Air University Review , January-February 1979

high noon or sunset?

With cancellation of the B-1 by the administration, the future of the manned bomber is uncertain. The bomber once enjoyed a position of unassailable supremacy among strategic forces. It was the strategic force. Romanticized names such as Flying Fortress and Stratofortress were indicative of the glamor and formidability attached to the aircraft. That has all changed, of course. The bomber has been brought down to earth. There are those who even seriously question its continued usefulness as an instrument of twentieth-century warfare.

I believe that the manned bomber can continue to playa valuable part in the projection of modern air power. But that role will be somewhat diminished, at any rate different from years past. The change will require accommodation in perceptions by both military and civilian defense planners. The Air Force, commanded largely by men with venerable--and venerated--flight experience, will have to accustom itself to an environment in which manned flight is no longer preeminent insofar as strategic air power is concerned. Civilian planners also must adapt. They should come increasingly to recognize that, though there are missions for which the bomber may no longer be ideally suited, there are other missions to which it brings impressive and needed capabilities.

The change in perceptions and expectations may be attended by a sense of anxiety, particularly for military leaders. Advocates of the manned bomber have lost an important round with the exit, at least for now, of the B-1. At best they seem to be fighting toward a draw. Criticism may intensify. Detractors of the bomber, fortified by collapse of the B-1 program, could line the streets. A final decision is still pending as to whether at some point in the near future a new bomber will be built. A shoot-out of sorts on this issue appears all but imminent. Many believe the clock to be climbing toward high noon for bomber advocates. Others believe, however, everything is settled about the decision except the dust. In their eyes, the bomber is flying toward its sunset.

The texture of discussion on manned bombers has usually been controversial and marked by uncertainty. For example, it has been more than 30 years since the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey attempted to gauge the effects of World War II bombing on Germany, but scholars are still digging through the rubble. The case for strategic bombing was hardly helped by overstated claims in behalf of air power during the immediate postwar period. One authority even declared that a central reason for storming Fortress Europe by land was to divert German manpower from the Luftwaffe.¹ Still, it is incontestable that Allied bombing, through the vehicle of the manned bomber, was a major influence both in shortening the war and winning it.

Notwithstanding its combat achievements, the manned bomber has later encountered heavy flak. There was the matter of Vietnam, the evidence on which is predictably disputed. A Rand analyst, while acknowledging the intentionally limited scope of U.S. bombing, claims that it not only failed to make a dent in the North Vietnamese economy but also failed in its avowed objective of promoting a negotiated settlement.² Architects of the Linebacker II series later in the conflict would render, as might be expected, a different interpretation of the efficacy of bombing.

Once the dominant component of our national military power, the bomber now plays a more modest role. "Today," according to McGeorge Bundy, "it is a supplementary guarantee against the madness of an attempted surprise attack, a diversifier that helps frustrate any Strangelove among Soviet planners."³ As previously noted, there are those who would be less kind in their assessment of the bomber's decreased importance. For instance, many critics of the B-1 argued, rather spuriously, I believe, that not only was the program too expensive but that bombers have become altogether obsolete, twentieth -century dinosaurs.

Arguments against the bomber are usually articulated in terms of low capabilities and high costs. That is, the bomber is seen as slow, vulnerable, expensive, and, in a familiar phrase, not cost-effective. Let us examine these criticisms in the larger context, without which the criticisms themselves lose much meaning.

How fast is slow? The typical B-52 pilot might answer that it is 520 knots (600 mph); the typical analyst, that it depends; the typical critic, that it does not matter. Assuming that the last answer is not the most helpful one, what of the other two responses?

Six hundred miles per hour is not a terribly impressive performance characteristic. At that rate, it would take at least eight hours for the standard B-52 mission from the United States to reach the target. From an airborne alert posture well north of the United States, the time to target could be cut by perhaps half. Bombers penetrating to target at altitude would be subjected to attack from thousands of air defense systems, nearly all of which possess speed capabilities superior, many vastly superior, to the bomber itself. It should be noted, however, that most of these systems are susceptible to effective countering through use of defensive avionics. Even so, it must be conceded that bombers will not typically outperform interceptor systems with respect to velocity. That concession made, its meaning or relevance remains far from clear.

