Air University Review, May-June 1978
Major Robert W. Chandler
| A specter is haunting Europe: not the specter of Communism evoked in these famous words by Karl Marx in 1848, but the specter of Soviet hegemony. That specter arises from the steady expansion of the military power of the Soviet state. But is remains contingent upon the faltering of American purpose, as America, wounded by the internal travail and external setbacks of the last decade, becomes preoccupied with its internal problems and internal divisions. |
|
James R. Schlesinger |
With this poignant reflection, the former Secretary of Defense asks whether the United States will muster the necessary political resolve and moral stamina to meet and overcome severe challenges to its vital interests in the coming decade. Dr. Schlesinger's observation also presupposes three long-standing postulates of American foreign policy: (1) a free, independent, non-Communist Western Europe is a vital interest of the United States, (2) Soviet military power threatens West European independence, and (3) American action is required to help counterbalance Moscow's armed might. This article reconsiders these fundamental assumptions: to re-examine the U.S. national interest in Europe, to reassess the the need for European-based American forces, and to speculate what action the U.S. might contemplate to bolster West European resistance against Soviet domination.
Most commentators today, when describing NATO and evaluating its prospects, liberally sprinkle their observations with such words as "fragmentation," "disarray," "disintegration," "drift," and similar characterizations. Some analyze the obvious numerical military imbalance that favors the Soviet Union in northern and central Europe and offer an endless stream of new ideas for shifts in NATO strategy, tactical dispersion of its forces, logistical redeployment, standardization of armaments, and similar prescriptions. Others foresee a weakening of American political resolve that will result in eventual dissolution of NATO and an accommodation of West European foreign policies to Moscow's superior power--a "Finlandization" of Western Europe. Finally, a few worry about the issue, wring their hands, and spin out dire prophecies of a nuclear Armageddon that will devastate Europe, the United States, and the U.S.S.R.
Perhaps the greatest problem is that NATO has been overstudied, overtheorized, and oversensitized by too many observers for too long on both sides of the Atlantic. No one can deny that over the years definite political realignments have occurred within the alliance to accommodate the divergent national interests and capabilities of its fifteen sovereign, independent member states. Nor can one ignore the fact that NATO is beset by a host of bewildering problems, both from the outside and from within. The emergence of "rough equivalence" in the strategic nuclear balance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., for example, has had a tremendous impact on the Atlantic partnership, especially in light of the burgeoning Soviet-Warsaw Pact offensive military power in Eastern Europe. Internally, several corrosive factors are eating away at NATO's politico--military bonds as each member pursues its own national interests-sometimes in harmony, sometimes in conflict with its alliance partners.
Indeed, when taken together on a single perspective, these external and internal disintegrative influences do conjure a pernicious picture of a disjointed NATO in political disarray. But such a representation ignores the realities of why NATO was formed in the first place and what continues to hold it together.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a political alliance with a military purpose. It has never been immutable; changes in its form and functions largely have flowed from a continuous metamorphosis of political relationships among its member allies.
At the outset of the Cold War, the war-weary peoples of Western Europe were deeply concerned about the Red Army poised along their borders. It seemed only natural at the time that the West Europeans and the North Americans should join in a tightly knit alliance to neutralize the military threat posed by the East. Since those early crisis years the loosening of NATO's inner links has evolved gradually as a natural by-product of the changing international environment-from the "tight bipolar" days of the 1950s to the more diverse "bipolycentrism" of the '60s and '70s. Additionally, as the nation-states of NATO Europe recovered economically and regained political stability, their competence and self-confidence to prosecute their individual national objectives were enhanced--the common ties binding the allies slackened accordingly
In recent years, the spirit of détente has made possible greater East-West trade and travel, political and arms control agreements, and a more relaxed international atmosphere that have contributed to benign perceptions of Soviet intentions. Yet, it is an irony of our day that while the West Europeans feel more secure than ever before, Moscow has increased its margin of physical military superiority over NATO to an unprecedented level. Apparently the Kremlin leadership has discovered something that we have known all along--democratic peoples have little stomach for costly defense expenditures in the absence of a clearly perceived, imminent threat. Indeed, despite some encouraging signs over the past year, NATO allies on both sides of the Atlantic still appear unwilling to support the spending necessary to offset the growing disparity in NATO-Warsaw Pact capacities, especially in the critical areas of northern and central Europe.
