Air University Review, May-June 1978

Blueprint for Abdication

Over the past decade the United States has taken a myriad of actions, often seemingly unrelated and uncoordinated, in such diverse areas as economics, foreign policy, and national defense. Many of these actions were expediencies of the moment, apparently undertaken without consideration for future consequences. The cumulative, synergistic effect of these actions is to provide a ready opportunity for the Soviet Union to devise a unique strategy for world domination. This strategic option is unique in that, without the need for armed confrontation, it provides for the United States, of its own volition, to abdicate its role as a world power and assume one of only secondary consideration.

The decades since the Second World War have seen the United States attain a position as the strongest and most influential power in the world. "Number one," however, implies that there are other countries in the running. An increasing number of people now believe the U.S., at best, to be sharing the top spot with the Soviet Union. Others believe that the U.S. has declined to a "close second" position and will continue to decline in the future. This latter group attributes this decline to a weakening of that intangible ingredient known as "national resolve."¹

Few nations have relinquished their positions of power consciously. deliberately, and in the absence of external pressures. Rather, the passing of dominance from one nation to another has more often resulted from economic or military pressures.

Military pressure can take many forms, such as the following involving the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.:

Full-scale nuclear exchange. This could result in widespread, extensive physical damage on both sides, as well as severe disruption of both economic systems. It could take several decades for the victors to rebuild their country to its prenuclear-exchange level.

Less-than-full-scale nuclear exchange or conventional conflict. This conflict could result in local defeat for either side. However, it is questionable whether such a conflict could be contained in either location or intensity. Neither side would likely be willing to risk the loss of prestige that would accompany a military defeat. (The author believes that if conventional conflict erupted between the two superpowers, escalation through tactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear exchange would result.)

Threat of overt action. A confrontation could build slowly, with the threat of military action if a certain threshold is crossed by the other side. In the face of strong, determined opposition one side could concede to the demands of the other if no grave damage would occur to their self-interests. Capitulation, however, is foreign to the national character of both superpowers. The leadership of either country would likely be removed for allowing such humiliating events to occur (e.g., the Cuban missile crisis and Khrushchev's demise).

Nolo contendere (no contest). In the presence of a strong adversary) one side could choose not to take a stand on an issue and thereby avoid confrontation.² If done often enough and in situations of mounting importance, a country relinquishes its power by default.

The ultimate Soviet goal appears to remain world domination. Obviously, the most desirable course of action for the Soviet Union would be for the U.S. to, in effect, plead "nolo contendere," either because of internal or external pressures, or through a general lack of national resolve. Soviet commitments to offensive military forces and civil defense in recent years, however, indicate that they have not ruled out the possibility of conflict anywhere along the spectrum.³ But they intend to pursue that goal judiciously and patiently in order to avoid paying a higher price than necessary.

Communist revolutionary theory views time as being on the side of communism; therefore, the fundamental strategies of guerrilla warfare lend themselves admirably to a protracted Soviet pursuit of world domination:

• Strike only when the odds are overwhelmingly in your favor.
• Avoid conflict when the possibility exists of grave damage.
• Strive always and in all places to shift the odds in your favor.
• Foment maximum confusion in your enemy's country, diluting unity and resolve.
• Camouflage your activities and intentions in order to deceive your enemy and capitalize on his lack of preparation.⁴

Many nations of the world still vividly recall the tremendous industrial base and manpower resources that the United States brought to bear in World War II. Western Europe and Japan owe much of their current economic base to the generosity of the American people in the aftermath of that war. Few people in the world could mistake the tremendous depth of technology required to put men on the moon, and fewer still do not envy the personal freedoms and standard of living enjoyed by the average American citizen. Many countries have received economic, educational, medical, and technological assistance from the U.S., with few, if any, strings attached.

Yet, how do these same people perceive America's current willingness to maintain its role as a world power? If they were to catalogue their perceptions of the United States solely on information gained from the Communications media, observations similar to the following might well result.

Political. Internally, our nation appears to be sharply divided over numerous issues. Foreign policy, foreign aid, domestic economic policy, organized labor, energy policy, and military spending are some of the more important ones. This fragmentation could easily be interpreted as preventing unified efforts toward a common goal.⁵

Economic. Many internal economic problems prevent our concentrated, effective use of the economic instrument of national power. These include inflation, unemployment, dependence on foreign sources for energy and raw materials, the decline of many "high technology" industries, rising labor cost, declining productivity, the debate over the role of multinational corporations, and the high percentage of our national budget focused on social programs.

