Air University Review, September-October 1978

Professionalism in Transition

the officer corps in the age of deterrence

Observation and analysis of continuity and change provide an excellent means to assess the strength and resilience of any institution, and the Armed Forces of the United States are no exception. The past several years seem to indicate that the dominant trend is change, and little evidence exists to suggest that this trend will be altered significantly in the future.

The amount and degree of change notwithstanding, much continuity exists in the U.S. Armed Forces. In part this reflects the bureaucratic nature of the U.S. military and the role it plays in the political, social, and economic interactions of the nation, but it can also be argued that the continuity of the armed forces is primarily the product of the leadership provided by the professional officer corps. Obviously the officer corps is undergoing change, but one could question whether the rate and thrust of its new orientation is clearly focused outward toward a reconceptualization of the role and problems of military force employment in a sophisticated and complex international environment or whether its predominant view is introspective, based on the assumption that straight-line extrapolations of existing strategies and force structures are adequate for the decade of the 1980s.

But before attempting to determine the extent and direction of change within the professional officer corps, one must first examine the salient variables that identify the officer corps as a profession, such as its corporate nature, its fundamental beliefs as expressed in its professional theory, and its professional ethic, which regulates the behavior of the corps. After defining the profession in terms of its variables, one can then suggest the thesis that the officer corps is faced with a serious professional dilemma when tasked to pursue a strategy of deterrence or war-fighting, given the existing international and domestic environment. Moreover, because of emerging fundamental alterations in the international system and some modifications in the domestic environment as well, the officer corps may find it essential to reassess the variables that constitute its professionalism. More significant, the nature of the changed international system may require the professional officer corps to conceptualize alternative military strategies that could differ considerably from the more traditional strategic constructs of the past.

Perhaps the most obvious variable that identifies the officer corps as a profession is its cohesiveness or corporateness. Like the more traditional professions of law and medicine, the officer corps reflects a corporate character due to its requirement for prolonged and specialized training and education, reliance on an ethical code of behavior, and an extremely strong sense of group solidarity ¹

Certainly a more important variable is the professional theory that exists within the officer corps. The theory consists of fundamental assumptions and principles pertaining to the organization of military forces and how they are employed in peace or war. In an ideal sense, the theory results from an analysis of past operational experience and measured judgments about technological influences. This professional theory serves as a wellspring for the military doctrine, strategy, and tactics that form the basis for all military activity. It is in this area that the military finds itself challenged during the nuclear age by those nonmilitary intellectuals who argue that the exponential increase in the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the basic lack of empirical evidence pertaining to their use relegate military judgment to mere speculation. Indeed, the doctrinal and strategic literature of the nuclear age is almost exclusively the product of civilian theorists, with military thought originating in the officer corps conspicuously absent.² But perhaps more significant is the fact that the officer corps has yet to realize that the implications of the existing strategy of deterrence, which stems primarily from the civilian intellectual community, pose enormous challenges to military professionalism--a proposition that forms the basis for this article.

The third and final variable, the professional ethic, appears to be of crucial importance, for it reflects the values and norms that regulate the internal relationships of the officer corps as a group and govern the relationship of the professional officer corps toward its clients, the institutionalized state and the society within the state. As a group, the officer corps stresses the pessimistic nature of man and accepts a cyclical view of history. Military force employment is justified by serving the political aims of the state, which is in continuous competition with other states. This condition requires the officer corps to be eternally vigilant and well prepared for war. Threat perceptions, therefore, are vital to the profession, for they strongly influence strategy, tactics, and weapon system preferences. More important, threat perceptions are a crucial element of the communication process between the profession and its clients.

These values and norms are institutionalized through training, professional military education, and socialization, which is a continuous function in a professional officer's career. And like professional theory, the professional ethic presents the officer corps with a challenge of major proportions when examined in the context of an emergent military strategy that may go beyond deterrence.

The degree to which the professional officer corps will alter its perceptions of these variables is a matter of conjecture. That they must consider modification is obvious, for certain emerging trends leave the officer corps little choice.

