Air University Review, May-June 1978

There has not been a popular American war in more than thirty years. Of course, this lack of popularity did not prevent our military involvement in Korea, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, or Vietnam. As most political analysts would agree, the public generally exerts far less impact on foreign policy than on any single domestic issue. Traditionally, public opinion has been described as a force that is slow to effect policy, which follows rather than leads, and has little clear consensus. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1. This graph shows the percentage of Americans saying no to the repeated survey question, "Do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" Data are from John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), pp. 54-55.

A growing school of thought suggests, however, that the Vietnam experience constitutes some kind of turning point in the reportedly weak linkage between public opinion and foreign policy, especially concerning the possibilities of future U.S. military intervention. When the public becomes sensitive to the costs of stalemate, support for intervention polarizes. Those who were previously indifferent to governmental policy take positions pro and con. And the linkage that was previously permissive becomes restrictive, inhibiting executive flexibility. The question is whether this restrictiveness has receded to its pre-Vietnam levels. After examining the intensity of this linkage, we shall draw conclusions based on current data concerning the way in which public opinion, as a constraint, may affect future military operations.

There is much evidence to suggest that the nature (location, type, duration, purpose, etc.) of possible future military involvement is far more circumscribed than planners currently believe. It maybe the case that the U.S. now has only one nonnuclear option: to win future conventional wars quickly through a maximum application of force.

Before examining the public opinion data, it must be stressed that there are several methodological problems in determining what the public attitude really is. Public opinion polls ultimately measure the ability of respondents to react immediately to a series of questions posed by a pollster. Further, it can be demonstrated that the wording of a question can have nearly as much impact on the response as a substantive change.² What a respondent says he will do under hypothetical conditions and what he actually will do when confronted with a real situation can be quite different. In short, foreign policy is not, and has never been, a mirror image of public opinion.

At the same time, while a great many factors enter into the determination of a foreign policy, certainly public opinion is a vital and, as many think, seriously neglected factor. It is, of course, the sustaining source of all national policies in democratic societies.

Within a normative framework, presidents and other representative leaders are supposed to care what the people think in a democracy and to conduct all policy in ways that the people would approve. The President and Congress should also pay attention to public opinion because, simply stated, they want to stay in office. Further, there is much evidence to suggest that national leaders and policy-makers are very sensitive to the public mood. The Congress is often briefed by nationally known pollsters; the State Department's Bureau of Public Affairs has a Public Opinion Analyst and systematically studies the editorials of certain newspapers, and the executive branch, if not immediately responsive, has shown itself to be both receptive and sensitive to opinion data.

But this is nothing new. What has the Vietnam experience done to change the public opinion-foreign policy linkage? There is no question that the resolve of the Congress to reassert its authority in foreign affairs was strengthened during the Vietnam involvement. Although it failed, the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, to set a deadline for withdrawal of all American forces, established a precedent for this type of congressional action in time of war. Congressional restraints were placed on the limits of U.S. involvement in Cambodia and Laos. More important than any mere precedent is the War Powers Resolution of November 1973, which limits the President's power to use American troops in overseas combat to sixty days (ninety days only if necessary for a safe withdrawal). Of course, Congress can have an extremely important voice in foreign policy well before the question of troop involvement as the actions with regard to Angola have shown.

Many observers anticipate a return to the more active foreign policy role played by Congress prior to 1940 and attribute this to a lack of presidential credibility during the war years, a "changing of the guard" in Congress from old and conservative to young and liberal, to the increased influence of foreign policy matters on domestic issues, as well as to a new national leadership. Whatever the causes, it is clear that Congress will continue to demand involvement in any discussion of troop commitments and that there will be extremely strong opposition to any presidential initiative that appears to be leading to another Vietnam spiral.

The Vietnam War has again reminded politicians to pay attention to the public's voice from the practical standpoint. There is little doubt that the Korean War issue contributed significantly to the Eisenhower landslide during the 1952 Presidential election. Similarly, the Vietnam War was the primary factor in forcing President Johnson's decision not to seek re-election. While President Nixon was temporarily able to intensify the war despite a nonsupportive public, he had received a tremendous initial mandate at the polls and was bringing the troops home on schedule. That this mandate subsided after the escalation was evident from 1972 election data. The point is that, while our national leaders have some latitude to act independently of public opinion, they certainly cannot disregard it for very long.