Another major influence affecting alliance cohesion is the increasing importance of NATO's nonnuclear forces. "While conventional forces must be linked to nuclear forces in order to represent an effective deterrent," U.S. Senator Sam Nunn explains, "now that the USSR has achieved strategic nuclear parity with the U.S., Warsaw Pact conventional superiority in Europe can be very dangerous."2 This is what the NATO-Warsaw Pact arms control negotiations in Vienna are all about--trying to find a way to preserve political stability in central Europe by establishing a verifiable balance of military power at lower levels on both sides (the Western view). It is toward these ends that the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks have been conducted for more than four years. Despite substantial proposals by the NATO allies, progress toward achieving an equitable agreement has been largely disappointing.3
The signing of the Final Act to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe by 33 European countries (all except Albania), Canada, and the United States in 1975 was a major politico-psychological event that contributed to Western images of nonhostile Soviet intent. As London's International Institute for Strategic Studies put it, "exactly what the event symbolized was uncertain." But many in the West have the opinion that the Final Act is a surrogate peace treaty that formally ends World War II. In effect, it sanctifies and gives Western de jure recognition to the Kremlin's nailing down of Eastern Europe.4
Internal erosive factors also have taken their toll on alliance cohesiveness. France, after a decade of absence, still remains outside the military organs of NATO. Greece, too, continues an outsider despite American urgings since the 1974 Cyprus crisis. Turkey similarly has maintained its pique with the United States and NATO in the wake of the Cyprus crisis and remains part in, part out of the military side of the alliance (the chances of Greek-Turkish conflict over the exploration and exploitation of possible oil reserves in disputed areas of the Aegean Sea remain, but mediation by other NATO countries so far has helped prevent military clashes). Portugal, after a two-year respite while it wrestled some tough domestic issues, is now on a road leading toward full reintegration with NATO. The question of Communist participation at the highest levels of the Italian government is an abiding source of great concern and consternation among the NATO allies. Spain, in spite of its obvious strategic importance, still lies on the periphery of the alliance. The British-Icelandic "cod war" that has been going on and off for more than five years is in temporary recess with some hope the dispute may have been resolved (British trawlers repeatedly violated unilateral Icelandic fishing restrictions within two hundred miles of its coast; when the latter tried to enforce its declaration with gunboats, London responded by dispatching Royal Navy frigates, and shots, rammings, and a variety of ugly incidents soon followed). Finally, the U.S. Congress periodically has considered substantial troop reductions in Europe, and both Republican and Democratic Party platforms in 1976 called for a reappraisal of the American military footing in NATO, heightening European anxieties of Washington's long-term commitment.5
The irony of these variegated influences is that while they give the impression of disarray and fragmentation they are actually indications of political vitality and solidarity. Recent events have shown that the Atlantic partnership, without impairing its fundamental sense of direction and purpose, can tolerate a certain degree of diversity and conflicting national interests among its members. Some observers may bemoan NATO's seemingly tepid response to the many conflicts and crises involving alliance partners, but its lack of direct action in the affairs of its members reveals an important political strength. Whether by chance or design, its overt hands-off policy in dealing with events in Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Italy, Britain, Iceland, and indeed, the United States during the Vietnam War demonstrates a high degree of political sophistication and flexibility.
In sum, NATO appears fragmented only in comparison to the strong bonds that welded a collage of weak European and powerful North American states together in the early 1950s. The looser NATO of the mid- 1970s reflects today's political realities between the NATO allies and their place in the international milieu. A few persons might judge the Atlantic partnership an anachronism--a vestige of the Cold War--but the fact is that the very common menace that brought them together in 1949 continues to provide much of its raison d'être.
Since the earliest days of the Cold War, a vital national security interest of the United States has been to prevent Soviet hegemony over Western Europe. To this end, the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine in 1947 were designed in part to serve notice on Moscow of continued American concern and involvement in European affairs. When in 1949 the United States entered NATO in the wake of the Berlin blockade and the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia, the Kremlin was confronted by a tangible demonstration of American political determination to defend Western Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to interweave and unite the national securities and destinies of Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Italy, Portugal, and Canada and the United States (Greece and Turkey were added in 1952; West Germany joined in 1955). Each nation promises in Article 5 "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."
From the outset, American troops were an integral part of the allied defensive component. Numbering about 100,000 soldiers in 1950, U.S. forces were increased to more than 400,000 by 1952, when many believed that the Communist attack in Korea was a diversionary effort in prelude to an imminent Soviet thrust into Western Europe. American strength peaked in 1961 at about 463,000 during the Berlin crisis, followed by a gradual downward turn in the 1960s that lowered the number to today's figure of about 300,000 troops.
