Air University Review, January-February 1980

Counter Command and Control
 in Conceptual Perspective

Within the Department of Defense, command and control and counter command and control capabilities are now perceived as key elements of combat power, rather than merely as means of support. This recognition over the past few years has resulted in a number of studies, working groups, and contractor evaluations, intended to develop an optimum application of command and control (C²) and electronic warfare (EW) as "force intensifiers."²

While all of these efforts are making important contributions to development of our capability to seize control of the battlefield, by lack of a common conceptual (doctrinal) base. For example, some groups consider electronic warfare’s counter command and control (counter C²) function only in a defense suppression sense, while other groups (often within the same organization) consider EW’s counter C² capability as a means for attacking a broad spectrum of enemy offensive and defensive military capabilities.

My intent here, then, is to focus on command and control and counter command and control within a general conceptual context. I believe that a critique of the strong and weak points of this analysis by variety of audiences will contribute to a common conceptual thread for the continuing and future development of capabilities in the struggle to control the battlefield. My emphasis will be on needed friendly counter command and control capabilities, especially in regard to theater warfare as in a NATO/Warsaw Pact air/land conflict.

Why do the United States and the West need a strong counter command and control capability? There is little doubt that current American interest in C² and counter C² has grown in almost direct proportion to Soviet emphasis in these same areas.

The desire to improve U.S. and Western capabilities in these fields could be cynically attributed to some shallow mirror-image aspirations, a sort of knee-jerk reaction to an emerging Soviet capability. Yet, quite frankly, there is a growing awareness throughout the U.S. and allied defense communities that a U.S./allied counter command and control capability is a social, cultural, political, and economic, as well as a military and technological, necessity in maintaining an adequate NATO/Warsaw Pact balance.

The following appraisal of the NATO/Warsaw Pact military balance, though now generally accepted in the West, still is rather sobering: The sociocultural and politico-economic structures of the U.S. and the other Western democracies will not support standing general-purpose military force postures adequate for reliance on a strategy of simple attrition in combat against the Warsaw Pact. If one accepts this appraisal, it follows that the Western allies must develop precise general-purpose force employment strategies. And these strategies should be based on the principle of disruption of the opposing forces’ abilities to command and control their numerically superior manpower and equipment assets on the battlefield. These tactics would be particularly important in the initial phases of the conflict when the quantitative imbalance would be the greatest.

If this disruptive concept were successful, it would involve well-coordinated applications of Blue firepower (air delivery, tube, and nonnuclear missile) as well as electronic warfare assets. These applications, to be used against enemy C²/C³ forces, should establish the vulnerability of key enemy air and ground forces, thereby ensuring their destruction by relatively limited levels of allied fire/weapons. This type of disruptive capability is basic to the objective of maintaining a high theater nuclear threshold.

What military factors are appropriate in consideration of a disruptive strategy against the Soviet/Warsaw Pact theater war concept? Is a disruptive strategy with primary focus on countering enemy command and control feasible?

For one thing the highly structured Soviet concept for theater war emphasizes extensive preplanning, precise scheduling, and continuous, detailed lateral and vertical coordination among all combat elements. I believe that these aspects of the Soviet approach to theater war constitute something more than just battlefield technique; rather they appear to establish a type of basic combat mindset seemingly vulnerable to confusion and loss of confidence when encountering unanticipated circumstances requiring immediate initiative. Further, this mindset is deeply rooted in Russian culture and Marxist-Leninist ideology, which emphasize hierarchy and central control.

