Air University Review, March-April 1979

The Search for certainties in military affairs is a flourishing enterprise backed by thousands of quantitative studies that aspire to calculate, with precision, the latest issues in national security. Yet it is an enterprise characterized by debate between those who find different truths emerging from their differing approaches. This is particularly evident in the context of debates concerning the nature of the Soviet threat and the requirements for U. S. security. In recent debates, the problem of surprise attack has become an issue of significance for which precise solutions are now being sought. However, only dusty, fragmented answers appear to those who want only the truth.

The dusty answers on the problems of surprise attack range between two views: (1) that Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces can, will, and wish to launch a surprise attack on Western Europe with such perfect political and military orchestration that, unless NATO makes drastic changes, Western Europe will be lost; or (2) that Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces face so many political and military operational constraints that surprise attack is not a credible option. Each extreme proposition, as well as those in between, employs laborious calculations, movement tables, indicator lists, political-military reliability factors, and citations from Soviet doctrinal literature to indicate the certainty of each thesis. But surprise attack, by its very nature, defies the certainties that military planners insist on. It is a condition that is not normally anticipated and is rarely deterred. In the context of modern military history, surprise attack is, for the defender, a political-military problem that has not been solved.

Solutions to surprise attack problems may lie in the ability to describe clearly the reasonableness of those activities that functionally constitute surprise attack capabilities. This approach is not limited to a recognition of the adversary's preference, nor does it impose on him our views of his ingrained hostility. Rather, in a systematic calculation, it describes the critical factors of surprise attack that the military planner must account for, be he optimist or pessimist. There are, in fact, theoretical and current operational facets of surprise attack capabilities that challenge most Western orthodox accounts of the surprise attack problem. The purpose of this article is to illustrate selected theoretical and current operational facets of Soviet surprise attack capabilities and constraints in terms of their reasonableness as realistic challenges to the current NATO posture. The aim is also to categorize those Soviet challenges that present the most acute problems for NATO forces.

Nature of the Problem

The history of Pearl Harbor has an interest exceeding by far any tale of an isolated catastrophe that might have been the results of negligence or stupidity or treachery, however lurid. For we have found the roots of this surprise in circumstances that affected honest, dedicated, and intelligent men, The possibility of such surprise at any time lies in the condition of human perception and stems from uncertainties so basic that they are not likely to be eliminated, though they might be reduced.²

Roberta Wohlstetter

The uncertainties associated with surprise attack problems are receiving increased attention among Western military planners. The origin of this concern is most often associated with a new round of estimates and studies that occurred between 1975 and 1977. Studies from Department of Defense organizations, private research corporations, and individual defense intellectuals have played a role in sharpening the debate on the Soviet buildup and the possibilities of Soviet surprise attack. As a result of the review on Soviet surprise attack capabilities, the issues, implications, and problems of surprise attack have been identified at a rather high level of abstraction.

For example, the central issue has come to be the cost of deterring Soviet surprise attack capabilities. The dilemma that NATO planners face of either placing prime emphasis on the immediate readiness of the force structure or of emphasizing long-term strength is in both cases a resource problem.³ It appears that NATO cannot afford both long-term strength and constant readiness. Yet failure to do so may facilitate surprise attack during crisis periods.

The debate over the cost to improve NATO readiness has, to some degree, obscured the requirement to examine the operational feasibility of countering surprise attack. While it may be convenient to focus on a single measure of effectiveness (cost), the various political-military responsibilities of NATO cannot be reduced to a costing formula. The cost arguments do not consider the methodological difficulties of calculating the adversary's military options and the unquantifiable political consequences of dealing only with cost-effective choices.

Calculating the political and military cost of deterring (or failing to deter) surprise attack requires analysis, initially unconstrained by cost considerations, of the following:

• the factors which facilitate surprise attack;
• the readiness factors, which increase an attacker's risks in conditions of surprise attack; and
• Soviet concepts and capabilities for surprise attack.