In recent years, both public and congressional concern have been expressed over the cost of maintaining these forces. Many have asked, for example, "why 200 million rich Americans should maintain around 300,000 American troops in Europe-thirty years after the end of World War II... to defend 250 or 300 million almost equally rich Europeans."6 Indeed, if one considers the issue from such a rhetorically loaded perspective, large-scale reductions may appear warranted. When contemplated from a more rational point of view, however, one finds that many of the arguments advocating substantial troop cuts are impressionistic and based on faulty notions of the purpose and role of the American armed forces.
In the first place, it should be evident that the forward basing of U.S. power today has nothing to do with World War II. American troops were dispatched to NATO Europe during the early 1950s to protect vital U.S. national security interests--to deter a European war that would have inevitably involved the United States--they continue to perform that crucial defensive function today. American forces are not and never have been based in Europe solely for the sake of European security. They remain in Europe because the threat from the East that brought them there has not diminished. On the contrary, a sound argument can be made that Soviet-Warsaw Pact military capabilities have increased dramatically in recent years, despite détente and the Kremlin's declared policy of peaceful coexistence.
Nor should there be any doubt that the securities and destinies of North America and Western Europe are inexorably linked. Americans have deep historical, cultural, economic, and political ties with Europe. A majority of Americans are of European descent; Americans and Europeans share similar cultural values, a common Christian-Judeo background, and similar political philosophies that embrace democracy and respect for freedom of the human spirit. Economically, American-European trade amounts to more than $30 billion annually, and American capital investment in Europe is more than $30 billion. In addition, Western Europe, as a whole, has the greatest concentration of skilled manpower and economic productivity outside the U.S. and U.S.S.R.7
In short, "the NATO alliance is a manifestation of the interdependence of U.S. and Western European security," former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld reminds us. "We should not lose sight of the fact that NATO protects the United States as well as Western Europe."8 To be sure, a free, independent, non-Communist Western Europe is an American concern-a vital national interest in 1978 just as it was in 1949. Without a direct United States participation and forward deployment that is respected by the Kremlin and trusted by our allies, the medium-sized powers of NATO Europe would be unable, both politically and militarily, to stand up to the Soviet armed colossus positioned along their borders. "The United States today still represents the only potential counterweight to the military and political power of the Soviet Union," writes James R. Schlesinger. "There is no one else waiting in the wings. There will be no deus ex machina. That the United States alone has the power to serve as a counterweight to the Soviet Union continues to be an ineluctable fact--just as it has in the entire period since 1945."9 Forward-based conventional and nuclear forces still support the vital U.S. national interests-they also provide much of the backbone and politico-military cohesiveness that make NATO work.
A primary NATO objective has always been to deter aggression by the Soviet Union. Through most of the 1950s, when the United States enjoyed a preponderance of strategic nuclear power, alliance strategy was based on a tripwire concept. In event of an attack against Western Europe, the presence of American ground and air power was to serve as a "trigger," unleashing a devastating massive retaliation by U.S. strategic nuclear forces against the Soviet homeland. This overwhelming reliance on the American strategic arsenal to deter war in Europe precluded the necessity for a strict conventional balance with Soviet armed might in Eastern Europe. But during the mid-1950s, when the U.S.S.R. began developing a substantial strategic force capable of striking the United States, NATO doctrine was modified to deal with the new superpower relationship.
Initially, the Americans countered the Soviet developments by deploying a potent arsenal of "theater nuclear weapons."10 Alliance doctrine at the time envisioned a simultaneous use of theater nuclear forces in Europe and a strategic nuclear massive retaliation against the U.S.S.R. By the early 1960s, the enormity of potential collateral destruction and civilian casualties in the NATO Europe countries began to penetrate the American consciousness (a notion probably shared by most Europeans for several years). Accordingly1 the United States shifted its emphasis by advocating improved nonnuclear (conventional) capabilities to reduce the chances of nuclear conflict. Simultaneously, Washington promoted a doctrine of flexible response to cope with the realities of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic relationship.11
First endorsed by the United States in 1962 but not formally adopted by NATO until 1967, flexible response places a premium on nonnuclear strength to deter and, if necessary, contain the Warsaw Pact. The strategy includes war-fighting capabilities to meet any level of conventional or nuclear attack as far forward to the East-West political frontier as possible. Flexible response provides a variety of credible options (including graduated nuclear escalation) that raise the potential risk confronted by the Soviet Union.
