Air University Review, September-October 1979
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Kastl
On the eve of his visit to the United States in June 1973, Secretary Brezhnev asked his advisers what he should seek in America. One adviser recommended cars, another computer factories, still another atomic power stations. No, replied Brezhnev thoughtfully, I'll just ask them to build us Communism.l
W
hat is détente? Are the Russian and U.S. versions different? And is détente compatible with long-range U.S. defense interests?Détente is a popular catchword in international relations; while it now perhaps has passed from official favor,2 it still serves to convey instantly a well-understood attitude toward complex world relationships. Will détente prove advantageous to the West in the long run? This continues to generate significant and heated debate, both within and outside the U.S. military community. In any event, the subject is of seminal importance to the military profession: Détente (or something similar to it) represents a fact of life that influences our foreign policy and our defense posture today. In analyzing detente, I propose to divide the subject into three parts: (1) defining the term more specifically, given the realities of 1979; (2) viewing détente as it is seen by both those who support or reject it; and (3) weighing the pros and cons of detente, vis-à-vis long-term American defense interests.
Read the 1950s rhetoric of the Cold War--few would disagree that the pendulum has swung from a clear-cut contest of strength to some new relationship based on an essential equivalence of strength between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Today, ideological purity apparently has mellowed into pragmatism, economic issues often influence events far more than purely military considerations, and bizarre, novel friendships and crosscutting coalitions thrive.
It is a cockeyed world: parochialism, regionalism, and cosmopolitanism flourish side by side. It is an alienated world: four "faiths" that promised much -secular humanism, technology, orthodox Christianity, and orthodox Marxism-no longer appear, in the eyes of many, to motivate humanity. And it is a world of confusion: political transformations are so radical that the nation-state, which dominated five centuries of history, no longer may be either the driving force or the highest expansion of political activity.3
Given this sort of world, what does détente mean? Beyond the generally accepted idea of a relaxation of tensions, it is extremely difficult for Western commentators to concur in any one definition of detente. To some, détente is:
Does détente have a different meaning in the Soviet world? Perhaps, Many would assert that to the Soviet leadership détente is merely another method--albeit one less dangerous--of continuing the class struggle. As proof, they point to Chairman Brezhnev's February 1976 speech before the 25th Soviet Congress. Essentially, the Soviet interpretation of détente assumes a lessening of the forces of war paralleled by increasingly mutually advantageous cooperation between states with different social systems; nonetheless, détente does not abolish the rivalry of the ongoing class struggle as a sacred duty of Marxism.9
Thus far, few might dispute the basic facts stated. Yet, when an interpretation of these facts is attempted--particularly when we ask, "What should the U.S. do next?"--analysts begin to reach clearly contradictory conclusions.*
*Lest labels such as "conservative" or "liberal" semantically interfere with exposition of contrasting viewpoints, I will refer to those generally in favor of détente as progressives Often, they are centrist or liberal in viewpoint, believe the Cold War is past, and assume that--given a changing political world--a new methodology for dealing with the Soviets is in America's best interests, In opposition to them stand those who might be called loyalists. Generally, they arc traditional or conservative in outlook, adhere to the basics of the predétente era as furnishing time-tested U.S. responses to unchanging Communist aspirations, and view détente with great suspicion in the face of Soviet military growth.
progressives
Progressives generally insist that America now safely may explore beyond the rigid, doctrinaire approach of the Cold War era. They believe that the twin tensions of Soviet ideology and Russian military adventurism have subsided, and viewing the contest as a death struggle with godless communism is a travesty. To the contrary, the real world is one where socialism is a fractured monolith, with Soviet ambition compromised by the shadow of nuclear war.l0 Moreover, it is a world where the Russians have discovered that neither raw military power nor foreign aid and cultural diplomacy permit the Kremlin to dictate other nations' decisions. Instead, today's world, is far more influenced by monetary considerations, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Common Market--areas where, incidentally, the Soviet Union has little say so.11 Therefore, say the progressives, now is the time when wise leadership can draw the Soviet Union into the ranks of cultured international nations, sensitive to the needs of constraint, discipline, and cooperation.12 Détente thus becomes a methodology for managing the East-West rivalry. True enough, America must maintain sturdy military defenses, but they should be spare and no greater than the basic levels necessary for adequate national security.
loyalist
To thinkers of more traditional persuasion, Soviet intentions and capabilities are crucial, and they remain ominous. There is every fear that the Soviets are seeking nuclear superiority; in turn, this resurrects the dangers of either nuclear confrontation or, more likely, Soviet expansion through international blackmail.
The future might be bright, loyalists argue, if only Soviet military programs reflected a live and let live attitude. Yet, quite the contrary is evident; notice how General George Brown commented in the introductory remarks to his FY79 Posture Statement that Soviet force improvements "have been deliberate, steady, and impressive."13
The Soviets still spend 40 percent more than the West on military forces, 250,000 troops still occupy central Europe, and there is little evidence that the Russians have surrendered their aspirations of world domination. In the face of this, say some traditionalists, the "siren song of the pacifists and U.S. unilateral disarmament advocates" is particularly disturbing, for it would cause an uninterrupted slide into second place and imperil our freedoms. The most telling point of recent Kremlinology is not Chairman Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the 25th Congress but rather the remark he is supposed to have made after the Helsinki meeting:
. . . trust us, comrades, for by 1985 . . . a decisive shift in the correlation of forces will be such that . . . we will be able to exert our will whenever we need to,14
Therefore, traditionalists conclude, détente represents a classic case of self-delusion.15 True, the Soviets so far have not lacked prudence, but they are building up to a nuclear war-winning primacy. If they someday choose to bully us, the West will face a painful dilemma: nuclear war or American surrender.16
not all black or white
In fairness, few on either side of the discussion would dismantle a strong and viable military force.17 Nevertheless, what separates the two schools of thought--and what is at the heart of their argument--is the degree to which the Soviets may be trusted today. Generally, progressives belittle a Soviet first-strike intention as "more or less mythological."18 Given the present Soviet leadership, the U.S. can successfully persuade the Russians to recognize a bipolar world and forego Soviet preeminence. Over time, outmoded communist doctrine will be chipped away, strengthening East-West accommodation.19 In contrast, loyalists insist that a major risk indeed exists, that progressives naively misapprehend true Soviet intentions, and that the struggle must continue between a messianic, expansionist Russian state and the West.20
The rhetoric of John Foster Dulles--or even of Kennedy--is out of style; today, the U.S. seldom strides across the international scene, intrepidly announcing that we will neither be outgunned nor bullied. And no longer do we feel compelled to respond to events, however minor, everywhere in the world.
Yet is the world truly changed, or does a virulent communism remain ready to rush forward if we show a willingness to meet it half way?
Consider the alternatives. If war has become an unworkable option, détente can be an excellent approach. We could begin achieving the sweet dream of eventually beating swords into plowshares. No longer fearing capitalism, the Soviets could relax. It is conceivable that Europe could be "demilitarized," thus barring a European conflict from leading the major powers to the abyss of war, as in 1914. The East European Warsaw Pact nations could gradually wrest from the Kremlin greater freedom of action and move toward polycentrism. Russia could delight in technology, consumerism, and commercial ties with the West. We could create a cooperative world. A diminished U.S. military budget would afford greater domestic succor and concomitant greater freedom of action for free enterprise. (Then, to turn the phrase around, Coca-Cola, IBM, and American farm know-how would "bury" the Russians, not the other way around.)21
Yet to traditionalist thinkers, we risk too much in a unilateral stand-down. Our national security interests are jeopardized by détente, since nothing has evidenced a Russian willingness to demilitarize. To the contrary, détente suggests we may be willing either to abandon our allies or even forsake our own vital interests. If Russia finds that détente involves a commercial war of influence but sees herself losing, traditionalists think she may launch on military adventurism out of exasperation or overreaction. Then, too, détente also suggests strongly to some that we condone a permanently divided Germany or Korea. More tellingly, détente carried the danger that the U.S. might draw down its arms and defensive alliances to a point where the West is too weak to resist a major Soviet military initiative.22 Alexander Solzhenitsyn asserts the traditionalist fear quite tellingly:
Now, of course, they have become more clever in our country. Now they do not say "we are going to bury you" anymore, now they say "détente." Nothing has changed in Communist ideology. The goals are the same as they were, but instead of the artless Khrushchev, who could not hold his tongue, now they say "detente."23
ferreting out Soviet intentions
What are the Soviet Union's true, long-term intentions? As suggested earlier, the division between loyalists and progressives essentially turns on this.
One is reminded of the old Indian story of the emerald test. Allegedly, one can discover if a stone is an emerald by dipping it in acid. If the acid eats away the stone, the candidate truly was an emerald. But to run the test, the stone must be destroyed.
It is the same way with the Russian intentions. If we seek accommodation, we have entered into a type of emerald test. Addressing this matter, progressives would reason that the Soviets do not aspire to world conquest today; so long as we maintain a sufficient military force, the Kremlin hardly seeks to occupy the United States. Thus, say these commentators, America now may lower its military guard, reconcile itself to a blander, less proselytizing communism, and enjoy the good life. If the Russians bluster from time to time, it should be chalked up to mere rhetoric--no more than jousting with words. After all, Christians and Moslems coexisted for centuries; so can these two isms.
The nagging trouble with the argument is this: If we emphasize negotiating, putting aside Cold War slogans and armament, and moving from confrontation to collaboration, we may have at least dipped into the acid bath. What if our stone truly is an emerald? What if the Russians really do intend to bury us?
A
s we continue the search for peace, it might be well to keep several points in mind.In no-nonsense terms, we have an idealistic streak in our American character that is both admirable and well worth preserving. It follows that, in the final analysis, there is a stark contrast between us and them. In our historical past, we had disagreements between Adams and Jefferson; our ruling leader sent his opponent philosophical letters, and in retirement they became cordial correspondents. In their historical past, they had disagreements between Trotsky and Stalin; it would appear that their ruling leader sent his opponent an assassin--all the way to Mexico.
Washington, D.C.
Notes
1. Cited in Theodore Draper. "Appeasement and Détente," Commentary February 1976. p. 2.
2. James R. Schlesinger, "The Evolution of American Policy towards the Soviet Union," International Security, Summer 1976, p. 42.
3. See Seyom Brown, New Forces in World Politics (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), pp.100-10, 213; Robert Legvold, "The Nature of Soviet Power," Foreign Affairs, October 1977, pp. 52-53.
4. Schlesinger, pp. 41, 46.
5. One of many definitions listed in Richard Rosecrance, "Détente or Entente," Foreign Affairs, January 1975, p. 464.
6. Suggested by Keith A. Dunn, "Détente and Deterrence: From Kissinger to Carter," Parameters, vol. VII, no. 4, 1977, p. 46.
7. R. J. Rummel, "Détente and Reality," Strategic Review, Fall 1976, p. 34.
8. Robert Constant et al., "Is Détente in the American Interest?" cited in Détente and Defense, edited by Robert J. Pranger (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), p. 212.
9. This may be merely Soviet propaganda, intended for home consumption. Leonid I. Brezhnev, Report to the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 24 February 1976, cited in Pranger, p. 166. Overall, the Soviets appear to view détente with clearer vision than does the West. Writing in a Russian journal, A. Nikonov stresses that détente has come about primarily due to the increased power of the Soviet Union; that peaceful coexistence does not lessen the ongoing class struggle; and that the aggressive nature of imperialism, to Soviet eyes, remains untamed. A. Nikonov, "Military Détente and the Transformation of International Relations," World Economics and International Relations, June 1977, pp. 28-39, reprinted in Soviet Press, Selected Translations, Nos. 77.9, and 77.10, Directorate of Soviet Affairs, Air Force Intelligence Service, September and October 1977.
10. Legvold, p. 70.
11. Legvold, pp. 55-58.
12. Helmut Sonnefelt, "Russia, America and Detente," Foreign Affairs, January 1978, p. 291.
13. General George S. Brown, United States Military Posture for FY 1979, 20 January 1978, p. 19.
14. Ira C. Eaker, "The Disarmament Conspiracy," Air Force Times, 2 January 1978, pp. 15-16.
15. See generally the remarks of George J. Keegan, Jr., in "Soviet Strength and Fears," World Issues, October-November 1977, pp 22,24,29.
16. Rummel, pp. 39-41.
17. See, for example, the views of Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Elusive Parameters of Detente," Orbis, Winter 1976, pp. 1344-57; Frederic H. Hartmann, "The Détente Debate," Naval War College Review, Summer 1977, p 40; Statement of Secretary of Defense Brown, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Release, 15 September 1977, p. 8; Legvold, p. 71; Schlesinger, pp. 42-43. For a far more optimistic view of Soviet intentions ("For some time, the Soviet Union has not been a revolutionary state; its conservatism is obvious not only in its foreign policies but in the nature of its economy and social life"), see Alan Wolfe, "The Trilateralist Straddle," The Nation, 31 December 1977, p. 713.'"
18. Hartmann, p. 40. Perhaps the strongest condemnation of the loyalists comes from Bernard T. Feld. He argues that the nation is being blanketed by "one of the most insidious campaigns in recent history: an attempt to turn the clock back to the worst days of the Cold War." Mr. Feld insists that it is "demonstrably clear (to all but far-out hawks and ignoramuses) that the current situation is quite the reverse" of loyalist claims--i.e., the American nuclear arsenal is clearly superior to that of the Russians. The article cautions that we may be entering a new, spiraling nuclear arms accumulation. Bernard T. Feld, "Where I, the Present Danger?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1978, p 28.
19. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "US. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," cited in Pranger, pp. 68-70.
20. Marvin Stone, "The Nation's Security," U.S. News & World Report, February 1978, p. 76; Paul H. Nitze, " Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Detente," Foreign Affairs, January 1976, p. 1; Rummel, pp 38-40
21. See generally Seyom Brown, pp. 9, 23.
22. Ibid., pp 20, 48, 59, 65, 66.
23. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "America: You Must Think about the World," cited in Pranger, p. 243.
Contributor
Lieutenant Colonel Joseph W. Kastl
(J.D., Northwestern University; M.S.E., Troy State University) is Deputy Legal Adviser and Legislative Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. As an Air Force judge advocate, he has served as an instructor at the Judge Advocate General's School, legal adviser at a unified command, and Staff Judge Advocate. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and has completed numerous legal and professional military education courses.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.