment that characterizes today's battlefield. At best, Tacair's fixed-wing aircraft would seem to have only a marginal capability in the CAS role. However, our thinking must not be constrained by prejudices and semantic definitions. We must recognize the capabilities of attack helicopters for the CAS role and must assign fixed-wing aircraft to the battlefield air interdiction role--a role offering simplicity, flexibility, and potential rewards in the target-rich second echelon area. It is here that Tacair can make its most effective contribution to the land battle.
A last observation is that air power in support of the battlefield is not an end in itself--but merely a means to an end. The final criterion by which history will judge its effectiveness is whether it prevented the enemy from occupying our lands and taking our capital cities. If he has achieved this, pedantic argument about the outcome of the air war will be of no avail. It is in this context that the role of CAS in modern warfare must be judged.
Air War College
Notes
1. D.M. Proekter, "Qualitative Aspect of Correlation of Forces Stressed," Novoye Vremya (New Times), March 1977, p. 21.
2. John Erickson, "European Security: Soviet Preferences and Priorities, Strategic Review, Winter 1976, pp. 40-41.
3. General David C. Jones, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, Interview published in Air Force, September 1975, p. 21.
4. "Electronic Warfare Keyed to Minimizing Engagement, Boosting Enemy Disruption," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 6, 1978, p. 136.
5. See Graham Turbiville, "Invasion in Europe—A Scenario," as cited in Air University Review, November-December 1978, p. 28.
6. In a statement to the House of Commons on the outbreak of World War II, September 1939.
7. Air Vice-Marshal P. de L. Le Cheminant, "Air Support in the Land Battle in the Late 1970s," Army Quarterly, July 1970, p. 21.
8. NATO Tactical Air Doctrine Manual, ATP-33, 11 March 1976.
9. Jacquelyn Davis and Robert Pfaltzgraff, "Soviet Theater Strategy: Implications for NATO," USSI Report 78-1 (Washington, 1978), p. 38.
10. Tactical Air Command Manual (TACM) 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, 15 April 1978, pp. 4-40.
11. Lacy W. Breckenridge et al., "Close Air Support: Concepts and Doctrines," Air War College Study, 1973, pp. 47-61.
12. Air Commodore P. B. Hine, "The Future of Military V/STOL," Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal, March 1978, p. 59.
13. Ibid, p. 60.
14. Wing Commander P. P. W. Taylor "NATO’s Dispersal Capability—A Fatal Flaw?" RAF Quarterly, Summer 1978, p. 176.
15. TACM 2-1, 1-1.
16. General William Momyer, Hearings before the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Close Air Support, p. 212.
17. Colonel Robert D. Rasmussen, "The A-10 in Central Europe—A Concept of Deployment-Employment," Air University Review, November-December 1978.
18. USAF Fact Sheet, "A-10 Close Air Support Aircraft," Office of Information, Air Force Systems Command, May 1977, p. 12.
19. Air Commodore P. B. Hine, p. 59.
20. TACM 2-1, 4-42-43.
21. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, July 1976, pp. 2-27, 2-26.
22. "Electronic Warfare Keyed to Minimizing Engagement, Boosting Enemy Disruption," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 6, 1978, pp. 134-39.
23. Steven L. Canby, "The Contribution of Tactical Airpower in Countering a Blitz: European Perceptions," Technology Service Corporation Project Report (Washington, 1977), p. 23.
24. Lieutenant Colonel Phillip K. Heacock, "The Viability of Centralized Command and Control (C2)," Air University Review, January-February 1979, p. 36.
25. Interview with Colonel Anton D. Brees, Former Chief of Electronic Warfare Readiness, Department of Defense, 13 March 1979.
26. F. David Schnebly, "The Development of the XMQM-105 Aquila Mini-RPV System," Proceedings, Fourth Annual Symposium, June 5-9, 1977, National Association for Remotely Piloted Vehicles.
27. Data extrapolated from Defense Operational Analysis Establishment Studies on "NATO Tactical Air power in Support of the and Battle, December 1973.
28. "A NATO Preview, NATO’s Fifteen Nations, April-May 1977, p. 92.
29. Charles J. Dick, "Tactical Air Power on the Battlefield of Tomorrow: The Search for a Mission, RUSI Journal, June 1978, p. 44.
30. General William Momyer, "What They’re Saying," Air Force Magazine, January 1972, p. 19.
31. "Electronic Warfare Keyed to Minimizing Engagement, Boosting Enemy Disruption" Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 6, 1978, p. 135.
32. As quoted in Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Increasing Soviet Offensive Threat Spurs Stronger Europe Air Arm," Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 1, 1977, p. 46.
33. Davis and Pfaltzgraff, p. 38.
34. Wing Commander Taylor, p. 11.
35. Canby, p. 23.
36. Steven L. Canby, "The Problem of Invalidating Premises," Technology Corporation Project Draft Report (Washington, 1976), p. 17.
37. Air Commodore Hine, p. 59.
38. Major General Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement, 1973 (Boston, 1973), pp. 258-60.
39. Terrell E. Greene, "Tacair in the Defense of NATO," Astronautics and Aeronautics, March 1977, pp. 18-27.
Contributor
Wing Commander Jeremy G. Saye, Royal Air Force,
is on exchange duty with the United Sates Air Force assigned to Hq Tactical Air Command (Division of Operations and Training), Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. A graduate of the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell, he has been involved in the ground-attack role since 1959 and has extensive operational and training experience in Hunter and Phantom aircraft. He recently commanded a Harrier squadron and has served in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Far East. Wing Commander Saye is a graduate of the RAF Advanced Staff College, Bracknell, and the USAF Air War College, 1979.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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