Air University Review, September-October 1978

A Response to Human World Order

Thus spoke Benjamin Franklin to John Hancock as they signed the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776. And so spoke Gerald and Patricia Misches in 1977 in their book, Toward a Human World Order. † The most fascinating impact of this rather interesting and somewhat polemic piece is that it addresses the same issue that concerned Franklin and addresses it in much the same way; the exception is that both the size of the community implied and the implications of the hanging are much larger in the book. Franklin was concerned about 13 fledgling colonies in a very uncertain wild frontier; the Misches are concerned about the future of individuals in over 150 established nation-states, which are also facing a rather uncertain and wildly unknown frontier of shortages and increasingly faulty assumptions. The shared issue is survival and how to assure it for individuals through, and in spite of nation-states.

† Gerald and Patricia Misches, Toward a Human World Order: Beyond the National Security Straitjacket (New York: Paulist Press, 1977, $2.95, paper, $9.95, hardback), 399 pages.

Toward a Human World Order is unique in that it addresses international survival from the point of view of the preservation of basic human rights and does it from the perspective of Abraham Maslow's well-known hierarchy of human needs. The authors assert that the right of the individual to self-actualization is a higher right than the survival of the nation-state. Unfortunately, they maintain, the drive to preserve the nation-state devours all the energy and resources of the state so that there is nothing left for the benefit of individual self-actualization and personal development. This occurs because the nation-state itself suffers from never having outgrown the security or survival level of the Maslow needs hierarchy; thus, nation-state leaders have never seen the vision of the self-actualization potential of the state. Security and individual state survival drive all the decisions of the state leaders and all state behavior. The nation (as if it had a personality) can thus never develop beyond a very low level of security consciousness.

The solution to this dilemma, say the Misches, is to focus on world order rather than on individual state survival. They assume and attempt to argue, however furtively, that the individual states will survive only when they stop struggling with each other to preserve their own personal security and turn their efforts instead to international cooperation with the goal of preservation of the rights of the individual. The protection and development of individual human potential will occur only when states recognize their unique interdependencies and stop competing with one another. They take over 300 pages to agree with Henry Steele Commager that:

What is called for is a revival of the wisdom and resourcefulness that presided over the birth of our Republic and gave us those institutions which still serve us so well and have been so widely copied throughout the rest of the civilized world. We must invoke that creativity to reconcile nationalism--with its assumption that nations can live by and to themselves--with the reality that, in almost everything that counts, the world is interdependent. We must invoke it to summon up an inventiveness in the realms of politics and economics comparable to that which we display in science and technology.¹

The Misches argue that the common denominator which states should share is the concern for maximizing human potential and not the concern for individual self-preservation. Apart from the fact that this proposition flies in the face of both the traditional international relations theory of realism and any educated sense of history, it is an inviting idea and idealism. The development of maximum human potential for self-actualization, like motherhood, is something that everyone supports. Unfortunately, their justifications for that position and their alternative suggestions leave much to be desired. Their book, to a great extent, is like cotton candy--inviting because it suggests fulfillment, but disappointingly hollow and without substance or lasting satisfaction.

It is necessary to consider the argument structure of the book itself. It opens with a plaintive description of the powerlessness of the individual and the nation-state in the face of what Alvin Toffler has called "future shock." After giving a relatively good collection of examples of why we are all powerless and perceive ourselves as such, the Misches make a case for the assertion that our sense of powerlessness derives from the fact that the state itself is powerless. They discuss national interest in some detail and then use this for a springboard into a disguised defense of world federalism arguments. They conclude with an appeal to universal religious values as a solution to all ills and as the invitation to proper perspective for the human development movement. I will treat each of these main arguments in turn from my perspective.

It is particularly difficult to argue against any assertion that individuals and nations are powerless ₉r at least perceive themselves as such. Émile Durkheim called this perception "anomie" in the nineteenth century, and few have since disagreed with him. The authors are clearly and articulately, if a bit polemically, in touch with a very real sense of the hopelessness that is abroad in the land. The book review section of any major newspaper or the content of any clustering of Sunday sermons will give evidence of that. Their argument is that it is more intense and much nearer a crisis now than it has ever been. But whether such perceived intensity is a function of more articulate communication capabilities or real despair remains a moot point.

