Air University Review, September-October 1978

Many now argue that the most dangerous issue facing the world is that of nuclear proliferation, and that contention is widely reflected in the great amount of recent press and international discussion.¹ President Carter apparently shares this belief and is even willing to sacrifice more potential efficiency in the battle for energy in an effort to stop, dampen, or slow proliferation.² Additionally, this is the one subject on which both U.S. political parties, the most renowned scientists, the military, the public, our allies, and enemies all seem to agree. Though the means to ensure nonproliferation may not be agreed on, nearly unanimously, the leaders proclaim proliferation to be bad, and nonproliferation, indeed an extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to be good.

However, a growing number of reasonable and responsible people are questioning that near unanimous opinion.³ The purpose of this article is not to advocate proliferation but to expose the reader to the logic and thought on that other side of the question. Nonproliferation seems so logical on the face of it, so moral and proper, that perhaps most of us have tended to approve of it with little or only cursory consideration. Reading this article may make the decision tougher--indeed, it might even raise the issue to the level of some other international dilemmas where the right or best answer is not quite so clear. Above all, it is designed to force the reader to go beyond gut reaction and think the issue through. Readers may--I am tempted to say probably will--continue to support NPT initiatives, but I suspect they will do so with slightly less assurance, while feeling more confident that they have considered the issue in depth. They may also conclude that nonproliferation could be counterproductive to the very conditions it seeks to promote.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968 amid great fanfare proclaiming that the world now had a means to avoid nuclear holocaust. It has since been signed or ratified by more than one hundred nations. These ratifications seem to be a giant step forward, yet nuclear weapons have proliferated in both total numbers and number of possessors and may be on the verge of even more rapid growth and expansion. In fact, the NPT, to date, simply has not achieved its avowed goal. Tonga, Zambia, and similar third world nations have rushed to the signing table, but most of the nations that have the technology or technological potential and the financial ability to produce nuclear weapons have not been so eager to sign; and two possessors, France and the People's Republic of China, have not signed. The list of nonsigners is impressive. The Federal Republic of Germany and Japan are the only nonpossessor nations with true nuclear potential that have signed and ratified, and they ratified only some six years later after pressures were applied by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.⁴ Significant nonsigners or ratifiers include Brazil, Israel,* South Africa,** India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Egypt among the nonpossessors;⁵ France, the People’s Republic of China (PRO), and India are among nuclear weapon possessors. The question we have to ask is Why? If nonproliferation is so clearly in the best interests of the world, why are such hey countries not responding to this call for what we see as sanity?

*Some now are convinced that Israel has added nuclear weapons to her war stocks.

**The U.S. and U.S.S.R. recently joined forces in an attempt to pressure South Africa to turn away from nuclear development. The verdict is not yet in.

Nuclear weapon possession is, after all, most valuable. Why else would the U.S. and U.S.S.R. possess thousands of warheads when the weapon has only been used twice more than thirty years ago? Why else would the United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, and India, at increasing degrees of sacrifice, devote the enormous amounts of investment (manpower, money, and resources) necessary to enter the nuclear club, even while the latter three were being pressured, sniped at, and criticized by the superpowers for so doing? Could it be just for the right of membership in the exclusive nuclear club? Could it be just for a seat of power on the Security Council of the United Nations? No. (Note that the People's Republic of China was denied her seat until she acquired nuclear weapons.) As important as it may be to join the nuclear club and enter the ever less effective and weakened Security Council, those reasons alone would not appear to justify the expenditure of the six "haves." Nuclear weapon possession must be perceived to offer something more. I suggest that that something more is quite evident and that it becomes more evident as proliferation increases. It is, in a word, "security." There is one self-evident and undisputed fact associated with nuclear power possession: no nation that possesses nuclear weapons has ever had its borders seriously attacked by another nation. True, nuclear possession may not be the sole reason for this, but, if we consider the evidence of history, it appears to be significant.

