Air University Review, November-December 1979

Despite efforts to ameliorate international tensions, the results often have been questionable. Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, asserts that "at no time since World War II has the West faced greater. threats to its institutions, values, and economies," and that the most serious threat is "the growth of Soviet military power and political influence."¹ In this regard, each of the books discussed here has some connection with American institutions concerned with international security and American defense issues.

Anyone seeking an understanding of contemporary economic problems will find Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager's Economic Issues and National Security a good primer. In The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era, Colin S. Gray examines economic and security issues but more single-mindedly focuses on military-economic problems posed to the West by the Soviet Union.

Both of these books were sponsored by the National Strategy Information Center.² Nuclear Weapons and World Politics by David C. Gompert et al. is sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, whose 1980s Project set to work a number of study groups on world problems relevant to the next decade.³ The authors concentrate on the question of minimizing or eliminating the dangers of nuclear confrontation.

In Economic Issues and National Security,* Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager state that today's foreign policies are determined more by external than internal pressures, and it is in this context that they examine both economic and security affairs. Moreover, they are convinced that the intimate relationship between economic issues and national security has not received sufficient recognition. To address these matters, editors Knorr and Trager have assembled chapters contributed by eight scholars, all but one of whom are American academicians in the fields of government or politics; the exception is Hanns Maull, a German, who is the European Secretary of the Trilateral' Commission located in Paris.

*Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, editors, Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977, $7.50), 330 pages.

The first two chapters, by Knorr and Robert Gilpin respectively, present a macroeconomic historical appraisal of the world's economic systems. Gilpin discusses the origin and nature of the existing interdependent world economy and the rise of Great Britain to economic dominance in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century. Knorr provides a more detailed account of America's belated assumption of economic leadership after World War II and of the principal financial and economic institutions established at that time to regulate the international economy: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank).

The fundamental contemporary economic issue discussed by several of the writers, and especially by Gilpin, is the confrontation between a "market economy" and a "mobilization exchange" system. The existing market economy is defined as a system involving "a market place wherein goods and services are exchanged to maximize the returns to individual buyers and sellers" and which "is not subordinate to society or the state." (p. 21) However, that interdependent market economy which fueled the industrialization of the West and helped create the modern democracies is now confronted by serious external and internal challenges.

Externally, the challenge comes from communism and from the economic nationalism of the less developed nations in particular. Both of these practice a mobilization exchange featuring state control of the exchange of goods and services--a control designed "to advance the security and power of the dominant elite" and, warns Gilpin, "the primary goal of exchange is to enhance the war-making capability of the state." (p. 21)

Western individualistic capitalism is also subject to attack from within. The pluralistic democratic principles of these nations encourage sociopolitical pressures on the government from business associations, labor unions, minorities, and a wide spectrum of lobbying interests including competing governmental agencies. Together these forces act to restrict the free operation of the market economy by their demands for governmental action to redress economic differences.

Other topics of special interest are economic interdependence, the relationship of industry, technology, and military power, and oil and food as instruments of power.

No nation of any size, it is contended, is totally self-sufficient, and all are forced to participate in international trade. Of the ranking powers only China and Russia have a limited requirement for imports, but, even for them, that is only a relative independence as their appetite for Western technology increases. The economic interdependence of nations affords them the opportunity either for cooperation or conflict with their trading partners. Governments must choose, states Clark Murdock, whether they wish to intervene actively in market activities or remain aloof and impotent. (That limited choice of options recalls the precepts of nineteenth-century Social Darwinism, which postulated that a nation must compete to survive; and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's dictum that rejected "neutralism" and demanded that states stand up and be counted.)

While economic power itself cannot be equated with military strength, Klaus Knorr reminds us that the levels of industrialization and technology are major factors of that strength inasmuch as they are indicative of a society's ability to produce and use modem weapons.

Knorr discusses the mechanics of economic coercion and the difficulty of applying it effectively. He declares that three factors are essential. First, a nation must be able to control the supply and distribution of a commodity. Second, that commodity must be sorely needed by the other nation. And finally, the needing nation must decide that it is more costly to accept the denial of the commodity than it would be to comply with the coercer's demands. Knorr believes that economic coercion is most successful in confrontation situations where the issue is not vital enough to warrant military action.

