Air University Review, January-February 1979

World Peace and the Soviet Military Threat

Few things in this world are as certain as change, and certainly our world has changed irreversibly since World War II. Yet, as the Frenchman said: Plus ca change, plus c'est la même chose ("The more things change the more they are the same.").

World peace, for example, continues to depend on American supremacy, and that supremacy is a function of the development and deployment of highly advanced weapon systems. A possibly moot point, in this connection, is the nature of the Soviet threat to world peace. What are the intentions of the Soviet Union? Has our assessment of its intentions and capabilities been realistic? If the Soviets, as a result of their intentions and massive arms buildup, pose an active threat to the United States, will our present stockpile of nuclear bombs and "conventional" missiles be sufficient deterrent to Soviet power? Are the current SALT talks leading to a weakening of American military power relative to the Soviet Union, and, if so, will such a weakening act as a stimulus to Soviet aggression?

These and related issues are discussed in three recent books about the Soviet Union. For a realistic insight into the nature of Soviet thinking, Marshal A. A. Grechko's The Armed Forces of the Soviet State: A Soviet View provides a detailed picture of the worldwide goals and ambitions of the Soviet Union in relation to its military and political policies. William T. Lee, a U.S. specialist in Soviet military and economic affairs, published two similar publications in 1977: Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How CIA Estimates Went Astray and The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955-75: An Unconventional Approach.

The true intentions of a nation can be assessed in terms of its stated intentions and its overt activity. Grechko's work, which was written when he was Minister of Defense of the U.S.S.R., serves as a major source for stated Soviet intentions.† Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko joined the Red Army in 1919, took part in subsequent civil war campaigns, and became a member of the Communist Party in 1928. After graduating from the Frunze Military Academy in 1936, he entered the General Staff Academy, graduating in 1941, just as Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. When hostilities ended, he was General-Colonel (three stars) and commander of the 1st Guards Army. By 1953, Grechko was General of the Army, soon becoming Marshal of the Soviet Union (1955). He later became Minister of Defense, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, First Deputy Minister of Defense, Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact nations, Minister of Defense, and finally a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Grechko died on 27 April 1976, but his statements can still be considered as fully representative of Soviet thought.

† Marshal A. A. Grechko's The Armed Forces of the Soviet State: A Soviet View, translated under the auspices of the United States Air Force (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, $3.20), 349 pages.

Grechko viewed all mankind as moving inevitably toward socialism and communism. He felt that only a socialist system, such as that of the U.S.S.R. could have an army with a just goal: the defense of "the revolutionary achievements of the working people." (p. 2) He regarded the Soviet armed forces as possessed of a "great liberating mission." According to Grechko, the army fulfills an "international duty," and the goals of the Soviet army are also adopted by the armies of other socialist states, all of them assisting the peoples of nonsocialist nations in "fighting for their social and national liberation." Countries such as the United States are pictured as controlled by "reactionary imperialists" who have "not given up their aggressive schemes." Various nations are accused of hindering the policy of peaceful coexistence by differing social systems. This is a curious assertion in view of Grechko's unqualified condemnation of all systems that differ from that of the Soviet Union. The capitalist nations are charged with disseminating lies, slandering socialist countries, and unleashing anti-Soviet hysteria at any cost while continuing the arms race. Grechko concludes that the U.S.S.R. must, therefore, strengthen the combat power of the Soviet armed forces, supplying them with "modern weapons, combat equipment and other supplies." His sequence of chapters documents this viewpoint.

It is hardly surprising, then, that William Lee, in Understanding the Soviet Military Threat, † depicts the Soviet Union as pursuing a policy of political expansion based on military forces that are developing more rapidly than those of the United States. As its title implies, Lee (formerly with the CIA) finds fault with certain CIA estimates of Soviet military power. The U.S. formerly relied on these estimates in reacting to the Soviet military threat. In the Foreword, Eugene V. Rostow points out that Soviet spokesmen frequently talk of a projected military expansion program designed to achieve complete superiority in every category. On that basis, the Soviets feel that they will "determine the direction of world political development." (p.2)

†William T. Lee, Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How CIA Estimates Went (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1977, $2.00), 73 pages.

Rostow emphasizes that the American intelligence community has resisted accepting these facts. Its conception of the Soviet Union is interpreted by Rostow as a government seeking parity with the United States rather than dominance. Thus, the U.S.S.R. is seen as a developed nation interested in maintaining the status quo, and the usual strategic and conventional weapons, sufficient to deter Soviet expansionism, are adequate for U.S. defense.

