Air University Review, March-April 1978

Dissent

the neglected factor in decision-making

How many times have you nodded assent during a meeting or as you coordinated on a paper, even when you did not totally agree? At the same time you may have recognized that implementation of the decision in its present form would not be feasible, and if put into action would lead to adverse and far reaching consequences.

Today’s leaders face rapid and continual change in a highly competitive environment. Change has become commonplace. To compete successfully--even to survive--leaders must adapt to these conditions by managing change. Thus, leaders must make timely and correct decisions to rectify deficiencies caused by changed circumstances.

Much has been written concerning the importance of systematic approaches to executive decision-making. We have been taught, using various steps and terms, that we should identify the problem, consider alternatives, choose the best alternative, and implement the decision. Analytical and behavioral decision techniques continue to be advanced in various publications and courses. Are we, as a result, becoming increasingly successful leaders and managers? Is our greater knowledge of the decision process producing better results? I doubt it. George Odiorne supports this in his examination of the "activity trap," when he asks why things are going awry. New ideas should be improving the system, but their unintended side effects are in reality killing us.¹

If you agree with these generalizations at least in part, then you agree that a fresh effort must be made to improve our decisions. We need to better understand why decisions are made as they are.

Typically, we Americans are anxious to find the trouble and fix it as quickly as we can. We learn early that successful leaders should attack problems quickly and decisively, that decisiveness and confidence are desirable traits-key indicators of the effective leader. This is especially true in the military, where "battle-field" decisions are considered the ultimate test.

However, we seem to do a poorer job of anticipating change than of reacting to it. We spend relatively little time considering the consequences of our solutions--consequences that often are worse than the original problem. This is where our decision process seems to be the weakest--in failing to evaluate the consequences of important decisions prior to implementation. In short, it is not enough to be change-oriented, we must be consequence-oriented as well.

A simple example might be of value here. However, such examples seem unnecessary when we consider the far-reaching consequences of our recent Vietnam and Watergate experiences. Decisions concerning "guns and butter," incursions into Cambodia, and "break-ins" will continue to affect and constrain our decisions, actions, and capabilities far into the future. Decisions by a limited few (concerning what seemed to be the central problem at hand) are causing us presently to spend considerable time repairing the unfavorable consequences of earlier incomplete judgments. Inflation, the War Powers Act, and loss of confidence in the basic integrity of government officials combine to reduce our effectiveness.

Look about you. Have our people and organizations profited from the lessons learned from Vietnam and Watergate? Open dissent concerning those important decisions was not visible; it was more important at the time to be a good team player To some this indictment may seem too harsh--to be judging after the fact. They may be true, but the significant point is that we do not seem to have made a conscious effort to apply the lessons learned. We tend to think of those problems as being behind us, but the basic cause still exists

Where are the Billy Mitchells of today? Is it coincidental that questioning our own military doctrine and strategies has been at tow ebb since we began increasing emphasis on institutionalizing our decision processes? Increased standardization of rules and regulations and greater centralization in making those rules have removed many of the prerogatives of decision-making from leaden at lower levels. If new and conflicting ideas do not enter our decision deliberations, we should consider the cause rather than continue to mourn the consequences. That cause is at least partially due to the climate we create within our organization,

What are the alternatives? It appears much easier and the time better spent in questioning debating, and dissenting before making a decision rather than trying to salvage flu results of a bad decision at a later date. To adopt such a methodology means that one must consider change on a wider scale than just problem solving. If executives are to be effective in the long run, they must evaluate alternatives not only in terms of the solution of an immediate problem but also in terms of the long-run implications of that solution. Peter Drucker points out that

… effective executives do not make a great many decisions. They concentrate on the important ones. They try to think through what is strategic and generic, rather than "solve problems." They try to make the few important decisions on the highest level of conceptual understanding. They are not overly impressed by speed in decision making; instead, they know what the decision is all about--what the underlying realities are which the decision has to satisfy. They want impact rather than technique; they want to he sound rather than clever.²

A competitive and changing environment fosters a certain degree of risk and uncertainty for all leaders; decision-makers are essentially risk takers. It is seldom possible to gather all the information concerning a problem. Not only is it prohibitive from a time or cost standpoint but sometimes misleading. Facts are concerned with what has already happened; decisions are concerned with the future.