Although the Soviet combined arms concept is popularly referred to as a "blitzkrieg" approach, it is really similar to blitzkrieg, only in its emphasis on surprise, envelopment, and rapid advance. What it lacks in comparison to the Wehrmacht blitzkrieg concept is that it does not emphasize subordinate initiative.³ According to a 1977 U.S. Army handbook on Soviet ground forces," Avoidance of responsibility and lack of initiative appear to be deeply rooted in the Soviet military. "⁴

In Soviet writings where initiative is emphasized, such urgings seem to be offset by equally or more stringent calls for extensive, rapid lateral and vertical coordination of alterations to the plan. Apparently, the Soviets see computers (supported by extensive command and control communications networks) as a solution to the dilemma of desiring blitzkrieg battle results on the one hand as opposed to their cultural and ideological imperative for a centralized battlefield on the other. For example, a 1976 article by General-Colonel D. Grinkevich, Chief of Staff of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) indicated that

. . . command and control have . . . become just as important a condition for victory as the quality and quantity of weapons . . . control in combat requires timely decision making . . . and persistent implementation of the decision. The commander and staff must maintain continuous communications with both the senior chief and his subordinates and adjacent units . . . the time has come to adopt more widely an automated [command and] control system.⁵

Grinkevich's attitude reflects current thinking within the Soviet military science discipline, especially his concern with and call to "adopt more widely an automated (command and) control system."

The Soviets have noted a "revolution in military affairs" precipitated by the evolution of military technology since World War II. According to Soviet theory, this revolution has consisted of three watershed technological breakthroughs: nuclear weapons, nuclear-capable missile delivery systems, and the evolution of computers as a major factor on the battlefield.

One Soviet military theorist very much inclined toward the use of cybernetics on the battlefield is General-Colonel V. V. Druzhinin, former Deputy Commander of PVO Strany (Air Defense of the Homeland) for Radio-technical Troops (radar); in 1977 he was a member of the General Staff and assumed to be Chief of the General Staff’s Armaments Directorate.⁶

Druzhinin and the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, are prime movers in the Soviet quest for computer technology.⁷ I t is very likely that Druzhinin is a principal architect of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact combined arms battlefield posture that will face NA TO in the '80s and '90s.

The battlefield uses to which the Soviets intend to put computer technology are well described by Druzhinin and Colonel-Engineer D.S. Kontorov in Concept, Algorithm and Decision, 1972, which emphasizes the Soviets’ need in combined operations for copious amounts of information on friendly and enemy forces.⁸ The book also develops concepts for computer-based rapid information collection, transfer, processing, and lateral/vertical dissemination of the extensive information load. It even anticipates the eventual allocation of responsibilities for "creative work" to machine processes (which may have to do with targeting.⁹ It is worth noting that Soviet authorities have refused copyright permission to Western publishers for the translation and publication of another (later) book by Druzhinin and Kontorov.¹⁰

In reading these authors, the principle of centralization appears to be the prime factor underlying Soviet enthusiasm for computerized command and control systems. In view of the cultural and ideological predispositions to centralism mentioned earlier, I conclude that there are definite limits to Soviet military science’s ability ever to extract itself conceptually from heavy centralization of decision-making, resulting in a deep reliance on "positive control" and an associated dependence on communications.

Two other books by Soviet authors, widely acclaimed within Soviet military circles, also provide evidence of Soviet dependence on centralism. The Offensive by Colonel A. A. Sidorenko clearly stresses that "the determination of combat missions lays the foundation for the organization of coordinated action and provides for strict centralization and firmness of leadership. . . ."¹¹

V. Ye. Savkin's book, Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics, strongly supports the fundamental importance of centralized control.

. . . establishing rigidly centralized troop control in the hands of the senior commander at critical moments of battle. . . . the military commander has begun to resemble. . . a scientist at control panels and radio station controls . . . to unite troops . . . combat equipment, weapons . . . for a common mission . . . only with centralized troop control. Under the contemporary conditions a rigid centralization of control permits the senior commander to determine the outcome of the battle as a whole at the necessary moment.¹²

If one compares these statements, which stress centralized battlefield decision-making capabilities and concepts, with Soviet/Warsaw Pact operational training and exercises, he notices the degree to which Soviet practice accords with the written theory. I find it difficult to believe that the Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces will be capable of broadly based, significant innovative action in actual combat, since it is not widely practiced in field training exercises.