NATO's nuclear inventory consists of some 7000 warheads designed for delivery by tactical aircraft, artillery, and short-range ballistic missiles. Some weapons would be delivered by European allies, but they are held in American custody until authorized for use by the U.S. President. Theater nuclear weapons play a crucial role in the flexible response strategy: (1) they deter nonnuclear aggression because of their potential, if NATO's conventional defense fails, to slow or halt a Communist advance; (2) they deter first use of nuclear weapons by the Warsaw Pact; (3) they influence the nonnuclear tactics that might be employed (e.g., they dissuade the massing of conventional arms that would be necessary for an effective attack against the West--massed ground forces make very lucrative nuclear targets); and (4) they provide an escalatory link with the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent.12
Although American bombers and intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles are the most important elements in the alliance military posture, extensive use of these weapons (and, therefore, their deterrent value) is probably least tenable in a conflict geographically constrained to Europe--in the eyes of American Allies and the Kremlin, too, massive retaliation against the Soviet Union is probably considered the least likely planned NATO reaction. But such a response might be deemed possible when one considers the overall military capacity of the Atlantic alliance as a single integrated escalatory chain, extending from conventional to theater nuclear to strategic nuclear warfare. It is from this potential escalatory chain of events that NATO draws its deterrence strength. No one can guarantee, for example, that even a small-scale Soviet-Warsaw Pact conventional foray would not escalate to a nuclear exchange between the superpowers, especially if NATO could not contain the Pact by nonnuclear means. As one eminent British officer, Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, observes, "the present NATO deterrent strategy is a nuclear one, but it has the flexibility afforded by a substantial level of conventional defence; and if this conventional strength should be eroded the strategy would become dangerous, heavily reliant on nuclear weapons, a mere trip-wire." 13 Thus, during an era of U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic nuclear parity, the conventional balance has taken on an added importance. Not only do NATO's nonnuclear capabilities signal a strong West European resolve to protect their political independence but they also provide a vital link with the theater and strategic nuclear forces of the United States--not as a "trip-wire" but as a part of the continuum of allied escalatory options extending across the spectrum of warfare. An erosion of NATO conventional strength vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, therefore, would be tantamount to lowering the nuclear threshold by making the use of theater weapons more likely and also increasing the possibilities of a strategic nuclear exchange. White Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger put NATO's military requirements into a realistic perspective when he noted that "if our high hopes for peace are to have solid foundations, and if we are to conduct our political and economic relationship in the world with an ample measure of confidence in our security posture, then NATO countries must continue to maintain a military capability in balance with that of the Warsaw Pact."14
To be sure, the NATO-Warsaw Pact equilibrium is acutely sensitive to major changes by either side, especially in northern and central Europe. In these arenas one finds major armed force asymmetries that favor the East. (See Table I.)
An incisive study prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress in January 1976 forewarns that when Moscow's forces located in European Russia are taken into consideration,
the Soviet side could quickly achieve the classic ratio of 3:1 superiority in ground combat forces that many military men cite as a prerequisite for successful offensive operations. More importantly. the Kremlin could mass massive power at times, places, and under conditions of its choosing, while NATO defends a front that stretches 500 straightline miles from the Baltic to the Austrian border,15
Nonetheless, despite the East's obvious numerical superiority, many observers tend to agree that the NATO-Pact capabilities are roughly balanced. This is so because of NATO's qualitative edge in ground and air forces, the technological superiority of its destructive capacities, plus certain deficiencies inherent to the Warsaw Pact armed forces. The upshot of the situation in northern and central Europe today is that "neither could attack the other with confidence of quick victory without escalation to nuclear war." And, writes Ray S. Cline in his recent geopolitical study for Georgetown University, "the tactical nuclear weapons on both sides are numerous enough so that only a truly crushing superiority in conventional arms would deny their effective use."16 Clearly, neither side has such a military preponderance nor is it likely such a disparity will develop so long as the West remains alert to the needs for both conventional and nuclear equivalence.
