Air University Review, November-December 1979

John L. Sullivan, bareknuckle champion of the world, used to boast, "I can whip any sonofabitch in the house," but he met his match in the back room of a Boston bar when a bookkeeper called his bluff.

"How did you beat him?" customers clamored.
"Simple," said the accountant. "I led with Pawn to Queen Four."

Every kind of competition, you see, has its own canons. Force cannot succeed if the rules call for fraud or finesse. That dichotomy causes great difficulty for U.S. decision-makers, who pay lip service to Principles of War, but have failed to enumerate Principles of Deterrence, which are quite different.¹ The whole field of deterrent theory in fact has lain fallow since the early 1960s, when the last seminal studies on the subject appeared.²

Accordingly, this country still lacks any systematic way to shape schemes for nuclear deterrence, which has been our dominant national security objective for nearly 35 years. Precepts for preventing conventional conflicts and insurgencies have been similarly plagued since the 1960s, when it first became apparent that even limited strife with the Soviet Union, its clients, or other associates conceivably could skyrocket beyond U.S. control.

A checklist of principles therefore could serve a practical purpose, if consciously considered by senior U.S. strategists who prepare and implement concepts.

Deterrent Goals

Deterrence is a strategy for peace, not war, designed primarily to persuade opponents that aggression of any kind is the least attractive of all alternative.³ Preventive powers ideally should protect principal protagonists and partners across the entire spectrum of political, economic, technological, social, paramilitary, and military warfare, preferably before conflict occurs, but during its conduct if required to contain escalation and conclude hostilities on acceptable terms. (See Figure 1.)

Secondary applications seek to discourage friends and the unaffiliated from pursuing courses of action that would impact adversely on important programs or plans. Allies, for example, sometimes switch sides unless incentives to the contrary convince them otherwise. They also can start wars that run counter to the interests of consorts or expand conflicts that confederates try to confine. A fifth Arab-Israeli conflict, for example, could have far-reaching economic (or even military) consequences of a negative nature for the United States, if triggered by Tel Aviv.

Conflict Cause

Deterrent concepts and supporting postures must take constant cognizance of war-causing conditions. Combinations that counter one set successfully collapse when confronted with others. (See Figure 2.) ⁴

Preemptive and preventive armed conflicts of traditional types can transpire because the deterring power is becoming too strong. Deterrees attack while present advantages still permit or to preclude a position that portends unacceptable peril. Combat can also occur when deterrent powers are too weak, if they inspire undue optimism on the part of opponents or encourage enemy inclinations to accept calculated risks.

Figure 1. Categories of conflict

Figure 2. Causes of conflict

Dangers double when some deterrent components are shaky and others simultaneously are impressively strong. The situation in Central Europe serves as one illustration.

Soviet tanks very likely will lose leverage in the early-to-mid-1980s, when NATO's precision-guided munitions are perfected and the next generation of antitank missiles solves technological problems that presently reduce effectiveness in forests, smoke, and fog. Moscow must decide whether to use its highly touted force preemptively, before being figuratively outflanked, or forfeit the politico-military benefits that massed armor now provides. Two corollary factors could encourage the Kremlin to take such a chance: NATO's continued lack of any shield against ballistic missiles and king-sized loopholes in battlefield air defense.

Strength or weakness is almost inconsequential when it comes to scotching most enemy miscalculations, accidents, irrational acts, and catalytic collisions touched off intentionally by third countries. Such catastrophes can occur under any condition at any plateau in the conflict spectrum.

Deterrent Properties

Deterrence induces powers to dissuade, not coerce or compel. Psychological pressure is its prime property; opposing intentions are its principal target. Rival capacities remain physically untouched.⁵

Three characteristics are clearly quintessential: threats of punishment or promises of reward, connected capabilities, and unqualified inclinations to carry through in the clutch.

Precisely what makes any deterrent ploy fare effectively or founder is difficult to prove, but one conclusion is certain: concepts that work well in particular circumstances will not work at all in others. (See Figure 3.)