Perhaps the most complex strategy ever followed by the U.S. military is the strategy of deterrence. It remains) since World War II, as the dominant concept of military force utility and continues to serve as the foundation of U.S. national security policy. That notwithstanding, its implementation creates a conceptual challenge for the professional officer corps and requires it to consider some fundamental adjustment in its thinking. For example, military planners traditionally assess a potential adversary on the basis of his capabilities, not his intentions. Yet, "…deterrence is about intentions-not just estimating enemy intentions but influencing them."³ Despite its tradition, the professional officer corps accepts this salient fact that is stated clearly in the official doctrine of the United States Air Force.

Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction to an enemy’s hostile actions. The intent is to deter an adversary--to prevent an act by fear of the consequences--or to impel him to take some action acceptable to the United States.⁴

But in an analytic sense, this theoretical construct poses some difficulty for the professional officer because it raises fundamental questions about his status as a professional. The problem stems not from the theory, which professional officers accept as valid and promulgate as doctrine, but from the operational uncertainty of the doctrine. By definition, the professional is required to combine his theoretical beliefs with practical applications in order to assess the true value of his professional expertise.⁵ But an empirically precise assessment about the efficacy of deterrence is made with great difficulty, if at all, and the void that results effectively denies the officer corps an element of assurance so vital to its well-being.

The deterrence strategy further complicates the issue of professionalism since deterrence is based on perceptions that are inherently vague and implicit. One deters by having the intention to deter and by persuading one's adversary that credible military force exists and will be used effectively if deterrence fails.⁶ This presents some difficulty to the professional officer corps because the deterrence theory suggests that perceptions of force capability can become more important than actual force capability. Thus, it is possible that force structure and readiness standards necessary to maintain the proper level of perceptions could be less than that required for actual war-fighting. Under such circumstances, the professional officer can be expected to respond in a traditional manner, that is, he will seek to apply those preparedness standards that provide him a perceived degree of certainty at the prudent risk level. Unfortunately, when a presumed state of mutual deterrence exists, the clients of the professional officer corps could oppose such action, since it could be misperceived by the adversary as a move to gain a military advantage. Thus, what the officer corps sees as necessary to assure force credibility can be viewed by his clients as undesirable because of its potential destabilizing influence. Like the previously discussed operational uncertainty of the deterrence doctrine, this dimension of deterrence effectively prevents the professional officer from combining theoretical knowledge with practical application and thus further questions his professionalism.

By contrast, and at a lower level of significance, it appears that the strategy of deterrence serves to reinforce the attitude of the professional officer corps toward war. As noted by Samuel P. Huntington, the professional officer "…is afraid of war. He wants to prepare for war. But he is never ready to fight a war."⁷ Nevertheless, the deterrence strategy does force the officer corps to modify the perceptions of victory that continue to command great influence and respect in the training and education of the professional officer. The traditionalist notion is that

…winning requires not only the means but also the ardent will to win, and the combat officer has been instilled with this will. The kind of military history he has read has stressed those heroic episodes, especially among historic captains of his own nation, where the will to win has conquered over considerable odds.⁸

One committed to a strategy of deterrence, by contrast, merely would define victory as the absence of war.

It should be recognized, however, that the demands for change placed on the professional officer corps would not disappear if the U.S. adopted a more traditional strategy of war-fighting in lieu of deterrence, largely because there currently exist powerful domestic constraints on the levels of military force and their use. Moreover, the prevailing and anticipated lowered perceptions of inter-national threat add another dimension to the changing attitudes of the clients toward the need for military force. Collectively, the constraints impede the fulfillment of the professional ethic.

By definition, the professional ethic includes the values, norms, and responsibilities with which the officer corps governs its interaction with the civil government, the society, and the internal relationships among the officer corps.⁹ The values that constitute part of the ethic are of crucial importance, since they form the basis for self-image and, moreover, enable both the state and society to evaluate the viability of the profession. It appears obvious that such a value system would include, at a minimum, patriotism, ideology, and nationalism. The existence of these values permits the officer corps to establish an appropriate normative structure within the armed forces. The normative structure, its hierarchy of values, and the corporateness of the officer corps tend to provide group cohesion and enable the officer corps to perpetuate the professional ethic. Yet, more important, they allow the officer corps to gain almost universal acceptance of a war-fighting strategy within the armed forces. But the effect is limited to internalization, because externally the normative structure of the professional officer corps has little impact. Indeed, the value system of the clients might differ appreciably, particularly when the interaction between the military and its clients is low, which it traditionally is in the United States.¹⁰ Under such circumstances, and particularly in the absence of actual military employment over a sustained period, the professional officer corps might find it necessary to emphasize threat assessments in order to convey professional judgments to its clients. Threat perceptions are vital in such a situation, for they provide the armed forces with a method of highlighting the risk and uncertainty associated with decisions made by the clients. But one must question the extent to which the professional officer corps can adhere to its ethical values necessary for a war-fighting strategy, given the trend of the views expressed by the elite and attentive public within American society. One analyst suggests that "… Americans in general, and elites in particular, see international affairs as less threatening than they once did, ... [and that] the cold war view of threat no longer is a part of most Americans' political consciousness." Moreover, the evidence seems to suggest that the shift is a major one and likely to remain for some years.¹¹