In the early days of the nuclear era, soon after World War II, many proffered the conclusion that atomic weapons made war unthinkable. That early premise failed to come true. Since 1945, wars have occurred around the world--in the Middle East, Korea, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere. These wars have involved possessors of nuclear power, either directly, by proxy, or in the weapon supplier role, but they have never involved the sovereign territory of a nuclear nation.⁶ Thus, although all wars have not been prevented, one could posit that nuclear war has been prevented and, further, that superpower or nuclear possessor wars have been prevented. This leads to the consideration that nuclear weapons may provide what nations have long sought: perfect territorial security. If even the possibility of that utopia comes from nuclear possession, it could readily explain why nations want them, in spite of the expense and why nations decline to sign a solemn treaty of self-denial. Surely, a nation that is able to attain a weapon system which has even some possibility of guaranteeing security should not forego that option, for is that not the first and primary goal of every government? Would the U.S. sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if we were a nonpossessor?

Considering the history of the nuclear era, I would additionally suggest another possible conclusion: that the proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually made them a more effective deterrent while simultaneously diminishing the likelihood of their use, a most incongruous and unique occurrence. Remember that when only one nation had nuclear weapons, it used them in spite of what, at least in retrospect, seems to have been questionable cause.⁷ But since that near-single use and the acquisition of similar weapons by other states, all have foregone their use in spite of provocation and opportunity. Thus, it can be argued that weapon possession by a single state is most unstabilizing, at least for all the others, but as more acquire the weapon the less likely it will be used, except in the theoretical last ditch effort to ensure survival.

If this is true, nuclear weapon holders, in the current state of weapon technology, have both the ultimate defense and, at the same time because of nuclear proliferation, an almost useless offensive weapon.⁸ On the surface, this combination could tend to achieve what the early prophets of nuclear weapons foretold, a nuclear guarantee against war. Further, if the foregoing is true, it follows that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, instead of threatening war, actually increases the probability of preventing war. This conclusion suggests the following hypothesis: If no nuclear possessor need fear attack, then the only place there can be wars is where nuclear weapons are not possessed, and if such places are diminished through nuclear proliferation, then war potential is also diminished. Thus, nonproliferation, our sacred cow, may be counterproductive to the very purpose for which we have established it, or, in other words, proliferation may be more likely to eliminate war than nonproliferation. A key point is that "proliferation" has changed this powerful offensive weapon into one that can be used only in a last-ditch defensive role.

Let us turn for a moment from the realm of pure speculation to the facts of recent history. The U.S. and U.S.S.R., in spite of numerous crises, have avoided war with one another, and at least one significant reason for that could be because they both recognize the exponentially increased risks to them as a result of nuclear weapons. In fact, a study of their relations can detect that as their nuclear arsenals have become more equal, they have become more and more prudent and cautious in their relations with one another; while when one side had a clear advantage, they were even more at odds.

But specific wars have occurred, even involving the superpowers--the U.S. in Korea and Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. in its invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Additionally, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., by proxy and supply line, have been involved in three Middle Eastern wars and other even smaller ones in Angola, Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Zaire, etc. In fact, it is the contention of many concerned voices in the world that these indirect superpower confrontations in nonsuperpower wars present the greatest danger of leading to superpower nuclear war as the result of escalation, miscalculations, etc. On the evidence available, one has to conclude, then, that nuclear weapons, if they are preventing wars between the possessors, clearly are not also preventing wars among nonpossessors and further conclude that this is dangerous. However, we seldom ask, could those small wars also have been prevented had the lesser powers possessed nuclear weapons?

The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia presents an interesting example. The Soviets are noted for a strong conservative bent in international affairs, especially as to involving Soviet forces outside the U.S.S.R.⁹ In 1968, Soviet generals were able to assure the party leadership that (1) organized Czech military resistance was unlikely and, (2) even if it occurred, it would be squashed reasonably rapidly and with, say, at worst, 10,000 to 40,000 Soviet military casualties, a relatively undramatic loss possibility of professional soldiers in a country with millions. But what if those Soviet generals faced a proliferated world and knew that Czechoslovakia possessed, say, just 10 to 20 Minuteman missiles or their like? Now, their worst-case analysis would have to indicate that an invasion of Czechoslovakia could mean the loss of several million at-home Russian civilians in an overnight holocaust. The "pucker" factor goes way up, and the conservative decision-maker is forced to re-evaluate the gains versus losses of his decision to strike or not.