Centralization is not the only factor that inhibits Soviet combat innovation, with a resulting heavy dependence on command and control communications. One can observe the nature of the Soviet combined arms operation in itself. Simply stated, Soviet combined arms operations rely on the concept of "critical time," meaning adherence to precise schedules in the completion of detailed series of independently pursued but heavily interdependent combat tasks. Failure in any of these tasks creates a pervasive "ripple effect" on the overall combined arms operations.¹³ Thus, schedule changes for completion of any one task require extensive lateral/vertical coordination.

I am of the opinion that Soviet command and control centralization and the associated time-critical concept require a specific counter U.S./allied C² capability: the capability to cause informational delays/ errors cumulatively resulting in a series of decision delays/errors which would minimize Soviet capability to realize the combat potential of their greater numbers on the 1980/1990 battlefield.

This goal should be achievable because of the increasing amounts of information needed by Soviet combat decision-makers for making decisions for each combat task and the resulting lessening critical time available for each decision. There will be further vulnerability to attacks of this type primarily because of the relatively more structured decision-making/implementation procedures required by the increasing reliance on formatted digital data communications systems inherent in Soviet computer applications. I also expect this format of reliance on specific data systems to lessen the combat value of even heavily redundant multimode C³ networks.

What are the technological factors operating within command and control capabilities, and how do they apply to a conceptual context for counter C²?

While a well conceived and applied disruptive strategy would exploit deeply seated culturally and ideologically driven Soviet vulnerabilities, the importance to U.S./NATO military preparedness of a comprehensive counter C² capability also possesses another dimension. Within that dimension one must look at Western technological superiority (although nonexistent or lessening in some areas), which should be dominant within the '80s, in the interrelated fields of microcircuitry, data correlation and display, and high speed/capacity communications. With that superiority comes a conceptual vehicle whereby U.S. military advantage in advanced information correlation and display and communications technology could most effectively exert leverage on the battlefield through a counter C² disruption strategy based on precise orchestration of fire/weapons/jamming deliveries. I believe that the development of a comprehensive U.S./allied counter C² concept with expert forces for its execution would certainly allow for the fullest exploitation of the superior military potential of Western technology.

Clearly, the United States and its NATO allies need a disruptive strategy based on counter command and control tactics. Following, then, are some general concepts that could be useful in developing such a counter command and control capability.

• A new combat medium has emerged. Whether it be called "C² warfare" (my preference), or "control warfare," or some other term, it possesses certain characteristics, most fundamentally the need to disrupt enemy control while protecting friendly control. Inasmuch as increasingly sophisticated tactical weapon systems place a greater burden on friendly and enemy battlefield control systems, this capability would be more important to the side depending on the precise application of fewer but more technologically sophisticated weapon systems. Having success in this combat medium would be a force intensifier.
• "Disruptive deliveries" concept. In most discussions of counter command and control, the focus is primarily on electronic warfare initiatives for jamming and spoofing enemy communications and radars. One must acknowledge, though, that the traditional approach of killing opposing commanders and destroying their control mechanisms are also effective disruptive tactics (to say the least!).

A comprehensive counter C² capability must contain the options of electronic warfare (including electronic deception) and also include lethal deliveries for countering enemy C² functions.

To categorize electronic warfare and lethal means together as "disruptive deliveries" gives one the option of exploiting the full range of these possibilities and puts electronic warfare on the battlefield as a legitimate weapon to be "fired" at the enemy in the sense of "electronic ordnance."

• "Disruptive deliveries" objective. Obviously, no disruptive delivery or delivery against any single "critical node target" can be expected to produce an Achilles’ heel effect within the enemy operations.

Actually, disruptive deliveries (electronic warfare/lethal) should pursue the "functional targeting" concept (discussed later), creating informational delays/errors cumulatively resulting in a series of enemy decision delays/errors which minimize their capability to realize combat potential.

