Russian Military Strategy a fresh look

There is a lively debate both inside and outside the federal government today as to the nature and extent of what is commonly referred to as the "Soviet threat." Some would have us believe that the "Russians are coming," and to support this contention cite impressive evidence of a massive military buildup aimed primarily at the United States and its Western European allies. Others--just as scholarly and experienced--take the opposite approach, claiming flatly that there is no Soviet military threat to the West. This school generally contends that the new military hardware and occasional saber rattling are merely normal characteristics of the Russian mind-set. A popular corollary is that the Soviet Union is so weak economically that it could not mount an effective sustained threat against the West, which will be able to hamstring it in a technological and economic sense for the foreseeable future.

What are we to believe when we read and hear such disparate arguments from legitimate experts? As is usually the case, the answer is probably somewhere in between the two extreme points of view just described.

In this article, it is hoped that a careful review of Russian military strategy will sharpen perceptions and help each reader make up his own mind as to the nature and extent of the Soviet threat. "What are the Soviet motives and the underlying historical legacies behind them? Are there explanations for the recent military buildup other than preparation for an attack on the U.S. or its NATO allies?"

These and other questions must be addressed with an eye toward objectivity in attempting to calibrate the Russian military posture, encompassing both capabilities and intentions.

Threads from the Past

A brief look at the Imperial Russian politico-military heritage and some of the pre-1945 lessons learned by the modern Soviet regime will provide a useful background for understanding present-day Soviet military posture.¹

Three major invasions of Russia (the Mongols in the thirteenth century, Napoleon in 1812, and Hitler in 1941) have had a far-reaching effect on the Russian mind and military thinking. The invasion by the Mongol Golden Hordes, who held European Russia in virtual bondage for nearly 200 years, was particularly catastrophic. Because of the occupation, Russia was virtually cut off from Western Europe for those two centuries, a time lag from which the Russians never recovered. The brutality and tenor of the Mongols stunned the Russians, who nevertheless successfully learned from their conquerors how to employ the weapon of fear. More important, however, the Russian psyche was forever ingrained with an invasion complex and a sense of insecurity and inferiority, which was reinforced by the two subsequent invasions with resultant ramifications to the present time.

This invasion complex has given rise to what is described as a "garrison-state" mentality, characterized by a need to create buffer zones on the Russian periphery to reduce the vulnerability of the homeland to attack and keep foreign influence and power as far away as possible from its borders. Closely tied to this notion is the internal use of coercive force in the form of secret police to keep the Russian populace under contra) and stifle perceived subversive threats to the Cohesion of the empire.

Another significant czarist trait was an inclination toward opportunistic territorial expansionism for a variety of reasons over the centuries: trade, pan-slavism, a missionary style, religious and ideological thrust, and simply the desire to accumulate power for power's sake. This drive traditionally relied on the use of the military instrument in an offensive mode, an interesting dichotomy when compared with the defensive orientation of the "fortress mentality" described earlier. These seemingly contradictory facets of the Russian politico-military heritage have been the twin driving forces behind Russian (and Soviet) military strategy down to the present day.²

Two other important military legacies to modern Russia were a strategy of aggressiveness and a continental outlook. In order to protect the homeland and extend its borders, it was necessary to wage war on the enemy's territory and destroy his forces.³ As a land-locked country for most of its history (lack of warm water ports), Russia has had a military outlook that was basically continental in scope, with military interests largely restricted to the empire's periphery. In this regard, Russian military power was never successfully projected beyond the Eurasian continent until relatively recently.

Military setbacks have also had a lasting impact on the Russian (and Soviet) military mentality. During the reign of Peter the Great, the limits of Russian expansionism became apparent for the first time, resulting in direct confrontations with the great powers and losses on the battlefield. These and subsequent military defeats suffered by the Imperial Army--particularly the 1905 debacle against Japan--added to the Russian inferiority complex, as did those absorbed by Soviet armies in the 1918-20 civil war and the 1940 invasion of Finland. Such setbacks often forced Russia to accept coexistence as a substitute for further expansion or aggression, but also served to make Russian collective will more determined. In a related vein, the deep-rooted invasion fear--particularly the World War II or Great Patriotic War experience--has taught the Soviets to maintain an effective, well-prepared military instrument that will never again be caught off guard by a surprise attack or allow the homeland to be invaded.