Ford's Edsel is a case in point. Considerable data were collected concerning the kind of automobile the American consumer preferred, but it was misleading because it did not identify changing attitudes. If yesterday's information were appropriate for tomorrow, there would be no need for decisions. Instead, we must draw on the opinions of others and try to learn which facts will still be relevant, and that means taking risks concerning what the "future will be like. This requires a careful weighing of risks--do the benefits outweigh "-the costs?

The easiest way to avoid risk and uncertainty to deal with the present rather than the future, to concentrate on immediate problems rather than far-reaching strategies. No wonder so many organizations consist of people who are continually putting out fires, staying busy (but comfortable) in their "activity trap." Our decision methodology actually encourages such activity

In the military, we are taught the staff study method, a very systematic and formal decision process. Its limitation, however, is that it considers problems, not objectives. Each action officer attempts to restrict his problem as much as possible so as to sell his solution with the least possible opposition. "Completed staff work" implies that the various alternatives have already been questioned and argued. Actually, constructive debate about alternatives seldom takes place. Instead, the positive aspects of the preferred solution are emphasized. Staff members normally have vested interests in the outcome--increased power, prestige, and reward for being a problem solver are powerful incentives. The pressure to be a positive team member is very strong, and the role of the devil's advocate is considered to be a hindrance to action.

Such an environment produces decisions that appear optimal on the surface, decisions that indicate consensus among the key people. But a similar consensus on the adverse effects of the decision frequently does not exist. Questioning and dissent on how the decision will affect the overall organization are typically not encouraged. As a result, the department that has the action is usually the only one interested in the implementation of the decision.

The Japanese method of decision-making takes a very different tack. Policy changes are debated throughout the organization until agreement is reached. The emphasis is on defining the question and transmitting information. When the decision is finally made, there is more ready acceptance, and implementation proceeds smoothly,³

The American method jumps to the decision much more quickly, We tend to want to overcome obstacles and motivate people to get the job done successfully.

The difference between the (we approaches is that the Japanese spend their time involving people in the decision process while we Americans spend our time trying to implement the decision. The most significant contrast is the point in time during Which leaders attempt to challenge the behavior of people so that new procedures will be followed in more purposeful and productive ways.

The Japanese way is understandably cumbersome and inefficient if it is applied to minor decisions or to decisions that must be made quickly. We need to understand that different situations call for different leadership styles, ranging from autocratic to participative Therefore, dissent and questioning are not always appropriate. However, the greatest value of dissent and questioning is found in higher-level policy decisions where adverse consequences would be disastrous and especially when effective implementation requires acceptance by subordinates.

Innovation has become a way of life in an environment where doing "more with less" is not only in vogue but necessary for survival. To encourage innovation, organizations frequently create ad hoc groups to study and recommend new and fresh ways of doing things-of keeping up with change. The military is no exception. Ad hoc groups are less constrained by established procedures and freer to cut across bureaucratic lines. But even those decisions made in this innovative atmosphere must be implemented within the established hierarchy. Since the implementers of the decision were not consulted during the deliberation, the outcome of the change largely depends on imposing or successfully selling the decision. Consensus and understanding among those who must execute the decision probably play the most important part in the ultimate success of any change.

In recent. weapon acquisition programs one can find examples of attempts to analyze the consequences of decisions prior to their implementation. After several problem acquisition programs during the l960s, the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in 1970 recommended a "fly-before-buy" approach, one in which greater technical realism and testing would augment the paper studies of the McNamara era.⁴ This was in reaction to serious cost overruns and problems encountered with systems like the C-5A and FB-Ill. Considerable discussion and questioning took place at the operating level during the planning for these aircraft concerning roles, missions, and requirements and capabilities. The failure to actively challenge requirements prior to the ultimate decision partially contributed to subsequent problems in both of these very vital national defense programs.

The "fly-before-buy" approach attempts to see just how new ideas will work before committing them to costly development and production stages. The production decision occurs only after careful testing and a thorough evaluation of life-cycle costs.