These factors need to be examined in terms of both theoretical and practical measures. In this article, a preliminary analysis is offered that deals with (1) the theoretical facets of surprise attack (primarily from the Soviet view), (2) the universal human factors which, in theory, complicate counters to surprise attack, and (3) the current capabilities (beyond theory) of Soviet forces for surprise attack.

Theoretical Challenge

In Soviet military doctrine, surprise in military operations is not an either-or situation but a question of degree. Surprise is seen as a product of a victim's ignorance, preconceptions, and gullibility as well as the attacker's ability to deceive. Soviet doctrine describes the attacker's success in concealing his intent and timing as essential to strategic surprise. Misdirecting the opponent's calculations of the time, strength, direction, speed, and manner of attacks is a factor in operational surprise. Tactical surprise derives from the unexpected weapons, techniques, and skills that are actually employed in combat.⁴ From the Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, surprise (vnezapnost') is:

One of the principles of military art, ensuring success in battle and in operations. Surprise makes it possible to inflict heavy losses upon the enemy in short periods of time, to paralyze his will, and to deprive him of the possibility of offering organized resistance. ⁵

To the Soviet definition, we might add that a surprise attack is an attack with minimum or no warning, which comes with such suddenness and intensity as to promote a decisive, major, and quick victory. It is a form of attack that is only truly understood in retrospect.

Other military establishments have views on surprise beyond the Soviet definitions. In Asian military doctrine, which includes the experiences of the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Vietnam, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the chief element of surprise is deception. Success in war is based on deception, full preparation, and the use of surprise, lightning attacks. Asian variants on the notion of surprise emphasize techniques and modes of battle as important factors. For example, the use of special tactics in guerrilla warfare, night combat, psychological operations, mountain warfare, ambush, counter-envelopments, and rapid movements are all essential elements of surprise in combat. The framework in which these elements become effective is the mask of deception. As Sun Tzu notes:

I make my enemy see my strengths as weaknesses and my weaknesses as strengths, while I cause his strengths to become weaknesses and discover where he is strong. ⁶

To assess a potential adversary's ability and preferences for surprise attack and his constraints in executing such an attack requires an accounting of the conceptual or theoretical aspects of surprise in the adversary's military doctrine. Therefore, among the methodologies employed in the study of surprise attack, the historical approach may be useful at the outset in order to determine continuities and discontinuities in military thought. The historical data allow description of:

• the adversary's theory of surprise attack and
• sources of military views on surprise attack.

The importance of analyzing historical case studies has been illustrated by the excellent Rand Report, Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy. This study illustrates the importance of military history and historiography in Soviet military planning and the current operational emphasis the Soviets place on historical models. The modern significance of the Manchurian case has been explicitly affirmed or commended by Soviet analyses of the campaign's strategic design. A considerable body of knowledge has developed in recent Soviet military literature that refers to the Manchurian model and other lessons of history on the importance of surprise. The common conclusions in the Soviet literature are that:

• strategic and tactical surprise can be achieved,
• strategic surprise yields a low-cost method for victory,
• surprise of time can be induced by deception, and
• surprise in the Manchurian experience is a model for procedures in modern combined arms operations and prewar mobilization.

Soviet emphasis on surprise has continued and is authoritatively set down in V. E. Savkin's book, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (1972). Savkin describes the theoretical results of surprise attack based on historical analyses:

As a result of the stunning effects of surprise attacks by nuclear and conventional weapons and decisive offensive operations by troops, the enemy's combat capabilities are sharply lowered and the correlation of forces changes immediately. He may panic and his morale will be crushed. In a vague situation his overall and particular systems of control' are disorganized to a greater extent, and the will of his commanders and the regular activity of staffs are paralyzed to a considerable degree. As a result of this, the enemy's commanders and staffs are incapable of organizing timely and effective counteraction. They have to hastily make on-the-spot changes in their previous plans without clarifying the conditions and status of the sides properly. The changes at times will not correspond to the situation at all. They will have to assign new missions to troops and under conditions of unceasing influence by the side which delivered the strike unexpectedly. ⁷

Savkin's work on surprise attack describes two critical points on the nature of surprise in modern military operations. First, since the modern battlefield (in the Soviet view) favors the rapid employment of forces in fast-moving operations, one can expect that the defender generally will not have taken steps to eliminate the consequences of surprise attack. Insofar as the defender has not taken "counter-surprise" action, surprise attack can be the deciding factor in achieving total success.