Even today, the day-to-day impact of World War II on the Soviet way of life must be seen to be fully comprehended by a Westerner. The horrors of the war and Russia's 20 million dead are kept vividly alive by the regime; new monuments to war heroes and hero cities are still being dedicated, and the militarization of society has glamorized paramilitary training for young people--all of which bears witness to a paranoia over defense of the motherland. To the Russians, the 22 June syndrome (the date Hitler invaded Russia) has a far greater significance as a never-to be-forgotten watchword than does 7 December for Americans. In this regard, the watchful eye of "Father" Lenin exhorting his countrymen to "be prepared and be vigilant" can be seen on banners and billboards everywhere.

From a broad historical perspective, military power has always been regarded as the main guarantor of Russian (and Soviet) security. This has bred a tendency to depend on numerical and physical preponderance--both in terms of troops and weapon system--to solve any military problem.⁴ As in other elements of Soviet society, the penchant for bigger and better comes through loud and clear.

The Revolution in
Military Affairs

The explosion of a hydrogen bomb by the Soviets in the summer of 1953 was destined to have far-reaching effects on Soviet military strategy and thinking. Perhaps most important, the possession of thermonuclear weapons released the Soviet leadership from an unadmitted but long-standing inferiority vis-à-vis the West, particularly the United States. Thus the Soviet armed forces had a new orientation, a new arm to strengthen the military instrument in the pursuit of national objectives.⁵

In the immediate postwar period, despite a large, well-equipped, and widely deployed army, the Soviets were incapable of offering any real match to the United States as a world power. By the mid-1950s, although the Soviets realized their politico-military vulnerability to the U.S. strategic nuclear bomber force, the availability of the hydrogen bomb, coupled with a modest delivery system in the form of a growing intercontinental bomber fleet of their own, gave the Soviet leaders a fresh outlook, which became known in the Soviet military lexicon as the "Revolution in Military Affairs." This outlook was strengthened by the development and testing of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) delivery systems in the late 1950s.

By 1960, the strategic military implications of the growing arsenal of Soviet nuclear-tipped ICBMs led Khrushchev to adopt a new total war defense policy, which postulated that in any future armed conflict with the West, an initial exchange of nuclear strikes deep into the adversary's territory would be the decisive factor. The new strategy placed heavy reliance on strategic forces and intimated that conventional or general purpose forces were largely outmoded or downgraded since future wars would no longer be fought on the frontiers. This posture was institutionalized by creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which soon had eclipsed the Soviet army as the most essential element of the Russian armed forces. Concurrently, combat-ready conventional forces--notably naval aviation, tactical air forces, and army divisions--were reduced in considerable numbers. Strong opposition to Khrushchev's policies, particularly the de-emphasis and reduction of conventional forces, rapidly developed in both party and military circles. By 1961, Defense Minister Malinovsky had become perhaps the most articulate critic of the new strategy theories--although probably with Khrushchev's tacit approval since the premier was already beginning to lose support on a broad front in the Soviet power structure. Malinovsky acknowledged the primacy of nuclear missiles, but advocated their distribution to all branches of the armed forces based on range and usage, and asserted that conventional forces were still needed to complement and supplement strategic forces. As a result of the internal pressure, Khrushchev was forced to modify his new defense policy and suspend the reduction of conventional forces.

. . . for the Soviets, strategic parity with the U.S. is essential, and, indeed, there is a perception in some quarters that they may be striving to achieve strategic superiority (or what they would term a "useful margin of strength").

Malinovsky's views subsequently were reflected in an important collective work entitled Military Strategy, first published in 1962 under the leadership of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky. The book, updated in 1963 and 1968, recognizes three categories of war: wars of national liberation, limited war, and general war. According to the authors, the Soviets are committed to support wars of national liberation, ostensibly by application of conventional military forces; while limited wars are admitted to exist on a hypothetical basis, such wars between superpowers are regarded as impossible since any conflict between them would inevitably escalate to total nuclear war.⁷ The essence of the work relates to general war, which is regarded as the culmination of the historical struggle between opposing socioeconomic systems, each pursuing decisive political goals. The main thrust is that general war will begin with a surprise attack on the Soviet Union, and, although nuclear-tipped missiles will be the decisive factor, victory can only be assured by the combined use of all types of forces.