The Vietnam War has created a sort of primitive stimulus-response situation in which similar future challenges, not clearly perceived as in our national interest, will elicit a similar response, opposition from the American people. The intensity of the response may even reflect learning as a product of cumulative experience. Angola is a perfect example. Although Henry Kissinger strongly denied it at the time, the structure of the situation was so similar to that of the early Vietnam involvement that it is surprising that the President and the Secretary of State did not do a better job of anticipating the congressional and public response. In December 1975,the Senate, probably feeling a general consensus and looking toward a potential election year issue, voted 54 to 22 to ban further covert aid to Angola. Even while Secretary Kissinger was promising to continue to resist the Soviet attempt to "impose its own brand of government" on Angola, the House of Representatives followed the Senate in January 1976 by voting 323 to 99 against providing the "trivial sums" needed to produce a military stalemate.³

Although it was often consciously used before to gain support for policy, the phenomenon of the news teak became a frequent occurrence during the Vietnam War and certainly impacted on public and congressional opinion. The importance of the leak is that it allows national security issues to spill out of the traditional arena and into the public domain, Since bureaucrats or politicians would not normally leak documents or information that would support current policy, this action would potentially create or contribute to public dissent against the administration's contemplated policy. The press is much more receptive to this type of information now than before the Vietnam War and will continue to be ready to print documents such as the "Pentagon papers" or a list of CIA station chiefs. What a few years ago would be considered treason is now often called "good investigative reporting," and the public, armed with previously unavailable information, will be more concerned. The conclusion is that covert warfare or intelligence activity cannot be used by an executive without a much higher risk of exposure.

Finally, if the Vietnam War has any effect on the future of the public opinion-foreign policy linkage, it will be in the lessons which that war taught our enemies. If we fail to recognize the power of the public to affect foreign policy decisions, that power will not he lost on our adversaries. Outside the narrow confines of the party central committees, the capacity of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to intervene militarily is virtually unconstrained by democratic accountability. The American public, largely as a result of the part it played during the Vietnam War, will present a significant force to the Communists in the future, both as a target for propaganda and as a latent constraint on foreign policy. There can be no question that changing public opinion and political dissent had a sustaining effect on the North Vietnamese and VietCong. As Leslie Gelb writes, "American public opinion was the essential domino. Our leaders knew it. Hanoi's leaders knew it. Each geared its strategy--both the rhetoric and the conduct of the war--to this fact."⁴ It is important that we understand this reality. Not only is U.S. public opinion affected by the stimulus-response mechanism of the Vietnam memory but it was and will continue to be, as Gelb calls it, "the essential domino"--the critical variable.

Within this framework of the American public's impact on foreign policy, we must assess' the importance of the fact that public opinion today is against the use of military force abroad as strongly as at anytime during the last 30 years.⁵ A new president has been elected while promising never to intervene militarily for the purpose of overthrowing a government.

To say that it makes a difference to the American people which country we will support should come as no surprise. What is surprising is (1) how very low the support levels became during the Vietnam War, and (2) that they have remained constant or dropped further since that time.

In a study conducted in November 1976, Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic of Yale University reported that the public willingness to employ American armed forces for the defense of other countries was much lower than during the early Cold War years. Further, unlike the response to most foreign policy issues, public response to the question of military support to various countries is highly selective, generally consistent, and appears to be linked to geographic distance from the U.S. as well as economic ties and military alliance with the U.S. ⁶

A recent Gallup poll shows that the only country on whose behalf a majority of Americans would be willing to send troops to combat an attack by Communist-backed forces is Canada. (See Table I.) The percentages favoring sending American troops elsewhere have not changed significantly since the question was asked in 1971, and that in itself is significant. It has remained consistent or dropped since the public became disillusioned with the Vietnam War. In four years. the support levels have not moved upward. What has moved is the percentage favoring the "refuse to get involved" course of action.