Speed alone, then, is not the strongest of points for the bomber, at least not for present subsonic bombers. Even the B-1, with its capacity for supersonic "dash," would not have done much better in terms of outdistancing the most modern of those Soviet fighters which, however fortuitously, happened to achieve interception. No aircraft, of course, will simply outaccelerate hostile missiles; though, a bomber in supersonic flight would present a much more difficult target than a slower one against antiaircraft artillery fire.

But the issue of speed is not one-dimensional. It transcends mere Mach number. Enter the analyst, who would be quick, sometimes too quick for those rooted in operations, to point out that speed should be measured in terms of getting away from the perhaps threatened home base as well as getting into the threatening target area. Aircraft caught on the ground are like mallards on the moat, relatively easy prey.

In that air bases may be subject to attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on notice of less than 30 minutes and by submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on notice of less than 15 minutes, it is sometimes argued that much of the bomber force could be destroyed on the ground by a surprise attack. Such an argument presents two difficulties. First, it seems to assume that bombers are destabilizing in that their bases present targets of opportunity to an adversary bent on offensive action. Yet it might be argued in return that a system which is based on sovereign territory and eight hours from potential targets is hardly as destabilizing as one which is only minutes away from its targets. No irrevocable snap judgments are necessary with respect to deployment of bombers. They are not ideal first-strike weapons for strategic warfare. They are, in the phrase of one observer, "slow to take offense."⁴ It would be curious, then, to cite their debility in this regard as provocative or destabilizing.

Second, and more important, an argument that points to the bomber’s alleged susceptibility to surprise attack seems to ignore the problems which such an attack might precipitate for an aggressor. One is hard-pressed to imagine a scenario in which an enemy’s first objective would be rapid demolition of our air bases. This folly could invite a devastating response by remaining U.S. forces. Even if one assumes, as is more likely, that a surprise attack would be against both out bomber and missile forces, the requirement for simultaneity in attack is very tricky. Should bomber bases, for example, be struck first by SLBMs—while ICBMs were in-bound against other targets—it could provide the type of conclusive impetus necessary for massive launch of our missile force. On the other hand, an approach that strives for absolute simultaneity in attack could give adequate notice to bombers, resulting in the launch of most of those on alert. Either attack pattern would have to cope separately with the third leg of the Strategic Triad, the SLBM force. It is a grave defect to think of problems posed to an aggressor as insurmountable, but we may safely term them considerable in this case. Chances are great that aggressive attempts at orchestration would result only in cacophony.

The vulnerability issue presents some ambiguities. Bombers are more vulnerable than missiles in that they are not protected by structures capable of withstanding nuclear blasts. The fact, however, that bombers are not encased in protective systems may add ironically to their chances for survival. As accuracies and potential yields⁵ increase for enemy missile systems, the danger will become more serious to stationary forces and those intended to "ride out" an attack. Any system locked into a second-strike posture from known geographic coordinates will be increasingly vulnerable. Modern bombers are designed to flush, not to be around when the damage occurs. This is a case in which comparative fragility may promote comparatively good survivability.

Bombers are mobile. In time of crisis, they can be dispersed to any number of diverse operating locations. This forte could be capitalized on to a greater degree in the future. The payoff in enhanced survivability seems to lie as much in thoughtful planning for dispersal contingencies as in such innovative, but limited, measures as quick-start engines. It may be that realization of a permanent satellite basing arrangement for bombers would prove either too expensive or otherwise unattractive for a number of logistical reasons. However, there is little reason why difficulties cannot be resolved on a contingency basis, particularly since this resolution could vastly complicate an aggressor's task of targeting all airfields on which there might be bombers. At present the B-52 force is spread over approximately 20 bases in the continental United States. There are, however, many times that number of airfields within the country, civilian and military, that could readily accommodate B-52s during emergency situations. Although it generates obvious sensitivities and requirements for permission, the bomber force could also utilize airfields belonging to allied nations.

With strategic warning, the bomber force could be dispersed and move about freely among various locations. At a given time, bombers might be found on only a fraction of available airfields. An aggressor, though, would have to target all of the locations in order to counter the dispersal pattern. The only ones more put upon than parties implementing strategic dispersal are those attempting to counter it.