The book also documented for the first time a broad shift in Soviet strategic outlook from primary preoccupation with continental land warfare and peripheral military interests to a focus on strategic warfare on a global scale. This, of course, meant that Soviet military strategy must give more attention to combating a non-European adversary.

Before the nuclear missile era, Soviet military strategy regarded an enemy's armed forces as the principal strategic objective of general war. With the advent of intercontinental delivery systems, the principal strategic objective of total war became destruction of all aspects of an adversary’s national strength—including military, political, and economic power centers throughout his entire territory. (In a tactical sense, however, the Soviets remained committed to annihilation of enemy forces on the battlefield.) From 1963 to the present, Soviet strategic military thinking has remained essentially as presented in the Sokolovsky book. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that this thinking enjoys a general consensus not only with the military but within the party hierarchy as well. Brezhnev, who succeeded Khrushchev in power in 1964, proved to be a proponent of the combined arms concept and continued to push for an upgrading of conventional as well as strategic forces. In fact, his apparent belief that an armed conflict between the superpowers would not necessarily escalate to total war provided a measure of doctrinal justification for the combined arms policy.

As early as the mid-1960s and on to the present, Soviet military writings stressed that the study of history shows that victory in war can only be achieved through offensive actions--assuring complete defeat of the enemy.⁸ In the nuclear age, this rationale has been expanded to incorporate the thought that decisiveness is the most important characteristic of offense in a thermonuclear war, advocating surprise nuclear strikes to defeat the enemy. While the official Soviet position is that the Soviet armed forces only fight wars imposed by the enemy, Russian military authors clearly emphasize the necessity of being able to thwart an anticipated enemy attack by having a capability to fight, win, and survive a nuclear war.⁹ According to this line of reasoning, only by having a war-winning capability can Soviet strategic forces serve as a viable deterrent to the West. Based on their World War II experience, total war, although catastrophic, is indeed thinkable to the Soviets in the context of Western miscalculations, misunderstandings, or irrationality.¹⁰ Even Marxist-Leninist ideology now embraces the notion that the West, in the death-throes of capitalism, may launch a last-gasp thermonuclear attack.

Soviet Grand Strategy

Since the end of World War II, Soviet long-range national objectives have remained remarkably constant despite periodic changes in tone and style and evolving strategic nuances. Key objectives include a constant strengthening of the Russian defense perimeter, domination over all of Europe, and increased Soviet influence and prestige worldwide--particularly in regions which are important to the economies of Western industrial countries.

Bolstering the defense perimeter entails several aspects: an Eastern Europe that remains under tight Soviet political, economic, and military control--a vital geographical and ideological buffer whose frontiers and political systems are unchallenged by the West despite a Soviet willingness to tolerate a certain level of expanded East-West cultural and economic ties; continuing military and political containment or even isolation of China and a series of bilateral treaties or other sponsorship relationships with third world countries on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass to provide for development of a viable infrastructure for pro-Soviet or socialist forces.¹¹

In political and military terms the Soviets regard Europe as a single geographic entity over which they feel a historical mission to exercise hegemony if not suzerainty. Ultimate domination of all of Europe is a clear Soviet goal. For Western Europe, this would mean the harnessing of economic and technological strength for support of Soviet progress, not an occupation--which is the last thing the Soviets would want (their Eastern Europe satellites already give them enough headaches). This grand design for Western Europe probably entails a series of bilateral agreements to facilitate Soviet influence on foreign and domestic policy formulation, leading to a reduction of defense expenditures and force levels and elimination of the defense link with the United States.¹²

In this regard, a good case can be made that Soviet decisions concerning force levels in Europe are influenced by a belief that Western European perception of Soviet superiority will eventually lead to policies favorable to the Russians concerning technology transfer and trade if not outright political sympathy.¹³

Finally, the Soviets hope to limit Western options in important areas such as the Middle East and Africa and to take advantage of weak points or vacuums in Western or third world areas of influence.¹⁴ This aspect of Soviet grand strategy includes many-sided efforts to gain some measure of control over the sources and supply lines of the West's strategic raw materials. By undermining the influence, prestige, and power of the U.S. and its allies, the Soviets hope to substitute their own--thereby "proving" the continuing viability and relevance of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Present Soviet
Military Strategy