Savkin's second point seems even more significant. After illustrating Soviet success in World War II surprise attacks, Savkin notes that, "it is possible to count on the success of surprise actions only on the condition of their prior planning, preparation, and timely implementation."⁸ Given the Soviet emphasis on the importance of surprise attack, one might assume that the Soviets have already completed their planning and, it appears, most military preparations to execute surprise attack in Western Europe if necessary. At minimum, there is a Soviet doctrinal requirement to attain (1) a state of deployed readiness for defense and surprise attack, (2) forms of security and concealment, and (3) counter-surprise capabilities. To the extent that NATO security, concealment, and counter-surprise abilities do not exist, Soviet surprise is facilitated.

In terms of military operational theory, surprise attack presents a significant challenge to the defending force. However, most military operational difficulties can be solved, or at least modified, to some level of tolerance. The human perception problems are not so easily solved. In theory, as well as in historical experience, the human perception (or misperception) problems have most often defied resolution. These problems, perceptions, attitudes, and assumptions may be grouped under the general heading of the "behavioral dimensions" of surprise attack. The best illustration of the behavioral problems can be found in the work by Robert Jervis on hypotheses on misperception. The following hypotheses on misperception are relevant to surprise attack problems:

• Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into theories and images. Theories determine what they notice.
• A theory will have greater impact on an actors interpretation of data (1) the greater the ambiguity of data, and (2) the higher the degree of confidence with which the actor holds the theory.
• Actors tend to overlook the fact that evidence consistent with their theories may also be consistent with other views.⁹

The hypotheses of misperceptions beg questions concerning current NATO views of the Soviet threat. Given the fact that there is great ambiguity in the data on Soviet capabilities and intentions, is it possible to describe the U.S./NATO theory of the Soviet threat, and is there a set of perceptions about the Soviets that is generally held with high confidence by the NATO members? In other words, is there perceptual orthodoxy in NATO which facilitates Soviet surprise attack abilities? In terms of general planning assumptions, at least three orthodox perceptions appear to have existed for several years:

• A Soviet attack against NATO can occur only during a period of tension.
• Capabilities to obtain information on Soviet preparations for an attack will produce unambiguous signals that will alert NATO.
• NATO can make the appropriate response under conditions of surprise attack and successfully defend against the Soviets.

These assumptions may be entirely appropriate for the present; however, in the past, assumptions such as these have usually led to disaster. The analytical scheme that follows illustrates the danger.

The first step in this analytical scheme involves a careful review of the indications and warning environments and the abilities and disabilities of both attacker and defender in major crisis events of the past. The following crisis situations were reviewed: the opening of World War I, the opening phase of the German attack in World War II, Pearl Harbor, the Soviet Manchurian attack in 1945, the Korean War (to include Chinese intervention), Soviet intervention: Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and war in the Middle East: 1967 and 1973. The primary requirement of the analysis is to extract those factors which proved most critical, on the parts of both attacker and defender, in the success or failure of past surprise attack cases.

Abraham Ben-Zvi recently analyzed a number of case studies of surprise attack aimed at revealing a conceptual framework through which the general problem of surprise could be understood. He concluded that in all the case studies:

In their determination to give priority to the strategic assumptions of possibilities over the tactical assumptions of actualities, the decision makers of the state about to be attacked attributed their own line of reasoning to the adversary. Overlooking the possibility that the enemy might not follow a similar train of thought, they failed to cross the conceptual boundaries that separated them from their opponent.¹⁰

Ben-Zvi also noted the need to evaluate tactical information on its own without interpreting tactical data only in the light of a priori strategic assumption. In fact of experience, the tactical indicators are probably more important. The Ben-Zvi conclusions are borne out by a central theme that is common to the case studies: that the behavioral dimensions of surprise attack are the most complicated and the least understood.

