Air University Review, July-August 1977
Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Dotson, AFRES
Author's note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Air Force or the Office of Management and Budget.
RS.D.
SOME months ago, a thoughtful article by Major Dennis W. Stiles in the Air University Review dealt with the intrinsic strengths and weaknesses of tactical air forces.1 By their very nature, tactical fighters can do some things well and others poorly, independent of the environment in which they are employed. But the combat environment itself imposes additional conditions that must be accommodated if tactical aircraft are to be employed effectively. It is necessary, then, to expand on the concepts explored by Major Stiles so that we may attempt to answer hard and specific questions about:
the composition of the future tactical fighter force structure (how many F-15s, F-16s, and A-10s);
the weapons that can be best combined with our aircraft to obtain the most effectiveness for the dollars available to us.
Without question, a conflict in Europe would pose the most demanding environment for our tactical air forces, and it is in the context of a conventional war in Europe that the thoughts to follow will evolve.
The Air Force's tactical fighter squadrons, active and Reserve, are assuming a role of unprecedented importance in preserving the integrity of the Atlantic alliance. Because our nation no longer enjoys overwhelming nuclear superiority over the forces of the Warsaw Pact, defense of Western Europe by an early use of theater-nuclear forces has lost the appeal that this so-called trip-wire strategy held for the NATO nations in the fifties and sixties. The perceived linkage between theater-nuclear war and general war has become uncomfortably tighter with the acquisition of a formidable nuclear arsenal by the Soviet Union.
It is no surprise, then, that the defense of Europe has been planned around NATO's conventional forces--under the expectation that these forces can prove strong enough to preserve the territorial integrity of the alliance while keeping the intensity of the conflict well below the nuclear threshold.
But the Soviet Union has not been content to upgrade only its nuclear forces. Any respected source of data will show the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact to be unsettlingly heavy in armor and artillery, the hardware which provides firepower and shock for a rapidly moving conventional offensive. To deter the Pact, and to defeat their conventional forces if deterrence fails, we must maintain first-rate conventional forces of our own. However, the nations of the alliance, including our own, have shown a reluctance to offset Warsaw Pact quantitative advantages in conventional ground forces by expanding our own armies to any appreciable degree. Rather than opt for the labor-intensive solution--with its attendant manpower costs--we have, instead, chosen the capital-intensive approach. We have decided to counter Warsaw Pact mass with Western technology.
A prime example of this reliance on technology is the future strengthening of NATO's tactical air forces with the F-16 and the replacement of F-4s in our own active Air Force with A-10s, F-15s, and F-16s. But it is not enough to obtain new equipment. There is much to be explored in determining the most profitable ways to employ that equipment to enhance deterrence and to make Central Europe a burial ground for Pact armor if deterrence fails.
The necessity for an effective division of labor between NATO's ground forces and air forces was highlighted recently in an article in Air Force Magazine that describes the role of NATO tactical air power as a partner with alliance ground forces in stopping a Warsaw Pact armored thrust across Europe. One paragraph of the article is particularly illuminating:
If intelligence is right, NATO ground forces could achieve local superiority against the first assault echelon. The second, equally decisive, "if" is whether US and other NATO tactical airpower would be able to deal with the Pact's second echelon before it could engage NATO ground forces at the forward edge of the battle area. This, then, leads to the third requirement for a successful defense by NATO forces--the rapid achievement of local air superiority over the main battle area to permit air interdictions of Pact follow-on attacks.2
For the air-superiority mission, the key words are local air superiority over the main battle area. The emphasis on aerial battle implicit in this statement, rather than attack of Warsaw Pact airfields, reflects two important developments for Western airmen:
NATO air-superiority aircraft will have a distinct technological edge over those of the enemy as the F-15 and F-16 enter NATO air forces in quantity.
Attacks on heavily defended Warsaw Pact airfields--where enemy aircraft are well protected with aircraft shelters and surface-to-air defenses--may be prohibitively costly compared with the damage inflicted.
For the ground-attack mission, the paragraph cited earlier describes what could be an increasingly important role for NATO air forces with the words: whether US and other NATO tactical airpower would be able to deal with the Pact's second echelon before it could engage NATO ground forces at the forward edge of the battle area. Implied here is a shift in emphasis from the familiar close-air support (CAS) mission--where aerial ordnance is delivered near friendly ground forces--to ground attack in support of friendly ground forces beyond the effective range of weapons organic to those ground forces (the so-called "battlefield" interdiction mission). *
*Author's note: AFM 2-1 Tactical Air Operations--Counter Air, Close Air Support, and Air Interdiction, identifies air interdiction as one of the five combat functions performed by tactical air forces. Air Force doctrine does not differentiate within the air interdiction function based on target distances relative to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). The term "battlefield" interdiction used in this article refers to that portion of the air interdiction, function described above (i.e., ground attack in support of friendly ground forces beyond the range of weapons organic to those ground forces).
This interpretation does not mean that close air support will be abandoned for battlefield interdiction but that the preponderance of the ground-support effort will be concentrated against follow-on echelons of Pact forces. But close air support will continue to be a particularly important Air Force mission.
If breakthroughs by Pact armor threaten at the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), air power will be massed in space and time to beat down the Pact forces before they can attain breakthrough momentum. Because CAS attacks must not endanger friendly ground forces, precision-guided weapons such as the Maverick missile will be particularly useful in this role. The A-10 will soon play the primary CAS role for the U.S. Air Force, and it is well-suited to this mission. The A-10 can perform in Europe's poor weather when other aircraft cannot, and, for a CAS aircraft, this capability far outweighs others in importance. The mission must be flown when the ground situation demands--not when the weather permits.
Because the A-10 will be thrown into the breach when points of attempted Pact breakthrough become discernible, it may be wise strategy to limit A-10 sorties early in the conflict to conserve the striking power of the A-10 force for maximum effect when breakthrough massing by the Pact begins to occur.
This strategy, of course, would require NATO ground forces to hold their own against Pact first-echelon forces where breakthroughs are not attempted and would depend upon success by the battlefield-interdiction force in disrupting Pact artillery and follow-on echelons. (Battlefield interdiction will be treated in detail later.)
A reduced employment of the A-10 early in the conflict could:
preserve the A-l0 force until it is most critically needed:
conserve Maverick missiles;
allow additional time for suppression of Pact air-defense weapons at the FEBA to reduce attrition of the A-10; and
conserve the A-10 force so that, when the Pact offensive stalls, the A-10 can precede counterattacking NATO armies to help rout Pact ground forces. After Pact surface-to-air defenses have been suppressed (or have run low on ammunition because their high rates of fire), the A-10 could be particularly lethal in such a counterattack role.
The second point--to conserve Maverick missiles--is particularly important. If A-10s expend Mavericks at the rates of which they are capable, before attempted Pact breakthroughs at the FEBA begin to develop, these valuable weapons may be in short supply when they are most needed to defeat breakthrough forces.
Earlier, it was stated that the Air Force has a continuing, central role to play in the battle at the FEBA. What does seem to be emerging, however, is perhaps a more important ground-attack mission--beyond the FEBA and beyond the effective range of the Army's organic weapons--for our tactical air forces.
This mission will enable air power to be applied with maximum speed and mass in ground attack because a number of constraints that limit the intensity of weapon delivery in close air support will be overcome. Specifically:
Because ordnance will not be delivered near friendly ground forces in battlefield interdiction, there will be a relative lack of dependence on forward air controllers (FACs) to coordinate air attacks--and this coordination can slow the rate at which weapons are employed.
Because of this reduced dependence on FACs, battlefield interdiction will have a relatively reduced vulnerability to enemy electronic countermeasures (ECM), which may hinder coordination of strike aircraft with FACs in the CAS mission--another factor that can slow the rate of weapons delivery.
Battlefield interdiction will enable the mass employment of area weapons, munitions that allow intense firepower to be delivered at high rates but which are dangerous to use near friendly troops in close air support.
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However, these advantages of battlefield interdiction come at greater risk of attrition, compared with operations in the CAS mode, because of a relatively longer exposure to enemy defenses. Therefore, gains in effectiveness must be balanced against increased risks of loss. Attempts to achieve such a balance have resulted in lively and useful debates about the following modes of attack for battlefield interdiction:
single-pass deliveries of area weapons;
multiple-pass deliveries of precision-guided weapons.
Because this article attempts to deal with the specifics of the battlefield-interdiction mission, the strengths and weaknesses of each attack mode will be explored in some detail.
Table l list definitions that will be used in subsequent tables to illustrate tradeoffs in the two modes of attack. Shown in Table 2 are assumptions about the various parameters defined in Table 1. These assumptions are intended to be relatively consistent, from one option to the other, though the absolute values may not suit the individual reader's intuition. The reader can easily determine the effects of his own assumptions by placing them in the framework described by the tables.
The effects of the assumptions shown in Table 2 are found in the five-day campaign history for 500 unit-equipment (DE) aircraft at the bottom of the table. Specifically, for Table 2:
The single-pass option results in about one third the kills produced by multiple attacks.
The losses incurred in the multiple pass attacks are greater than those of the single-pass option by more than a factor of two.
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The kills-per-loss ratio favors the multiple-pass option.
Tables 3 through 5 provide sensitivity excursions about this first example by exploring changes in attrition and kill assumptions.
In Table 3, the probabilities for loss have been doubled, and the sensitivity of the performance of the multiple-pass option is shown vividly in the campaign history:
In both options, kills have decreased from those shown in Table 2--the kills of the multiple-pass option have decreased 50 percent while those of the single-pass option have dropped by 20 percent.
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The multiple pass option has the better kills-per-loss ratio.
Thus, if the reader believes that the loss rates shown initially in Table 2 are too low for the environment being considered, he would find the multiple-pass tactic less attractive as loss rates are increased.
Table 4 presents a variation on the attrition theme by exploring the intuitively appealing view that a higher loss rate per pass will occur on subsequent passes for multiple attacks, compared with that for the first pass. The results show:
The same outcomes for the single pass option (compared with those of Table 2).
A drop in kills for the multiple-pass option by approximately 40 percent (compared with the multiple-pass results shown in Table 2).
A kills-per-loss ratio favoring the single-pass option.
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Table 5 introduces a hypothetical new area weapon that would allow multiple kills to be obtained from one pass, to show how such a weapon would dramatically improve the performance of the single-pass option, compared with that of multiple attacks. All other assumptions from Table 4 are retained. The campaign history in Table 5 shows:
Approximately equal kills for both options;
Fewer losses and, thus, a higher kills-per-loss ratio for the single-pass option,
Multiple kills from an area weapon could result if sufficient area of coverage and density of coverage can be applied against dense targets, If a multiple-kill area weapon could be employed: it would be highly cost effective. Table 6 shows that:
If the outcomes in losses shown in Table 5 were to be equalized by purchasing additional aircraft for the multiple-pass option so that the surviving DE aircraft would be the same in each case, $2.3 billion would be required to procure additional UE aircraft;
For the cost of these additional aircraft and the Mavericks expended, $500,000,000 in R&D could be expended for the new weapon, and its cost could be $484,000 per sortie.
It should be noted that no peacetime operating and support (O&S) costs have been assessed against the additional UE aircraft, though O&S expenditures would be required to provide 290 fresh, combat-ready DE aircraft at the fifth day of conflict.
The key point shown by Table 6 is this: If a weapon could be delivered against Warsaw Pact artillery and armored targets, and could achieve multiple kills in one pass, this weapon would be highly cost effective--even if its R&D cost and unit acquisition cost were quite high.
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Though this section on battlefield interdiction is somewhat detailed, the problem of target acquisition, prior to attack, has not been dealt with specifically because it is not clear that a target-acquisition sensor--eyeball or other device--would favor either single-pass or multiple-pass weapons for visual attacks, With either weapon the pilot must find, identify, and strike the target. However, poor weather would preclude attacks with precision-guided weapons, while area weapons could be employed in the general area of suspected targets. Also, poor contrast of target and background could deny the lock-on of a precision weapon when a pilot can sufficiently locate a target to deliver an area weapon.
The desirability of one weapon or the other for battlefield interdiction depends, as the tables have shown, on:
the attrition suffered by attacking in one mode compared with the other;
whether multiple kills can be achieved by dropping area weapons in one pass.
Actually, a mix of area and precision-guided weapons may be a better answer than the either or implications of the tables shown earlier.
First, the use of area weapons early in the especially against massed artillery, provide multiple kills and reduced losses to our tactical fighters. Later, after defense suppression has been applied liberally, and possibly after the enemy has attempted to reduce his losses by spreading his forces, precision-guided munitions could be employed to good effect. Such a mixed-weapons strategy could achieve a favorable balance between kill rate and force conservation.
It will not be surprising, therefore, to see the F-16, armed with a new area weapon, evolve as a very important ground-attack system in the NATO arsenal. The F-16, with its small size, high speed, and ability to maneuver defensively without great energy loss, should prove to be a highly survivable aircraft. Also, its survivability will be enhanced by its bombing system which will incorporate a continuously computed impact point (CCIP) release cue that will allow effective weapons delivery without exposure to the risks of relatively long periods of target tracking required by other weapons. Finally, the F-16 should be able to carry the load that a new area munition will probably require.
Though this treatment of battlefield interdiction has covered a good deal, more needs to be said about the importance of force conservation. Perhaps this subject is an appropriate closing note.
The environmental imperatives of a war in Central Europe may place a high premium on early force conservation by NTO to defeat the Pact, because:
NATO air forces are indispensable to the containment of a Pact offensive and must be employed with effect at the outset of battle;
Pact forces, enjoying a favorable advantage in ground forces, are less dependent on their air forces for early air support;
The Pact tactical air force may be employed sparingly near the FEBA early in the conflict so that Pact surface-to-air defenses can attrit NATO's air force--unimpeded by cumbersome requirements for the coordination of their own aircraft and surface weapons;
After the Pact surface-to-air defenses have been substantially suppressed or have drawn down their ammunition, the Pact tactical air force may be unleashed to destroy the remainder of NATO's air forces and to add more punch to the ground offensive.
Thus, the conspicuous absence of Soviet trained Egyptian fighter forces during the early battles of the 1973 Yom Kippur War may be an indication of Soviet employment concepts for tactical fighters. We may well have witnessed a conscious effort by the Egyptians to withhold fighters from the battle area until duels between the opposing air force and friendly surface-to-air weapons had run their course.
Because the Warsaw Pact will come at NATO with quantity on the ground and in the air, we must conduct battlefield interdiction and close air support skillfully, so that we conserve our forces while exploiting the great firepower potential only tactical air power can bring to the battlefield--to stop the enemy's ground offensive before it gains momentum.
Fairfax, Virginia
Notes
1. Major Dennis W. Stiles, "Air Power: A New Look from an Old Roof-top," Air University Review, November-December 1975, pp. 49-59.
2. Edgar U1samer, "Tac Air--History's Most Potent Fighting Machine," Air Force Magazine, February 1976, p. 22.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Dotson, AFRES, (USAFA; M.A., Harvard University) is a budget examiner in the National Security Division of the Office of Management and Budget. His Air Force assignments included: study director for cost-effectiveness applications to force-structure analyses of the tactical fighter force in the Air Force Office for Studies and Analysis; F-105 fighter pilot in Southeast Asia: and T-38 instructor pilot. Colonel Dotson is a Distinguished Graduate of Squadron Officer School.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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