Under Brezhnev, Soviet military strategy has become more and more refined. In his fourteen-year tenure, Brezhnev has shown a clear appreciation for the risks of nuclear war as well as for the application and use of force short of war--including extensive military and naval exercises, large-scale provision of arms and other military assistance to selected countries, various forms of intimidation, and publicizing scientific and technical achievements with military overtones. Of course, land-based and submarine-launched strategic nuclear missiles have become the protective umbrella under which all Soviet politico-military actions are taken.¹⁵ In this respect, for the Soviets, strategic parity with the U.S. is essential, and, indeed, there is a perception in some quarters that they may be striving to achieve strategic superiority (or what they would term a "useful margin of strength"). By the mid-seventies the Soviets had developed and deployed an entire new generation of ICBMs and SLBMs. Moreover, they are continuing to put emphasis on high-yield warheads while mounting a concerted effort to improve accuracy and other qualitative missile performance factors.

. . . although the Soviets may be satisfied with strategic parity, they probably will maintain their drive toward clear superiority in the area of general purpose forces to override perceived U.S. advantages in other areas, primarily economic and technological.

In Soviet eyes this strategic force modernization effort must be just subtle and low-keyed enough to preclude full mobilization or unleashing of the U.S. technological and industrial base in a strategic trumping effort, which the Soviets deeply fear. Moreover, it must be remembered that even strategic parity cancels the overwhelming strategic predominance the U.S. has enjoyed since World War II.

Perhaps even more important, however, since the nuclear deterrent has reached a rough equivalence on each side, the Soviets in the 1970s have given every indication that they are seeking clear superiority in the area of conventional forces. A tremendous buildup in the level and quality of conventional weapon systems has been coupled with an effective projection of military and naval forces beyond the Eurasian continent for the first time in Russian history. Soviet blue water naval operations have increased world wide, particularly in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the level of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe provides an offensive capability apparently well beyond that required to keep the satellites in check. While there are many who see this as a prelude to a Warsaw Pact attack against NATO, a strong argument can be made that this overkill of forces stems from the deep-rooted insecurity and weakness that the Soviets have always tried to mask from the outside world. Given the 22 June syndrome, the massive Soviet military build-up opposite NATO can at least be partially explained as a knee-jerk reaction to a perceived invasion threat across the Central European plain--the route used by both Napoleon and Hitler. Moreover, the Soviets perceive that the principal U.S. military strategy since World War II has been to encircle the U.S.S.R with bases, maintain a capability to project force anywhere in the world, and follow a propensity to engage in military actions on foreign soil--a posture which the Russians regard as a serious threat to their national security.

Within the past several years, numerous developments involving conventional forces have indeed resulted in a strengthening of the Russian defense perimeter to counter both U.S. and Chinese presence, political influence, and military power. Specifically, these developments include an increase in Soviet naval efforts to confront U.S. nuclear deployments on the Russian periphery; the extensive buildup of Soviet military capability opposite NATO and along the Chinese border; and the expansion of worldwide force projection capabilities such as airlift, sealift, and sea control. The use of Russian military cadre and Cuban surrogates in peripheral areas such as Africa--while widely regarded as an opportunistic ploy to gain power and influence at the expense of the West--can also be thought of in terms of an extension of the Russian defense perimeter. It is interesting to note that despite the expanded Soviet view of the world and their role in it, the heritage of a continental military tradition--with emphasis on peripheral matters--continues to run strongly through Soviet strategic thinking.

As we have already seen, modern Soviet military strategy holds that coordinated use of all types of military power is necessary to achieve Soviet politico-military objectives.¹⁶ This goal requires a flexible military establishment affording selective reliance on a whole range of weapon systems. In this vein, there is increasing evidence of a trend toward dual purpose forces and weapons that can operate effectively in a nuclear or conventional environment. It must be noted, however, that the Soviets traditionally have experienced a long lag time in fielding a military capability to match the particular international politico-military situation for which it was developed. This has often led to weapon systems and force employment concepts that are out of tune with the existing environment.

Pervasive in modern Soviet military literature is a clear concept of victory at all levels of conflict. Over the past decade, there have been increasing indications of a shift in the Soviet view toward the possibility of a limited war between the superpowers--particularly in the context of a European conflict. Present force preparation developments and military writings reflect a growing interest in other force options short of an all-out nuclear exchange, i.e., tactical nuclear options and conventional options.¹⁷

The Brezhnev leadership clearly recognizes both the limits and potentialities of military power and is prepared to manipulate or bargain to improve the Soviet position. In this light, the Soviets are not averse to negotiating for strategic arms control or disarmament measures that would reduce the danger of a nuclear holocaust while preserving Soviet strategic parity with the West at the very minimum. Indeed, peace is precisely the modern form of warfare the Soviets have chosen.¹⁸ At this juncture, probably only two sets of circumstances could alter this decision in a strategic nuclear context a direct threat to their national survival or a severe infringement of their superpower status, which is extremely important to the Soviet psyche as "ideological proof" that they finally have become a dominant actor on the world scene.

This brings up the subject of détente in the context of Soviet military strategy. First of all, it must be remembered that détente is not a new concept. Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev each used the political expedient of peaceful coexistence with the West when such a policy was in the best interest of the Soviet Union, specifically to gain time or advantage for a particular purpose. In the most modern sense, détente to the Soviets embraces the need to avoid or reduce the likelihood of strategic nuclear war. What the Soviets hope to get out of d6tente is to neutralize threatened or actual use of nuclear weapons by the West and cancel U.S. strategic options while upgrading Russian nuclear capabilities and conventional military strength. Despite widespread notions to the contrary in the West, détente to the Soviets does not mean suspension or abandonment of the ideological struggle against the capitalist system. Hence, Russian support of wars of national liberation, use of surrogates, as well as threatened or actual use of conventional military forces are all fair game to the Soviets under the framework of détente. From a political standpoint, détente in the Soviet view has moved them closer to their key national strategic objectives. In Soviet eyes, then, détente is a tactical expedient that serves to accelerate the continuing shift of world correlation of forces in their favor.

The Near-Term Future

A good case can be made that the military instrument is now the only instrument of Soviet national power that is generally effective on the world scene. Although the Soviets will take advantage of any perceived opportunity or weakness to achieve strategic superiority, at least rough strategic nuclear parity between the two superpowers can be expected to prevail for the foreseeable future. As indicated previously, the Soviets probably will studiously avoid giving the impression of trying to achieve strategic superiority.

In this light, while the upgrading of strategic forces will continue to receive top priority by the Soviets, nuclear weapons probably will become less and less of a usable instrument in superpower "power politics." Henry Kissinger goes one step further by asserting that nuclear weapons are becoming a less plausible factor in

regional politico-military affairs as well.¹⁹ Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviets will continue their buildup of conventional forces to more effectively project Russian power and influence on a global basis. Thus, although the Soviets may be satisfied with strategic parity, they probably will maintain their drive toward clear superiority in the area of general purpose forces to override perceived U.S. advantages in other areas, primarily economic and technological. The Soviet navy is likely to be employed more assertively as an instrument of international political influence and to protect expanding Soviet overseas interests.²⁰ This intensified conventional force projection probably will be coupled with more support of client states and use of surrogate military forces to test the relevance of deterrence in lesser conflicts around the world.

As Henry Kissinger so aptly put it, the Soviets have no preconceived master plan for military strategy and the use of the military instrument of power; rather they seem to be accumulating as much power as they can to avoid a repeat of the circumstances surrounding the Great Patriotic War and will employ such power and influence whenever and wherever the opportunity presents itself.²¹ Ultimately, peripheral areas of the world--peripheral to the Eurasian landmass and the North American continent--will be the key to which side will prevail.

As they pursue their self-perceived manifest destiny, the Soviets are convinced that time is on their side, so they feel no immediate compulsion to supplant the United States as the world's foremost political, economic, and military power. When it is in their best interest, the Russians can indeed be patient.

Notes

1. For a good overview of modern Russia's politico-military legacy from the past, see Adam B. Ulam's Expansion and Coexistence (Washington: Praeger, 1974), pp.3-12.

2. Throughout this article, use of the term "military strategy" specifically refers to the definition contained in JCS Pub.1, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; "The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force," This definition is narrower than the usual Western definition of "national strategy" or "grand strategy,'' which involves the use of all resources of a nation in achieving national objectives. (JCS Pub. 1 defines "national strategy" as: "the art and science or developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives?") Note that the above definition of military strategy is quite different from (and hence is not interchangeable with) the Soviet version of "military strategy," as contained in Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, 1965, Soviet Military Thought Series (vol.9) published under auspices of USAF:

The highest level in the field of military art, constituting a system of scientific knowledge concerning the phenomena and laws of armed conflict.