Social. Sharp divisions exist within our country on the issues of racial integration, changing morals, welfare, medical care, poverty, the effect of inflation on fixed incomes, and the frequent conflict between concerns for the environment and economic growth. Polarization of these issues often precludes cooperation in other areas of common interest.

Technological. Technological strength is recognized as one of America's greatest assets. It is both broad and deep, equaling or surpassing any country in the world in almost all fields. When coupled with our large and highly sophisticated industrial base, it gives us an overwhelming advantage in any program we undertake.⁶ Unfortunately, this vast resource is not currently focused on any program of strategic importance.

Military. While both superpowers unquestionably possess the military capability to inflict mortal damage on the other, our relative position in the military arena is perceived by many as declining. Some Americans discount the warnings of their military leaders, suspecting a collusion between military and industrial leaders aimed at self-perpetuation more than at defense. Military purchasing power has dropped at an alarming rate over the past ten years, especially in such future-oriented areas as the development and acquisition of new weapon systems and the research and development vital to long-term technological supremacy. Our strategic and conventional forces are aging rapidly and becoming more costly to operate and maintain. Yet modernization and replacement of weapon systems are proceeding at a slow pace, especially when compared to the unprecedented growth of Soviet offensive capability.⁷ Self-righteousness seems to overwhelm prudence occasionally, as when the U.S. unilaterally abandons offensive chemical warfare (and the Soviets counter with increased manufacture and deployment of chemical weapons);⁸ or as Congress and the American press thrust our foreign intelligence apparatus and operations into a public spotlight, which results in the loss of many sources of information.

Ideological. Our ideology is primarily oriented internally and contains no

theoretical basis for its external expansion to other countries. While believing that our form of government is superior to any other, our efforts to convert other countries to representative democracy are spasmodic and limited primarily to the passive dissemination of information, rather than an aggressive propaganda effort and active political involvement. Some of our more valuable allies chafe at our periodic self-righteous arrogance and intolerance toward countries that are friendly to us, yet which do not have representative democracy forms of government,⁹ or who conduct foreign policies with which we do not agree. The ensuing cut off of military and economic aid (e.g., Turkey) is construed by many of our allies as internal "meddling" and makes U.S. foreign policy appear to be based only on a combination of short-term U.S. interests and political popularity contests,¹⁰ rather than on strategic common sense.

World opinion Criticism of U.S. foreign policy has become commonplace, especially among third world. nonaligned countries. In some instances, this may be due to merit or to a variety of emotional factors, such as rising sentiments of nationalism and their resentment of our prosperity and world influence. Many of these countries feel that they can criticize "the American giant" or engage in acts of violence against U.S. citizens, diplomats, and property with impunity and thereby gain a measure of self-respect by "standing up to imperialism." Yet they seem to perceive little such immunity from Soviet retribution, and therefore refrain from such actions toward the Russians.¹¹ Our policies are subject to much malevolence in public forums (e.g., the press and the United Nations) from nonaligned nations, Communist nations, and occasionally from our own allies. Considerable resentment toward us exists on the part of many undeveloped and underdeveloped peoples, despite the enormous sums of aid and technological infusion that have been poured into some of these nations. Consequently, there is a growing reluctance among the American public to support foreign aid programs.

National attitudes. An apparently prominent tendency among growing segments of our population is to turn away from the outside world and focus on the myriad of domestic problems that continue to plague our country --economic, environmental, and societal problems of staggering magnitude and variety.¹² This tendency is mirrored by the reluctance of many politicians to support foreign aid or national defense expenditures, and their concurrent desire to divert these monies to health, housing, welfare, education, and other areas directly concerned with increasing the immediate day to day standard of living of the American people. who already enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the world.¹³ Leisure time seems to be increasingly directed toward idle activities with no real physical or intellectual benefits. This traditional "Puritan ethic" of self-discipline, industriousness, and frugality in the interest of along-term goal seems to have been replaced by a quest for immediate self-gratification. American people seem increasingly self-centered and shortsighted, ignoring the far more serious problems of the rest of the world because of frustration and a concern for their own problems at home. Perhaps the most serious problems currently plaguing American attitudes today are a lack of direction and sense of purpose. As a nation, we have no clearly enunciated and tangible national goal on which our people can focus their energies and behind which they can unite their efforts, such as the space program of the 1960s.

The Blueprint

If the Soviet Union perceives our nation in a manner similar to that just described, then there clearly lies before it a strategy that could achieve world domination within a decade, without resorting to armed conflict.