Chapters by Hanns Maull and Cheryl Christensen analyze the coercive use of oil and food. Maull notes that the impact of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (0 PEC) embargo of 1973-74 was less drastic than anticipated because of the oil producers' inability to control tanker, pipeline, and refinery production. Nevertheless, he concludes that because of the world's energy requirements oil will continue to play an important role in international affairs. Maull is doubtful that a counterembargo of foodstuffs would have been an effective means for altering OPEC policy. And while Christensen notes the advantageous position of the United States in regard to food production from 1960 to 1975 when it produced an average of 12 percent of the world's wheat and 25 percent of the total grain, like Knorr, she concludes that food is a difficult commodity to use for economic coercion. Moreover, she observes that today the United States is in a less favorable position to use food coercively since new laws have drastically reduced the amount of public food stocks. She further concludes that except under the most dire emergencies, the United States should use its foodstuffs magnanimously.

Throughout this book there are references to the weaknesses of the American political system where power is fragmented and decentralized both privately and governmentally. Beyond setting macroeconomic policy, for example, Stephen D. Krasner observes that the government has little institutional capacity to intervene in the economic market -thus the difficulties that exist in regulating wage-price levels and the inadequacy of "jawboning." Similarly, the politico-economic restraints of domestic interests have led to limited foreign policy parameters in developing economic relations with the Soviets and in dealing with the energy crisis.

The editors and authors of Economic Issues and National Security are to be complimented for a well-written and organized collection of articles with a minimum of economic or political jargon. Knorr and Trager have done an exceptional job in interrelating the various topics and points of view. Too frequently in such collections there is much redundancy with no recognition that similar data and ideas have been used in several of the selections. However, in this book there is little of that except where it is pertinent, and there the writers invariably note the context and place where such material previously was used. If there is any objection to the writing, it is to the overenumeration of supporting factors, principles, elements, etc., which too often give a Lawrence Welk beat to the text, i.e., "a one-and-a-two-and-a--."

One puts this book aside with a sense of apprehension for the future that perhaps is best expressed in Gilpin's warning that "the growing importance of the economic factor in international relations…suggest[s] the increasing politicization of international economic relations…. This situation, if carried to its logical extreme, would be the transformation of all economies into mobilization economies." (p. 63) The key question is, as stated by Knorr and others, Can the democratic capitalist societies muster sufficient political will for the actions necessary to retain the market economy?

For the development of a broad perspective of the world scene, Colin s. Gray recommends the study of geopolitics.* Dr. Gray, now associated with the Hudson Institute, formerly taught at universities in Great Britain and Canada and was a staff member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He recommends the study of geopolitics because it will enable one to "understand trends and historical continuities" rather than being misled by more dramatic but less significant events. As a working definition of geopolitics he uses Saul B. Cohen's: "the relation of international political power to the geographical setting."⁴ And for Gray the crucial geographic realities are the spatial relationships of the powers and the West's requirements for access to the world's physical resources. Gray regrets that because of the false, propagandist Geopolitik of the Nazis, geopolitics has been mistakenly slighted as a scholarly discipline and the works of notable and pertinent theorists like Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman are ignored.

*Colin S, Gray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution (New York: Crane, Russak &. Co., 1977, $4.50 hardback, $2.95 paperback), 70 pages.

Gray makes a pessimistic appraisal of the West's position in the global arena. "We are at the mid-stage of a shift in relative power and influence to the Soviet Union that is of historic proportions," and it is "the most pressing, dangerous, and potentially fatal fact of the real world." (p. 3) He considers it foolish to ascribe any serious interest in stable international relations to the Soviets as there is no apparent limit to their appetite; instead, the West must gird for a difficult, permanent struggle.

To support these contentions Gray argues as follows. First, Marxism-Leninism has by its very nature a conflict-oriented concept of international relations which holds that all nonsocialist regimes are enemies of the Soviet Union. Second, the struggle for power is a fundamental feature of international relations and is, in essence, a duel for world dominance between the "Heartland" and "Insular" powers. And in that duel the principal pawn is the "Rimlands" of Eurasia-Africa and the adjacent waters, for, in Spykman's dictum, "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world." (p. 27) In the initial concept of Mackinder, this was a contest between Eurasian land power (possibly a Russian-German combination) and British sea power. Today, according to Gray, the Soviets and the Americans are the protagonists.

It is in this context that Gray believes the growth of Soviet military power and the nation's intervention into the affairs of Africa, the Middle' East, and elsewhere must be evaluated. Soviet rimland bases now threaten the Cape route, which is "the energy lifeline of Western Europe," and recent Soviet worldwide naval exercises such as "Okean-75" demonstrate the vulnerability of NATO's western flank. The denial of Soviet control of Western Europe is imperative. If the Soviets achieve domination of the Eurasian-African rimland, the United States might physically survive, but it would be forced to abandon its liberal, democratic ways for "a fortress discipline and illiberal fortress practices." (p. 58)

Thus, the main problem confronting the United States is not the negotiation of SALT or multilateral force reduction (MFR) but to address security issues on a global basis. The only rational foreign policy for the United States, says Gray, is the containment of the Soviet Union within the Heartland, i.e., within its present boundaries and traditional sphere of influence. The United States needs to muster its political will to prevent Soviet world domination.

Nuclear Weapons and World Politics* by David C. Gompert et al. is one of the studies sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. The council plans eventually to publish more than twenty of these 1980s Project Studies. In this volume each author presents and analyzes a "nuclear regime," and Franklin C. Miller contributes an appendix summarizing nuclear strategy, weapons development, and existing nuclear arsenals. The nuclear regimes are defined as systems of international commitments, national military forces, and doctrines "that together govern the role of nuclear weapons in war, peace, and diplomacy." Two of the nuclear regimes deal with the existing nuclear scenario, another contemplates limitations in the number and role of nuclear weapons, while the fourth proposes ways to eliminate all such weapons.

*David C. Gompert, Michael Mandelbaum, Richard L. Garwin, John H. Barton, Nuclear Weapons and World Politics: Alternatives for the Future (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977, $6.95), 370 pages.

The tone of Nuclear Weapons and World Politics differs markedly from Colin Gray's. Although the critical nature of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivalry is recognized by Gompert, it is viewed as traditional great power competitiveness rather than as an ideological clash between good and evil. There is some apprehension expressed about Soviet ambition and policy, but the general position is that the two superpowers are interested in detente and that their military postures are basically defense-oriented. In addition, the writers stress the development of better international and Soviet-American cooperation.

Principal issues examined include mutual assured destruction (MAD), proliferation, and the escalation of nonnuclear warfare. The authors' views differ significantly. Nevertheless, there is general consensus that MAD is essential for international stability in the next decade and, therefore, strategic defenses should be limited so as not to place it in jeopardy; that silo- based missiles will become vulnerable in a few years; and that submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are the best deterrent weapons. There also is agreement that while the present international stability may be tilted either by technological or political change, the latter is the more dangerous likelihood.

I found Richard Garwin's design for a nuclear regime the most debatable. He agrees that nuclear weapons are here to stay, but he wishes to limit their use to deterrence or retaliation. For greater international stability, he recommends that the United States continue to seek international commitments for nuclear reductions but, if that fails, that it make unilateral reductions! (Elsewhere in the book Gompert states that "we simply do not know if Moscow needs to be deterred. Ironically, accepting nuclear inferiority and terminating the threat of escalation might be the best way to find out...." (p. 330) Garwin argues that an American strategic force of SLBMs, bombers, cruise missiles launched from cargo-type aircraft, and a small number of silobased intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) would provide sufficient assured deterrence. In addition, forward-based strategic and tactical nuclear weapon systems should be removed. He denies that the removal of those forward-based nuclear forces would endanger NATO, whose defense actually depends on America's ICBMs.

Garwin also contends that United States conventional forces need strengthening but that they should emphasize defensive weapons such as mines and precision guided and cruise missiles. Furthermore, as a means to retard proliferation, this nation should take the lead in limiting the development of new nuclear weapons and in adopting a policy of no use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states.