There is clearly a sense of frustration among both individuals and groups around the world, but the unusual suggestion of this book is that the frustration is due to the structural lag of institutional development behind the growth of individuals. The authors maintain that this hopelessness exists because the prevailing institution (the nation-state) devotes all its energies to self-preservation at the expense of any human goals. Thus, powerlessness is the result of a national interest that focuses on the basic level of Maslow's need structure. It follows that because the nation never escapes the basic security level, the powerlessness perceived by the individual is never alleviated. The problem with this argument is that the state cannot be assumed to function like a person.

The second argument is that the obsession with security "in the national interest" literally eats up all the energies of the state and leaves no resources for the development of human potential and thus human rights. The authors introduce a rather novel, though simplistic, description of what they call the "national security motors" to demonstrate their point. They argue that, unlike the demobilization in previous wars, since World War II the United States has been involved in constant mobilization for the preservation of its national security:

Military security became a motor that needed to be constantly turned on and operative.... But military preparedness was not the only national security motor that was to dominate life in the second half of the twentieth century. The postwar world witnessed a gradual but steady escalation of economic and resource interdependencies and a corresponding competition that would eventually pose even graver threats to national security... Thus, there are now three national security motors: balance-of-weapons competition, balance-of-payments competition and competition over scarce resources. (pp. 46-47)

This is perhaps the most interesting part of the book because it clearly articulates the economies of setting priorities for national security while, at the same time, showing three intricate interdependencies of both the national and international economies. It maintains that these complexities literally are driven by national security concerns at the expense of concern for human individual needs. Unfortunately, this argument ignores the enormous budget for cabinet level departments in the U.S. government such as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of Housing and Urban Development, and the Department of Transportation. These departments clearly demonstrate a high government priority for response to human needs and thereby counteract the authors' arguments.

Once the authors have demonstrated the projection that governments are literally unable to respond to human needs because of their complexity and national security motors, they turn to what they perceive as a meaningful alternative to national interest and national sovereignty. They call this a grassroots movement to generate world order while, at the same time, they refuse to call it a proposal for world federalism. Their argument is not only unrealistically idealistic and extremely weak but also reveals their hidden agenda in writing the book. Although their argument is always couched in the famous Benjamin Franklin terms (and it is very hard to argue against the proposition that we should work together for common human goals, or we will all somehow fall apart or be the less for the lack of effort), it is clear that they are calling for support of their own "World Order Models Project," which has already been under way for some time. It somewhat disturbs me that they never really admit this advocacy position outright; instead they veil their support of this organization in their introduction of all of its programs and utilization of examples from the project's experience. They spend nearly 100 pages of the book discussing a New World Order and outlining strategies for achieving it as they have outlined it. They totally ignore the almost universal history of failure of such attempts in. the past to be anything but a haven for intellectuals and never have any real impact on the common citizen. And they neglect to address the entire international relations field of the burgeoning growth of nongovernmental international organizations (NGOs) that exist apart from their propositions. These NGOs already are meeting the Misches' prescribed solution to the national interest problem:

What is being asked, then, is not to abandon present problem-solving efforts for some far distant future utopia. Recommended, rather, is a pragmatism which recognizes that such problem-solving efforts will not bear much fruit without commensurate effort put into structural adaptation at the global level. (p.329)

The concluding argument of the book appeals to what the authors imply is the universal religious value of "wholeness." They see religions values as the only shared core of perceptions that can bind the individuals of the world together in a grassroots movement to enhance and guarantee the rights of individuals and emphasize the human growth toward self-actualization. They describe traditional religion as impotent because it responds usually by drawing its "moral skirts" around its few followers and claiming immunity from the problems of the world.

With a vision of themselves as members of God's faithful remnant who will enjoy eternal bliss when this world passes away, they scrutinize their personal lives to make sure they are ready for the end. And thereby they contribute to the resulting destruction by failing to take any positive initiative on behalf of the world and humankind. (pp.231-32)

Instead, the authors appeal to what they call "authentic religion":

In both the Western and Eastern meanings of the word, authentic religion is concerned with a vision and celebration of the essential relatedness and oneness of all existence. It points toward a potential and destiny that transcend the immediate evidence of brokenness and incompletion. Authentic religion is developed in the humble awareness of participation in reality and meaning greater than self and beyond measurable physical, social, political or economic relationships. (p.333)

This definition of authentic religion leaves ample room for emphasis on humanistic values and the development of human rights and human goals. Consequently, they argue that basically the only human thing to do is to respond to our basic human religiosity that derives from our concern for our fellow man and eagerly lend our support to their proposed grassroots movements for "a more human world order." This movement toward a more human world order is, therefore, basically a human, religious movement.

What then are we to do? If we do not leap on their band wagon for human world order, are we to be considered irreligious? I think not. But I do feel we should respond to the book for what it is--an invitation to examine the balance between human values and state values. The point of the book is that human rights have been given no attention because of the national security motor. This is hardly true in a nation where an entire recent decade saw the evolution of the civil rights of one particular segment of its population defined and clarified regardless of the national security motors. Neither is it true in a nation that recently fought its longest war in defense of the human right of freedom for a country that had experienced less human development opportunity than its own. The book is neither good political science nor necessarily good theology (or religion?), but it does invite from us a response to good humanism. And it does suggest some provocative dilemmas generated by the national motors that are driven by our growing interdependencies. Most of all, however, it suggests that we examine our values lest we find ourselves "hanging separately."

I feel that this volume suggests a very real challenge in terms of our responsibility to respond to our interdependence with one another, our responsibility to "hang together." Its goal of generating a system for international focus on human priorities is a good goal; its methodology is just a bit too unrealistic. Perhaps the best invitation of the book is for us to examine how our own personal human potential by definition requires interdependence. Iranaeus wrote that "The glory of God is man come fully alive." We cannot disagree with that goal nor would the Misches. But the emphasis suggested by them is that coming alive cannot be achieved without relationship that recognizes interdependence. Human development is, in the context of the ideas presented here, community development. By definition then the human development movement is a community development, the development of a community that ministers to its own needs and the needs of its individual members. Coming fully alive is a ministering within a community; ministering is community, literally "a way of living."

As Air Force members we are thus challenged to a more human order within our own community. We are constantly reminded of this need and given checklists and suggestions on how to make it happen. But, do we succeed? Do we want to succeed? And, if we want to succeed, where do we start? And how?

Rather than answer those questions with a long prescription, let me share with you a significant paragraph from C. S. Lewis that puts my own interdependencies into proper perspective.

It is a serious thing to live in a society of possible Gods or Goddesses, to remember that the dullest and most uninteresting person you talk to may one day be a creature which... you would be strongly tempted to worship, or else a honor and a corruption such as you meet now, if at all, only in a nightmare. All day long we are in some degree of helping each other to be one or another of these destinations. It is in the light of these overwhelming possibilities, it is with awe and circumspection proper to them, that we should conduct all our dealings with one another. All friendships, all loves, all play, all politics. There are no ordinary people. You have never talked to a mere mortal. Nations, cultures, arts, civilizations--these are mortal, and their life to ours as the life of a gnat. But it is immortals whom we joke with, marry, snub and exploit--immortal horrors or everlasting splendor.

C. S. Lewis
The Weight of Glory

The next move is yours!

Note

1. Henry Steele Commager, "200 Plus 1," Parade, July 3, 1977, p. 6.

Chaplain, Captain, Russell L. Osmond (M.S., Syracuse University) is on the chapel team at Griffiss AFB, New York. His assignments include Keesler AFB, Mississippi; Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai AFB, Thailand; and the 3320^th Retraining Group at Lowry AFB, Colorado. This review was written while he was Air Staff Training Officer for the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. He has been a lecturer for ACSC and AWC base-level seminars and is currently completing a Ph.D. in political science. Chaplain Osmond is a Distinguished Graduate of Squadron Officer School.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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