Further, an examination of case studies on surprise attack supports the view that surprise attack is primarily a behavioral problem. It is only after the behavioral dimensions have been recognized that military operational analyses have any meaning. Some of these dimensions are illustrated in Figure 1. The challenges of surprise attack have been developed in a format that illustrates the relationships between the attacker and the defender in a surprise attack. It illustrates the relationship in terms of these critical categories: behavioral, environmental, procedural, technical, and doctrinal. Tracking the asymmetries of the attacker/defender relationship through the critical categories leads to conclusions about the critical properties of surprise attack.

The figure presents an interactive model of the critical properties of surprise attack. The data in the model are based on this author's analysis of seven cases of surprise attack. The analysis consisted of documenting the behavioral aspects of the attacker/defender relationship in these seven cases. For example, in each case, attackers and defenders (in the opening phase of war) in World War I, World War II, Pearl Harbor, etc., indicated in written memos and messages, etc., their assumptions and perceptions regarding themselves and the defender. These indications were extracted, paraphrased under the heading attacker rationale, and categorized to illustrate how the attacker/defender behavioral relationship operates. Figure 1, therefore, is a behavioral model of the critical properties of past surprise attacks. The term "critical," in this context, suggests the properties which caused the attacker to succeed and ensured the defender's failure. In terms of the theoretical challenges of surprise attack, it is held that these critical properties are operative today as much as they were in the past. Further, the model illustrates why, as Henry Owen has noted, surprise attack usually works.¹¹

The left-hand column of the model indicates the categories under which the critical properties of surprise attack have been grouped. During the analysis of the various elements of the attacker/defender relationship (in seven case studies), a pattern emerged that suggested the five critical categories. The critical categories may contain an internal hierarchical relationship in both degree of importance and difficulty to explain. Initial research indicates that the attacker pays more attention to the first three categories than the last two. This subdivision also implies the difference between long-term goals (strategic interest) and those of more immediate, practical value. Another internal relationship exists between the categories in that they are not rigid. There is spillover between the various categories and the groupings of attacker/defender rationale.

Across from the five different categories of critical properties are sets of attacker and defender rationales, behaviors, procedures, tasks, reactions, interpretations, etc. The relationship between the attacker and defender in each category is not parallel. However, the relationships imply a form of parallelism. For example, under the behavioral properties of attacker rationale, the first item states that "the risks are extremely great, but we must proceed." There is a parallel response in terms of the defender rationale: "The risks are so great that the (rational) enemy will not attack."

A specific example of the data in Figure 1 can be illustrated through the critical category of doctrinal activity. Today, according to many defense analysts, Soviet military doctrine is

both a body of technical military knowledge and an indicator of Soviet preferences for forms of attack. According to the research model, prior to the time of a surprise attack the sources of adversary doctrine would continue to articulate current doctrinal norms in a way to suggest that:

• No shifts in doctrinal views have occurred.
• Doctrinal preferences of today indicate continuity both in thought and in behavior.
• Doctrinal prescriptions suggest the ideal toward which progress is being made.

Yet, the attacker has in the past, through special planning mechanisms and organizational relationships, departed from his ideal doctrinal norms in order to execute the surprise attack. This form of doctrinal interaction and perception reinforces the defender's faulty assumptions and creates new options for the attacker. After the initial phase of war, the attacker's operational style is usually based on his normal doctrinal standards and operational habits. However, doctrinal revolutions can occur during conflict also.

There are those who will not allow the Soviets enough flexibility to execute surprise attack. The Soviet style is characterized as too rigid and, therefore, too vulnerable for innovation on the battlefield. However, it may be worth noting that the current Soviet commitment to the utility of surprise attack is also a commitment to flexibility not unlike the flexibility that Soviet armies did, in fact, demonstrate during WW II. The challenge to the defender (NATO) is to anticipate the reasonable means and conditions under which the Soviets can achieve flexibility and depart from (maybe exceed) normal operational and doctrinal standards.