In similar fashion, civil-military relations appear to be undergoing change. Indeed, Huntington currently suggests that the immediate future will be characterized by "...less congruence and possibly less interaction between the military establishment and other social institutions."¹²

Under such circumstances it appears unlikely that the professional officer corps would convey high-level threat perceptions to its clients on a sustained basis, and, therefore, one must question the extent to which professional officers could rely on threat perceptions as a value in its ethic. It is this condition that leads Professor Huntington to conclude that "the tension between the demands of military security and the values of American liberalism can, in the long run, be relieved only by the weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism."¹³

Thus, it appears that both a deterrent strategy and a war-fighting strategy present serious dilemmas to the professional officer corps; the former by preventing the professional officer from combining his theoretical knowledge with practical application and the latter by the apparent divergence between client threat perceptions and those that the professional officer must institutionalize to satisfy his professional ethic. Independently, both strategies place a strain on professionalism. But when it is realized that existing American strategy is based on the notion of deterrence and war-fighting if deterrence fails, then the full impact of the professional dilemma becomes abundantly clear. Put differently, the clients of the American military require its professionals to maintain a strategy which demands that the professionals' expertise remain unproved; simultaneously, the clients ask the professionals to remain prepared to implement a strategy that requires the institutionalization of an ethic fundamentally at odds with that of the clients.

Perhaps the basic question is one of strategic direction. Does there exist a strategy that would provide for the security of the state while simultaneously permitting the professional officer corps, with its attendant theory, ethics, and corporateness, to maintain a positive and intellectually respected interaction with its clients? Or, alternatively, is it necessary for the professional officer corps to reconceptualize its theory and ethic, with proper emphasis on both continuity and change, in order to ensure a continuation of the profession of arms?

Perhaps the greatest challenge for the professional officer corps in the last decades of the twentieth century is to conceptualize alternative military strategies that reflect existing concerns about the utility and the role of military force in international politics. A prerequisite to that effort is serious introspection leading to an objective analysis of how the profession wishes to define the variables that constitute its professionalism. Obviously such efforts might lead to considerable change but not to the exclusion of tradition and continuity.

The first task for the professional officer corps might be to re-evaluate its dependence on both professional theory and practical application. In the existing technological era, the latter chiefly functions as means of providing a measure of certainty and offers a sense of accomplishment. Practical application does not appear essential for mature professionals and, moreover, may not have validity due to rapidly changing technology and the constant flux of politico-military situations. This is to suggest, of course, that theory and doctrine--and the resulting strategy as well--can be accepted as valid without empirical data to substantiate their validity.¹⁴ The professional officer corps can base its theory, doctrine, and strategy on a continuing analysis of its own capabilities and its professional assessment of the threat.

With regard to its ethic, the professional officer corps can give thoughtful examination to its values and norms and ask if they maintain relevance for the existing environment. It appears that the divergence between the professional officers' perceptions of their fundamental values--nationalism and threat assessment--and those of the state and society may unduly and unnecessarily strain the linkages between the two. Perhaps the professional officer corps should recognize that its normative influence, external as well as internal, has less impact in today's relatively sophisticated and pluralistic environment. Clearly, internal socialization has its limits, and the professional officer corps should be aware that excessive commitment to the war-fighting values of the military institution is a dangerous movement toward a distinct military ethos.

The strategic implications of a reconceptualization of professionalism could be a major significance. Deterrence can be accepted in a total intellectual sense, since the demands of the profession will not require practical applications of theoretical constructs to ascertain their validity.

