Recently while reading James Fallows's article, "Muscle-Bound Superpower” in the October 1979 issue of Atlantic Monthly, I concluded that perhaps the reason many of our defense planners are reluctant to discard reliance on management rationality and advanced technology is that they are so closely linked to our traditional beliefs in a firepower-attrition doctrine versus a maneuver doctrine. There is one thing that is clear to all of us--if you can annihilate your enemy, you will be successful in combat. The ability to outmaneuver your enemy does not necessarily lead to the same conclusion. Reliance on managerial analysis to evaluate our technologically superior weapons systems shows (though obviously there will always be someone who disagrees with the analysis) that we can annihilate our enemy if only we acquire enough of these offensive systems, and this comforts us because we are now dealing with a known capability. It is more difficult to show that we can be victorious in battle simply by outmaneuvering our enemy. When one has the responsibility for the nation's security, it is much more comforting to rely on a sure thing and optimistically hope that the resources provided will be sufficient than to discard a winning formula in favor of an unprovable alternative. The consequences if that alternative proves to be wrong or is poorly executed are disastrous.
When one does not have the responsibility, for national defense, the choice of alternatives seems easy, but to the planner the choice of a defense posture based on a maneuver doctrine is made even more difficult by two factors. First, he must be able to demonstrate to the people who approve the systems and appropriate funds our ability to succeed by using these technically advanced systems. This is more easily done with quantifiable data. Second, he must also convince our enemy, whose perceptions of our capability define reality for him, of our ability to succeed. Our enemy's perception of our capability will definitely influence his behavior whether our systems actually work or not, and that in actuality is the essence of deterrence.
I am not trying to justify or pass judgment on the actions of our defense planners. Rather I am trying to understand one more possible reason (and there are many, I am sure) why they may cling to ideas or follow a logic that seems utterly ridiculous to those who do not bear the same responsibility for the nation's defense, do not feel the same burden that is associated with making a wrong decision, or whose convictions are so strong as to remove any doubt of the superiority of an alternative way of planning our defense.
Air Command and
Staff College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Contributor
Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Hutchinson (B.A., United States Air Force Academy; M.S., Troy State University) is Special Assistant to the Commandant for Doctrinal and Conceptual Matters at Air Command and Staff College. He has served as a planning and programming officer in the Directorate of Concepts at Hq USAF. Much of his career has been spent flying tactical fighter aircraft, including the F-100 and F-111, with one tour in SEA as a forward air controller and another in F-111s. Colonel Hutchinson is a Distinguished Graduate of the naval War College and Command and Staff Course.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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