Fear of punishment, not promise of reward, is most likely to keep foreign armed forces from riding roughshod. Military power is especially persuasive when coupled with clear intent to inflict frightful wounds if attackers leave no alternative. Partners can amplify the deterrent potential of directly imperiled principals.

Revolutions arising from dissatisfaction with domestic deficiencies demand a different approach to deterrence. Armed services and police can stifle subversion for some unspecified period, particularly in closed societies, but positive steps to improve the people's life-style provide a better solution.⁶ Allies may advise, and perhaps help maintain a military shield behind which political, economic, and social programs can prosper, but local leaders in the long run must sink or swim on their own.

Whether carrots, sticks, or some mixture would most likely discourage undesirable nonmilitary deeds depends on a complex skein of interrelationships between deterrer and deterree. Muscle and other manifestations of material might are by no means the only measure.

Take crippling embargoes as one case in point. Targeted parties might deter such aggression by threatening to seize stocks from tormentors, if they possessed sufficient military strength and the commodities concerned were nonperishable metals, like titanium. Countersanctions serve well as preventives when each side possesses supplies essential to the other and outside sources are insufficient or can be stopped.

Neither precondition would prevail, however, if Persian Gulf petroleum producers put pressure on the United States by turning off their taps. U.S. force could easily defeat indigenous defenders while seizing oil fields, but success would produce a Pyrrhic victory if saboteurs smashed facilities or set them on fire in the process. Promised punishment, in that perspective, would lose a lot of "pizzazz." So would economic sanctions, since the countries concerned need U.S. goods and services less than we need oil. Enticement probably would appear more attractive than intimidation for deterrent purposes, if such problems really arose.

Principles of Deterrence

Principles of War, as tools for tacticians and strategists, have been tested for 30 centuries.⁷ Principles of Deterrence proposed in these pages are predicated on unproven theories developed during the past 30 years.

Precepts in those two categories overlap in some instances and are opposites in others. (See Figure 4.) The Principle of Objective (sometimes called Purpose) is implicitly shared but does not show on the deterrent side, since the preventive aim is self-evident. Neither do Unity of Command and Simplicity, which could be included on both lists.

All other Principles of Deterrence are different. The following sequence of presentation was selected to silhouette interdependence, not priorities: preparedness, nonprovocation, prudence, publicity, credibility, uncertainty, paradox, independence, change, and flexibility.

None of those norms are immutable, like Bernoullian numbers and Boyle's law of gases, where conditions and conclusions are solidly linked. Not every principle is appropriate for every occasion, and a few in fact conflict.

Still, Principles of Deterrence can serve as a capital checklist to assist sound judgment by architects and appraisers of national security concepts and plans. Users simply should recognize that no two requirements are quite alike and apply the list accordingly.

Nothing encourages power grabbers or opportunists quite as conclusively as prospective opponents with their guards down. Perpetual preparedness is one price of peace.

Aggressors who choose the time, place, and initial character of conflict can tolerate low force levels and lax readiness standards until the time comes to strike. No such luxury is allowable in target countries that are open to sneak attacks. Long-range plans and programs, however impressive, provide a poor deterrent if they spurn incremental improvements in present posture while waiting for seven-league strides.⁸

U.S. strategists have been blind to the Principle of Preparedness for approximately 200 years. The country has escaped unscathed thus far, but its citizens have not. The "Battered Bastards of Bataan," for example, spilled their blood to buy time while we "pulled ourselves up by our bootstraps" early in World War II. Maimed veterans and tombstones in national cemeteries bear mute testimony to many other instances. Minor lapses in preventive measures might be merely unfortunate even today, but major ones may prove fatal.

*U.S. Principles of War are shown for comparative purposes, The Navy and Air Force substitute Cooperation or Coordination for Unity of Command. Principles espoused by other countries differ substantially in some Instances.

Note: Alignment of the two lists is unrelated.

Preventive and preemptive wars are instigated deliberately because national decision-makers believe that war now is preferable to war later. Differences deal mainly with degrees of premeditation. Preventive wars result from long-range planning. Preemptive wars are triggered on the spur of the moment, to attenuate the effects of imminent enemy attack.