Beyond Theory:
The Deployed Challenge

The Soviet military buildup in Eastern Europe-whether one dates its origin to the first five-year plan, 1928, or to 1968-69, when a new group of Soviet forces was added to the Pact--is a concept that has escaped definition in recent defense literature. This has been the case in part because an inappropriate question has driven the search for revelations about Soviet intentions. The question has been, Is the current Soviet deployment in Eastern Europe offensive or defensive? Some answer "defensive," because history shows that Russia must always be concerned with her defensive posture or suffer another large-scale invasion. Others say "offensive," because history also shows that Russia has continually expanded during the last ten centuries. What is missing from both positions is the recognition that the Soviet buildup, while currently a capable defensive force, is also developing characteristics which go beyond either offensive or defensive requirements. It may also be characterized as a pre-emptive deployment in terms of gross numbers, organizational arrangements, and operational style.

For the purpose of this hypothesis, one can confine the assessment to Soviet forces only and consider the following propositions:

• Current Soviet forces in Eastern Europe have achieved an in-place reinforced status (the classical indicators of attack will soon be permanently present with or without crisis conditions).
• A lengthy mobilization is no longer required, nor is it politically feasible.
• The doctrinal emphasis for the "pre-emptive deployed" Soviet force is on high-speed operations in an unrelenting offensive, in the context of a surprise attack.
• The performance characteristics of the deployed force include capabilities to execute surprise attack either in the conventional or nuclear mode, but they increasingly emphasize the requirement to maintain the conventional for an advantageous period as well as to change from the conventional to the nuclear mode.

These propositions are not meant to suggest that the Soviets prefer the surprise attack or,

for that matter, the military solution in Europe. However, the nature of the political setting in Eastern Europe and the Soviet perception of military threats in the area simply require the development of pre-emptive capabilities to (1) provide for the defense of the East European and Soviet heartlands and (2) ensure the credible representation of Soviet interest in the mid-European buffer zone. In other words, these pre-emptive capabilities bear on the political as well as the military balance in Europe.

The deployed threat, however, does consist of a certain numerical strength in the form of 58 Soviet and East European divisions. The operational deployed threat would most likely consist of 27 to 30 Soviet divisions (in the initial phase) and, in John Erickson's terms, certain "earmarked" forces of the East German and Polish forces. The total pre-emptive force of 30-32 Warsaw Pact divisions is, by almost any firepower/manpower equation, adequate to the task of presenting to NATO a critical security problem.

 Source: International Defense Review, February 1975. pp. 175-86

The maintenance of a pre-emptive force is also a critical problem for Soviet commanders. They no doubt must deal with a great number of operational problems and political constraints. However, Soviet perceptions of their operational problems and constraints have become the basis for substantial improvements in the forces. For example, there have been increases in artillery strength, greater resources for mobile air defense, and improvements in command and control. ¹²

Significant changes have also occurred in aircraft deployments: increased performance of older aircraft, increased performance in all-weather capability, introduction of third-generation aircraft for ground strike missions, and modernization of air defense aircraft for secondary roles. The impact of these changes indicates that in terms of Western military planning, in the event of a surprise attack by Soviet forces, there will no longer be an adequate warning period. With the newly introduced aircraft, the Soviets may be able to launch an immediate offensive from their initial positions without a gradual buildup and without dependence on the "wave" principle of air attack.¹³ The combined improvements in air deployments and ground forces constitute a set of refinements that ensure the defensive, offensive, and pre-emptive utility of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. Further, there is a continual emphasis on organizational and operational readiness factors to ensure the utility of the Soviet forces, whatever their assignment.