Should the United States unilaterally adopt these policies, Garwin declares, it would gain the support of most nations, and the Soviet Union would probably follow the example. Not only would these policies reduce the danger of direct Soviet-American confrontation but also both powers would be able to redirect their attention to the defense of nonnuclear nations. Garwin concludes that a nuclear regime as described .is superior to the present situation and that it can be achieved in the 1980s.

The sections of this book are well coordinated. Each author presents his arguments and comments on the advantages and disadvantages of his nuclear regime vis-à-vis the others discussed. David Gompert, in addition to his section on the possible strategic deterioration of the present nuclear regime, presents introductory and concluding chapters to assist the reader in evaluating the interrelated problems of nuclear weapons and world politics.

Together, these books provide considerable insight into the complexities of contemporary international affairs and the problems of shaping an effective American security policy to cope with the situation. For twenty years a basic tenet of American policy was the containment of communism and of the Soviet Union in particular. George Kennan provided the concept,⁵ and President Truman dramatized it on 12 March 1947 when he declared that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Not until 1969, when the Nixon Doctrine was enunciated, did the United States step back in principle from Truman's declaration of the nation's readiness to intervene against Communist aggression. But then President Nixon announced that times had changed, America's allies were stronger, many states had thrown off colonialism, and, although the Communist World was still hostile, it was divided. Henceforth, said Nixon, United States policy would be to help defend its allies and others whose survival was vital, but in other cases aid would be limited as deemed appropriate by America, particularly in regard to providing manpower for foreign wars.

Under Presidents Nixon and Ford came the shift to a policy of détente, which was formalized with the establishment of friendlier relations with the People's Republic of China, the nuclear arms agreements with the Soviets, and the Helsinki accord of 1975. In the 1912 SALT and the 1974 Vladivostok agreements, the United States sanctioned the concept of "strategic sufficiency" previously advanced by President Eisenhower.

The outcome of the American involvement in Southeast Asia forcibly demonstrated the necessity for caution before militarily intervening in distant wars where the issues are not vital to the national interest and where military commitment may escalate into a major war. The American response to the Angolan and Ethiopian-Somalian conflicts indicates that that lesson and the Nixon Doctrine have been taken to heart. In both of the latter conflicts, despite Soviet advisers and military equipment and Cuban troops, the United States refused to commit itself militarily. The main issue for Americans was not the containment of communism but whether the outcome was vital to other American interests--and the decision was that it was not.

Not only is the mutual mistrust of the United States and the Soviet Union unabated but peace has become more fragile because of regional and racial conflict, nuclear proliferation, and North-South economic confrontation. Nor have many of the newly independent nations found peace or stability in their emergence from colonialism: Africans war with Africans, Arabs with Israelis and other Arabs, and Asians with Asians. The dream of universal interest in global security that was a guiding principle in the establishment of the United Nations has faded. The question is, notes Pfaltzgraff, "What is to be done?" That is the issue facing the Carter administration and the American people.

Notes

1. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. Jr., "The American-Soviet Relationship in Global Perspective," in John E Endicott and Roy W. Stafford, Jr., editors, American Defense Policy (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).

2. For a review of the interests of the National Strategy Information Center and many of its publications, see Lieutenant Colonel David R. Mets, "Watching the Pendulum Swing: A Look at the Works of the National Strategy Information Center," Air University Review, September-October 1977, pp. 85-100.

3. The council is even better known for its long-time sponsorship of the distinguished journal Foreign Affairs.

4. Gray cites Saul B. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a Divided World (London: Methuen, 1964), p. 24.

5. The debate continues as to what Kennan meant the policy of containment to be. See Foreign Affairs, July 1977 and January 1978, and the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter, March and June 1978.

George W. Collins, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF (Ret), (Ph.D., University of Colorado) is currently Professor of Military History at the Air War College. He is an Associate Professor of History at Wichita State University, Wichita, Kansas. He served as a B-17, B-29, and KC-97 navigator and taught navigation and history at the Air Force Academy. Dr. Collins was a Fulbright lecturer in Afghanistan. He has published articles in professional journals and is a previous contributor to the Review.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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