The Principle of Nonprovocation, which promotes stability, dampens those proclivities, but deterrent strategists have much more latitude than is generally realized because not all pugnacious postures prompt enemy attacks. Anticipatory retaliation," as a rule of thumb, rarely occurs unless chances of success exceed penalties for failure.

Preventive strikes against the Soviet Union were a popular subject for public contemplation by many of America's senior military men and civilian scholars during dark days in the 1950s, when Moscow was amassing assured destruction capabilities against the United States.⁹ The Soviets, however, sweat it out because the practical balance of nuclear power left them little to gain and everything to lose from preemption.

Insecure forces that must strike first or face ruin create truly desperate dangers that deterrence may fail. They tempt opponents to take a chance on preemption or compel possessors to beat foes to the draw if they believe their position is becoming too precarious.¹⁰

Sound deterrence confronts foes with irrefutable indications that net gains will be less or net losses more than they could expect by refraining from some given move. Maximizing the enemy's expected costs, however, may not always be consistent with minimizing dangers on the friendly side if,¹¹ for any reason, preventive steps should fail.¹²

The Principle of Prudence, a close counterpart of the Principle of War called Security, introduces discretion into deterrent strategy.

Some theorists contend that deterrence and defense occasionally are incompatible. U.S. assured destruction concepts rely entirely on powers to pulverize aggressors with a second strike, not protect ourselves, on the premise that mutual vulnerability best preserves the peace by making survival impossible in a full-scale U.S./Soviet war.

Skeptics score conclusions of that sort for being oversimplistic. They subscribe to the assumption that no standoff is eternally certain.¹³ Deterrence and defense should consistently be seen as inseparable, since one disputant or another will always find a way to shift the strategic balance in his favor.

The Principle of Prudence is bound to neither brief. It simply states that any strategy which cleaves to deterrent concepts that exclude defense should be subject to close scrutiny.

Neither fear of punishment nor promise of reward is possible if the deterring power keeps its capabilities a secret. That requirement is directly contrapuntal to the Principle of War called Surprise.

Deterrers must, therefore, make important decisions concerning what intentions and capabilities they should communicate to deterrees, and how they should seek to get the message through.¹⁴

Selecting proper courses from the smorgasbord of options is a complex process. Incentives can be conveyed directly or indirectly, verbally or nonverbally, officially or unofficially, formally or informally, explicitly or implicitly, publicly or privately, clearly or ambiguously. Terms can be general or specific. Representations can be relayed once or repeated.

Each choice has intrinsic strengths and weaknesses. Official pronouncements, deliberately prepared and delivered by top political dignitaries in some formal forum, for example, generally carry greater weight than off-the-cuff pronouncements at press conferences. Correspondence leaked at lower levels, without clear links to key leaders, leaves greater latitude for give and take, but the impact in turn will very likely be less pronounced. Public speeches that commit a country's prestige commonly provide a more potent deterrent than pledges made in private. Demonstrations are more convincing than dialogue.

The mission in each case is to fashion the best balance between deterree's belief and deterrer's flexibility.

Prospects of reward or punishment serve deterrent purposes if the likelihood that they would be applied appears plausible. Credibility increases that prospect from possible to probable in the opinion of opponents, provided incentives are neither insufficient nor too intense.

Persuasive powers, as a general rule, expand in direct proportion to pressures employed, until they reach some unspecified point beyond which potential prickbats or benefits begin to strain belief.

The United States, for example, once counted on threats of massive nuclear retaliation as a cure-all for low-level conflicts, but that simplistic strategy, calculated to get a "bigger bang for each buck," was bankrupt from the beginning. Opponents who specialized in psychological warfare, subversion, and insurgency scored consistently without tripping nuclear triggers. Our promised response was simply out of proportion to piecemeal provocations.

The dearth of homeland defense makes U.S. assured destruction capabilities a dubious deterrent today against any Soviet sin short of full-scale nuclear strikes on U.S. cities, despite contrary contentions by Defense Secretary Harold Brown.¹⁶ Historical precedents suggest that survival of the state surpasses all other priorities. Threats that risk suicide for anything less strain credibility. The Code of Bushido, which caused Japanese soldiers to cast themselves into the sea rather than surrender at Saipan, worked well at the lowest level. It became barren, however, when one nuclear bomb burst over Hiroshima and another over Nagasaki, because national survival, not personal safety, was at issue.

Uncertainty is the fallback position if credibility flags or fails. Deterrence then depends primarily on deterree doubts concerning all kinds of complications.¹⁷

Subjective and changeable states of mind called intentions are obvious sources of uncertainty. They make the input of opponents arid interested third (fourth and fifth) parties perilous or impossible to predict. Unanswered questions about capabilities on either side can also give deterrees pause, particularly when imponderables could create critical gaps between expectations and performance. A successful Soviet first strike against U.S. "sitting duck" missiles in silos, for example, may soon be duck soup from a technical standpoint, but any decision to shoot would still be difficult because the Kremlin could never be sure its systems would work precisely as planned or that we would not launch on warning.

Bluster can sometimes cause opponents to back off, but is risky business even for professionals. Habitual bluff as a substitute for solid abilities is a born loser; so is deterrence that bans bluff under any conditions. The best combination inspires and intensifies doubts on a selective basis.¹⁸

The "rationality of irrationality" comes into play when deterrent strategists consciously strive to strengthen uncertainty with promises of punishment or reward that would cost dearly if they had to implement them.¹⁹ Unequivocal commitments coupled with automatic responses are fairly common. Feigned lunacy can lend credibility to illogical concepts that leave national leaders little choice when the chips are down. A recent track record spotted with unpredictable acts makes madness even more plausible.

Fatal consequences, however, are the possible penalty for failure. Conflict is sure to occur if both sides press brinkmanship to its limits in attempts to drive hard bargains, believing the other will back down.²⁰

Peace, paradoxically, can occasionally be best assured by war, if drawing the line in one place forestalls evil elsewhere.

"Active" deterrence to prevent future wars or expansion of conflicts in progress often discourages overconfidence in foes and keeps friends from becoming disheartened. President Truman had that in mind when he chose to fight for Korea in 1950.²¹

President Johnson took a solid stand in Southeast Asia during the next decade, partly to prevent the so-called domino theory from taking an unpredictable toll. Failure to follow through effectively when the showdown came suggests that his fears were well-founded: the Soviet Union and its proxies still encourage, sponsor, and support subversive insurgencies around the world, with promise of success at a price they are willing to pay.

There is an additional paradox: the deterrent value of defending any objective may vary inversely with its intrinsic importance to the offended party. Determined response to aggression where low-level interests are involved often suggests to foes that further efforts would be unprofitable.²²

Payoffs are most impressive when active response shows opponents that they stand to lose by being belligerent, not just break even when compelled to stop. There is, however, a final paradox. The use of armed force or other coercive power may achieve future deterrent ends, even if it fails, provided steps taken inform foes that ill-gotten gains from aggression will incur excessive expense.

Collective security systems are centered on common interests. Allies and associates strengthen deterrence as long as so doing serves important purposes of the partners concerned. When shared incentives cease, so do coalitions. Affiliates, in fact, sometimes touch off troubles instead of constrain them. Consequently, no country should count on cooperation under all conditions.

Many NATO members preached patience and moderation when massive retaliation first surfaced as America's deterrent doctrine, fearing that impulsive employment of nuclear weapons would lay waste to the lands they yearned to preserve. Those apprehensions turned inside out when Soviet abilities to strike U. S. territory startled the Western world. French President Charles de Gaulle, anticipating that event, formulated the force de frappe in the 1950s precisely because he suspected that the United States would scarcely sacrifice its cities in a nuclear exchange to save NATO Europe from a Soviet assault.²³

Any deterrent plan or program that depends on cooperation by competitors probably is doomed to fail. That truth seems self-evident, but woolly-minded wishful thinking may replace pragmatism in the most enlightened societies.

The dogma of mutual assured destruction, for example, makes long-term common sense only if both sides subscribe to the concept, which is not the case. U.S. and Soviet vulnerabilities seem much less mutual than they did in the last decade. A gap of disputed proportions grows because Soviet leaders promote protection for their people and production base while U.S. leaders do not.