It has been said that bombers are too expensive. The lament is not new. A British observer in the late thirties wrote that "in 1934, first-line aircraft...being of comparatively simple construction, cost about £3,500 each," or some $17,000 in American currency of the time. The writer continues that by 1939 prices had "increased to as much as 800 percent of their cost a few years ago."⁶ Between the thirties and forties, bombers evolved from canvas to aluminum. They also progressed from five digits to six digits in dollar-cost per aircraft. The B-17 was built for approximately $200,000 each; the B-29 for about $600,000.

At this point, the economist will begin to issue dire warnings on the danger inherent in comparisons of then-year dollars. Duly cautioned of the rapids, let us follow this stream yet a bit further. Within five years of peak production of the B-29, the first B47s were being added to our inventories at a cost of about $2 million apiece. The $8million B-52 followed a decade later. The analyst, ever thirsting for a "knee of the curve" here or a leg up there, might be tempted to visualize it all as illustrated in the accompanying graph.

If one wished to risk disclaimers from analyst and economist alike, he might project the curve out even further, where he would find that the cost per bomber climbs quickly toward $100 million. This projection in fact approximates reality. The estimated cost of one B-1 bomber was just above the nine-digit dollar level at the time of program cancellation. All of which could lead to the conclusion that the cost of modern bombers is not so much outrageous as it is predictable. The price per bomber increased tenfold between 1940 and 1950, a decade of mass production and presumably of attendant economies. It is hardly shocking, then, that individual costs reflected another tenfold rise during the past 20 years.

All that rises, however, must necessarily neither converge nor climb toward the absurd. The most discouraging--and ultimately unacceptable--aspect of the projection shown is that it betrays no "knee" in the curve, no promise of leveling off. Most taxpayers would find it only partial balm for the economic wound to learn that one reason for this spiral is the fact that since the early forties industrial commodity prices, and with them prices in such areas as procurement and research and development, have more than quadrupled.⁷ Increases in labor costs have been steeper still. Again, though, many citizens prove inattentive to primers on inflation. Their only concern--a concern to which the military must be sensitive--is that $100 million is quite enough to spend on any single weapon system, particularly so when it is announced that hundreds of such systems are necessary for mission requirements.

As evidenced by the apparent fate of the B-1 and by cancellation of high-cost naval vessels, the public and governmental moods are distinctly against programs involving very expensive individualized items. One should not attempt to establish $100 million as the absolute upper limit for a single aircraft. But one could predict confidently that, in the near term at least, any vehicle costing in this range is going to require justification and support of the most compelling type. The Secretary of Defense has stated that the B-1 would have been a more attractive option had it cost 30 percent less but that the technology of the cruise missile development played a larger part in its cancellation. The meaning of this experience with regard to future efforts seems clear: set up programs with discriminating price consciousness or fold them up and put them away.

The task in a sense is to build a juggernaut without wire wheels. Sporty systems by and large are not cost-effective. The pale of cost versus effectiveness has been the familiar territory of defense decision-makers for the past 15 years. It perhaps is an area more uncharted, however, than many imagine. There is not a little pseudoscience to it all. Nevertheless, the tendency is to look for some metric, a definitive standard or index, by which we can measure how much we can get for our money.

Measuring the cost-effectiveness of bombers is difficult and imprecise. In 1945 our air forces contained over 23,000 bombers of all types, representing an investment of at least $5 billion in aircraft alone. Today our bomber force, consisting of about 315 B-52s and 65 FB-111s, represents a sunk cost in the range of $6 to $7 billion. The meaning of such a comparison is not at all clear. Granted, the bombers of yore were "effective." Through a vast preponderance of power, they helped to win the war. Present bombers, though, are capable of projecting power and exacting destruction on an almost unbelievably larger scale. For example, two million World War II B-17 s could not have carried the destructive power that a single B-52 is capable of delivering. Many descriptive adjectives, and some undescriptive ones, attach to present capabilities. One of these descriptions is the word "effective." Are bombers more effective today than before? Yes and no. Yes, they are awesomely more capable. No, they do not, as before, represent the last word in strategic systems.

But surely an investigation that compares only the old and the new is not very revealing. Far more interesting--and telling--is the question: How effective are bombers today? Are they still worthwhile?