Likewise, a war-fighting strategy takes on new dimensions since it would not rest on a professional ethic that places primary emphasis on nationalism and threat assessment. Instead the ethic could stress the return to the notion of territorial defense and coercive diplomacy, concepts which should be more congruent with the clients of the professional officer corps. This modification of the ethic makes it possible to alter the war-fighting strategy so that its orientation is directed more at escalation control of conflict. The profession of arms then takes on the image of what is referred to as a constabulary force,

…continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force and seeks viable international relations rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture. ¹⁵

Although not in the tradition of classic military force employment, the professional officer corps may have no choice but to accept this changed orientation, if for no other reason than the continuing and fundamental alteration of the international system. The emergence of a large number of new states, with their attendant nationalism, and the surfacing of determined sociopolitical aspirations are accompanied by a diffusion of military and politico-economic power. Given the magnitude of the diffusion--particularly the military dispersion that includes the availability of conventional weapons of unprecedented accuracy and the likelihood of nuclear proliferation--the threat to international order and security appears ominous.¹⁶

For the professional officer corps, the changing international system requires an assessment of the role of force in such an environment and an adequate strategic concept. In a professional sense, application of the deterrence strategy at levels below strategic nuclear exchange and classical conventional warfare in a NATO-type scenario might have serious limitations because of the enormous difficulty in determining adequate force structure requirements for a multitude of potential adversaries. Likewise, a traditional war-fighting strategy may offer little promise in such an international system simply because the magnitude of the threat conceivably could exceed the resources that realistically could be made available for a continuous war-fighting strategy. Indeed, the challenges are formidable.

A review of the implications of this changing international environment leads one American scholar to conclude that

the paradox of the emerging international system is that the need for more effective structures and mechanisms to reduce the likelihood of conflict will be greater than in any previous era. But at the same time the potential for exploitation of a variety of conflicts for unilateral advantage will be greater than ever. The broad interest of the United States lies, of course, in helping to shape a global system in which the prospects for conflict will he diminished. For this purpose American military power will remain an indispensable ingredient.¹⁷

It appears, therefore, that the response of the professional officer corps must be a strategy that offers military force structures of sufficient capability and flexibility to apply coercive diplomacy in the international system, while the political processes work toward the establishment of a new world order in which "… the prospects of conflict will be diminished."¹⁸

The manner in which the professional officer corps responds is crucial; that it must respond is an ethical imperative.

1. The definitions offered are drawn from the following sources: Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1957); and Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1960; reprinted with a new Prologue in 1971).

2. A notable exception is Maxwell D. Taylor’s The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1960). By contrast, there is a plethora of scholarly Soviet materials written on doctrine, strategy, and tactics by military officers of the U.S.S.R. Much of the writing is available in the "Soviet Military Thought" series, translated and published under the auspices of the USAF.

3. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 35.

4. AFM 1-1, Aerospace Doctrine: United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, Department of the Air Force, 15 January 1975, p. 1-1.

5. Abrahamsson, p. 61.

6. Schelling, p. 36.

7. Huntington, p. 69.

8. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 490.

9. Abrahamsson, pp. 63-68; Huntington, pp. 9-10, 76-79.

10. Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington, Civil-Military Relations (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977), pp. 22-26.

11. Bruce Russett, "The Americans’ Retreat from World Power," Political Science Quarterly, Spring 1975, pp. 8, 17.

12. Goodpaster and Huntington, p. 26.

13. Huntington, p. 456.

14. A precedent for such acceptance exists in the history of the U.S. Army Air Corps during the 1930s. During that time, and on the basis of meager evidence, it developed and taught the doctrine and strategy of daylight, high-altitude precision bombardment.

15. Janowitz, p. 418.

16. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "Emerging Major Power Relationships: Implications for the American Military in the Late Twentieth Century," Air University Review, March-April 1977, pp. 7-11.

17. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

18. Ibid.

The editors wish to thank Lucian Mandeville, Director, Armed Forces Research and Study Center (C.E.RS.A.), Institute of Political Studies, University of Toulouse (France), for permission to publish this article.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Fabyanic (Ph.D., St. Louis University) is Chief, Military Studies Division, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His flying experience includes tactical airlift operations and combat missions in the F-4 Phantom. He has been an assistant professor of history at the United States Air Force Academy and a research associate at Columbia University. A colonel selectee, Colonel Fabyanic is a 1976 graduate of Air War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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