Among the current factors on the Soviet readiness utility listing, one finds the following requirements:

• Preparations for short, intensive operations
• Examination of theater command and control coordination demands
• Organizational arrangements for the management of multiple breakthrough zones
• Establishment of superiority ratios in armor (5:1) and artillery (8:1) and provision for delivering superiority in manpower, mobility assets, and air defense to breakthrough zones
• Planning for reconstitution of divisional elements (replenishment and resupply in combat)
• Establishing time-critical criteria for the performance of each operational task
• Provisions for massive deception operations.¹⁴

In view of the readiness activities associated with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, NATO military planners should consider how the Soviets view NATO's postures. Is it not possible that the Soviets recognize, as we do, that NATO's shallow rear, maldeployments, and dependence on mobilization and reinforcement facilitate the Soviet surprise option? Is it not also worth considering the minimum requirements for NATO forces to achieve an efficient state of readiness that specifically increases the adversary's risks in attempting surprise attack without intensifying tensions in specific crisis situations?

At minimum, both the consequences of Soviet surprise attack and an analysis of Soviet constraints must be displayed in a way that illuminates options other than the "either" of investing in long-term stability or the "or" of fixing the force for present security.

The potential consequences of the Soviet pre-emptive posture demand greater attention from the analytical community and from Air Force planners. The Air Force needs to state its own concept for the "initial phase" of defense, which clarifies the following operational issues:

• What is the USAF's role in deterring surprise attack?
• How will the Air Force consume its warning time in Europe?
• How will the Air Force operate under the conditions of surprise attack?
• What planning factors should govern the employment of U.S. Air Forces in a short-warning scenario?

Air Force planners are now considering these operational issues and their implications in terms of budgetary considerations, short-term and long-term consequences, U.S./NATO political constraints, and trends in the Warsaw Pact. However, the actions of the future, whether under the rubric of readiness or modernization, require some overarching objective to guide Air Force priorities. If our planning experiences of the past reveal anything, they show that we have not placed sufficient planning priorities on clearly developing trends in the Warsaw Pact forces. The developing pre-emptive characteristics of Warsaw Pact forces may be only dimly understood today. However, today's trends have a way of maturing rapidly. The Air Force can keep pace with the maturing threat by allowing some planning excursions that deal with trends. In terms of readiness planning, the Air Force can accommodate this need by organizing the readiness business into categories of effort, such as the following:

Category I--Readiness initiatives for improving the initial effectiveness of TACAIR in Europe

• Mobilization/deployment innovations
• C³ enhancements
• Logistics changes
• Indications-warning alert procedures Category II--Readiness initiatives for quick-fix
• Munitions programs
• Training
• New equipment integration Category III--Readiness initiatives for the long-term (extended readiness planning)
• Long-range readiness requirements
• TAC/TRADOC joint planning

There may be other organizational forms for the future management of Air Force readiness plans and programs. One should expect change in the management approaches to readiness as changes occur in U.S. perceptions. For the present, however, the Air Force will increasingly be relied on to solve many of the initial defensive problems in NATO. The Air Force has an opportunity to define a major role for itself in deterring the Pact's pre-emptive power or providing the main, initial defense should deterrence fail.

Whatever resource solutions we finally apply to NATO's posture, we must constantly note the conceptual difficulties in developing strategies for defense. Our strategies and operational plans are governed by sets of assumptions, regionally oriented perceptions (or misperceptions) which, in a sense, institutionalize both the behavioral and operational factors that facilitate surprise. For example, the process by which regional strategies are decided and attendant operational plans are determined is based on sets of expectations both about the potential attacker and the defender. These expectations may be, and usually are, biased by several external forces, such as political and fiscal priorities. Yet the expectations in strategies and plans eventually prescribe the acceptable behavior of those who must participate in their development and implementation. Therefore, conceptually, surprise can result when an adversary's actions fall outside a set of orthodox expectations. And, to the extent that military planning functions omit the continuing need to test expectations and trends and understand the differences between operational reality and political constraints, military establishments can become reactive bureaucracies unable to support either political initiatives or unorthodox operational requirements. Yet there exists no calculus that accounts for institutional factors, self-deception, and the impact of planning techniques.