Coordinated disruptive deliveries would ultimately affect key enemy fire and maneuver elements and thereby produce their attrition or neutralization (e.g., through denial of fuel/spare parts). However, attrition in and of itself cannot be used as a measure of effectiveness (MOE) in calculating the impact of disruptive fire/weapon/electronic warfare applications; the battle effect of attriting equivalent enemy air, armor, infantry, and artillery units depends greatly on time and place. That is to say, destruction of a particular type aircraft or ground unit at one time and place in battle is not necessarily equivalent in influence on the battle outcome as destruction of the same type of equipment or unit at another place and time on the battlefield.

Attrition is further limited in its utility as a combat MOE because it does not account for the battle effect of denying certain fire and maneuver options to the opposition.¹⁴

• The "functional targeting" concept. Rather than basing air, artillery, and electronic warfare targeting on an "entity targeting" concept which focuses only on particular installations, units, or complexes, effective disruption requires targeting to focus on targets defined as "functions." For example, a "functional targeting" approach targets the artillery fire control functions of a particular unit rather than simply targeting the fire control authority. This functional targeting approach allows for alternatives that are not available with entity targeting. In the fire control example, these alternatives include (at a minimum): destroying the fire control authority, jamming the fire control data/information receiving capability of subordinate fire elements, spoofing the fire control authority, destroying all (or selected) fire elements being controlled, and spoofing the fire elements being controlled.

The choice of the particular alternative would be geared to the type of enemy operation being countered. To continue with the example of artillery fire control, one disruptive technique might be best for countering enemy control of artillery support used for a breakthrough operation, while another disruptive technique may be better used for countering enemy fires in a meeting engagement. And since the alternatives or the modes of optimum employment will differ depending on the type of operation being countered, it follows that the relative priorities for each target would not be constant. For example, priorities that apply in attacking a hasty defense would probably differ from those in attacking a prepared defense.

Therefore, the functional targeting process requires every friendly intelligence echelon to determine just what type(s) of enemy operations are being encountered at a particular time. The current technique of "intelligence templating" the unfolding of an enemy operation allows this sort of continuous assessment.¹⁵

• The need for joint employment/targeting doctrine. The disruptive deliveries and functional targeting concepts require the development of a joint doctrine that would prescribe certain delivery medium/target type options for the various air /land combat echelons. Thus it could be doctrinally directed that each echelon of the air /land warfare team be permitted and equipped to attack certain C² targets with various means. 

For example, if, doctrinally, a ground division commander had the means to fire upon but not electronically disrupt a functional target and if he later determined a need for that target to be electronically disrupted (perhaps his fire was ineffective), he could forward that requirement to the next echelon. On consideration of that request, an electronic warfare action by units (perhaps air units) equipped and doctrinally authorized would be employed to disrupt the target electronically.

Although complex, it is my opinion that with the Western lead in information correlation and other data-handling technologies, we could use these types of doctrinal employment/targeting distinctions to effect the necessary battlefield coordination. This concept is similar to current concepts for artillery and offensive air support.

• A functional basis for counter C² organization. What are the possible organizational arrangements as well as functional requirements for support of a counter command and control organization? Within the context of the previously recommended doctrinal employment/targeting prescriptions for each air/land echelon, the counter C² structure at each echelon should be capable of managing, in an integrated manner, the following mix of traditionally separate disciplines:

--Collection, analysis, reporting of counter C² relevant intelligence (including information on threats to friendly C²/C³).

--Communications security/operations security surveillance, analysis, and reporting to give friendly commanders an idea of how enemy intelligence is perceiving friendly operations.

--Electronic warfare, air, tube, missile deliveries (disruptive deliveries), including lethal means against enemy C² functions and attritive deliveries against key enemy force elements made vulnerable by induced breakdown of the enemy command and control process.

--Analysis of Red deception activities.

--Development of Blue tactical deception initiatives.

--Responsive management of friendly communications to minimize the effect of enemy counter command and control operations.

The integrated management of these disciplines should allow for the following processes:

Analyze enemy threats and friendly vulnerabilities for defensive planning, and enemy vulnerabilities and friendly capabilities against them for offensive planning.