Abdication by default is the result of a lack of resolve.¹⁴ It may result from preoccupation with immediate personal comforts rather than with the long-term national interest, a general lack of direction due to confusion and unrest in many areas of national and international activity, an introversion stemming from frustration in foreign affairs, a gradual weakening of strength and flexibility in national defense and international economics, complacency and wishful thinking rather than realism, or a combination of these factors. In our political system, it is indeed true that the actions of the government reflect the attitudes of the people.

A determined, patient, and skillful adversary can do much to foster the diminution of our national resolve, but their efforts must be marked with the utmost subtlety to avoid focusing attention on the true intent of their activities.¹⁵ As an example, Adolf Hitler spoke openly of peace, yet prepared quietly for war. The rest of the world relied on a faulty perception of Nazi intentions and ignored Nazi capabilities. Europe muddled along hoping for peace and yet was drawn inexorably into war. History can be very valuable in showing what actions to avoid, yet too often we fail to learn from history.

The conditions that exist today in our country readily lend themselves to exploitation by the Soviet Union (using a combination of the concepts of protracted conflict and guerrilla warfare). I would expect a Russian handbook on the implementation of this strategy to have various component programs divided into two major efforts, one Clandestine and the other overt.

The checklist for covert efforts might include the following.

• Support any individuals or groups (particularly politicians) whose activities contribute to a reduction in American defense spending, no matter how patriotic their motives. This support can take many forms (e.g., manpower, financial backing), but it must be such that the true source is never suspected. Support should also be given to al] groups and persons who promote greatly expanded federal spending in nondefense areas, or who protest American military or political involvement in any foreign country or alliance.
• Strongly support extremist groups of all persuasions.¹⁶ The worldwide press has a tendency to give maximum exposure to anything bizarre or sensational; consequently, this communication tool is particularly potent. It can be manipulated to provide a constant bombardment of unpleasant stimuli that will tend to produce confusion and withdrawal in a person. Just as an animal who is constantly bombarded with unpleasant stimuli gradually becomes unwilling and unable to act purposefully, a nation in similar circumstances will become more withdrawn, shortsighted, and unable to act decisively. Foreign extremist groups, even though their actions do not involve the U.S. directly, can nurture the growing spirit of American isolationism. Domestic extremist groups, on the other hand, can create confusion and serve to divert attention from strategic problems of less immediate but still vital long-range importance.
• Exacerbate economic problems at every possible opportunity. Products should be bought in large quantities on the world market or directly from the U.S. whenever these purchases will create a shortage in the United States or drive up prices to the American consumer. Seek to absorb or control the production of raw materials such as oil, chromium, bauxite, or uranium, which are vital to American economic health yet come from foreign sources. Support should be given to labor unions that are seeking increases in pay and benefits that exceed increases in inflation and productivity. Any action that can cause national or international economic uncertainty is a chance for exploitation.
• Give the widest possible coverage to all U.S. problems or failures in foreign affairs, real or contrived. An inability or unwillingness of the U.S. to support its international commitments must constantly be spotlighted for the rest of the world.¹⁷ Articles that describe successful activities should be suppressed. distorted, or played down as much as possible.¹⁸ The ridicule resulting from selective news coverage will serve to distort and diminish American influence abroad as well as to erode respect for America as a world power. Many foreign news media are either supported by the U.S.S.R., under Soviet influence, or selectively fed items that are false or distorted. As other nations lose respect for the U.S., the American people will first lose their own self-respect and then respect for their country. Self-esteem is as vital to nations as it is to individuals.

The Soviet Union Can take certain measures designed to divert attention from its long-term goals yet at the same time foment a false sense of security in the United States.¹⁹ With control over most of the information that the rest of the world sees concerning internal Soviet policies, preparations, and intentions, these measures can be implemented with relative impunity. If expertly executed, they can virtually guarantee that the rest of the world will perceive that there is no Soviet threat and, therefore, there is no need to maintain economic or military defenses. The October 1973 attack on Israel is a classic illustration of how effective a carefully woven web of political and military misinformation can be.²⁰ The Soviet Union, as this example and others in Eastern Europe show, is eminently well qualified to exploit the weaknesses, complacency, and wishful thinking of any nation, the U.S. included.²¹ The Trojan horse of détente is yet another example of an effort with a tremendous potential for Soviet exploitation.²²

The list for overt efforts might include the following.

