Air University Review, January-February 1977

Managing the Human Resources
 of the Total Force

HUMAN RESOURCES now cost considerably more than all other defense expenditures combined. Will this growing share of the budget eventually cripple the nation's ability to acquire new weapon systems and carry out the research and development to help the United States maintain a competitive edge? If so, how can we hope to gain an advantage over the forces of other nations or alliances, or match the advancing sophistication of the weaponry they employ? At the same time, what will be our defense capability in the All Volunteer Force (A VF) environment?

These questions worried members of the United States Senate as they debated the Department of Defense (DOD) authorizations for fiscal year 1974. Senators Lloyd Bentsen and Howard H. Baker, Jr., thereupon suggested that an independent commission be formed to consider the problems related to defense manpower. As the Senate weighed this possibility, other members suggested additional concerns worthy of investigation: What are the socioeconomic effects of volunteerism? How many people will we require within the next decade? How well do we utilize people? Do we pay them adequately and fairly? Can our present forces carry out their missions?

Convinced that a study could prove helpful, the Senate wrote into the authorization bill the language to create an investigative group; House members concurred in conference. Thus the Defense Manpower Commission, consisting of seven members (four appointed by the Congress, three by the President), was established on 19 April 1974 with the broadest charter ever devised for such an undertaking: to consider all of the human problems in the Department of Defense and the armed forces, including the entire life cycle of manpower and personnel matters, for active and Reserve forces, civilians in DOD, and private contractor personnel.

Two years later, after studying these subjects in cooperation with a professional staff of about twenty, holding hearings and meetings in Washington and elsewhere in the nation, and making numerous trips to visit the armed forces, the commissioners submitted their comprehensive report. Although it is difficult to condense over Jour hundred pages of argument and recommendations into a short article, readers of the Air University Review may wish to know some of the key recommendations of the report, particularly as they relate to the United States Air Force.

Commissioners reached the general conclusion that manpower can be studied rationally only as one system, not as a series of systems. The parts of the manpower system relate so closely that it is seldom possible to make a change to one without affecting the others, sometimes adversely. When someone alters one segment, he may improve it, but he also may cause burdens elsewhere that exceed the gain he has effected. The Commission attempted to study manpower as a whole, although to do so requires a discipline that vastly complicates the approach to specific problems. Let us look at the major inquiries of the report.

Although it has become a vital element in our defense planning, the total force still is far from a reality. Many Army national Guard and Reserve units cannot be ready for deployment overseas within ninety days: twice that time would be more realistic. Air National Guard and Reserve units, with high levels of support, usually have excellent readiness ratings. But ground units too off have been plagued by inadequate equipment and training time, the latter particularly in the larger units that require more time for readiness than possibly can be available to them. Despite gratifying progress recently, the Navy does not yet adequately utilize its surface Reserve.

The logic of a total force policy implies a mix of active Reserve, and civilian manpower to accomplish the missions of each service. That mix cannot be as cost effective as we might wish, however, unless a manager knows that actual costs of manpower types, including the entire life-cycle costs from recruitment to retirement. Such cost data do not now exist, and many estimates are grossly misleading. The tendency is to calculate only the immediate out-of-pocket expenses of a person’s salary, disregarding the supporting benefits provided, the investment in training and professional development, and ultimately, also, the retirement benefits that will be supplied. With adequate cost data, each service probably could develop a better manpower mix than the one presently used, particularly if the manager had more flexibility in the choice of manpower to accomplish the mission.

A case in point is the cost of Reserve force. Although too often we deal with rules of thumb for guidance, such as "a Reserve component costs only one-fifth as much as an active one, " the commission staff has estimated that a National Guard infantry battalion (with a low in our defense planning, the total force readiness rating) costs 12 to 15 percent of still is far from a reality. Many Army National Guard active one while an Air National Guard and Reserve units cannot Guard A-7 unit (with a high readiness be ready for deployment overseas within rating) costs 65 percent of an active one. Obviously, both readiness and capital investment influence substantially the total cost of the unit.

Looking at the combatant force structure. But ground units too often have of the Air Force, the Commission been plagued by inadequate equipment concurred in the expansion of the tactical training time, the latter particularly cal forces from 22 to 26 wings. To accommodate these units within the existing time structure, the Air Force must economize in the use of military personnel. It is possible to do so in a number of ways. Probably these four new wings can The logic of a total force policy implies be accommodated on existing bases to a mix of active, Reserve, and civilian reduce support costs. In addition, some facilities could be closed if it becomes politically feasible to do so. Commissioners believe that more civilians could be utilized in support organizations, only a portion of which are ever deployed. Many of the Air Force industrial facilities could make more extensive use of labor- saving equipment if the constraints on acquisition were eased. The Air should use contract personnel more frequently; the test at Vance Air Force Base, Oklahoma, may provide insight that can be useful at, other installations. Furthermore, in using contractors, the Air Force should determine the job to be done, not how to do it, in order to encourage an imaginative approach by firm making the bid. Commissioners believe that contracting can substantially without hindering the deployment of fighting units. When assessing contractor costs, the services must compare them with life-cycle military or civilian cost, not merely those immediately out of pocket.

The Reserve Associate Program, which has brought so much credit to the Air Force for imaginative use of Reserve personnel, should be expanded to include other missions, particularly where it is desirable to improve the wartime surge capability. Commissioners speculated particularly upon the use of associate personnel with active-duty tactical fighter and reconnaissance squadrons. Where possible, support functions should be consolidated so that one facility could accommodate several Reserve units. As with the active units, deployment should determine the numbers of military personnel required in a unit, thereby opening possibilities for both civilian employment and contracting. When a Reserve unit has a rating of C-3 or better, then only one active force advisor is needed, a change that would reduce the number of advisors without curbing effectiveness.