Apply assets to monitor enemy and friendly C³, identify enemy vulnerabilities and friendly compromises, and react with appropriate offensive and defensive tactics (e.g., communications jamming, spoofing, weapons/ fire targeting, intelligence exploitation). Evaluate effectiveness of defensive and offensive measures and provide feedback for the next iteration of analysis.¹⁶

Counter command and control, pursued as a combat medium, has the potential for significantly increasing U.S./Western war-fighting capacity, especially with regard to general-purpose forces' actions against the Warsaw Pact. I believe that the total concept of command and control warfare must be understood and evaluated within the terms of combat and force intensification potential. This evaluation must be first and foremost in the context of the battlefield. It must ignore whatever administrative programming inconveniences that result from the concept's requirement for integrated management of currently separately programmed and funded disciplines.

The overall concept of counter command and control is vital for Western military preparedness, but it presents the U.S. and her NATO allies an extreme management/organizational challenge of historical significance.

Notes

1. Harold Brown. Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington, D.C. February 2, 1978), p. 100. Emphasis added.

2 The term "command and control" is used instead "command, control, and communications." Most people first considering the problem tend to focus on the technical aspects of communications rather than assess all facets of command and control capability; "communications" is simply one important medium for support of that capability.

3. I was influenced in this assessment of the respective Wehrmacht and Soviet blitzkrieg concepts by a very perceptive tactical concepts briefing given by Colonel John Boyd, USAF (Ret), to an Air Staff hosted "Battle Doctrine" seminar on 16 April 1978.

4. Handbook on the Soviet Ground Forces, (U), revised, SupR 69720 (Fort Huachuca, Arizona: United States Army Intelligence Center and School, July 1977), p. 2:9.

5. D. Grinkevich, "Command and Control in Response to Contemporary Requirements," Military Herald, April 1976, pp. 47-51. Translated in Soviet Press Selected Translations, 77-11 November 1977, pp. 289-96. Emphasis added.

6. Harriet F. Scott, "The Soviet High Command," Air Force, March 1977, p. 56.

7. Ibid

8. V. V. Druzhinin and D. S. Kontorov, Concept Algorithm, Decision (Moscow, 1972), translated and published by the USAF, 1974.

9. Ibid., p. 295.

10. Druzhinin and Kontorov, Problems of Military Systemotechnology (Voprosi Voyennoj Sistemotekhnik), Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1976.

11. A. A. Sidorenko Colonel, Doctor of Military Science, The Offensive (Nastuplenie), Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1970.

12. V. Ye. Savkin, Colonel, Candidate of Military Science, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (Osnovnye Printsipy Operativnogo Iskusstra i Taktiki), Military Publishing House Moscow, 1972. Translated and published by the USAF, 1974. Emphasis added.

13. Ibid., Savkin presents a good explanation of the critical time concept on pp. 184-87.

14. This observation, while certainly not original with the author, was confirmed for him by his experience as an interrogator in the Republic of Vietnam (1969-1970). Numerous North Vietnamese officers and Viet Cong cadre explained to him that, owing to the B-52 threat, standing orders often precluded large-scale maneuver operations. This denial value of B-52 operations could not be quantified, but it was an important factor in the evolution of the war.

15. See Army FM 100-5 for a concise, unclassified discussion of intelligence templating, pp 7:13-17.

16. The author appreciates the thoughts of Mr. Gordon Sommers, Civilian Advisor to the Commander, USAF Security Service, in development of this functional delineation.

Lieutenant Colonel John E. Rothrock, Jr., (B.A., Hobart College; M.A. University of Notre Dame) is an International Politico-Military Affairs Officer in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force and is certified as a Soviet/East European Area Specialist. Previous assignments have included analytical and planning positions at Hq USAF, Hq U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and USAF Security Service. During the Southeast Asian War, he was chief of a prisoner of war interrogation team in support of U.S. Army and USAF units. Colonel Rothrock is a graduate of the Defense Intelligence School, Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and a Distinguished Graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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