• Encourage trade at all levels. Every effort must be made to import high technology products, such as computers, air transport equipment, complete production lines, and materiel processing facilities.²³ The travel and personal contacts of foreigners who accompany these imports into the Soviet Union should be carefully controlled. This prevents an accurate picture of activities that may betray true intentions. This approach to trade enables the U.S.S.R. to make quantum jumps in many areas of technology without making the extensive investment in underlying research that would normally be necessary. This exchange should be accompanied with much fanfare, yet in reality it should be a one-way proposition with nothing of practical value or utility going back to the U.S. or other Western nations. Care must be taken by the Soviets not to export any technology if it aids potential adversaries or reveals the sophistication of Russian efforts in defense-related areas.
• Exercise care in all public forums not to appear belligerent or to indulge in flamboyant forms of provocative behavior that, in earlier periods, kept the U.S. alert. There must be no open profession or preaching of Soviet ideology and its ultimate goal of world domination, as this would only lend credence to the efforts of those Americans who advocate stronger measures for national defense.²⁴ If intervention in the internal affairs of other nations is necessary, proxies (such as the Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia) should be used to help camouflage Soviet involvement.²⁵
• Redouble efforts to surpass U.S. military capabilities during this period of importing technology and professing a complete "change of heart."²⁶ These efforts can go relatively unnoticed because of Soviet control of information relating to the size of military budgets and the nature of military programs. If America continues to lose momentum in military research and falls behind in efforts to modernize its air, sea, and land forces, the Soviet Union could, within a decade, have the military power to force the United States to back down in any political or military situation that would not directly threaten the survival of the United States.²⁷
• Support and publicize to the maximum extent possible any action throughout the world that focuses attention on U.S. intelligence activities. Efforts from any quarter in the U.S. to declassify sensitive information of any sort should get similar support. Publicity, especially on sensitive data, will do much to destroy intelligence gathering sources that can take years, even decades, to develop.²⁸ Without an accurate view of Soviet capabilities and intentions, it will be even more difficult for the U.S. to effectively direct its defense efforts.

The Soviet goal is world domination. A promising, low-risk alternative course of action is to induce in Americans a sense of complacency, an air of good will, a feeling of security, and a general reluctance to practice self-discipline and make the sacrifices necessary for continued national security and a viable foreign policy.²⁹ Simultaneously with this diminution of U.S. national resolve and a continued decline in our military capability, the Soviet Union would continue rapid expansion of their offensive military forces. This approach would allow the Soviets to make steady foreign policy gains and erode the U.S. position and influence around the globe. Eventually, Soviet military power would be such that the U.S. would have to yield to Russian designs in many areas of the world rather than risk a confrontation. Nolo contendere (acceding to an unpleasant outcome without resistance) would be more palatable than the loss of face from backing down in open confrontation.

At that point, the United States will have abdicated its role in the course of world affairs. The Soviet Union--as the only nation with the prestige, the military capability, and the will to fill the power vacuum--will have achieved its goal.

Democracies have historically preferred to concentrate on domestic concerns when no clear-cut threat is present. The tendency is to relax as dangers seem to recede. We somehow perceive that the maintenance of strength is incompatible with, rather than the precondition for, the relaxation of tensions. Do we wishfully mistake prosperity for security, a fatal mistake that has been made by a parade of prior civilizations? Is our appraisal of détente too often colored by assumptions about Soviet motivations, intentions, and priorities that largely mirror our own desires and bear precious little resemblance to reality? Are we naively pursuing a belief that our security can be guaranteed by a piece of paper, hoping that it will serve as a substitute for determination, technology, and resources?

There exists in a substantial portion of the American public an indifference, apathy, and unwillingness to face harsh prospects. If the U.S. is going to become a second-class power on the world stage, this decision should be made consciously and deliberately, not as a result of wishful thinking and ignorance about the consequences of seemingly unrelated events and actions. Otherwise, the appraisal of national resolve attributed to former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will be frighteningly accurate: the American people do lack the will to maintain strategic parity and their present role in international affairs.³⁰

Notes

1. Sir Robert Thompson, ''Military Victory: Political Defeat--The Failure of U.S. Strategy in Vietnam, "International Defense Review, December 1974, pp. 727-29.

2. Leon Gouré, "The Threat" (lecture delivered to the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami, Florida, 13 November 1974).

3. Herbert J. Coleman, "Diversified Soviet Offensive Moves Cited by NATO Unit," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 June 1976, p. 20; Ira C. Eaker, "Soviet Intentions: A Roadmap," Air Force Times, 9 July 1975; Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, "U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Who's Ahead?'' Reader's Digest, September 1976, pp. 79-83.

4. Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith, USMC (Ret.), Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger. Inc., 1961), p. 46.

5. Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, USAF (Ret.), unpublished comments at AFLC Commanders' Conference, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 14 May 1975.

6. Graham, pp. 79-83; Robert Hotz, "Trends at Le Bourget," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 June 1976, p. 7.

7. Coleman, p. 20: General Russell E. Dougherty, "The Three Faces of Deterrence," Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, no. 3-1975: James R. Schlesinger, ''America's Worldwide Defense Role," Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, no. 3-1973.

8. Eaker, "Soviet Intentions: A Roadmap," p. 13.

9.  Howard Flieger, "The Cambodia Caper." U. S. News and World Report, 7 April 1975, p. 76.

10. Gen. T. R. Milton, USAF (Ret,), "Assessing U.S. Reliability as an Ally," Air Force Magazine, April 1975, p. 27.

11. Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, USAF (Ret.), "Are U.S. Ambassadors Expendable?" Air Force Time, 18 September 1974, p. 13.

12. John F. Loosbrock, "Reverberations from Vietnam," Air Force Magazine, June 1975, p. 6.

13. See note 2; Loosbrock, p. 6.

14. See note 2.

15. Robert Strausz-Hupé et al., Protracted Conflict (New York Harper, 1963), pp. 67-84.

16. Ibid., p. 65.

17. Milton, p. 27.

18. "The Wayward Press," Air Force Magazine, June 1975, p-17.

19. Howard Flieger, "A New Year's Resolution," U.S. News and World Report, 5 January 1976, p. 68; Robert Hotz, "A Classic Example," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 31 March 1975, p.7. Strausz-Hupé, p. 79.

20. Robert Hotz, "A Classic Example," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 31 March 1975, p. 7.

21. See note 2.

22. Gen. Russell E, Dougherty, "New Dimensions of Strategic Deterrence," remarks at the Air Force Association Symposium, Shreveport, Louisiana, 13 November 1974; Reginald A. Hubley, "Message from the Publisher," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 December 1975, p. 7.

23. Graham, p. 82; "Trends at Le Bourget," p. 7.

24. Strausz-Hupé, p. 53. "A Classic example," p. 7.

25. Hubley, p. 7.

26. Coleman, p, 20; Hubley, p. 7;Robert Hotz, "Pitfalls of SALT-II," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 15 December 1975, p. 9, Donald H. Rumsfeld, "A Defense Appraisal" (excerpts of a speech to the Electronics Industries Association meeting in Washington, D.C.), Aviation Week & Space Technology, 29 March 1976, p. 7.

27. See note 2.

28. Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, The Service: The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen (New York: World Publishing Co., 1972), p. 216.

29. Ibid., pp. 295-96.

30. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, USN (Ret.). On Watch, reviewed by Arthur G. B. Metcalf in Strategic Review, Summer 1976, p.121.

The long-range goal of arms reduction is a central policy of our government, and has been for a number of years. President Carter, by his words and deeds, has strongly emphasized this aspect of our security policy. His recent address at the United Nations is the latest example.

This search for ways to control the increase in numbers of weapons, their destructiveness, and their proliferation reflects policy continuity. In this regard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been staunch supporters of strategic arms limitations. This support stems from the judgment that if agreements ale equitable and verifiable, US national security interests can be well served.

Mutual and verifiable reduction of strategic nuclear arms is a desirable, and, I believe, an achievable goal. However, we must be cognizant of Soviet actions and the risks they entail. Every policy, every strategy, every action entails some risk. Our task is to insure that that risk remains at a prudent level. We must be watchful that the earnestness of our wish does not blur our vision, or hinder our judgment.

GENERAL GEORGE S. BROWN
Address to the Business Council
Hot Springs, Virginia
14 October 1977

Major Kenneth G. Miller (M.S., University of Southern California) is Executive Officer for Major General James E. McInerney, Jr., Director of Military Assistance and Sales, DCS/S&L, Hq USAF. He has been project engineer for the F-4 Wild Weasel program and program manager for a C-130 Hurricane Hunter radar R & D effort. He also served with the Aircraft Engineering Division, Hq SAC, and as aide-de-camp to the Commander, Warner Robins Air Logistics Center. He won the 1975 George Washington Honor Medal from the Freedom’s Foundation. Major Miller is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Armed Forces Staff College, and Air War College.

 Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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