Table I. Question: "In the event a nation is attacked by Communist-backed forces, there are several things the U.S. can do about it-send American troops or send military supplies but not send American troops or refuse to get involved." What action would you want to see us take if (country) is attacked?

 Source: The Gallup Opinion Index, July 1975, Report No. 121, pp. 54-55.

Without exception, this has increased. For example, the figure has increased by a surprising 11 percent among those who would "refuse to get involved" if West Germany were attacked. It should be noted, however, that U.S. willingness to send troops to West Germany is virtually the same as it was four years ago. What this suggests is that people who previously believed sending of supplies a sufficient response now would prefer to "stay out" entirely.

One might wonder, since support is apparently so low for West Germany, how the American public feels about other countries where we have clearly demonstrated our national support: Korea and Israel.

A 1974 survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations asked Americans if they would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops, .... . if North Korea attacked South Korea." Only 14 percent favored involvement, and 65 percent opposed. The remainder was undecided.⁷ Because of the wording of the question opinion data on South Korea are not completely comparable with the others reported. Therefore, change cannot be addressed. Nevertheless, the absolute values are impressive. It may be assumed that more recent revelations concerning Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) involvement in U.S. domestic politics can have only a further adverse impact on U.S. willingness to provide military support.

The low support figures for U.S. troop defense of Korea and West Germany are particularly noteworthy. One might be tempted to argue that the response is meaningless since U.S. forces are presently stationed in these countries and are patrolling within a few hundred meters of the Communist border. Formal commitment exists, and American soldiers would obviously be involved whether the public supports it or not. On the other hand, one might conversely argue that the response is all the more significant since it implies that a growing segment of the public would not support reinforcements in the event of an attack and questions that we are there in the first place. Of course, one can speculate that support levels might rise dramatically if American lives were being lost in an attack, but it is significant that they are so low at the present time.

In the case of Israel, Louis Harris reported in April 1975 that a majority of 62 percent to 24 percent believes that "Israel is friendly to the United States because it wants our military supplies."⁸ In the same article, however, he reports that only one out of four Americans would be willing to send American troops to the Middle East even "if Israel were being defeated by the Arabs." The Israelis would undoubtedly say that the "troops to Israel question" is meaningless since they have always insisted they would never seek them. But the evidence of limited commitment remains.

In a 1975 publication, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations reported similar findings.⁹ The Council concluded that there is "low public support for getting involved in places where war might actually occur, or where U.S. commitments and interests might actually be tested." ¹⁰ The lack of appeal for traditional cold war aims suggested by this survey is also noteworthy. While a majority (54 percent) of the public considers "containing communism" to be "very important," this goal currently ranks ninth in foreign policy priority. Moreover, only 34 percent of a leadership sample considered "containing communism" to be "very important, actually rating it less important than "protecting the jobs of American workers." Among these respondents, it was rated twelfth in priority.¹¹Similarly, both the public and leadership placed the export of either liberal democracy or capitalism at the bottom of the list of eighteen goals.

Still, the mood was not one of isolationism. Two-thirds of the American public agreed that "the United States should play an active role in the world"; 99 percent of the leaders agreed. The order in which the foreign policy goals were ranked by both the public and leadership indicates what specific forms this role should take: (1) keeping the peace in the world, (2) international cooperation, (3) promoting U.S. security, and (4) worldwide arms control.¹² What seems to be rejected is the idea that a threat exists that can be countered by direct military intervention.

"Type of threat" has not been a variable used frequently in opinion polls. Whenever it has been used, it has displayed a very large difference in public willingness to aid a country that is perceived as "attacked by a foreign communist force" or subject to a serious insurgency movement led by an indigenous communist movement."

