Air University Review, May-June 1978

Thirty-three years after the death of Adolf Hitler, historical and legal debate on the German leader still rages. After the initial flurry of post-World War II biographies, autobiographies, memoirs, and historical treatments of Hitler and his frightening historical legacy were published in the early 1950s, a one-sided picture of Hitler emerged. When documentary evidence in both published and easily accessible microfilm form reached avalanche proportions, special studies on Hitler and Nazi Germany portrayed the dictator in more complex form. As a result, the convenient portrayal of Hitler as the easily recognized devil incarnate contrasted with a more complex interpretation. With each specialized study, revision of opinion on the acceptability of the one-sided demonic Hitler changed. A. J. P. Taylor, the British historian, lent credence to this view when he called Hitler a statesman and a simple businessman. Since then, an increasing number of books on Hitler have been published that reflect these contrasting interpretations. Both works reviewed here aid in our understanding of Hitler and his legacy.

In this debate on Hitler, David Irving's book is a blockbuster.* The author's purpose is not to de-demonize Hitler but to view "the situation . . through Hitler's eyes, from behind his desk." (p. xvi) Irving has no illusions, knowing that "the facts revealed here concerning Hitler's recorded actions, motivations, and opinions should provide a basis for fresh debate." (p. xvi) It is his intent to see "this tragic moment in history ... from Hitler's point of view." (p. xvii) The author defines his "biggest problem in dealing analytically with Hitler is the aversion to him as a person created by years of intense wartime propaganda and emotive postwar historiography." (p xvii)

*David Irving, Hitler's War (New York: The Viking Press, 1977, $17.50), bibliography, index + 926 pages.

Irving does not mince words on controversial issues. On the central question of the responsibility for the extermination of the European Jews, Irving states that "the incontrovertible evidence is that Hitler ordered on November30, 1941, that there was to be ‘no liquidation’ of the Jews." (Italics added.) (p. xiv) Perhaps this is preposterous. Irving credits Himmler and others with the killings which were "partly of an ad hoc nature, ... and partly a cynical extrapolation by the central SS authorities of Hitler's anti-Semitic decrees. Hitler had unquestionably decreed that Europe's Jews were to be 'swept back' to the east; . . - " (p xiv) Irving is convinced that Hitler did not order the extermination. Even in 1943, the dictator was still against extermination, even though Himmler's SS and the Gauleiters had virtually finished the extermination task. Irving postulates that postwar interpretations that held Hitler as the demonic leader ascribed alt mistakes to him and particularly fixed responsibility for the atrocity of killing European Jewry on Hitler's shoulders are all so much "inter-historian incest." (p. xiii)

Major newspapers and national magazines have reviewed Irving's controversial book in scathingly brutal terms. Reviewers have scoffed at Irving's purpose. His views are regarded as attempting to de-demonize Hitler if not completely to exonerate him. Because of Irving's views on the Holocaust, reaction to his book has been heated condemnation that it was even published. Most reviewers have refused to go beyond this initial shock wave of reaction.

The book is nevertheless sensational for other reasons. In attempting to view Hitler's direction of the war, Irving comes to a central conclusion "that Hitler was a less than omnipotent Führer and that his grip on his immediate subordinates weakened as the war progressed." (p. xv) This insight into Führer leadership is central to an understanding to the German successes and failures in the war. Irving lays bare the process of Hitlerian decision-making. In a word, such decisions were made through a tedious process of procrastination. Within this perspective lies Irving's main contribution.

Irving's research effort is impressive. He has purposely avoided the secondary source literature on Hitler and Nazi Germany because of his aversion to historians' incestual interpretations. Instead, Irving has relied almost exclusively on primary documentary materials, unpublished diaries, manuscripts, and a host of personal interviews. For example, Irving consulted the captured papers of Goering's deputy, Field Marshal Erhard Milch, the rarely used war diary of the German Naval Staff, and unearthed a treasure of diaries from formerly reluctant guardians. Irving warns the student of history not to lend total credence to Helmuth Greiner's editing of the OKW operations staff war diaries or to General Halder's footnotes to his own diaries. Last, Irving has also interviewed the surviving members of Hitler's wartime entourage. As a result Irving paints a convincing picture of Hitler.