These same principles can be applied to other decisions. The Complete consequences of a decision must be forced into the open. Future benefits and total costs must be realistically weighed and debated. If the decision can profit from a trial test (such as with flights of the Concorde aircraft into certain airports), it makes sense to do so. If a test is not feasible, wide-ranging viewpoints must be solicited. The more critical the decision, time permitting, the greater the number of views which should be sought. Dissenting or diverse viewpoints ultimately strengthen the final decision.

How can we provide the methods needed for better decisions? It appears that our decision process needs revision in two basic areas. First, alternatives need to be considered in light of overall objectives, not just compartmentalized problems. Second, greater constructive debate and dissent prior to the making of decisions are needed and should be encouraged. If dissent does not occur, the decision-maker must become the protagonist. He must ask such questions as how will this decision better promote organization objectives? And what could go wrong with all of this?

The decision-maker must set the climate for active and well-thought-out dissent. That climate is easier to establish once the decision-maker realizes that the real threat to authority occurs when dissent takes place during the implementation of the decision and not during the deliberation stage.

As an example, changes such as eliminating intermediate headquarters or adding consulting teams mean that we plan to change the way people will interact (behave) within the organization-to elicit that behavior which will get the job accomplished more effectively for the dollars expended. However, before implementing any change, we should have a very clear idea of what that decision will do to the behavior of our organization. How will communication be affected-will it be faster, more direct, and complete? What happens to decision-making? Is it improved? Will the right people make the decisions? What about conflict--are we creating conflict by not clearly delineating responsibilities? Do we have to sell or impose the idea throughout the organization? Are we creating a situation that yields more effective use of our human resources, one in which our best people will want to stay? What about cost--are we expending -our resources where the marginal return is the greatest?

This kind of questioning requires a more thorough analysis of the entire situation. We must consciously weigh the decision's advantages and disadvantages and make only those changes that clearly benefit the organization. For example, the consolidation and centralization of our organizations may show dollar savings in the short run but hinder ongoing efforts for increasing the effectiveness of our people.

We should continue to look for better ways to communicate within the hierarchy. However, the elimination of intermediate headquarters does not mean that corresponding decision authority automatically ascends to higher headquarters; instead, it should be delegated to lower levels when the need and analysis so dictate.

We must, therefore, continue to ask ourselves, "What is it that we are really trying to accomplish?" The overall answer should be to provide maximum effectiveness of our war-fighting capability within an ever changing environment. That calls for some hard questions and tough answers from our best people at all levels.

The task, then, is to intelligently and consciously hedge against that uncertain future-to use all of the tools and information available. This is probably why some executives exercise intuitive judgment so well. They have the ability to estimate on a wider range the future possible effects of their actions. They avoid actions which they "feel" have high probability of producing serious loss; however, a systematic and conscious examination and inquiry are good substitutes for such intuition.

At your next meeting, if there is no disagreement concerning an important decision, reflect a while on these words of Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., who said at a meeting of one of the General Motors top committees (during the 1920s):

"Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete agreement on the decision here." Everyone around the table nodded assent. "Then," continued Mr. Sloan, "I propose we postpone further discussion of this matter until our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some understanding of what the decision is all about."⁵

It is interesting to note that the matter in question was not adopted during the next meeting.

These remarks are not meant to advocate committee action or a retreat from decisiveness. Responsive and responsible leadership is probably more important now than ever before. These remarks are, however, a call to actively involve those who best understand the situation and who are closest to the problem. Those people are often other than the immediate staff and advisers to the executive. Participants may include a larger group or only a few, either individually or collectively. This is perhaps the successful leader's greatest ability-to identify those subordinates who are best qualified to aid in a specific decision. The extent of participation and the techniques used to foster it are necessarily dictated by the urgency and importance of the situation in question.

Most of our great presidents have under-stood the value of conflicting opinions. Washington knew and valued the frequently divergent views of Jefferson and Hamilton. Those presidents who sought conformity are remembered more for their lack of accomplishment. For it is only through dissenting views that new alternatives and creativeness can surface. It is not possible to have new solutions without new and differing ideas and opinions.