The same applies to the Israel/Egypt/ Syria triangle and similar African, Latin American, and other rivalries. Thus, is it not reasonable to ask if proliferation might not mean less chance of war-rather than an increased likelihood?

By now you arc surely saying, but what about all those wild-eyed fanatics around the world? Surely nonproliferation is valid if it means preventing Idi Amins, Black Septembers, el-Qaddafis, and the like from acquiring nuclear weapons. This is a strong argument and on the surface makes sense to most of us (if we are not Ugandans, Palestinians, and Libyans). But, like so many of the apparent truisms of nonproliferation, examination of the issue reduces the definiteness of the initial conclusion. Wild-eyed fanatics have, in fact, had nuclear weapons and for some reason (possibly the fact of proliferation) chosen not to use them. The world may be shocked by the actions of Amin and el-Qaddafi, and even of the Black Septembers and other Palestinian terrorists, but their actions pale when compared with the murders, death camps, and unbelievable horrors of Joseph Stalin. Still, even Stalin resisted the temptation to use nuclear weapons once acquired. Mao Tse-tung's record cannot match Stalin's--at least is less well documented--but many have thought him mad, unrestrained, and callous toward life; yet he, too, proved quite modest in the nuclear arena. Both these men saw the value of nuclear weapons, killed or caused the death of innumerable lives just by diverting resources to acquire the weapons,¹⁰ yet both showed restraint after nuclear weapon acquisition.

The point is that no matter how badly a nation might want to use its nuclear weapons for evil gains, since proliferation all they can realistically do with them is point to them with pride and say, "don't tread on met" They cannot (at least have not) use them because once a nation acquires such weapons no other nation can afford to push so drastically that he might have to use his nukes. But, simultaneously, without being attacked and in ultimate danger of survival, the nation is inhibited in the use of its weapons against even a nonpossessor because it fears retaliation from some other of the ever growing number of possessors. Idi Amin and such types may appear mad, but it is a controlled madness. These powerful men are willing to murder, harass, and torture those under their control and too weak to defend. They are even ready to tweak the nose of superior powers up to the point that it is not really serious enough to invite a strong response. However, they do not foolishly attack or push too far those capable of squashing them. Few, if any, who have risen to such absolute power have ever attacked a foe when it was clear that the foe or his allies would easily be able to annihilate them. An Amin with ten nuclear missiles under his control would not be a very attractive alternative to the world, but realistically, neither does he add much to the threat of nuclear war. The world feels helpless now to stop his internal machinations (partly due to nuclear proliferation), and if he had nuclear weapons, the rest would be even more deterred from interference. But, conversely, Amin might then perceive himself as less threatened and, therefore, determine it unnecessary to strike out against his "imagined" threateners. My point is that, bad as it might be even if an Amin were a nuclear possessor, the only likely change is that there would then be less chance that any other nation would decide to remove Amin--"nukes" protect the good and the bad equally, but due to proliferation they offer only an unusable offensive threat. Amin types are disgusting aberrations, but no more so than the world has faced before; and the previous aberrations, once they acquired nuclear weapons and faced the fact of proliferation, actually demonstrated restraint about their use and protection. It is a hard fact to accept, but to much of the world it was the U.S. alone that used such weapons, and U.S. irrationality alone, as recently demonstrated by "Nixsonian-like" paranoia over national security, they most fear. The wild-eyed, fanatic fear may be exaggerated--I hope.

I say "I hope" because there is another argument against support of the NPT concept. Many of the world's most renowned experts in weapons, international affairs, politics, and nuclear science are now concluding that the battle is lost; proliferation is inevitable if only because science cannot be withheld, and the science of nuclear weaponry is available.¹¹ I might add that it is inevitable also because many see these weapons as useful. But the point they make is, why fight the inevitable? It is worth fighting even for a lost cause if the cause is noble and correct, but it is not worth the candle if the cause is not clearly in the best interests of man kind; and the points related thus far at least raise the question that proliferation might well be better for mankind than nonproliferation so the candle's value is questionable. However, unmanaged proliferation is more dangerous than other alternatives--one of which I will describe later.