Hitler's War is a massive, chronologically organized work which brings out several incisive interpretations. Only a small sampling of the author's views are possible here. From the outset, Irving points out Hitler's irrational desire not to destroy the British Empire while fighting a bloody death duel with her. Hereby, the British author reveals Hitlerian overtures to both England and America in an attempt to settle the widening conflict. On Norway, for example, Irving does much to explain Hitler's rationale for pre-emptive action. Hitler's decisiveness is also explored. In the planning for the invasion of France, Hitler's procrastination method of decision-making is explored. Turning to the invasion of Russia, Irving clearly focuses on Hitler's ideological thought. Further, Irving explores the operational goals and thereby seeks to counter many of the conventional interpretations of Hitler's failure in the east. The author argues that Hitler did not want to take Moscow, rather he was pushed into it by the General Staff. The book goes to great lengths to show that Hitler felt the General Staff was misleading him. Much is made of the intelligence debacle and faulty logistics. The assurances of the logistical planners for the German army that all was ready for the winter campaign are critically evaluated as contributory in Hitler's decision to attack Moscow.

In order to shed long-held illusions about Hitler, Irving repeatedly points out that Hitler sanctioned timely withdrawals in order to blunt Russian offensive attacks. He also explains Hitler's preoccupation with economic and political problems as a basis for military decisions. Hence the pursuit of oil in Rumania and the Caucasus, the rebuilding of the Donets Basin generating capability for coal extraction, the alliance with Finland to protect the valuable iron and nickel ore source in Sweden, the need to hold on to the Crimea to keep Balkan and Turkish loyalties, the reining in of the U-boat arm to respect American neutrality; all these political and economic aims are brought out to demonstrate Hitler's integration of these factors into military decisions.

The joint command and operational structure of the German armed forces are interesting to military readers. Hitler was the prisoner of his own structure! He is not only supreme commander with an operational and integrated staff (the OKW) but after 1941 he becomes commander of the German army with the General Staff directly subordinate to him. Hitler became increasingly hostile toward the General Staff and sought to degrade its role. As a result, there was inconsistency in Hitler's direction of the war, depending on whether Hitler was listening to the OKW or to the General Staff. Irving clearly points out the inefficiency of the Luftwaffe and then explains why Hitler kept its ineffective chief, Goering. Bungled decisions, such as his failure to develop an effective bomber force, are squarely laid to Goering's ineptness.

Many of Hitler's military decisions seem sound to Irving. For example, Irving insists that Hitler defined the point and time of the Russian breakthrough, sealing the fate of Paulus' Sixth Army; he advocated early launching of Operation Citadel, which would have improved the odds at the Battle of Kursk; he correctly analyzed the D-day invasion site; he was not fooled by the "man who never was" deception operation; he recognized the signs of impending Italian collapse and ordered withdrawal of German forces from the Russian front to Italy (parenthetically dooming Operation Citadel); and last, he did not plan to overextend himself in the Battle of the Bulge. In each case, the author points out how Hitler's decisions were sidetracked by those holding different views. He says that, in the end, Hitler usually deferred to the views of others.

In short, Irving's book should be read precisely for its revisionist view and for the light it sheds on the Hitlerian decision-making process. Much can be stated on what is lacking, on more conventional interpretations, and on Irving's scholarship. It may not be conventional history, but the book should be known to the student of this period.

If Irving’s book is filled with controversy, Bradley F. Smith's Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg* is refreshing for its revelations of the judicial decision-making process. The latter's starting point is the acceptance of a central fact: Nuremberg "deserves our attention . . . because it was a crucial episode in modern man's effort to grapple with the responsibility of leaders for unleashing war and causing mass atrocities." (p. xvi) Obviously, he is diametrically opposed to Irving's interpretation on Hitlerian responsibility for the atrocities.

*Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg (New York: Basic Rooks, Inc., 1977, $11.50), bibliography, index + 334 pages.

The question may be asked: Why read another work on Nuremberg? Most important, because for the first time a single study uses the "heretofore classified documents of the U.S. and British governments and records from inside the Tribunal's secret deliberations." (p. xvi) Smith masterfully interweaves this fresh documentary material into his narrative. The perspective throughout the work is from the standpoint of the Allied judges on the bench. In their views and deliberations lies the value of Smith's study.

Smith purposefully sweeps aside the various legalistic and historical interpretations which judged Nuremberg itself. Without taking sides, the author summarizes the controversy and accepts the fact of Nuremberg's historical importance. He traces the motives of the Allies in bringing major war criminals to trial. He concludes that one of the long forgotten but obvious benefits of Nuremberg was that due process rather than summary execution resulted.

The author's study comprises a fine aid by which to walk through that legalistic maze. If, for example, the formulation of the London Charter is taken as the starting point, it constitutes the basic authority for the trial. Through it the difficulties with legal niceties of ex post facto law, the ban on superior orders as a defense. or the inability of the defense to invoke Allied actions as a defense may be overcome.

Smith points to the U.S. as the driving force behind the trial. He traces the origin of the American effort, how the British, French, and Soviets joined later in the war. He indicates the central American effort in having six German organizations declared criminal and trenchantly observes that this motive was to ensure speedy administrative disposition of all the German members of criminal organizations held by the Allies. (Parenthetically Allied Control Council Law #10 declared organizations criminal even before the final judgment at Nuremberg, thus facilitating the final disposition of the large numbers of Allied prisoners.) The author indicates the primacy of American effort in the prosecution through Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, who served as head of the prosecution. Last, Smith identifies several important incongruities. For instance, America, as the world's leading capitalistic power, insisted on placing industrialists on trial; the British in turn did not agree on the trial of the German naval leaders; and, interestingly, the Soviets had reservations on the charges of conspiracy and aggressive warfare.

Another question may be asked: What is important about Smith's analysis? Through the use of new sources, Smith is able to show a remarkable divergence between the Allied nations' judicial and prosecution teams. He also says that none of the judges, not even the Soviets, followed rigid instructions from their governments and that personal animosity existed between judges and the prosecution. Also recorded is the reaction of the judges to Jackson's decision to overwhelm the court with documentary evidence. In Smith's estimate, that did much to dehumanize the court, and it (but not the prosecution) did recognize the plight of the defense lawyers, who were treated no better than second-class citizens.

Most important is the vivid exposition of each individual verdict. Smith is clearly amazed that the fate of 13 defendants could be determined in two days. Although their end is well known, the book succeeds in bringing out the personal views of each of the judges. The forcefulness of these samples may whet the reader's appetite. For instance, French judge Donnedieu de Vabres characterized Goering simply as a "high-class brigand" (p.177) and voted for his death by hanging. Some defendants caused intense debate on the method of death--hanging or the firing squad. In the opinion of American Judge John J. Parker, Wilhelm Frick, the former Nazi Minister of Interior, merited mercy simply because "he was really but a bureaucrat." (p. 99) Julius Streicher was convicted for his looks: " . . he still appeared to be a dirty old man-'the sort,' . . - 'who gives trouble in parks.'" (p. 200) Streicher was ghoulishly portrayed "as the cheerleader for a team of exterminators." (p.202) On Albert Speer and Fritz Sauckel, Smith caustically points out: "If Armaments Minister Speer gave the labor quotas to Sauckel, and Sauckel then seized the laborers, can Sauckel be any more guilty than Speer?" (p. 209) Sauckel went to the gallows, while Speer went to jail for 20 years. Both the Americans and the Soviets agreed on the execution of Speer; however, the British and French forced a compromise. Last, Smith writes with great insight into the most difficult sentencing of Doenitz and the acquittals of Schacht, von Papen, and Fritzschc. On Doenitz, the Amercian judges squarely favored acquittal but were foiled through the perversity of the British judge who held out for a severe sentence. This situation brought forth a penetrating comment from the Soviet judge that a "most severe sentence must be accorded to the least guilty." (p. 262) These brief glimpses show Smith's grasp of each of the judges' views, the importance of chance, and the value of compromise at Nuremberg.

Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg is ideal for observing the value of the trial and its limitations. It shows that judges could not "transcend the views of their own time." (p. 304) Yet it also concludes that both the immensity of total defeat and Nuremberg made another stab in the back legend impossible.

Both Irving and Smith, however divergent their views, make a significant contribution to the understanding of Hitler and his legacy.

Major Michael D. Krause, USA, (Ph.D., Georgetown University) is a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He served most recently with the 7^th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, California, while the Division was in its formative stage. He has taught modern European and German history at the U.S. Military Academy and has also lectured on the organization of the German General Staff at the U.S. Army War College. Major Krause is the author of a textbook on the European military theorists and thinkers from 1870 to 1914.

 Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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