There have been some takers on this lure of a question. The reviews, in a nutshell, have been lukewarm. Researchers at the Brookings Institution, after reporting that bombers receive "about 35 percent of all money spent on ...strategic forces," manage only the mildest of endorsements in the appraisal that "there is some justification for retaining bombers as a hedge against the failure of other retaliatory capabilities."⁸ If bombers are to be retained, the writers at Brookings go on to say, better to invest in wide-body transports, which could be modified to launch cruise missiles from standoff range.⁹

This recommendation seems to have been adopted in part by the administration. Production on the B-1 has ceased, though testing and research continue. Production funds are to be used to develop air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) for the B-52 fleet. The press has indicated that the administration, "in canceling the B-1, took the position that the manned bomber had been over taken by cruise missile technology."¹⁰ That is not quite how the rationale for the decision was worded by the administration itself. The Secretary of the Air Force has gone on record that:

The decision to stop deployment of the B-1 was a matter of relative effectiveness and costs of two different systems under certain sets of wartime attack conditions. In itself, the B-1 performance has been excellent and it has met or exceeded all Air Force requirements and is fully capable of performing its intended role. However, there obviously are alternative approaches to meeting threats to national security. Choosing between these alternatives involves a total analysis and appreciation of national priorities. ¹¹

Whatever the driving factors behind the decision to go with development of the ALCM, that system could be in production within two years. B-52s now operational could be modified to carry the ALCM. It is possible that the cruise missile, carried by aircraft and sea-going vessels alike, could become a fourth and equal component of our strategic structure. The results would be something of a Tetrad, though perhaps the excursion into Greek for counting the number of components in various groupings has already outlived its value.

At any rate, given realization of cruise missile potential, the bomber's role will both increase and decrease. Its utility will increase as a platform from which cruise missiles might be launched outside an adversary's borders; it will decrease as a strategic vehicle designed expressly to penetrate to target. Since the total number of bombers is not likely to increase in the near future, the assignment of any significant portion of bombers to standoff missions means that the number identified as penetrators will decline.

The above is not to say that the fate of strategic bombers is on the skids. The manned bomber has to be taken seriously with or without a load of ALCMs. As the British continue to demonstrate, and our present Strategic Air Command as well, even older bombers are a force to be reckoned with when they come forth in numbers carrying nuclear arms. One might even apply this same observation to the cruise missile itself, a comparatively old head with new eyes and teeth, attractive not for singular performance but for its sheer multiplicity and nuclear bite. To add to their strength, many of our bombers recently have undergone extensive modifications, particularly in their countermeasures and navigational systems. Further modifications are ongoing or, as noted with regard to the ALCM, contemplated. One can improve and improvise on large aircraft to an extent not possible with smaller aircraft. The bomber force is not yet ready to be pitched out to the rag-and-bone man.

The coming of cruise missiles, far from undercutting the bomber's value, could provide needed stimulus. Indeed, the ALCM should lend prolonged life to strategic bombers, converting them into a future force that combines standoff and penetrator aircraft.

What Will be the makeup of this future combination of bombers? Some claim to see a place for what is termed the land-based, multipurpose aircraft (LMA). As visualized, such aircraft would be quite large, somewhere in the class of a modern 747. They would be subsonic and serve as mobile platforms for the employment of a great variety of weapons and sensors. An aircraft of this type could be assigned any number of roles where long endurance and massive firepower are at a premium. It might be called an "airborne heavy cruiser" of sorts.

The LMA would carry with it high payloads, high endurance, and a high price tag. The latter characteristic may be overlooked by futurists, but it is apt to receive a prolonged stare, if not the jaundiced eye, from many travelers of the present. The same features that make the LMA an attractive system make it also an expensive one, perhaps prohibitively expensive, and an attractive target. The LMA is not likely to be built in the foreseeable future for the same financial reasons that caused demise of the B-1. Exit the age of the behemoth; enter the era of the beneficiary.

Insofar as bombers are concerned, one of the beneficiaries of the future ought to be the fast, moderate-size, moderate-price aircraft. There is no conclusive reason to believe that the B-52 is the last of the strategic bombers. There is every reason to believe, however, that its eventual successor will represent a somewhat different concept: a no-frills strategic aircraft that projects a power bulge without a fiscal one. It will probably be smaller than the B-52 but possess an equal or greater payload capacity.