Lee cites Soviet defense expenditures that have grown steadily since 1958, with 14 or 15 percent of the Soviet gross national product allocated to defense. The Five-Year Plan for 1976-80 continues the trend, with perhaps 18 percent of the 1980 budget allocated for defense. Included are an increasing number of weapon systems--much more accurate MIRVed ICBMs/SLBMs, for instance--able to reach U.S. targets from Soviet coastal waters, as are new aircraft with larger payloads and greater potential for penetrating hostile airspace. These capacities, Lee feels, are consistent with the "well-documented Soviet objective of achieving superiority over the United States and its allies in military power." The Soviets have achieved, or will soon achieve, numerical parity or superiority in almost all important types of weapon systems, Lee asserts. Although they may still be lagging qualitatively in weapon technology, their intention of becoming both quantitatively and qualitatively superior in all weapon systems is potent.

Lee believes that the continuing power buildup can be accounted for partly by its political utility: the Soviet Union holds that peaceful coexistence, or detente, exists largely because of its superior (or supposedly superior) military power. Increasing Soviet military budget outlays through 1980 indicate an expectation of further political gains resulting from military power.

Lee contends that the current trends in Soviet priorities are made possible with the help of the Western nations--technological and otherwise.

William T. Lee's The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955-75: An Unconventional Approach† was published in collaboration with the General Electric Tempo Center for Advanced Studies, which solicited the cooperation of Soviet analysts and economists in its preparation. The author describes the uncertainties and data gaps existing in the CIA's direct-costing approach to estimating U.S.S.R. defense expenditures. Because of various hidden expenditures suited to the political "cosmetics" practiced by Soviet leaders, the CIA adopted the direct-costing method, which estimates the amounts in each military program, then applies estimated individual prices to each quantity. Only recently has the CIA admitted that it underestimated the Soviet defense budget by a factor of two in 1970 and possibly by a factor of three at present. Lee analyzes this error in an in-depth review of various methodologies used to estimate U.S.S.R. national security expenditures (NSE), providing an alternative way of estimating NSE "based entirely on published Soviet industrial output, budgetary, and national income data, while accepting the limited coverage of the 'Defense' and 'Science' budgets." (The Estimation, p. 2) The author lists the advantages of this approach: it is derived directly from Soviet data, in rubles; it is not subject to the index number effect of applying U.S. prices to Soviet weapons and technology; it does not depend on estimated ruble-dollar ratios; it reveals resource allocations in each Soviet annual and Five-Year Plan; it is an alternative to the direct-costing method and provides an aggregative check on the results of that approach; and it provides an approximate picture of U.S.S.R. NSE as Soviet leaders see it. While admittedly not perfect, Lee offers his approach as one resulting in a better estimate of the Soviet NSE.

† William T. Lee, Lee's The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures, 1955-75: An Unconventional Approach (New York: Praeger, 1977, $25.00), 358 pages.

As to why the CIA estimates went so wrong, Lee lists a number of reasons in Understanding the Soviet Military Threat. The first was its emotional rather than analytical response to the initial overreaction to the intelligence community's early overestimation of Soviet heavy bomber production and Soviet ICBM deployment. Some consequences were U.S. expansion of heavy bomber production and ICBM/SLBM forces far beyond what the U.S. might otherwise have considered necessary. A second reason was the fear of strengthening bureaucratic Soviet military forces and nuclear overkill on both sides.

Lee points to the Cuban missile crisis as proving that the U.S. advantage in bombers and missiles was effective in curbing Khrushchev's adventurism, without risk of war. Lee maintains that, in response to the bomber and missile "gaps" of one kind or another existing between Soviet and U.S. forces, "The prevalent reaction was some apparent institutional guilt for having contributed to a perceived overreaction by the United States, plus a widespread belief that the Soviets had opted out of the intercontinental missile competition, and a determination not to overestimate again." (Understanding, p. 29)

The Soviet Union envisioned the threat to itself as being through Europe, so that Eurasian strategic requirements came first in its priorities. The United States, according to Lee, expected the Soviets to manufacture several hundred heavy bombers and first-generation ICBMs in the 1950s. Instead, the Soviets manufactured several thousand medium bombers and 700 IRBMs. When the U.S. produced 41 strategic missile submarines, the Russians constructed some 57 (41 of them nuclear-powered), but many of these carried cruise missiles designed for operations against naval targets. "We simply did not understand Soviet strategic concepts; hence we misjudged Soviet priorities." (Ibid., p. 30) Lee concludes that Soviet political leaders want a great deal more than minimum deterrence and that they have made no secret of their aspirations.

Lee mentions another error in American strategic thought-the so-called "mirror imaging" based on the implicit or explicit assumption that Soviet aims are similar to ours, that they react as we do to common problems and experiences. American strategists equate "strategic" and "intercontinental," whereas the Russians interpret strategic considerations to encompass their very borders. Lee feels that the threat of civilian and city destruction is no deterrent in Soviet thinking; they think in terms of the destruction of military, industrial, and administrative targets rather than worrying about how much of the population will die." All the indicators suggest that the Soviets will not accept assured destruction in the future unless there are stark changes in the political leadership." (Ibid., p. 32)

What many observers in the U.S. do not understand is that the Soviets have their own brand of propaganda, difficult for Westerners to comprehend. "Actually, it is probably more ritual than rhetoric as we now use the latter term. Such ritual does not really involve factual or intellectual credibility; it is required dogma in the Soviet system." (Ibid., p. 34) One must look beyond the ritual to find the real message, making distinctions between Soviet doctrine, strategy, and "operational art." Failure to do this has caused some American analysts to dismiss genuinely informative statements by Soviet leaders as pure rhetoric-statements that are factual and which are taken seriously.

In view of CIA and other underestimates of Soviet military strength, Lee makes a number of proposals for improving intelligence studies and estimates. First among them is giving credence to the obvious: exploiting unclassified information. Not only should the statements of the regime's spokesmen to their people be taken at face value but also greater use can be made of the large quantity of unclassified information leaking out of Russia. Despite the great secrecy surrounding military matters, the Soviets have been willing to discuss their objectives and various of their programs. "The time of these programs, the choice of system designs, and the integration of the new weapons into the forces, all suggest a well-conceived plan guided by doctrine, strategy, and lessons drawn from the Vietnam and Middle East wars." (Ibid., p. 39)

Lee also suggests that efforts be made to simulate the effectiveness of Soviet weapons and forces and that a more realistic historical perspective be adopted. Knowledge of past trends can help us understand how new trends in Soviet planning reflect Russian objectives and requirements. Ranging from the opportunistic tactics of Russian revolutionaries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to Grechko's updated statement of policy, every added bit of historical evidence helps American analysts acquire a realistic view of Soviet thought and ambition. The evidence suggests strongly that the U.S.S.R. understands and respects power. Negotiations are not likely to succeed unless U.S. representatives can speak from a position of unquestioned power, especially military power.

The U.S. has engaged in disarmament or arms limitation conferences with the Soviets for decades, and may continue doing so at the cost of tempering military preparedness in deference to the seemingly interminable but hopefully fruitful negotiations. In the meantime, the United States has been weakened militarily in relation to the Soviet Union. In view of William Lee's analysis of the situation, realistic thinking suggests that American negotiators are not likely to impress the Soviet planners except from a position of military strength. Where social, political, and economic vacuums have existed, the Russians have usually moved in to fill them. A major reason for their retreat in the Cuban affair was their unwillingness to test American military might at that time.

One consequence of such realism is a military program costing many billions of dollars. Such a cost may very well be the price Americans must pay for the survival of their institutions. Skimping on programs on which our survival depends could amount to committing national suicide.

However, an adequate defense program need not increase the overall United States defense budget alarmingly. At the present time, more than 60 percent of our defense budget goes for financing personnel costs. Cutting manpower is not inconsistent with maintaining a defense posture. A manpower reduction would leave us with sufficient conventional forces, permit greater recruitment selectivity, and release the funds needed to finance the exotic new weapons required to counter the Soviet threat.

In any case, a crisis in decision-making now exists. One realistic alternative is to develop, manufacture, and deploy weapon systems on a scale the magnitude of which will impress the Soviet Union. If this alternative is pursued, the stagnating arms limitation talks will become more meaningful and likely to produce results much sooner.

Captain Steven E. Cady (M.S., University of Southern California) is a B-52G electronic warfare officer with the 69^th Bombardment Squadron at Loring Air Force Base, Maine, and is also the 42d Bombardment Wing Executive Officer. His Air Force career includes five years of enlisted service. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leaven worth, Kansas. He was Loring’s 1976 "Officer of the Year" and was selected as an "Outstanding Young Man of America" for 1978. His articles have appeared in Air University Review and other journals.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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