On the basis of the tenets of military doctrine, the experience of past wars, and analysis of the political, economic and military conditions of the current situation, military strategy investigates and elaborates on problems pertaining to the training of the armed farces as a whole and the individual Services, and their strategic use in war; the forms and methods of conducting and directing war; and also problems pertaining to comprehensive strategic support of the combat operations of the armed forces.

At the same time, military strategy is afield of practical activity for the higher military command in training the armed forces for war and providing leadership in armed conflict. Military strategy exerts an influence on the preparation of a country for war in such a way as to ensure victory.

For additional discussion on the Soviet concept of military strategy, see Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrei Grechko, State of the Forces of the Soviet Union (Moscow Voenizdat, 1975). pp. 16-17; and V. D. Sokolovsky, Military Strategy (New York: Praeger. 1968), pp. 15-17. In Soviet military writings, the concept of "military doctrine" is closely related to (and in fact encompasses) military strategy. The Dictionary of Basic Military Terms provides the following definition:

A nation's officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of armed forces in them, and also on the requirements arising from these views -regarding the country and its armed forces being made ready for war.

Military doctrine has two aspects: political and military technical. The basic tenets of a military doctrine are determined by a nation's political and military leadership according to the sociopolitical order, the country's level of economic, scientific and technological development, and the armed forces' combat materiel, with due regard to the conclusions of military science and the views of the probable enemy.

Moreover, there is no comparable Western usage of the term "military doctrine." Note that the above definition is not compatible with the usual Western definition of military strategy or ''grand" (''national") strategy. For a more detailed discussion on the nature of Soviet military doctrine, see Sokolovsky, pp.42-43 and Grechko, pp. 10-16.

3. Michel Garder, A History of the Soviet Army (New York: Praeger, 1966), p.17

4. Malcolm Macintosh, "Soviet Military Policy." Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 58.

5. War and Army, 1972, Soviet Military Thought Series (vol.2) published under auspices of USAF. pp. 250-60; see also Garder, p.140).

6. The current Soviet view of "deterrence" is somewhat different from that held in the West; to the Soviets, deterrence is meaningless without a viable capability to defend the homeland should war avoidance fail. See John Erickson, "The Soviet Military, Soviet Policy and Soviet Politics,'' Strategic Review, Fall 1973, pp. 24-25.

7. Sokolovsky, p. 200.

8. Ibid., pp. 292, 297-98.

9. Macintosh, p. 61; see also Leon Gouré, Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1975). pp.8-9.

10. Sokolovsky, p. 288.

11. Avidgor Haselkorn, "The Soviet Collective Security System," Orbis, Spring 1975.

12. John Erickson, "European Security: Soviet Preferences and Priorities," Strategic Review, Winter 1976, pp. 40-41.

13. John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, March 1975.

14. Macintosh, p.67.

15. Ibid., p.65.

16. Sokolovsky, p. 16.

17. General Lt. Z. C. Zavyalov, "The New Weapon and Military Art," Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970-75, Soviet Military Thought Series (vol. 11), published under auspices of USAF, pp. 210-11; see also Grechko, p. 6; see also The Revolution in Military Affairs vol. 3 (Moscow: Soviet Military Thought Series, 1973), p.137.

18. Garder, p.209.

19. Henry Kissinger, lecture to students and faculty of National Defense University, 26 May 1977 (Permission to use granted by Dr. Kissinger on 14 October 1977).

20. Robert G. Weinland at al., "Admiral Gorshkov's 'Navies in War and Peace,"' Survival, March/April 1975, pp. 54-65; see also Grechko, p. 3; see also Admiral of the Navy S. G. Gorshkov, "The Experience of History and the Situation Today," Soviet Press Selected Translations no.765, May 1976, p. 21.

21. Kissinger, op. cit.

Colonel David J. Cade (M.P.A., Syracuse University) is Commander of the 6931^st Security Group at Iráklion Air Station, Crete. He was one of six National War College students to visit the Soviet Union in May 1977, hosted by the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Colonel Cade spent more than five years at the Pentagon, as executive assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, on the Air Staff in the Directorate of Plans, and in the Directorate of Intelligence Systems. He has also had tours with SAC and USAFSS and overseas assignments in Germany, Panama, and Vietnam. Colonel Cade is a graduate of Armed Forces Staff College and National War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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