I n discussing the theoretical and operational elements in the calculus of surprise attack, it is easy to drift into the hysteria of uncertainty and fear so often associated with descriptions of the Soviet threat. This tendency may be unavoidable. However, it should be understood that no attempt has been made to provoke unfounded fears. In terms of Soviet designs on Western Europe, or any other region, there may be no need to worry about Soviet military aggression. As Hannes Adomeit has noted:

What is remarkable in Soviet foreign policy over the past decade is its failure to fulfill Western predictions that the newly-won status as a superpower somehow required expansionist behavior and risky ventures "commensurate" with it.¹⁵

It would be easy to make the case that the Soviets will avoid the risks associated with either political or military confrontations with the West. This risks-avoidance behavior is not only characteristic of Soviet risk-taking history but also recognizes the political constraints imposed by the current state of affairs in Eastern Europe.

However, to dismiss the need for comprehensive military planning on the basis of the Russian past and the uncertainty of recent trends is to miss the major fact recognized by the Soviet deployment in Eastern Europe. That is, the Soviets recognize both the need to avoid military confrontation and the requirement to deal with unexpected, unplanned for crises promptly and successfully. They also apparently recognize that the conflict potential between the U.S.S.R. and the individual East European states will be greater in the future, not less. And, in the context of evolving internal crises, the Soviets may be forced to employ military forces.

The Soviet Union has invested much treasure in the East European buffer zone since 1946. It is a zone of strategic importance to the Soviets, yet it is increasingly a difficult area to manage. It is a management problem that may require extreme solutions. It is a management problem that could involve Western Europe; indeed, it has been affected by West European political and military postures for decades. Finally, it is the type of management problem which, on the military level, can be dealt with best by the existence of and ability to use pre-emptive capabilities.

As the Soviet Union has recognized that the more likely military confrontation in Europe may be borne out of a sudden crisis which must be quickly resolved, so must NATO planners admit to the need to deal with unorthodox, surprising events. As the calculus of surprise attack suggests, the greatest challenge in planning to deal with the unorthodox is not the discovery of fixed military operational solutions. The challenge is to learn how to deal more precisely with uncertainty.

Notes

1. Cited in W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: Kant to Wittgenstein and Sartre (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1969), p. xxiii.

2. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford,

California: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 397.

3. In this context, "long-term strength" refer, to both the process of improving NATO's general posture over time and the specific ability to build up forces in a crisis period and sustain combat power for a longer term than the adversary.

4. John Despres, Lilita Dzirkals, Barton Whaley, Timely Lessons of History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy (Santa Monica: Rand Working Note 9151-NA, July 1975), p. 80.

5. General-Colonel A. I. Radziyevskiy, editor, Dictionary of Basic Military Terms (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1965), p. 35.

6. Sam C. Sarkesian, editor, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare. (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1975), p. 169.

7. V. E. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1972), pp. 232-33. (Translated and Published by USAF in Soviet Military Thought, No. 4.)

8. Ibid.

9. Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, April 1968, pp. 454-79.

10. Abraham Ben-Zvi, "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks," World Politics, April 1976, cited in DOD Current News #112, 10 June 1976, p. 8.

11. Henry Owen, "Surprise Attack: It Usually Works," editorial, Washington Post, November 10, 1976. Mr. Owen's work begs the question: When has surprise attack not worked? Very little has been done in military histories/case studies to show how surprise attack has failed. However, it seems most appropriate to understand how surprise attack works before investigating how it fails.

12. John Erickson, "The In-Place, Unreinforced Soviet Attack," Soviet

Military Digest (University of Edinburgh), October 1976, p. 5.

13. Peter Borgart, "The Air Attack Potential of the Warsaw Pact," International Defense Review, April 1976, p. 43.

14. From Erickson, op. cit.

15. Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: From Confrontation to Coexistence?" Adelphi Paper No. 101, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1973, p. 37.

Lieutenant Colonel Alton L. Elliott (M.A., St. Mary’s University) is Deputy Chief, Policy Analysis Group, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. He has served as an intelligence officer at Headquarters TAC and USAFSS; an EC-121 crew member in Thailand; served on the faculty of Squadron Officer School; and as a political-military affairs officer, Hq USAF. Colonel Elliott is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and a Ph.D. candidate, Georgetown University.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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