Some decisions, such as those that involve safety and dynamic operations, must be made quickly. However, executive decisions are normally not that pressing. Leaders must take time to ensure that the right questions get asked. If these questions are not asked, then complex policy decisions will be made by a single individual within a small circle of confidants (in at least a partial vacuum), and subordinates will continue to react to and resist implementing decisions they do not and cannot understand.

During the past few years, there has been growing appreciation of the role which involvement plays in the decision process. The decision process at the national level has seen a proliferation of advisory groups, the best known and most influential being the National Security Council. The Air Force Board Structure is also a highly formalized body of advisory groups that highly influence our decision-making elements. General William V. McBride recently remarked that "the Air Force Board Structure permits the best minds and the best effort to be placed on corporate concerns, with the leadership able to tap their advice and experience before making a decision."⁶ This process also recognizes that the broader the base of support for a decision, the better is the possibility for successful implementation.

There is need to transfer this concept to our overall decision process. Our leaders must be given the flexibility they need to do the job-to involve, when practicable, the decision capability at the level that knows most about the decision.

Our military organizations need to get back to employing all of our leaders, the people we have hired and the people we hold responsible for guiding and directing our organizations, especially our middle leaders and managers. When we first began to experience substantial external change during the l960s, our leaders found that the bottom (operating) level of our organizations increasingly did not accept and implement directions from the top. Since a climate for dissent did not exist within the hierarchy, there arose a need for the top to find out what problems existed at lower levels. The result was that the top increasingly bypassed middle management and went directly to the operating level through mediums of inspection, various councils, and the like.

The results have not been encouraging. In fact, they have often been disastrous. In some instances, lower levels demanded that the top hear their problems directly; dissent became violent in other instances. Middle leaders responsible for putting decisions into action were and are even now largely excluded from participating in making decisions that directly affected their daily activities. The point is that we need a forum for dissent, but differing views most fruitfully occur within the structure which we have carefully created and staffed.

Ultimately, a decision process that continually bypasses our middle leaders will fail. Lower levels that report directly to commanders and reliance on external change agents are basically "quick fix" arrangements. They are indicators of an unhealthy organization--one that needs to get back to the basics of managing within its established capabilities. Lasting change can only occur within the group of people who have daily responsibilities for the unit.

We should realize by now that arbitrary decisions are seldom implemented as originally conceived, because considerable power to resist exists at lower levels. On the other hand, decisions which capitalize on the knowledge and experience of those on the firing line have little trouble being placed into action. Involvement breeds commitment, and commitment produces team action.

If the foregoing is correct, the time has come us to shift our yes men from the decision mode to the implementing mode, and to bring our dissenters out of the implementing mode and into the decision mode. We must encourage--even demand--questioning and well-thought-out dissent from our knowledgeable people and make it a part of our decision process. Once the decision is made, we need to press on positively and strongly with its implementation.

Decision-making in an ivory tower immediately surrounded by harmony and conformity is relatively easy. Conversely, it takes strong, self-confident, and farsighted leaders to encourage questioning and dissent during their deliberations--and intelligent and thinking subordinates to make such dissent effective. Are you, as a commander, capable, or even ready, to meet the challenge? Or is that warm glow that comes from putting out fires too comfortable? Think about it as you nod assent or coordinate on that next important decision.

It may well be that our ability to question and the freedom to think and act may be our single most important advantage in any future conflict with our potential adversaries.

1. George S. Ordiorne, Management and the Activity Trap (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 5.

2. Peter F. Drucker, The Effective Executive (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 113, 114.

3. Peter F. Drucker, Management (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), pp. 466, 467.

4. Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense Panel (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1970), p. 74.

5. Drucker, Management, p. 472.

6. General William V. McBride, "The Air—A View from the Top," Air Force Magazine, April 1976, p. 28.

Colonel Edsel R. Field (M.B.A., Kent State University) is Deputy Commander, Operations, 438^th Military Airlift Wing, McGuire AFB, New Jersey. His experience has been primarily in airlift operations, including tours in Military Airlift Command and Southeast Asia flying C-123s. He has served as a plans and programs officer at Hq USAF and on the faculty of Air War College, of which he is a Distinguished Graduate.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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