In many ways, the bomber of the future will not be dissimilar from the proposed B-1. It will differ, though, in two important respects. First, the comparative cost of a future bomber should be less than that of the B-1. Second, whereas the B-1 was conceived primarily as a penetrator, the bomber of the future is likely to be consciously designed to fulfill both standoff and penetrator roles. There is nothing, of course, which says it should not do both. That is, it may prove most advantageous to design an aircraft capable of launching a potent store of small cruise vehicles against stationary targets, for example, and then penetrating in order to seek out targets that are either mobile or for some reason resistant to attack by cruise weapons.¹²

In considering present and future roles for the bomber, one should not overlook the tactical mission. There are those who possibly shudder at the thought of huge, high-cost bombers cutting a path in the hostile skies over a battlefield. They may be right. But what if the skies are not so intensely hostile? And what of the enemy staging areas immediately to the rear of the battlefield? It is here that bombers might be of utility. For too long the bomber's role as a strategic system has overshadowed its potential application to tactical situations. The mission of the bomber is not to be sent instinctively toward the sound of guns; its mission should gravitate toward places where it can lend much-needed assistance.

Bombers could be sorely needed in Europe in a conventional conflict. If the West is to overcome its disadvantage there in terms of troops, artillery, and armored vehicles, it will have to make better than a fair showing in the air. Should allied air power ever be required to fill the breach, it must do so quickly, before opposing ground forces achieve a self-fulfilling momentum or occupy an unacceptable portion of friendly territory. Allied tactical air forces currently emphasize both readiness and flexibility. But the fact is that they will be called on not only to support ground forces but also to conduct an air fight for survival in which they themselves will be outnumbered. It is true that some aircraft (for example, the Air Force's A-10) will be used almost exclusively in ground support. Yet the calculus of one aircraft attempting to destroy one tank in one pass does not, in itself, necessarily add up to thwarting a fast-moving concentration of armored vehicles that may number in the thousands.

The argument here is not against ground-support aircraft. They will serve a vital role. The problem is that there has never been a land and air battle in Europe--or anywhere else--of the dimensions that a full-fledged engagement between east and west could yield. In case of such a battle, there are generally three possible results regarding the contest between allied tactical aircraft and advancing enemy armor: (1) allied air will help stop enemy armor through use of conventional munitions; (2) allied air will succeed through use of tactical nuclear weapons; or (3) allied air will be unsuccessful in assisting efforts to stop the enemy advance on land.

There can be little doubt that a full conventional struggle in Europe would require firepower output from allied air forces on a scale heretofore unknown. Bombers are suited for just such massing of firepower. Given that the second and third of the above possibilities are undesirable, it seems only prudent that all avenues should be explored in order to make the first possibility a probability. That bombers can survive and be effective over a modern battlefield is not certain. That use of bombers should not even be contemplated is certain foolishness.

Various problems, however, must be overcome before serious contemplation can be given to use of bombers in a scenario similar to that described above. First, planners should mentally erase many of the supposed lessons learned from the experience of B-52s in Southeast Asia. An air campaign in Europe doubtless would be of shorter duration and greater intensity. Targets would probably be military concentrations near the battle line or in proximate staging areas rather than industrial facilities or military complexes more to the rear; however, it is conceivable that bombers might also be used against airfields. Nevertheless, since every effort most likely would be toward control of escalation and containment of hostilities, it is doubtful that anything approaching a general interdiction campaign should be entertained. Even if engagements are restricted to forward areas, though, the attrition for bombers, as for all combat systems, will probably be higher in this most perilous of military environments than in Vietnam, where on the costliest of raids about three percent of attacking aircraft reportedly were lost.¹³

The counterweight to this grim prospect is that presumably it would take relatively few missions for bombers to strike decisively against massed (but fleeting) targets of opportunity and to achieve the desired resolution. Bombers have more effective systems for electronic countermeasures. Also, one would expect that as bomber strikes and various forms of ground suppression took their toll, the attrition rate would lessen for succeeding attacks.

Second, a fresh approach to implementation as well as to planning will be necessary if bombers are to be employed to advantage in a conventional role. There will be no time, as there was in the sixties, to structure a contingency force and to outfit and modify bombers for tactical use. New or improved munitions may be required. Something of a revolution has already occurred in the field of precision munitions. But given the occasional complexities and the relative high cost of precision weapons delivered by air as compared to those fired by ground systems, it appears that a reasonable course to follow, for bombers at least, is one of increased investment in area munitions. What is needed is something relatively simple, inexpensive, and capable of disabling heavily armored vehicles over a wide area. Such munitions tend to be large. Since they are best delivered in high numbers for extended coverage, it may prove more desirable to drop them from bombers rather than from smaller aircraft. Area weapons could prove especially effective against such targets as tank columns that are massing for attack.

Bombers, as well as other aircraft, could employ precision munitions and traditional explosives against less concentrated targets or in rear areas, where one might wish to be very careful as to what was and was not an appropriate target for attack. Having significantly greater endurance than fighters, bombers are capable of loitering for hours well behind friendly lines, while enemy columns are in the process of forming or until such time as the enemy attack plan unfolds. They could be called in from their "orbits" on very short notice. The incorporation of bombers into air operations in this manner should maximize the effect of aerial firepower.

Bombers do not, of course, have to bring to bear firepower per se. I suggested earlier that it might be sufficient merely to disable enemy armored vehicles, as opposed to destroying them, along with their human freight. Bombers are large aircraft and capable of delivering a variety of stores, some of which either have yet to be developed or receive even thoughtful consideration.

It is not my purpose to rely heavily on future technologies or explore futuristic weapons. But one should understand that future weapons need not necessarily be more lethal than present ones. In this vein, it is appropriate to point out that bombers conceivably can drop things other than high explosives from their bomb bays. For example, what if it were technologically feasible (or, equally significant, technologically desirable) to incapacitate as many as possible of the mechanical vehicles in an entire division through the careful delivery by a few bombers of a nonlethal substance? This might be done, say, through ejection of an ultrasticky resin compound or a thin foam that dries quickly to super hardness for some hours. Other payloads, more exotic or less, are possible. It takes but a brief flight of imagination to visualize being able to impede an opposing force without extensive loss of life. There are situations in which recourse to such weapons might be highly desirable, particularly as an indicator that the actor wished to avoid further escalation. The result would not bring a sense of humanity to warfare, but it could bring additional ways to stall aggressive behavior or to communicate reasoned intent.

In this perhaps idealized framework, it is possible even that the term "bomber" may become something of a misnomer--that the vehicle, capacious and ever susceptible to numerous innovations, could as readily become a platform for increased communication as for increased destruction.

Until the advent of the millenium, however, there will continue to be a run on pragmatism. The services should take under consideration possible ways to include bombers, where feasible, in contingency forces for conventional operations. There exists a wide area for expansive, as opposed to cloistered, military thinking. Means might be discovered to exploit the bomber's natural advantage in terms of range and payload. Increasing conventional capabilities remains a fertile subject for our best efforts. Topics of this nature are ripe for creative treatment in places such as the military's professional schools, particularly in the war colleges, estates which to date have not produced an especially large volume of substantial and vintage thought.¹⁴

One alternative that merits investigation is the possibility of assigning to the reserves some of the older B-52s now in service. These aircraft could be assigned perhaps to the reserves as part of the wherewithal to begin specialized training for conventional scenarios, with an eye toward Europe. One option that comes to mind is use of a portion or all of the 75 "D" models of the B-52, soon to pass into obsolescence anyway for strategic purposes, in order to have in ready reserve a carefully structured expeditionary force of heavy bombers. Bombers may figure importantly in countering concentrations of forces and materiel, including the more than 50,000 armored combat vehicles in Warsaw Pact inventories, in case of a conventional conflict in Europe.

Notwithstanding tactical applications, the bomber's primary role will continue to be a strategic one. Bombers presently stand with ICBMs and SLBMs in the constitution of the Triad. The manned bomber accounts for a sizable share of the partnership: a quarter of our nuclear weapons, over half the destructive power (megatonnage), and a third of the yearly budget for strategic systems. It might be said to carry its share of the load, literally and figuratively.

Bombers seem destined to maintain their viability on through the foreseeable future. Maintaining bombers avails us with multiple options and opportunities for flexibility, in addition to presenting an enemy with multiple problems of defense.

This is not an advocacy piece for an instant new bomber. The administration has made its decision against the B-1, and barring some unforeseen turn of events, such as a breakdown of SALT, that decision is not very likely to be amended. But decisions are based on conditions, judgments, interpretations, men. In short, they are based on factors that can and do change. Because a decision was made not to build a new bomber in this, the latter part of the eighth decade of the century, it does not follow that the issue is forever fixed.