Another concept of the nonproliferation policy that may in fact not be what we think it is, is the image its support by the U.S. creates. In the U.S., we instinctively consider nonproliferation to be good and support of the NPT to be respected and proper. The failure of the NPT should have warned us that they may not be universally true, but it did not. The truth may be, however, that other nations, especially those verging on nuclear capability and properly desirous of its advantages, consider the U.S. NPT policy to be hypocritical and arrogant. They may well interpret our platitudes about the evils of nuclear weapons as merely propagandistic cover for our participation and perpetuation in superpower world domination rather than a sincere desire to avoid a nuclear Armageddon.

Think of it for a moment from their viewpoint. What the U. S. may be perceived as saying, in concert with the U.S.S.R. and the world's former pre-eminent colonialist, the United Kingdom, is: We and our powerful friends have accumulated these super destructive weapons in numbers that can threaten the world. We need them, but of course you do not In fact, in your hands they could be most dangerous. For us they guarantee freedom from attack by any and all and near ultimate security, but for you such a guarantee is not necessary. Sign the NPT and if anything goes wrong, we might decide to protect or punish you, depending on how we interpret the circumstances. You should forswear such weapons and even some of the energy related benefits some aspects of nuclear production capability might afford you, since they can lead to weaponry. We, on the other hand, will keep ours, even constantly increasing the numbers and/or the capability of them to destroy efficiently. Now if that is the way many of the nuclear have-nots judge our nuclear stance (this ignores the specialized economic gripes the Germans, Japanese, and Brazilians have made in recent months),¹² it is rather easy to see why they not only do not sign on but, in fact, might harbor rather strong resentment over the policy.

I would posit that our NPT policy--plus SALT, détente, and related activities that have brought the U.S. and U.S.S.R. into close and frequent contact--could cloud the view of much of the world concerning the basic differences between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Partly because of this NPT attitude, they might judge us as two superpowers striving to achieve even greater power and wealth while telling others that it is bad for them to follow our path.

However, I do not mean even remotely to suggest that détente is the wrong approach, for I feel quite strongly the other way. Yet as other nations observe summit meetings with our President and the Soviet General Secretary arm-in-arm, toasting in champagne and concurring in joint policies like the NPT, it could cause the third world and even some of our developed allies to wonder if the super-powers are not becoming more and more alike and conspiring to hold onto special wealth, might, and status at everyone else's expense.

I suggest that instead the U.S. should highlight the differences between our system and the Soviet's whenever possible. Agreements to reduce or limit nuclear weapons and to exchange cultural programs, etc., can easily be judged by the world as progressive steps for all if they diminish ever so slightly the superpower threat of war, and they should continue.

But the NPT policy may be viewed through others' eyes as discriminating--an act of inequality and even immorality favoring the greats while depriving the weak. This image is not consistent with the founding of the U.S.; our founders called for no entangling alliances, all people and nations equal, and no plan for the U.S. to try to dominate others. Thus, in spite of our belief of its goodness, the NPT policy might in the eyes of many be viewed as a new kind of imperialism, one sponsored by Communist and democrat alike. Is there then an alternative, a middle ground that turns us away from the lost cause while simultaneously taking advantage of some of the pros for proliferation? I suggest there may be. It is an approach I call "controlled proliferation," which is designed to lessen the risks of war, reduce the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, improve the U.S. image as a leader and seeker of an equitable as well as peaceful world, while simultaneously avoiding for as long as possible--perhaps indefinitely--proliferation to those most unstable, undesirable states.