Table I. The military balance, northern and Central Europe
|
NATO* |
Warsaw Pact |
(of which |
|
| combat manpower (all types of formations) |
630,000 | 945,000 | 640,000 |
| main battle tanks | 7,000 | 20,500 | 13,500 |
| tactical aircraft | 2,350 | 4,075 |
2,300 |
| conventional artillery | 2,700 | 10,000+ | ? |
| theater nuclear weapons | 7,000 | 3,500 |
3,500 |
| medium/intermediate range ballistic missiles |
0 |
583 | 583** |
*French forces not included
**(1976 Library of Congress estimate)
Source: The Military Balance,1977-1978 (London International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977). pp. 102-10.
While the probability of Soviet military intervention in Western Europe may not be perceived as great as it once was, it should at least be recognized that the overall numerical advantage in armed might favoring the Warsaw Pact gives it a substantial potential for aggressive mischief. This superiority could also indicate a greater Soviet risk-taking propensity in the future. To be certain, unless an adequate military equilibrium is maintained, political intimidation of NATO Europe through threat of force could become a real part of the near-term European scene.
Or are Americans and their NATO allies foolish enough to believe that the Kremlin no longer covets influence in West European affairs? Although the warm waft of détente flowing from Moscow tells the West of peaceful intentions, certainly the long-standing Soviet goals regarding Western Europe remain unchanged: eviction of the American military presence, a breakup of NATO without a viable nuclear-armed European defense community taking its place, and ultimately a total domination over West European political, economic, and military affairs. To be reminded why American forces are in Europe today, one only has to review the recent Soviet actions in basing its variable-geometry Backfire nuclear bomber in northwestern Russia. Similarly, Moscow has supplemented its European-targeted ballistic missile force with new mobile launchers that are armed with multiple warheads.17 Are these defensive measures? Do they foster peace and stability? Are they consistent with détente? Or are they another incremental step in Moscow's attempt to overwhelm the West's political and psychological resistance to the "specter of Soviet hegemony haunting Europe?" In a study for the Stanford Research Institute, Richard Pipes of Harvard University summarized the Kremlin's grand strategy:
It seems probable that the long-term objective of Soviet foreign policy is to detach Western Europe from its dependence on the United States, especially where defense is concerned …It is difficult to conceive of any event that would more dramatically enhance Soviet power. . . . Russian military power resting on a West European economic base would give the USSR indisputable world hegemony--the sort of thing that Hitler was dreaming of.... However, the separation of Western Europe from the United States must not be hurried. The Soviet leadership has taken a measure of U.S. politics and knows (whatever its propagandists may say) that it faces no danger from that side, . . . The U.S. forces in Western Europe present no offensive threat to the Soviet Union. Their ultimate removal is essential if the USSR is to control Western Europe, but their purely defensive character does not seriously inhibit Russia's freedom to maneuver. What the Soviet fears more is a German-French-English military alliance that might spring into existence should U.S. troops withdraw precipitately from Western Europe.18
The problem for NATO is to fashion a force composition that will ensure a balance of power and continued East-West stability. But, as Thomas W. Wolfe of the Rand Corporation observes, with the advent of U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic nuclear equivalence and the possibility of Moscow achieving a measure of superiority, "the theatre balance in Europe can be expected to grow increasingly precarious." 19 Observers on both sides of the Atlantic contend that the existence of parity in effect "decouples" the American strategic arsenal from the defense of Europe--the time-worn question of whether an American president would risk the destruction of New York for Paris. Recent changes in the U.S. nuclear targeting doctrine, however, have buttressed the credibility of this critical link in the deterrence process. Greater flexibility and an increased number of nuclear options by strategic forces have been made possible by the new policy. In effect, these revised targeting procedures at least partially "recouple" U.S. bombers and missiles to the defense of Western Europe and improve NATO's deterrence posture across the board.20
Nonetheless, John Erickson of the University of Edinburgh is pessimistic about NATO's chances of maintaining adequate equality and stability. He notes that the Soviet "buildup in Europe is now an accomplished fact," and that it has given the Kremlin an instrument to secure limited political objectives by "simply having" a highly visible military force that is "now well past purely defensive requirements." Professor Erickson's final note sounds an ominous warning for the NATO peoples:
This all comes back to Sotzhcnitsyn's point that the Soviet leadership may place an undue and obsessive reliance on military force, on its form and function, but then Western Europe has increasingly chosen to ignore the military factor. Between them these two postures have contributed to what can only be counted a growing imbalance. In the final outcome, Europe may well become that "low risk option" that will suit the Soviet command perfectly.21
It seems evident that North Americans and West Europeans continue to embrace complementary national security interests that should coalesce in a strong NATO deterrence posture, lessening the possibility of Soviet intervention becoming a "low risk option." But this means that an adequate conventional-nuclear equilibrium must be maintained in northern, central, and southern Europe. It is open to question whether in the future the Allies will deploy sufficient armed forces to neutralize the political effectiveness of Warsaw Pact military capabilities. Ultimately, the answer will concern the political cohesiveness of NATO as much (and perhaps more so) as military hardware, for deterrence is the product of military capacity and political will. One must recognize, too, that Americans bear a special responsibility for NATO's deterrence because it is from the United States that the alliance draws nuclear strength and much of its political determination.
"A goal of the highest priority for this administration is to ensure stability in the vital European region," Secretary of Defense Harold Brown explains. "The United States will do its share to ensure that NATO has the capabilities-conventional as well as nuclear-to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of Western Europe."22 Accordingly, in May 1977, the NATO allies responded favorably to President Carter's call for increasing their respective defense expenditures by approximately three percent annually in real terms. In addition, several short-term improvements to assuage NATO vulnerabilities have been undertaken, a long-term
NATO defense program aimed at ensuring greater coordination of national efforts has been instituted, and steps have been taken toward improving cooperation in development, production, and procurement of standardized NATO military equipment.23
While these recent improvements in allied consultation are encouraging, they must still contend with differing European and American attitudes on the appropriate role and levels of NATO forces. For instance, while Americans advocate strong conventional war-fighting might to keep the nuclear threshold high, the West Europeans. as a whole, have been dragging their feet on matching the nonnuclear capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. For their part, the Europeans tend to regard a buildup of their own conventional strength as allowing greater numbers of Americans to go home, thereby weakening deterrence by reducing the visible or tangible U.S. political commitment to the defense of Europe-a debilitation of the conventional-theater nuclear-strategic nuclear escalatory chain. Indeed. the Europeans consider the theater nuclear weapons a critical link by which the American strategic arsenal is coupled to NATO. French journalist Pierre Hassner explains:
There is a wide consensus among Europeans on the notion that the risk of escalation is today the central element of deterrence in Europe as opposed to either conventional response or massive retaliation; that it has greater credibility than either; and that it is less sensitive to differences in strength. The basis of deterrence is less the credibility of a deliberate decision than the unpredictability of a process; the substitute for American strategic superiority . . . is continuity between the two American-led systems of deterrence.24
In view of the critical importance given to American conventional and nuclear force postures by the NATO allies, it should not be surprising that they are acutely sensitive to discussions and actions in Washington that might indicate a substantial reduction of these forces. Thus, when Americans try to answer the question "How much is enough?" in setting appropriate force levels in Europe, their calculations should include not only an assessment of deterrence and war-fighting capabilities vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R.-Warsaw Pact but also an evaluation of the most likely political impact on NATO's cohesiveness. Better yet, American-European consultations might best determine "how much is enough" by including the differing views from both sides of the Atlantic. Once this question is jointly answered, the next ones can be tackled: "Who pays, and how much?"
The answers to these important questions will be determined politically by the fifteen sovereign member states as each pursues its own national interests in its own way. One may be certain that although misunderstandings and differences of opinion may sometimes mar their relations, the NATO allies will remain partners in the crucial area of common defense so long as deterrence of Moscow remains a paramount concern to them all. Without the substantial counterweight provided by the United States against the material and manpower resources of the U.S.S.R., the West Europeans would have only two alternatives: arm themselves with nuclear weapons to deter Moscow and ensure a modicum of independence or accommodate their foreign policies to the superior power of the Soviet Union, i.e., accede to "Finlandization." Americans should remember, too, as Ray S. Cline points out, Western Europe potentially could become "the most powerful regional center in the world if its resources were successfully mobilized for a common political purpose."25 This latent capability alone seems reason enough for the United States to take whatever actions that might be necessary to deny Soviet hegemony over Western Europe--not to mention. the American moral commitment to foster democracy and human rights abroad and the nation's long-standing promise to support NATO Europe militarily and politically against Soviet intimidation.
A specter 25 haunting Europe.
But it is the specter of Finlandization resulting from political dissolution of NATO--a disintegration that can be made possible only by an American denial of sufficient armed forces to counterbalance Soviet power. It is in this context that Americans must realize that NATO's cohesion and Europe's future ultimately are in their hands-and that Europe's destiny is tied to their own.Manassas, Virginia
Notes
1. James R. Schlesinger, "A Testing Time for America," Fortune, February 1976, p. 75.
2. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Policy, Troops, and the NATO Alliance: Report of Senator Sam Nunn, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 6 See also Leon Sloss, NATO Reform: Prospects and Priorities, Washington Papers No. 3-30 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 2.
3. Strategic Survey 1975 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), p.110. See also Christoph Bertram, Mutual Force Reductions in Europe: The Political Aspects, Adelphi Paper No. 84 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972).
4. Strategic Survey 1975, p. 57.
5. U.S. Congress, Senate, hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Forces in Europe, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973. See also Phil Williams, "Whatever happened to the Mansfield Amendment?" Survival, July/August 1976, pp. 146-53.
6. William Watts and Lloyd A. Free, State of the Nation (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1974), p. 240.
7. U.S., Congress, Senate, U.S. Forces in Europe, statements by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, pp. 58-115, and Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1975).
8. U.S., Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress, Annual DOD Report FY 77, 1976, p. 8.
9. Schlesinger, "A Testing time for America." pp. 76-77.
10. Although "tactical nuclear weapons" is standards lexicon for many journalists and commentators on NATO affairs, the term is used imprecisely to describe U.S. "theater nuclear weapons." As Britain’s Brigadier Kenneth Hunt (Retired) observes, "there is … no satisfactory definition of a tactical nuclear weapon, since 'tactical' refers to the use and not the nature of the system—it would doubtless be considered strategic by whomever it fell on!" See Kenneth Hunt, The Alliance and Europe: Part II: Defence with Fewer Men, Adelphi Paper No. 98 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 2.
11. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, "Report to Congress on the Theater Nuclear force Posture in Europe" (April 4, 1974, as quoted by "Documentation," Survival, September/October 1975, pp. 235-41, and Wolfgang Heisenberg, The Alliance and Europe: Part I: Crisis Stability in Europe and Theatre Nuclear Weapons, Adelphi Paper No. 96 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p.4.
12. Recently, the United States has begun to modernize some of its nuclear weapons stockpiled in Europe. The increased accuracy and lesser power of these new weapons may result I an overall reduction in number of forward deployed weapons without a cut in military capabilities. See "Fewer. Better Arms Is Goal Rumsfeld Assures NATO," Chicago Tribune, June 16, 1976, p.14.
13. Hunt, Defence with Fewer Men, p. 2. See also General Andrew Goodpaster, U.S. Army (Retired), "NATO Strategy and Requirements 1975-1985," Survival, September/October 1975, p. 213.
14. James R. Schlesinger, "NATO’s Constant Need—Improvement," International Herald Tribune, June 3, 1974, p. 6.
15. U.S, Congress, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, United States/Soviet Military Balance: A Frame of Reference for Congress, by John M. Collins and John Steven Chwat, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 9.
16. Cline, p. 85.
17. "U.S. Says Russians Are Arming More Missiles with MIRV’s," New York Times, July 30, 1976, p. 6.
18. Richard Pipes, editor, "Détente: Moscow’s View," Soviet Strategy in Europe (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976), p. 23.
19. Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Military Capabilities and Intentions is Europe, " Soviet Strategy in Europe, Richard Pipes, editor, p. 156.
20.Andrew J. Pierre. "Can Europe’s Security Be 'Decoupled' from America?" Foreign Affairs, July 1973, p. 774. See also Lynn Etheridge Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine, Adelphi Paper No. 121 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976).
21. John Erickson, "Soviet Military Posture and Policy in Europe," Soviet Strategy in Europe, Richard Pipes, editor, p. 207.
22. U.S. Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress, Annual DOD Report FY 79, 1978, pp. 23, 6.
23. Ibid., pp. 3-4. See also U.S., Department of the Air Force, "The Dynamic Future of NATO," Commanders Digest, October 6, 1977.
24. Pierre Hassner, Europe in the Age of Negotiation, Washington Papers No. 1-8 (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 36.
25. Cline, p. 91.
Contributor
Major Robert W. Chandler
(Ph.D., George Washington University) is a planning and programming officer at Hq USAF, Assistant Director for Strategy Development and Analysis, Directorate of Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans an Operations. He has also served in the international politico-military affairs, intelligence, and transportation areas. Major Chandler has been a political science instructor with the University of Maryland (European Division) and the University of Nebraska at Omaha. He is a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Major Chandler is a graduate of the Defense Intelligence School and Armed Forces Staff College.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor