Document created: 9 September 02
Air University Review, July-August 1979

Generalship

Why should Air Force officers bother to read biographies of an Army officer who died before many of them were born? General of the Armies John J. Pershing, whatever his stature in history, never displayed any unique sensitivity to the larger implications of the airplane as a weapon. But to neglect two recent biographies* of a highly successful leader of men for that reason would be to miss an unusual opportunity for professional enhancement. As Montgomery of Alamein observes in his History of Warfare,^l generalship is the art and science of command; a science because it must be studied theoretically, an art because the theory must be reduced to practice. Great captains are made, not born, and the making involves hard study, wide reading, and self-conscious introspection; nobody becomes a truly great commander who has not first studied and pondered the art and science of war.

*Frank E. Vandiver, Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J. Pershing, 2 vols. (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1977, $35.00), vol. I, xxii and 594 pages, vol. II, 584 pages, maps, illustrations, bibliography.

Donald Smythe, Guerilla Warrior: The Early Life of John J. Pershing (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973, $10.95), ix and 370 pages, maps, illustrations, bibliography.

Ambitious officers who aspire to the upper reaches of command will find the two biographies under review here a treasure-trove of insights on the making of a leader. The two authors approach their task in quite different fashion: Vandiver, a widely published historian who is chancellor of Rice University, loves a good story and tells it with brisk enthusiasm; Smythe, a Jesuit scholar who has written eighteen articles on Pershing as well as this first volume of his as yet unfinished biography,² is more spare in his prose but has a knack for capturing remarkably revealing facets of his man in capsule episodes sensitively perceived. Read these volumes, then, pencil in hand, and make a record for future reflection. There is much to be harvested here. For example, after describing Pershing's boyish awe on seeing General Grant at West Point, Vandiver remarks: "Few things reveal more about a man than the hero he will follow."

Both authors recognize that Pershing's tour as professor of military science with the ROTC at the University of Nebraska was a profoundly formative period of his life. In retrospect the general himself concluded that "every officer should have some experience at a university." There he met people who were seriously interested in ideas, he broadened his horizons by studying law in addition to his regularly assigned duties, and he acquired a circle of friends in political life who enhanced his education substantially in that sphere. Above all, he came to appreciate how important it was for regular officers to serve with citizen soldiers in peace, the better to cope with wartime armies where such soldiers provide the bulk of the manpower. In contrast to his success at Nebraska, as a tac officer* at West Point Pershing was a failure. In his zeal for perfection, he drove too hard. But the experience was not all loss; he learned that there are limits beyond which men will not be pushed. He never made the same mistake again.

*Editor's note. Tactical (or tac) officer: an officer responsible for the military side of a cadet's education.

Very early in his career Pershing recognized the importance of cultivating a wide circle of acquaintances. Typically, after a chance encounter with a rising young New York politician, Theodore Roosevelt, he took the trouble to keep the friendship green. But this studied effort was not confined to influential figures above him who might advance his career; he was no less alert to those below. At West Point, for example, he began noting those cadets who held promise for future appointments, a practice which paid off twenty-odd years later when the assignment of so many commanders in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) was his responsibility.

In Cuba Pershing grew still further, demonstrating a capacity for sustained hard work even when ill, coolness under fire, and a willingness to stick his neck out when it served a genuine military purpose to do so. (At the close of hostilities, Captain Pershing had over a million dollars worth of unvouchered equipment charged against him as quartermaster; he was more interested in seeing that his troops had what they required than he was in protecting his flanks with a mass of paper receipts.) He was avowedly ambitious, but as a truly professional soldier he sought the opportunities and responsibilities of high command and not merely promotion. When tempted with a jump to flag rank by filling a position in the War Department's Bureau of Insular Affairs, he opted instead for a field command in the Philippines at his current grade.

At Zamboanga, on the edge of the wild hinterland of unsubdued Moro tribesmen, Pershing plunged in and studied his new subjects with zeal. He soon demonstrated such a grasp of native folkways that he was entrusted, though only a captain, with command of an expedition of 700 men, a force normally led by a colonel. In a few brief forays during which he subdued a number of renegade Moro chieftains, Pershing demonstrated that he possessed that rare gift, the ability to lead men in battle. His secret was certainly not charisma, for he was often described by subordinates as cold and aloof, a man not given to praise. But he was economical with lives, a leader who measured success not in the number of battles won but those avoided. He became a master at psychological warfare, subduing the enemy's will before he launched his assaults.

One episode that perfectly illuminates why Pershing's men admired him, if they did not love him, occurred at the close of his expedition to disperse the dissident Moros around Lake Lanao. On returning with his exhausted troops to his base at Camp Vicars, he was denied entry because his men had been exposed to cholera. With characteristic dispatch, Pershing resolved that difficulty by ordering all the stay-at-homes into a separate tent camp while his weary veterans took over the more comfortable regular quarters.

Duty as an official observer in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 afforded Pershing a unique opportunity to acquire an appreciation for the logistical implications of modern warfare as he watched Japanese staff officers direct an enormous volume of color-coded supply containers in a steady stream from wharfside transports to the front lines. On the battlefield he saw large formations of all arms engaged in operations on a scale impossible in the tiny peacetime U.S. Army. Although Vandiver tells us Pershing observed the widespread use of barbed wire and machine guns, he fails to provide his readers with a documented assessment of just how fully Pershing actually comprehended the momentous implications of these and other similar technological innovations which received a thorough testing in the Russo-Japanese theater of action. The experience did shape Pershing's tactical thinking profoundly, however. When promoted to flag rank and given a brigade at Fort McKinley in the Philippines, he insisted on combined arms maneuvers to develop that sense of teamwork so necessary to combat readiness. In the rainy season he gave examinations on tactical problems to all of his officers and had their work graded.

Don Smythe's sensitivity to subtle nuances in depicting human relationships is nicely illustrated in his account of Pershing's behavior after his promotion from captain to brigadier over the heads of many former superiors. Instead of waiting for his old colonel to call on him, as protocol would require, he telephoned and asked if he, Pershing, could come pay a visit. This gracious gesture, trivial in itself, was genuinely appreciated and helped soften the blow implicit in their sudden reversal of status. F or thoughtful readers, such episodes are what make biography worthwhile. Again and again Smythe reveals facets of Pershing's mind as he matured into an effective leader of men. We are not surprised (0 learn that he was a glutton for hard work; more helpful is the information that he habitually boned up on the minutiae of a new assignment so as to impress his new superior with his command over the smallest details. Or, again, the reader is given pause by the suggestion that early in his career Pershing recognized that "inefficiency is inevitable where human beings are concerned." (Smythe, p.58)

Vandiver's determination to dig out every last shred of evidence at times may seem to surfeit the reader with detail, but woven into those details one finds a multitude of revealing insights. For example, as a cadet Pershing found French difficult, and he had never really mastered the tongue. Then, in 1910 when on leave in France, he had an unexpected layover of a month because of a sudden change in orders. Instead of confining this unanticipated gift of time to sightseeing, he applied himself to an intensive course in French conversation. His objective was to improve his capacity to perform as an observer; he could not have anticipated that his application would make a vital difference when President Wilson selected him as commander of the AEF some seven years later.

Pershing's selection to command the Mexican Punitive Expedition in 1916 not only gave him opportunities to enlarge his experience as an operational commander, it also provided a useful test for technological advances such as the field radio, the motor truck, and the airplane, which were still novelties to the Army. In addition, the Mexican terrain afforded a brutal arena for service tests. Although the few available underpowered 10,000-foot-ceiling airplanes soon failed when confronted with 12,000-foot mountain passes, Pershing saw enough of them to learn that they could be decidedly valuable in reconnoitering during the pursuit of an elusive enemy.

Not the least significant aspect of Vandiver's treatment of the Mexican episode is the account he provides of the relationship between Pershing and his aide, Lieutenant George S. Patton. For those who aspire to high command, it is certainly worth noting that even while enduring the rigors of a winter campaign in Mexico, Patton, ever the dedicated professional, found time to write papers on tactics which Pershing, no less the true professional, took time and trouble to criticize with care.

Perhaps the most fruitful by-product of Pershing's Mexican adventure was the forbearance and loyal silence he observed in the face of shifts in administration policy. This loyalty doubtlessly weighed in the balance when Wilson selected Pershing soon after the declaration of war in 1917 to head the American Expeditionary Forces in France. Vandiver reproduces in full Secretary of War Newton D. Baker's directive to Pershing outlining the scope of his duties. Unfortunately, he fails to do the same for an overlapping set of instructions prepared by General Tasker Bliss, thus foregoing an opportunity to contrast military and civilian conceptions of the task at hand. Indeed, one of the criticisms this reviewer would lay against Vandiver is his tendency to assess Pershing's peers through the general's eyes rather than objectively from alternative sources. This is notably so in his treatment of Generals Leonard Wood and Tasker Bliss, who are condemned by innuendo rather than evidence. Similarly, when the War Department undertook the necessary but politically unpopular task of closing down a multitude of obsolete company-sized Indian frontier bases, Vandiver describes the effort as a "monstrous blunder" when it hit the bailiwick of Senator Frances E. Warren of Wyoming, Pershing's father-in-law. But these occasional lapses are quickly forgiven as one reads on in the rich tapestry of detail the author provides for serious students of the chemistry of command.

Vandiver is particularly effective in sketching the problems confronting a commander who must preside over the expansion of an army of thousands as it grows to one of millions. A supply system geared in time of peace to the needs of company-sized garrisons scattered about the nation would manifestly require a massive overhaul and infusions of imaginative leadership before it could function effectively. So, too, an army which seldom assembled formations larger than a regiment in peacetime would be hard put to develop leaders, both commanders and staff officers, capable of employing divisions, corps, and armies operationally against the enemy. Just moving a division (28,000 men and some 8000 animals) from point A to point B and supplying them without faltering posed problems enough to tax veteran campaigners, let alone a hastily assembled army of largely inexperienced citizen soldiers. The solution, Pershing realized, was to establish a system of schools akin to the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, even if it meant drawing off large numbers of desperately needed officers for training after the AEF divisions arrived in France and prepared to move into place on the front. The high value Pershing placed on schooling as opposed to other forms of training at a time when he was under great pressure not to divert scarce officer strength from the operational units affords a good index of his true appreciation for professionalism.

One of the great challenges confronting officers in a rapidly expanding army in wartime is the need to grow intellectually and adjust psychologically to an abruptly altered way of life. Major James G. Harbord was a student in the Army War College in April 1917. One month later he was Chief of Staff of the AEF. Overnight promotions required significant shifts in attitude and in habits of thought. Officers who had spent weeks in tracking down a fifteen cent shortage in their peacetime property accounts were now expected to plan the expenditure of millions without batting an eye. Moreover, as the scale of everything grew larger, old, familiar, tried and true techniques of personal leadership would no longer work as they did in the company or battalion. Vandiver skillfully brings out Pershing's perception of this shift and describes his efforts to restructure his staff to take account of the new conditions. The need to delegate ever more authority did not, of course, diminish the importance of personality or the human dimension of command, although it may have limited the number of individuals who came into direct contact with the man at the top. Vandiver offers the reader a whole series of revealing episodes in which we see the mind of the supreme commander in action. His strength of character is deftly implied in an account of Pershing's excoriation of General Siebert for the manifold deficiences in his newly arrived First Division. His chewing out was brought up short by one of Siebert's staff, Captain George Marshall, who rebutted the attack in cold anger, pointing to the unfairness of criticizing Siebert, who had been away from the division on orders. Instead of retribution, which everyone present expected, Marshall earned Pershing's respect as a man of character. An aspiring commander might well ask himself, "Would I have accepted such contradiction from a junior before a roomful of observers--even if he were right?" That he probably would not is strongly suggested by Marshall's comment years later, "I never had another commander I could do that with." (Vandiver, vol. II, p. 798)

In all studies of the AEF, the theme of amalgamation, which is to say the efforts of the French and British to absorb American manpower into their armies rather than allow the AEF to function as an independent command, is a dominant one. Vandiver traces Pershing's battles for autonomy with great care. The major outlines of the contest are well known; his contribution is to show the personal qualities Pershing brought to bear in this running battle with the French and British military and civil authorities. He shows how skillfully the general appropriated the ideas of others and made them his own, an essential of high command. He also shows how Pershing wisely based his case on the need for an independent American army as essential to the proper motivation of his troops rather than his own understandable pride in personal command. There are insights, too, on Pershing's technique within the conference room; his formula for successful negotiations seemed to involve, first, a lucidly clear conception of the objective sought and, second, unfailing courtesy combined with inscrutable patience.

Pershing's relations with his division commanders also provide subject matter -of great interest. When the first fourteen commanders came over ahead of their troops to get a preview of the war by visits to the French and British fronts, he required each of them to write a report on how he planned to improve divisional training back home in the light of his experiences on the front. The character of the replies received helped him decide which of these generals were suited to lead divisions into battle.

As long as Pershing believed a general was helpable, he did what he could to further his abilities as a commander. Those who appeared beyond redemption he relieved, even when they were lifelong friends and classmates. Sometimes his efforts at cultivating a better quality of generalship took bizarre forms. To one diligent but intellectually rigid commander he gave a copy of Tolstoy's War and Peace, suggesting that it might" develop your imagination." His faith in the value of reading history was apparently substantial. His sarcastic dismissal of one failing commander was to observe that "he has not yet gone as far as Caesar's Commentaries in studying the history of war." For all his ruthlessness in removing failing commanders, when dealing with men who broke under the strain of combat, Pershing showed remarkable sensitivity, taking great pains to protect their dignity. From direct personal experience he knew that battle consumes generals as well as frontline soldiers; after each major push, he would visit his divisional commanders in their "headquarters and scrutinize them closely for manifestations of crippling exhaustion, emotional let-down, and the like. Even successful commanders sometimes need to be replaced when the crisis is over.

Vandiver effectively depicts the crushing emotional and moral burdens on the supreme commander himself. These ranged from hardening his heart when reflecting on the 100,000 hospital beds scheduled to receive casualties from the Meuse-Argonne offensive to stiffening his resolve when flatly refusing to obey an order from Marshal Foch that would have handed the main American forces over to a French general while transferring Pershing to an unimportant quiet sector of the Front. One senses something of the general's secret for successful command in Vandiver's account of his ability to dismiss all worry on retiring at night and thus assure himself a refreshing sleep. Above all, Pershing struggled against that infectious disease, inflated ego, which threatens so many who achieve lofty rank. His formula, when beset by the adulation of cheering crowds, was to remind himself that the honors were not really for him personally; he was but a symbol for the debut of the United States as a world power. A real hero recognizes that pride goeth before fall, as Pershing had occasion to remember when given a skittish horse to ride in the victory parade through the streets of London and again when the "Pershing for President" boom quickly faded back home.

Inevitably, Pershing's career after 1919 was anticlimactic, but Vandiver's treatment of his role as Chief of Staff is somewhat disappointing. While the author asserts that the general wanted to accept the office to put across his ideas for a "democratic army," we are never told just what he meant by this. N or do we find any real assessment of how adequately he filled the office. Vandiver does bring out, however, Pershing's most important, if seldom recognized, contribution to national defense long after retirement: in 1939 on the eve of World War II he urged Roosevelt to make George Marshall Chief of Staff and later to retain him in that office for the duration rather than place him over the armies invading Europe, a field command Marshall sorely wanted. "I know of no one at all comparable to replace him as Chief of Staff." (II, pp. 1093, 1095) The captain who spoke up in defense of General Siebert and the commander who accepted the rebuke were clearly both professional soldiers who recognized quality when they saw it.

Both these biographies under review merit the attention of thoughtful professionals. Smythe has so much to offer one can only hope he will soon publish the concluding volume of his biography. His treatment is quite different from Vandiver's; the two authors complement one another more than they compete. The strength of Vandiver's treatment lies in his concern with Pershing the man; the cumulative impact of the many vignettes he has assembled is a real human being, very much alive and a far cry from the stick figure which emerges from Pershing's own far less skillful published autobiographical effort. This reviewer found the two studies taken together a well-rounded portrait of a complex human being as well as significant contributions to the art of generalship.

Notes

1. General Sir Bernard Montgomery, History of Warfare (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 19-21.

2. Smythe's book ends with the declaration of war in 1917.

Major General Irving B. Holley, Jr., USAFR, (Ph.D., Yale University) has taught in the Duke University Department of History since 1947. He is a visiting professor at the National Defense University, and serves as mobilization assistant to the Commander, Air University (ATC). After serving in the Army Air Forces during World War II, he taught for two years at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He has also been Visiting Professor in the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy, 1974-75. Professor Holley is a member of the advisory boards of Aerospace Historian, South Atlantic Quarterly, and Air University Review; a trustee of the American Military Institute; a member of the NASA advisory committee on history; and chairman of the advisory committee on history to the Secretary of the Air Force. His published works include Ideas and Weapons, a study of doctrine, and Buying Aircraft: Air Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor