Air University Review, July-August 1978

Prescriptions for Professionalism

The central problems facing the military profession today focus on two issues, identity and purpose. No reasonable man can be expected to pursue a profession of questionable utility in an environment of diminishing esteem. This "identity crisis" must be quickly resolved if we are to recruit and retain a high-quality officer force.

Contemporary evidence suggests that identity is directly related to organizational purpose. The most promising direction to search for a new purpose is in redefining professional roles while maintaining internal competence in the omnipresent requirement to direct the nation's combat forces during wartime.

A survey of recent literature reveals that soldiers and scholars share an unusual consensus on both the sources and solutions to these problems. Evidence, however, tends to be scattered through publications not normally available in military working areas, or it springs from lecture halls and seminars oriented toward specialized audiences.

The idea persists that the military profession mirrors the society. Speaking to an audience of business leaders, academicians, and soldiers during the Civilian/Military Institute Symposium at the Air Force Academy, Lieutenant General DeWitt C. Smith, Jr., then the Commandant of the Army War College, defined the societal relationship of the military establishment in these terms: "There is no country in the history of the world less like Sparta than the United States. Members of the military profession are also members of the society at large. We have the same dreams and aspirations as other members of American society."¹

General Smith's assertion is by no means original. A popular argument to counter hypercritical essays deriding present conditions in the Army is based on just such logic. The reasoning goes much deeper, however. It demands that we examine societal forces such as the internal political situation, current economic conditions, and the international environment since these elements define the role of the armed forces and shape its attitudes, ethics, and professional legitimacy. Researchers tend to treat the military society as a separate entity unaffected by these conditions. This oversight produces enormous distortion between traditional ideas of what the professional soldier is expected to be arid contemporary realities that dictate what he is allowed to be.

As early as 1971, Lieutenant General Robert G. Gard, Jr., pointed out that "American society will set the tone and general limits within which the armed forces can adjust traditional concepts of professionalism to changing realities in international competition and cooperation, changing conceptions of the role of the United States in world affairs and changing social values."²

Efforts by the military establishment to respond to these new demands have produced considerable re-examination of institutional purpose, questioning its ethical underpinnings and launching a new search for a viable role in the society. It has also fostered considerable skepticism and an attitude of introspection on the part of many Army officers, especially among those who have recently commanded troops. We face head-on what Samuel P. Huntington has called the nub of the problem of civil-military relations, "that of balancing the functional imperative stemming from the threats to society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society."³ Serious attempts to define that balance lead contemporary researchers down the same path that Huntington took--describing the nature of the officer corps.

Sam C. Sarkesian, a retired Army lieutenant colonel who heads the political science department of Loyola University in Chicago, offers what he considers an insider's view in his book The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society. † Professor Sarkesian rose through the ranks and brings to his study experience ranging from combat duty with Special Forces to service on the faculty at West Point. Although his outlook is colored by his background and is even now somewhat dated; the tone of the book is a welcome respite from the damning diatribes other former officers have presented to the public: The author makes it quite clear that he will neither "... attempt to diagnose the ills of the Army nor prescribe for its health." He portrays today's professional Army officer as a man torn between isolating himself in his traditional self-contained community while hoping for the return to normalcy that has followed other wars or actively participating in the search for a new legitimacy.

†Sam C. Sarkesian, The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975, $13.95), 268 pages.

Sarkesian defines the tenets of professionalism much as did Huntington, in his seminal work The Soldier and the State.⁴ Huntington's "corporateness" becomes Sarkesian's "organization structure," "expertise" becomes "special knowledge and education," and "responsibility" becomes "self-regulation." He goes further than Huntington, however, and applies what he calls "commitment and calling" to the present state of affairs in the Army. Using this characteristic, Sarkesian demonstrates that while the profession possesses these attributes traditionally considered above reproach, accession to officer status does not automatically confer them on the officeholder.

Closely allied with Huntington's concept of responsibility, especially in terms of contributing to society, is Sarkesian's notion of the motivational element in the professional character. This variable often serves as the vehicle for substantive change. It can be greatly enhanced by family contentment, meaningful superior-subordinate relationships, and the development of a sense of organizational purpose. Certainly the financial rewards for a military career are more competitive than ever before, but money is obviously less motivational to the professional than the more cerebral issues: a feeling that the organization needs him; having an input into policies that affect him, his unit and the soldiers for whom he is responsible; and above all, a feeling that the service he provides is essential for the nation's well-being. Expand these issues from the individual to the institutional level and we begin to address the root of the problem of social legitimacy facing the military establishment today. Sarkesian succinctly states it this way:

If the military profession is to regain its past prestige and restore its integrity, it must recognize that it is the servant of society The profession, therefore, cannot bestow legitimacy upon itself--this comes from society, and must be the fundamental professional premise.

With that beginning, Sarkesian goes on to present a point of view about what is happening both in and out of the Army as he imagines today's professional officer views it. Since the book is directed toward an audience unfamiliar with the service, uniformed readers can skip over chapters that describe duty in the Pentagon and. skim briskly through material on the role of the wife and the socialization of the family, which Sarkesian dramatically refers to as "the shadow world." No doubt, to the uninitiated that intriguing tide will conjure up some very distorted notions regarding the forces at work in this arena. It is unfortunate, too, because civilian readers will unduly weigh social relationships and ascribe to them much mom influence than they actually enjoy. These aspects of military life are significantly affected by recent changes. Increased salaries, longer tours, guaranteed station choices following short tours, and the overall reduction in personnel turbulence have caused military families to become more and more civilianized. Combine these features with increased specialization in the career development system and Sarkesian's assessment of the influence of internal social factors is greatly diluted.

Sarkesian covers the grinding detail of officer efficiency reporting and ticket-punching in a thoroughly readable and informative package. He keeps his earlier promise and avoids numerous opportunities to editorialize. The result is a cohesive description of our system containing an implicit criticism of the tendency for cutthroat competition. He would argue that one serious flaw in the present rating system lies in the danger of rewarding conformity and punishing mavericks who may espouse individual ideas. He recognizes that the profession is a conservative organization that philosophically values the group above the individual. Progress and meaningful change face the same institutional inertia as in any bureaucracy.

Sarkesian urges us to devise methods that will identify the conspiratorial ticket-puncher and the cutthroat career-limber while rewarding the committed professional. He emphasizes the pitfalls of the current system but offers no viable alternative for narrowing the gap between the professional ideal and contemporary reality. Meanwhile we must live with the imperfections of the current system.

Although the Army has incorporated a new system of efficiency reporting since Sarkesian's book was published, the squares and figures on the forms he describes remain a permanent part of the record. They are, theoretically, the only oracle to which promotion boards may speak; so whatever the changes since their completion, they are very much a part of today's promotion system. That system, regardless of its modified format, legal safeguards, etc., is an imperfect device subject to the frailties and prejudices of human manipulation.

Sarkesian comes very close to prediction in his discussion of the emerging elite, the aftermath of Vietnam, and the future character of the profession. It is here that his ideas appear most parochial due to his Special Forces experience.

Conveniently classifying the modern officer corps on the basis of age, he discusses the salient characteristics of each group and assesses their impact on the modem military establishment. He describes today's elites as a generation steeped in the traditions of conventional professionalism. These "traditionalists" entered the armed forces before, during, or immediately after World War II. They remain convinced that the restiveness in contemporary society is a passing phenomenon and the return to traditional values is inevitable. Securely entrenched at the top of the hierarchy, the traditionalists view their role as preserving the rigid pre-World War II ideal of an isolated professional.

The next layer, the transitionalist, is comprised of officers who entered the service during and immediately following the Korean War. They are a generation who witnessed a limited war in Korea, observed the Lebanon crisis, the Cuban missile affair, and the commitment of forces to the Dominican Republic. Unlike the traditionalist, this group has always operated in an arena where military force was used as a political instrument to influence conditions in the international environment. They are accustomed to seeing armed forces committed to situations where political advantage is the ultimate objective and all-out combat is a condition to be avoided. Generally better educated and certainly more sensitive to the society, the transitionalists are imaginative and innovative. As this group evolves into the top leadership positions, Sarkesian implies that rigidity and resistance to change will begin to dissipate. This will result in some convergence between the profession and society and will accelerate the acquisition of social legitimacy.

The third group, the modernists, represents an era characterized by domestic dissent, rejection of authority, and a pervasive attitude of antimilitarism. These officers entered the service during the 1960s and served as captains and lieutenants during the Vietnam War. They experienced the effects of social unrest prevalent during that period and will, therefore, reflect a more liberal attitude than their elders. As the modernists rise in the hierarchy, Sarkesian believes that professional ideology will become more reflective of the society. Modernists will tend to answer questions relating to the purpose and role of the military in consonance with societal realities.

In Sarkesian's opinion, the Vietnam War placed the American Army in a no-win situation from the outset. Conventional tactics, traditional concepts of victory, and a thorough misunderstanding of revolutionary warfare compounded the difficulties produced by a lack of public support. Salvation, he implied, depended on adapting traditional strategies to winning an unconventional war. In the final analysis, we failed to recognize that revolutions are bound to succeed unless they are crushed with overwhelming force or by offering the polity better conditions than the revolutionary. The former course of action was out of the question because it violated the American ideal of protecting noncombatants. The latter alternative was overlooked because most military and civilian elites did not understand unconventional warfare.

The draft caused many young men with strong antimilitary sentiments to enter the service. Their introduction into ambiguous combat situations eroded organizational cohesiveness, discipline, and military spirit. The national purpose was questioned. Military men at all levels found their tasks frustrated by ambivalence on the part of their leaders, peers, and subordinates. Ticket-punching created a lack of stability and continuity in the command structure at all levels. Meaningful superior-subordinate relationships were rare, and the faith in leadership exhibited in previous conflicts was woefully absent

The war ended with the withdrawal of public support. Left with the disappointment of failure and the memory of scandals that touched the very soul of professionalism, the American military establishment faces an uncertain future. That future, according to Sarkesian; must include the re-establishment of an attainable, operable, professional ethic coupled with a viable institutional purpose.

Sarkesian concludes that the profession of arms will be permanently modified as it becomes more and more involved with social issues. Such involvement is inevitable in the essential quest for a new legitimacy. His formula for change is ill defined, but he suggests that military assets be turned to the benefit of society. Military civic action groups, Special Forces units, and medical rescue teams could possibly expand their operations to include service to civilian communities and institutions. Historical precedents and contemporary examples can be readily cited to support the efficiency of such endeavor. Sarkesian fails to account for the fact that such peripheral pursuits have always hurt the military establishment by detracting resources and attention from its primary task of combat readiness.

If Sarkesian's work can be labeled as an "insider's view" of the military establishment, Maureen Mylander provides an "outsider's opinion in The Generals.† The daughter of a West Point graduate, Mylander grew up in the Army but cut her military ties at the age of eighteen. She went on to pursue a career as an information specialist and has since enjoyed wide success as a journalist.

†Maureen Mylander, The Generals: Making It Military Style (New York: The Dial Press, 1974, $10.00), 397 pages.

Motivated by what she terms a need to "…get to know the men behind the guns," she provides an in-depth study of Army generals and the system whereby they ascend to the top of the profession. Her research is overwhelmingly subjective, and her style is often sensational.

She portrays the professional soldier as a man consumed by a desire for promotion. Competition is the single most pervasive feature of the system. It is instilled at West Point, nurtured through association with superiors who provide the role models, and tested in units and professional schools throughout the Army. There are no alliances, no margins for miscalculation, no room for the man who permits some human quality to pre-empt an opportunity to outdistance a classmate, a friend, or a fellow soldier. Success breeds success, and failure causes immediate and permanent disaster.

The man who embodies Mylander's necessary qualities for generalship is cold, calculating, and brutally self-serving. The system that produces generals, she implies, makes the institution insensitive to the needs and attitudes of contemporary society. Herein she identifies the problem with today's military establishment.

She provides what might be called a handy pocketguide of do's and don'ts for the would-be general. The list contains such guidance as "don't specialize," "don't buck the system," and "don't be overly critical." The do's include, "command at each level," "win medals," and "work hard." The items on the list could apply to any profession with but little modification. Mylander offers them as features that inevitably relegate the military to a less than professional status.

Certainly professional attributes must be interpreted in terms of balance and degree. Failure is to be abhorred. We cannot afford to lose the ultimate battle so should we not expect the soldier to view failure with more disdain than the businessman? As far as competition is concerned, societies that place second in wars do not survive, so is it not essential that professional soldiers be more competitive as a group than, say, educators? Soldiers, particularly in the combat arms, always strive to command--that is the ultimate test. If we want our soldiers to be political scientists, engineers, or international relationists we have numerous institutions in which to train them. In fact, when we need those skills in the officer ranks, we can commission them as we did in World War II, but they are Christmas help, not military professionals, The university for the general must remain in the crucible of command. American society does not require the officer to be anything except a winner. The professional attributes embodied in competitiveness and the ability to command, therefore, are the most basic demands society makes on its soldiers.

The road that leads Army officers to the ultimate promotion is depicted in very realistic terms in The Generals. The officers who presently wear stars have ascended, almost to a man, through the channels provided by the combat arms. Infantrymen, artillerymen, and armor officers dominate the general officer ranks because their career patterns offer numerous opportunities for command. Candidates go from one job of high responsibility to another, from one specialty to another, never pausing in any area long enough to become polarized. Careers follow classic patterns that include necessary detours for schools and assignments where points of view are tempered through association with bright contemporaries. Generals-to-be share common experiences by attending prestigious universities, filling faculty positions at one of the war colleges or at West Point, and often working on highly visible Joint Staffs. Along the way most have benefited from the sponsorship of one or more of the famous patriarchs of World War II. All of them have demonstrated enormous capacities for work, dedication, and the best traditions of the profession. They have ridden out many storms and survived unscathed. Basically they demonstrate the intelligence and tenacity required to rise to the top of any profession. The paths they follow are not open to all members of the military service, and doors close for many reasons along the way.

Mylander implies that the system through which a man attains star rank rewards bureaucratic astuteness more than individual ability. She leaves the reader with a nagging fear that the most resourceful and the best qualified officers are many times eliminated by the drive for systemic conformity. This tendency rewards the officer who displays the attributes of an organizational man while stifling innovative intellectualism or efforts to attune the organization to the needs of the society.

Unlike Sarkesian, Mylander prescribes for the ills of the Army. She believes many of today's problems stem from ticket-punching or rising to stardom through highly stylized career patterns. She suggests that the Congress take a more active interest in general officer nominations to broaden the experience base and eliminate classic promotion patterns. The civilian elites in the Defense Department can also do much to break the mold by rewarding the specialist, the nontraditional careerist, and the devil's advocate. Longer tenure, especially for commanders, is another Mylander prescription and one that has seen some amount of fruition since her book was published. She suggests allocating general officer billets on the basis of job responsibility rather than on the size of command. Such changes would require the dedication of general officer slots to the specialist fields and, thereby, provide multiple routes to the top.

Many readers can be led astray by Mylander's tendency to generalize and by her proclivity for overstatement; however, there is much substance and a great deal of truth in The Generals. Military readers would do well not to dismiss the message on the basis of the delivery. One way to ensure meaningful change is to consider outside opinion, especially when change is so obviously apparent. Mylander provides a view insiders are incapable of rendering. It is based on some well-documented research and at times is reminiscent of popular insiders' prescriptions. More recently she has updated part of the book dealing with the mechanics and psychology of the war colleges.⁵ This demonstrates a professional sincerity not associated with journalists who generally tend to espouse popular ideas for the benefit of readership. She recognizes current efforts to effect institutional change and warns that the Army must be careful to ensure that cosmetic adjustment does not forestall the pressing need for substantive organizational change.

Social legitimacy, professional relevancy, and military ethics are popular topics for contemporary writers. Sarkesian and Mylander provide two of the more articulate works, but they share the common fault of being apart from the military establishment either through time or vocation. Such points of new are worthwhile in redefining a new direction for the military establishment, but soldiers ultimately choose and direct the course of the future in the profession of arms. The impetus for meaningful change must, therefore, come from within the profession.

Writing for the Strategic Review in the fall of 1976, Colonel William L. Hauser suggests that some evidence of adjustment is already apparent.⁶ He posits the notion that substantive change can only be realized after a redefinition of strategy. Currently it appears that strategy is tied to the maintenance of a sixteen division force with all the ancillary support required to sustain combat in Europe. Colonel Hauser quite logically concludes that the resources for such a strategy are out of the question. The idea is fostered and perpetuated, however, by a generation of officers who ascended to prominence during the latter days of World War II and in the years preceding Korea. This group now occupies high offices and wields great influence. Hauser calls them the "long generation." They equate to Sarkesian's traditionalist and provide an effective barrier to the essential strategic adjustments required to reconcile capabilities with missions in a modem world. He further suggests that in terms of size and purpose, the army of the future will be characterized by the maintenance of flexible forces tailored for rapid deployments. As the long generation passes and officers wh6 have had recent line experience emerge in the sense of Sarkesian's transitionalist, more strategic realism, relevance, and organizational purpose will evolve. Internal reform will continue, but massive, rapid change is hardly a possibility.

There exists today an institutional uneasiness produced by recent social antipathy. This attitude will become less pervasive as new career management programs and reasonable bureaucratic procedures are initiated by the transitionalists. Hauser points out that we are hardly on the verge of producing a mercenary professional who looks at his work only as a job. Soldiers still value patriotism, enjoy working in a profession where success is measurable, and the vestiges of systemic prestige still abide. Finally there is a psychological macho associated with soldiering that will persist, and we will continue to attract officers who are motivated, capable, and professionally sincere. He emphatically warns us, however, that we cannot rely on self-motivation and internal reward forever. At some point, society must mediate its attitude of antimilitarism and bestow legitimacy. He trustingly asserts that the society will deliver, and public respect will ultimately be reinstated.

Colonel Ronald P. Dunwell, United States Marine Corps, speaks for a large number of contemporaries when he suggests that the military profession has become overpoliticized.⁷ This condition has overburdened the organization with nontraditional military roles and mesmerized elites with management procedures and civilian organizational styles. This tendency has been amplified over the years as subordinates perceived such expertise as necessary for upward mobility. It has created excessive bureaucratic layering and severely diluted the armed forces' capability to perform its chartered role in the society. Further, it has created a generation of officers more adept in foreign affairs and management principles than in the business of training and leading soldiers. While agreeing that some degree of balance is necessary, Colonel Dunwell calls for a reversal of present trends and urges a return to emphasis on the uniquely military features of the institution.

All of these suggestions represent an inordinate amount of intellect, expertise, and personal effort on the part of the authors. Sarkesian tells us when we have been and suggests a few ripe areas for future exploration. Mylander identifies some bureaucratic realities that are self-defeating, archaic, and divisive. Obviously she is not all wrong, and the Army is not the only guilty party. The two soldiers I have mentioned deal with the "now" issues. Can we field large standing armies capable of sustaining prolonged conventional engagement in Europe, or does Hauser's force structure make more sense?

Current strategic concepts do not square with the popular admonishment to do more with less. When strategy is out of step with capability, some rationalization necessarily occurs. How does this affect our ethical code?

Officers are expected to be expert soldiers. When was the last time we wrote a field order or was that ageless military command tool covered in the curriculum? Certainly officers must maintain a broad information base, but is not an understanding of the unique elements of the profession essential to professionalism? Social legitimacy must be earned by the military establishment. To achieve this, there is a pressing need for the soldiers of all services to return to soldiering. It is a full-time job.

Notes

1. Molly Riffel Parris, "Gen Smith Says Criticism Needed," Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, February 13,1977, p.3A.

2. Colonel Robert G. Gard, Jr., "The Military and American Society," Foreign Affairs, July 1971, p.710.

3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959), p.17.

4. Huntington, pp. 8-14.

5. Maureen Mylander, "The War Colleges," The Times Magazine: Supplement to the Army Times, Navy Time, and Air Force Time, March 7, 1977.

6. Colonel William L. Hauser, "The Military Ethic," Strategic Review, Fall 1976, p.76.

7. Colonel Ronald P. Dunwell, USMC, "Erosion of an Ethic," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1977, p. 56.

Major William M. Dollar, U.S. Army, (M.P.S., Auburn University) is Army liaison officer at the United States Air Force Academy. He served in Vietnam as both an infantryman and as Army aviator. He has been instructor at Fort Benning, Georgia, and a company commander, S-3, and executive officer in a mechanized infantry battalion, Fort Carson, Colorado. Major Dollar is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Advanced Course and Air Command and Staff College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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