Under controlled proliferation (CP), the U.S. would publicly withdraw from the NPT for reasons of its failure, the clear inevitability of proliferation, and the possibility that proliferation may better achieve the goal of lessening the danger of war. We would then make it clear to the world that, under certain circumstances, we would be willing either to assist or even grant nuclear weapon acquisition or energy capability to certain have-nots. The circumstances are, of course, the key, and they would have to be carefully determined,¹³ but as a starting basis I suggest the U.S. might grant limited nuclear weaponry:

• Where a government has a long history of stability and friendly relations with the U.S. (Canada, Switzerland, The Netherlands, as examples).
• Where possession of nuclear weapons or energy by the state in question would make the region more stable by lessening the likelihood of war (Taiwan, Israel, Egypt, Greece, Turkey).
• Where human rights are at an acceptable level or have drastically improved and are still improving (Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden).
• Where the recipient will sign a treaty not to use such weapons except in defense of his sovereign national territory that has been invaded or attacked.
• Where the recipient will agree not to add to the number of weapons supplied by the U.S. or to transfer them.

In essence, the U.S. would consider supplying a small number--10 to 50 nuclear weapons--to those nations in which we determine it to be in our interest and the world's to do so, yet limit the number given or developed and their range so the recipients and the world can recognize that they basically have only a defensive force; a force that would make an attack against them too great a risk to consider, yet a force too small to enable them to initiate an attack capable of totally destroying another. (Expert opinion considers zoo to 800 warheads sufficient to destroy any modern state.)¹⁴

Think how this might be used to assist U.S. foreign policy. What influence might we gain over an Israel or Egypt to settle their problems, if, instead of promissory guarantees over which they have no control, we could trade 10 Minuteman missiles for a reasonable compromise allowing a Palestinian state on the West Bank. Israel and Egypt would remain independent and now have control themselves over assuring the settlement. Yet, the agreement would likely stand because the risk factor potential would then exceed the desire for change. We could also make a U.S. force withdrawal from South Korea result in increased South Korean security rather than lessened.

What would the reaction to controlled proliferation be? Obviously, the U.S.S.R. would protest. Not because the U.S. policy would be wrong but because without U.S. participation in the NPT their chance to dominate the world is lessened. Unfortunately for the U.S.S.R., they trust no one not under their control sufficiently to give them nuclear weapons, and their natural fear and insecurity plus their imposed alliances are too fragile for them to follow our lead within their bloc. Proliferation in Soviet eyes is a far greater threat than it is to the U.S.

Those who sought such weapons but could not or would not meet the U.S. standards might also be unhappy. But, so what? They are not very likely to be cooperative with us now, and they just might decide that meeting U.S. standards of human rights and foreign affairs conduct would be worth the effort if it gained them genuine security--something the offer of our friendship or money alone does not assure thus provides little leverage to the U.S.

However, two serious concerns remain. One, I have not refuted the idea that proliferation, via the numbers game alone, increases the chance of nuclear weapons use. I accept that possibility, but with this qualification--How much danger is added? There are already at least six nuclear nations and 40,000-plus warheads in the world. Would 10 or 20 nations and another small fractional increase in the total number of weapons change that likelihood significantly (say, at the peak, another 2000 weapons)? There is a risk, but it might not outweigh the gain.

The second concern is related to the first. It deals with guarantees and their flimsiness. How can the U.S. be sure a nation that passes some carefully developed criteria of friendship, stability, etc., will remain that way? The answer is simple: We cannot, but, frankly, that is also true today. We have no such guarantees that the current possessors, the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China, India, or France, will not decide to attack tomorrow. They are all more atomically powerful and in some cases more likely opponents than any logical recipients of CP would be--and perhaps in the case of France, the U.S.S.R., and the People's Republic of China, they are even less stable--e.g., How many governments in France since World War II? What succession lines exist in the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China? In other words, in the danger area, nothing new is added, but in the stability area, perhaps there could be an improvement. Under CP the U.S. would probably not give missiles to a Uganda under an Amin or a Libya under -el-Qaddafi, but we might to Belgium and The Netherlands; Egypt and Israel; Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and even Romania; Canada and Iceland. Would the world be more explosive or less so? I contend there is a legitimate possibility it might prove more stable, and in such a proliferated world the U.S. would have to lead by example rather than power alone--a worthy challenge in a more equal world. It would be a dangerous gamble, but one that could enhance peace and nudge the United States back into the more traditional leadership role of its past--leading by leadership rather than power quotient.

Have we been wrong? Has nuclear weapons' greatest use to the world been frittered away by a shortsighted policy designed not to save the world but to ensure a dominant position in it for the current possessors for as long as possible--an inequitable policy hidden, as so often in the past, by the cover of security? If so, it will fail, and unfortunately the evidence shows it to be failing. Proliferation is occurring. The controlled proliferation alternative proffers a chance to achieve the long sought grail—a world of peace. Should we not consider it on its merits without blind allegiance to nonproliferation on instincts alone?

1. In recent months The Atlantic, Atlas, Saturday Review, Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and The Illustrated London News, to mention a few, have featured articles on the question of nuclear proliferation. Additionally, the U.S. State Department and U.S. officials have spoken out publicly and in print citing the need for nonproliferation and the connection between proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy development.

2. President Carter has delayed development of the fast breeder reactor in the U.S. and tried to persuade the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Canada to stop nuclear energy agreements with other nations for fear they encourage the possibility of proliferation. Mike McCormack, ''How Not to End Nuclear Proliferation," Washington Post, April 24, 1977, p. 5.

3. R. Robert Sandoval in "Consider the Porcupine: Another View of Nuclear Proliferation," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1976, p. 17, suggests nuclear weapon proliferation might have some advantages. Another article raising the question is: "Undue Alarm over Nuclear Spread?" Wall Street Journal, October 15, 1976 by Ernest W. Lefever, p. 12.

4. The West Germans were very slow to ratify the NPT and finally did so by a slim margin only when the U.S. and Russia insisted that German ratification was needed before the Berlin agreement would be signed. Japan was equally slow, only ratifying in 1976. The issue is frequently debated in Japan with an increasing number of supporters opposing Japan's allegiance to the NPT.

5. For a more thorough study of the possibilities and needs of nuclear power development potentials, see Major Wayne Morawitz, "Nuclear Proliferation and U. S. Security," Air University Review, January-February 1977, pp.19-28.

6. There have, of course, been the Sino-Soviet clashes over disputed territories on their 5000-mile border.

7. In retrospect, we have learned that the Japanese would probably have surrendered with out invasion or the use of atomic weapons.

8. Drew Middleton in "Thinking about the Unthinkable, Politics and the Arms Race," The Atlantic, August1976, pp. 54-57, is only one of many international observers who argues that nuclear parity rules out the use of nuclear weapons except in extreme emergencies.

9. Note that even now, when some experts claim the Soviets have acquired nuclear and overall superiority, the Soviets choose to use "proxies" (the Cubans) for their African adventures. In a 1970 article in the Air University Review (January-February), I predicted direct Soviet intervention in Africa by the mid-70s.

10. The best chroniclers of Stalin’s madness and his obsession with acquiring nukes are Aleksander I. Solzhenitsyn in several of his books, including The First Circle and The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, Parts I and II; and Robert Conquest in The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Thirties.

11. Nuclear Energy, Report of the Fiftieth American Assembly, April 22-25, 1976, Arden House. This distinguished group joined many others that believe, try as the world might, nuclear weapons will proliferate, and that the knowledge to build is common knowledge and the cost ever decreasing.

12. Daniel Yergin, ''The Terrifying Prospect Atomic Bombs Everywhere," The Atlantic, April 1977, p. 60.

13. Daniel Yergin in his excellent article, ''The Terrifying Prospect: Atomic Bombs Everywhere," The Atlantic, April 1977, suggests policies whereby the U.S. would use incentives to accomplish nonproliferation. The similarity between the other goals (nonnuclear) we list is interesting. The Committee for Economic Development in an 88-page report issued in 1976 also urged a close connection between other U.S. foreign policy goals and nuclear nonproliferation.

14. In a study, 1970 without Arms Control, the National Planning Association indicated no more than 200 warheads are needed to destroy a large nation/state.

Colonel Donald L. Clark, USAF (Ret.) (M.P.A., George Washington University) is Assistant to the President and a lecturer in political science at Montana State University, Bozeman. While in the Air Force, he taught international affairs at Air Command and Staff College, was the first USAF Fellow to Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, was Assistant Air Attaché in Moscow, and served on the Joint Staff in the Office of International Negotiations. He has been a frequent lecturer at the various military staff and war colleges and is a previous contributor to the Review.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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