In April 1973, special samples were taken from more than 1200 business executives (from the Fortune 500) and senior military officers enrolled in the five war colleges (Air, Army, Navy, National, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces).¹³ Table II shows the percentage of respondents from both groups who would approve the use of American troops in each case. Predictably, the percentages reflect a greater willingness on the part of business and military elites to commit U.S. forces than on the part of the public. Apparently no case exists in which the majority of executives would approve the use of American troops to combat an "indigenous insurgency." The military officers polled would do so only in the case of Mexico. Such low support for committing American troops to counter the attack of Communist-backed forces (Table I) indicates that only an extremely small proportion of the general public would approve of the use of American troops to fight an indigenous insurgency' in the countries listed. What all of this suggests is a lasting predisposition against combat intervention

Popular Support
over Time

These public opinion data have the greatest significance for military planners. The question is no longer "How quickly can the war be won?" but rather "Row quickly must the U.S. combat commitment be terminated?"

Time, as it affects public support, is the crucial constraint, and it works to, constrain in several ways. The War Powers Act clearly constrains the President. Given the low percentages in the U.S. public favoring military intervention, and past congressional action in the case of Angola, the President must consider that the first test of national support will occur within a two-month period. Within this period, Congress has the power to order the immediate removal of U.S. forces by concurrent resolution that cannot be vetoed.

In contrast, time is definitely on the side of the enemy. If he has a totalitarian form of government, he will have no problem with public constraint. Simply stated, his tactic need be only to match force with force until stalemate arid wait for the U.S. to defeat itself.

In a 1974 study, Professors Larry Elowiti and John Spanier convincingly presented such a thesis of time sensitivity in the following scenario of future military interventions:

The American political system "locks in" after an initial period of support. The President has only a relatively short time, therefore, to employ force to gain a politically satisfactory settlement. Once he is caught between a rising level of public dissension and a declining curve of congressional support, all of his maneuvering... will do little to stem the erosion of his backing. In the end, his party will go down to defeat in the next presidential election.¹⁴

Moreover, they predicted this scenario would occur regardless of the circumstances of the particular war. This would indicate that even if Congress allowed the President to continue the war, he would quickly find himself severely constrained by the effects of time on the public mood, should stalemate occur.

The U.S. military leadership might also be sensitive to a new limited war scenario involving uncertainty of victory. A September 1974 survey of the 173 individuals who held U.S. Army general officer command positions in Vietnam during l965-l972 reveals that nearly 70 percent of the men who managed the war in Vietnam did not think the U.S. objectives were sufficiently clear. Furthermore, more than half of them did not feel in retrospect (1974) that it should have progressed beyond an advisory effort or that the results of the war were "worth the effort." Significantly, this survey was taken well before the collapse of South Vietnam. ¹⁵

The public opinion data presented here support the conclusion that the outcomes of future limited wars of intervention must be decided quickly. This suggests maximum application of force. How quickly this can be done depends to a great extent on the first two factors discussed, the country concerned and the type of attack.

It has also been suggested that the war could possibly be kept on the political "back burner" by using a limited number of all-volunteer American troops and by keeping the casualties low. There are problems with this alternative. Even if it were possible for a president somehow to divert public attention from a small-scale intervention and stop unfavorable news leaks, an enemy would quickly turn up the heat on that "back burner" for the benefit of the American public. National leaders would then be left with the inevitable choice between an immediate, but far more dangerous, escalation or a hasty retreat.¹⁶

Some indication of how quickly an enemy can escalate an issue is provided by the "Angola scenario." Although it is reported that the National Security Council's "40 Committee" had authorized a covert American grant of $300,000 to the Angolan National Liberation Front. and Secretary Kissinger had warned the Soviet Union against "running a risk of conflict with us," the Soviets stepped up covert large-scale shipments of AK-47 rifles, machine guns, and rocket launchers through Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire. In August 1975, Cuban and Soviet personnel appeared in Angola, and by late October Cuban arrivals increased. In November, Soviet ships and transport planes were unloading tons of weaponry at Luanda and Henrique de Carvalho, including T-54 and T-34 tanks and l22 mm rockets. By late February 1976, an estimated 11,000 Cuban combat troops were stationed in Angola, and the Soviets had provided about $300 million in supplies.¹⁷ What the U.S. had succeeded in doing by attempting to keep Angola in the political shadows was, in fact, to signal an unmistakable reluctance to fight over it. The Soviets and Cubans, however, did not slow down their efforts while we debated our position and our options.