I believe that the issue of a new manned bomber is neither dead nor moot. There is a requirement for a new bomber, one without frills or wire wheels. We need this system, not so much for what it will be but for what it could become. Few, if any, foresaw the B17, designed originally for coastal defense, becoming a high-altitude strategic bomber; or the 3-52, designed for high-altitude nuclear delivery, becoming a bomber capable of low-altitude penetration for nuclear strike on one hand and a conveyor of massive conventional ordnance on the other. One need not trust in providence to have some sense of appreciation for the likelihood that, as, with systems in the past, a new bomber would be able to accommodate change, often to advantage.

There is an inherent danger that any proposal for a barebones bomber will be seized on by critics as an absurdity, something similar to proposing a stripped down Cadillac. A new bomber should not be a Cadillac, large or small. It should not be a Maserati or even a Buick. It should be a vehicle capable of giving a comfortable degree of assurance that our strategic defenses will remain reasonably credible and balanced into the next century. Its potential applications, without pretending to exhaust the possibilities, range from use as a laser platform to a role in antinaval operations. It offers the promise of becoming a workhorse, with hopes for windfall on the side. There is sufficient precedent to support both expectations.

Some Say that it is high noon for the manned bomber. Others claim that the bomber is in its twilight. To still others it seems that in a sidereal world, where time so often surprises us, it is not out of the question that a new day may soon be dawning.

Hq USAF

Notes

1. General Carl Spaatz, "Strategic Air Power: Fulfillment of a Concept," Foreign Affairs, April 1946, p. 396.

2, See Oleg Hoeffding, Bombing North Vietnam: An Appraisal of Economic and Political Effects (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1966).

3. "The B-1: A Long Look before Buying," Washington Post, May 13, 1976, p. A23.

4. See Francis P. Hoeber, Slow to Take Offense: Bombers, Cruise Missiles, and Prudent Deterrence (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1977).

5. A national news article, which if of substance is also of profound importance, went largely unnoticed. It mentioned "concern that the Soviets are nearing a breakthrough in developing thermonuclear weapons 100 times more powerful than the largest current weapon. One possibility...is a Soviet attempt to build a 'gigaton' hydrogen bomb, whose explosive power would be equal to 1 billion tons of TNT." See "U.S. Officials Put Wraps on Soviet Physicist's Lecture," Washington Post, March 13, 1977.

6. Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year, 1939 (London: Encyclopaedia Britannica Co" Ltd" 1939), p. 34.

7. Economic Report of the President (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 305. Also see Fact Sheet issued by Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), "Department of Defense Deflators," January 11, 1977.

8. Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood, Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force: Why and How (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976), pp. 1 and 9.

9. Ibid., p. 34.

10. Drew Middleton, "Some Doubts Persist over Cruise Missile," New York Times, July 12, 1977, p. 7.

11. John C. Stetson, "A Message from the Secretary of the Air Force," Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, July 15, 1977.

12. We use the term "cruise" today because we are conditioned to it. Thoughtful students of weaponry, however, can predict that as the cruise missile is perfected it will not be limited to "cruise" speed. It is bound to get faster, probably much faster than the platform from which it is launched The missile almost certainly will be improved to take evasive actions against ground systems while remaining compact in size. It may even succeed in becoming the first fullblown development of a system that has long enjoyed promise and suffered resistance, the remotely piloted vehicle.

13. Quanbeck and Wood, p. 13. There are those who would place this figure higher, perhaps as much as three or four times higher, on infrequent occasions.

14. See, for example, John P. Lovell, "Apolitical Warrior or Soldier-Statesman," Armed Forces and Society, Fall 1977, p. 125: "The war colleges of course face an enormous problem because they endeavor to cover a vast array of subjects in a year's time, with students whose background preparation in the social sciences and humanities (especially) ranges from negligible to extensive. The 'cafeteria' or 'shotgun' approach to providing exposure to the large number of subjects deemed by war college officials to be relevant at this level in the professional career has been popular-and criticized repeatedly over the years." (fn. 4)

Lieutenant Colonel Edd D. Wheeler (Ph.D., Emory University) is a plans and programs officer on the Air Staff.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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