Strategists who stamp deterrent plans "complete" and stash them on the shelf are asking for unpleasant surprises.

Approaches that produced success in the past should not be transferred from one time period to another without very precise appreciation for changes taking place in the interim. Concepts and supporting force postures are just as tough to transplant from place to place, unless the situation in one locale is pertinent to the others.

Take the case of tactical nuclear weapons, which were practical U.S. tools when first deployed in the 1950s. Assorted U.S. delivery systems were specifically designed for carefully controlled counterforce combat in congested Central Europe, where collateral damage and casualties are a crucial concern.

Their deterrent value, however, depends on abilities to use them effectively at acceptable costs. Massive retaliation could still clamp a lid on local escalation in the 1950s but would cripple our unprotected society if we "pulled the plug" today.

Credibility, therefore, declined dramatically as soon as U.S. big bombs and missiles became decoupled. NATO in the new environment has little to gain and much to lose if it has to unleash the theater nuclear genie. War would take place largely on its home territory. Soviet saturation attacks could be expected in the heat of battle. So could fallout from surface bursts, against which the Warsaw Pact is better protected than Western Europe. Soviet strikes against ports, airfields, supply points, and command centers could be executed surgically with emerging missiles, like MIRVed SS-20s.

Talk about tactical nuclear options as a substitute for conventional strength thus is much less convincing than it was many years ago.

Preferred concepts and capabilities, however fruitful they seem, may prove fallible.24 The Principle of Flexibility, therefore, fosters optional solutions to important problems and acts as a beacon to strategists bent on putting too many eggs in any deterrent basket.²⁵

Bear in mind that Tyrannosaurus rex, the most menacing monster the world has ever seen, was a victim of overspecialization. His only known survivors are found in museums.

Strategy, in some respects, is like research and development. Phase I in each case produces basic theories and concepts. Phase II, which applies those tools to practical problems, falls flat if Phase I fizzles.

Security specialists in the United States need easy access to fundamentals that could assist their search for faultless deterrence across the conflict spectrum. This compilation of principles, which provides nothing new except the package, seeks to simplify their quest.

Notes

1. Six colonels in a study group formed by the Air Force Chief of Staff Seem to have compiled the only public list of deterrent principles Their product was published as Colonel Robert H. Reed, USAF, "On Deterrence: A Broadened Perspective," Air University Review, May-June 1975, pp. 2-17. Collaborators included Colonels Stuart W. Bowen, Robert W Kennedy, William H L. (Moon) Mullins, John L. Piotrowski, and Leonard J. Siegert.

2. Sources for this essay depend primarily on the works of writers who expounded deterrent concepts during the nascence of US nuclear strategy, as most of the other footnotes will show.

3. Types of deterrence, tailored to achieve different purposes, are discussed by Herman Kahn in On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 285-87; Thinking about the Unthinkable (New York Horizon Press, 1962), pp. 111-16, 122-23, 158; and On Escalation Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 281-84.

4. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 278, probes problems of peace. See also The Future of Conflict, edited by John J. McIntyre (Washington National Defense University Press, 1979), 186 pages.

5. Several studies summarize the essence of deterrence. See especially Y. Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace, 1963 (Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1966), pp. 9-40, 124-33; Morton A Kaplan, "The Calculus of Deterrence," World Politics, October 1958, pp. 20-44; William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," a chapter in Military Policy and National Security, edited by Kaufmann (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), pp. 12-38; Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 3-51.

6. Deterrent concepts open to counterinsurgents during the incubation stage of any insurrection are enumerated by David Galula in Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964) See especially pp. 64-69.

7. Principles of War are presented in John M. Collins, Grand Strategy Principles and Practices (Annapolis, Maryland: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1973), pp.22-28.

8. Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1962), p. 26.

9. Successive U.S. presidents professed a second-strike policy in the 1950s, but "Nuke the Russians before they nuke us" was a popular slogan among many admirals and generals. Astute civilian published serious studies of the subject. See, f9f example, Samuel. Huntington, "To Choose Peace or War: Is There a Place for Preventive War in American Policy?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1957 pp. 359-69.

10. Thomas C. Schelling describes the "Dynamics of Mutual Alarm" in Chapter 6 of Arms and influence (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966), especially pp. 224-48.

11. Mathematical models of cost-gain ratios are displayed and discussed in Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, pp. 16-24.

12. U.S. Admiral J. C. Wylie, seeking to set the foundations for a general theory of strategy, started with four assumptions The first was cited as follows: "Despite whatever efforts there may be to prevent it, there may be war." Military Strategy (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1967), pp. 78-79.

13. Herman Kahn forecast unfortunate consequences if any U.S. president "convinces the Soviets that he mean what he says when he says that 'war is pre. posterous.' I suspect that many in the West are guilty of the worst kind of wishful thinking when, in discussing deterrence, they identify the unpleasant with the impossible" On Thermonuclear War, p. 286.

14. Y. Harkabi devotes Chapter 9 in Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace to "Communication of the Threat," pp 124-31. His coverage concerns nuclear deterrence, but principles apply equally to other preventive concepts. Many examples are contained in Chapter 5, "Declaratory Policy and Force Demonstrations," of Snyder's Deterrence and Defense, pp. 239-58.

15. Harkabi summarizes the essence of credibility in Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace, pp. 28-35: "For a threat to deter it must be credible, but not every credible threat deters…. As the threat of punishment increases in severity or violence, its deterrent value will grow…As the threat increases in severity, the feasibility of its implementation will decrease.... Thus, as the threat of violence-increases, its credibility decreases."

16. Defense Secretary Harold Brown, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, indirectly refuted recent statements by former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who told NATO allies they should not count unequivocally on a U.S. "nuclear umbrella." Brown declared that massive retaliation remains a realistic option, despite risks to U.S. territory, because defeat in Western Europe would directly threaten U.S. "vital interest," Robert G. Kaiser, " 'Door Open' to Boost Defense Spending in '80s, Brown Says," Washington Post, September 20,1979, p. A-2

17. Herman Kahn christened uncertainty "the residual fear of war" in Thinking about the Unthinkable, p. 129. Kissinger expanded that perspective in Necessity for Choice, pp. 53-58. "The threat that leaves something to chance" occupies a full chapter in Thomas Schelling's treatise on The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 187-203.

18. John McDonald plumbed the business of bluffing in Strategy in Poker, Business, and War (New York: W.W Norton & Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 28-34,70-74.

19. Herman Kahn describes "the rationality of irrationality" in On Thermonuclear War, pp. 6-7, 24-27.

20. Bertrand Russell postulates that if one party were willing to run great risks and the other was not, the former would win every war of nerves. "We are, therefore, faced, quite inevitably, with the choice between brinkmanship and surrender." He explores that theme in Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), pp. 30-31.

21. President Truman, for example, "let it be known that we considered the Korean situation vital as a symbol of strength and determination of the West. Firmness now would be the only way to deter new action in other parts of the world." Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956), pp. 339-40.

22. Snyder discusses active deterrence in a section entitled "Strategic Value and Deterrent Value," Deterrence and Defense, pp.33-40.

23. General Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, Tome 2 (Paris: Plon), pp. 524-25.

24. "The player who plans for only one strategy runs a great risk simply because his opponent soon detects...and counters it. The requirement is for a spectrum of strategies that...by intent and design can be applied in unforeseen situations. Planning for uncertainty is not as dangerous as it might seem; there is, after all, some order" in human affairs. "Planning for certitude," however, "is the greatest of all... mistakes." J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy, p. 85.

25. U.S. strategists inexplicably exclude Flexibility from the Principles of War and pay fearsome penalties. Figure 4 shows Flexibility on that list as well as with Principles of Deterrence to indicate the desired overlap.

Colonel John M. Collins, USA (Ret), (M.A., Clark University) is Senior Specialist in National Defense, Library of Congress. Washington. D.C. With more than 20 years in strategic and tactical planning, he prepared contingency plans for Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. He was a member of the faculty at the National War College (1968-72). He is author of Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (1973) and American and Soviet Military Trends: Since the Cuban Missile Crisis (1978). Collins is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and National War College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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