Should the President ever decide on combat intervention, swift and decisive military action reminiscent of the Dominican Republic, the Mayaguez rescue, or the Sontay raid would appear to be the only option for the U.S, in less than total war for some time to come.

This conclusion raises several questions. Does existing joint military doctrine provide a framework for this type of fast war? Will present force structure and weapon systems permit it? Is the U.S. military trained and prepared for this type of action? Is the President capable of mounting a decisive attack without prior congressional approval and the necessary public debate? The answers to these questions, as perceived by ourselves, our allies, and our enemies, are important and may well be crucial to the future of Africa., Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The questions must be answered by both the civil policy-maker and the military planner. And the public must understand and accept the rationale for the commitment and be able to see a real possibility of swift victory. If the U.S. appears weak or irresolute, enemies may deliberately test us, and conflict is inevitable. Moreover, allies will retreat, and shifts in allegiance are certain.

The U.S. cannot afford to continue signaling reluctance to resort to force either through the pronouncements of the national leadership or the genuine disinterest of the American people. The real irony of the public attitude is best expressed by James Schlesinger:

The cry of the American neo-isolationists does not mean there will be no more Vietnams. For if this viewpoint prevails, there will be many, many Vietnams successfully carried out by forces hostile to the United States. In that somber truth lies deeper significance of the deadlock of American policy regarding Angola.¹⁸

Nor can the U.S. falter, once a decision to commit troops has been made. If time is a critical factor, given a popular unwillingness to accept the costs of protracted conflict, then the U.S. military establishment must adapt to it and so structure its forces and doctrines for their employment that a decisive victory of conventional arms can be swiftly won. This is the price of a credible ability to intervene and perhaps the only real deterrent against Vietnams of the future.

Notes

1. A speech before the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 25 June 1976, p. 109. Reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin, 26 July 1976.

2. Norval D. Glenn, "Problems of Comparability in Trend Studies with Opinion Poll Data," Public Opinion Quarterly, spring 1970, pp. 82-94.

3. John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola;" Foreign Affairs, April 1976, pp. 414-19.

4. Leslie H. Gelb, ''The Essential Domino: American Politics and Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, April 1972,  p. 459.

5. Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic, "American Opinion on the Use of Military Force Abroad," Political Science Quarterly, Fall 1976, p. 411.

6. Ibid pp. 425-27.

7. John L. Rielly, editor, American Public Opinion and U. S. Foreign Policy 1975 (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1975), p. 18.

8. Louis Harris, "Oil or Israel?" New York Times Magazine, April 6, 1975, pp. 21-35.

9. The figures were slightly higher, but the possible responses did not distinguish troops from supplies.

10. Rielly, pp. 18-19.

11. Ibid., p. 13.

12. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

13. Bruce Russett and Elizabeth Hanson, Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975), pp. 59-99.

14. Larry Elowitz and John W. Spanier, "Korea and Vietnam Limited War and the American Political System ORBIS, Summer 1974, pp. 512-13.

15. Douglas Kinnard, "Vietnam Reconsidered: An Attitudinal Survey of U.S. Army General Officers, "Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter 1975-76, pp. 147-53.

16. For an elaboration of this thesis, see previously cited articles by Elowitz and Spanier and Russett and Nincic.

17. Marcum, pp. 414-17.

18. James R. Schlesinger, " The Continuing Challenge to America." Reader’s Digest, April 1976, p. 65.

Major Brian P. Mullady (M.A., Boston University) is a student at the U.S. Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies, Garmisch, Germany. Preceding this assignment he was a U.S. Army foreign area officer and studied Russian at the Defense Language Institute, Presidio of Monterey, California. A dual-rated aviator, he has commanded helicopter and fixed-wing units in Korea, Vietnam, and Germany. He has also been Executive Officer of the 14^th Aviation Unit (Air Traffic Control) in Germany. Major Mullady is a 1977 Distinguished Graduate of Air Command and Staff College.

 Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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