Certainly an important and probably an indispensable element in Reserve force readiness has been the use of technicians. But this program is more costly than need be, owing to the dual role of the technician. The Commission recommended the use of National Guard and Reserve personnel on active duty, replacing the technician who is both a civil servant and a military reservist. This change, one that certainly would have to be phased into operation to protect the rights of those presently employed, would preserve the concept of the citizen-soldier, improve command relationships, and eliminate dual pay and retirement.

To determine the numbers of personnel required by 1985, the Commission made several assumptions: that the United States would avoid hostilities, that we would maintain our relative defense capabilities, and that the present international situation would not change.

These are bold assumptions that probably will not prevail for a decade. But if they do, then the Commission believes that our active military forces should be maintained at approximately their present strength of 2.1 million personnel. Civilian personnel could be reduced somewhat, perhaps by seventy or eighty thousand to a level of one million, assuming base closures, the use of more laborsaving equipment, and the employment of more contract personnel. The Selected Reserve should continue at about 890,000, provided the Navy finds a use for its surface reserve. Private contract personnel could increase.

Although the Air Force can be proud of its success in attracting volunteers throughout the period of conscription, the All Volunteer Force has imposed some strains on recruiting efforts. But largely these have fallen on the other services, particularly the Army and the Marines, which must attract men into ground combat jobs where the technical training opens few employment opportunities in civilian life. For the most part, the services all have made an excellent transition to the AVF.

Commission staff members, on the basis of data collected, conclude that the quality of the active forces, both in educational level and mental category, has improved over the draft years. But the opposite is true of the Reserve forces. The number of blacks has grown, without any indication that this has affected the ability of units to carry out their missions as some had suspected. The participation of women has increased, but the Commission detected a continuing lack of acceptance of them. There is little evidence that volunteerism has changed the geographic or economic composition of the forces; the services still draw their numbers from the middle class.

The Commission considered carefully whether the services should adopt a representational policy. To write such a statement that would encourage rather than inhibit improvement would require the skills of a poet laureate, the experience of a statesman, and the wisdom of Solomon. The Commission concluded that the armed forces should recruit and assign personnel without regard to representation, except for women where the case is special and requires exceptional handling. To make certain that institutional discrimination does not continue in career patterns and assignments, the leadership from the Secretary of Defense downward must take a personal interest in equal opportunities for women and members of racial minority groups. In particular more women and minority officers must be attracted and then encouraged to advance through the ranks.

The Commission made many specific recommendations on recruiting operations that merit the consideration of those actively engaged in the responsibility. Of general interest was the suggestion that the services be given flexibility in the use of incentives and options so that the amount offered is commensurate with the need at a particular time. For instance, in those months where larger numbers of people must be attracted to fill training programs or to make up for retirements, perhaps incentives should be increased, with corresponding reductions during months when fewer people are required. Likewise, the state of the economy and the time of year will determine to some degree the recruiting competitiveness of the armed forces, thereby making a policy of varying rather than rigid incentive all the more attractive.

Flexibility in the use of quotas would make it possible for recruiting managers to weigh the propensity of young people in one area to enlist or to assess local economic conditions. Likewise, recruiters should be measured on the success or failure of those they recruit, based upon job performance. A single mental test should be employed by all of the services and administered by joint teams independent of the recruiting forces. The tests should be changed frequently to avoid compromising them.

Selection tests should measure the likelihood that a recruit will complete his enlistment satisfactorily rather than predict his success in training. By using a least-cost analysis, the Air Force probably could improve its assignment of personnel to augment the success of its recruits. Study of this section of the report could provoke a healthy discussion of Air Force assignment methods.

A most important charge to the Commission was to explore the future of the All Volunteer Force. To do so, one must look at the supply of men during the next decade, the period of study assigned to the Commission, and the alternatives for employment that will be available to young people during that time. The supply will diminish between now and 1985 (and more sharply after that). Employment will depend upon the vigor of the economy. Members of the Commission staff calculated the success of recruitment, assuming the continuing competitiveness of financial incentives, for an economy that grows rapidly, moderately, or slowly.

The study concluded that the active forces will not encounter difficulty attracting volunteers during the next decade if the economy grows slowly or moderately. But in a time of rapid economic growth, the armed forces must change their methods to attract youth; the staff suggested revising physical and mental standards, utilizing more women, offering more tempting bonuses, or providing more competitive salaries. Some combination of these alternatives should attract sufficient numbers of qualified people to make the A VF viable during periods of rapid growth until 1985. For the Reserve forces, present methods probably will attract the necessary volunteers during slow or moderate periods, but they will not avert significant shortfalls during rapid economic growth. Major revisions and possibly a change in the locations of units might be necessary in a spirited economy.

Commissioners were disturbed by current mobilization planning. In the event of major hostilities, the armed forces, particularly those in ground combat, will depend upon the Individual Ready Reserve and the Standby Reserve to replace casualty losses, until new men are provided by enlistment or conscription and trained by the services. The Commission staff concluded that DOD estimates of the size of this replacement pool were too optimistic. The staff also judged that plans for reinstating conscription from a small Selective Service headquarters-making necessary the establishment of boards to carry out registration, appeals, and induction, and the delivery of men to the armed forces would require a substantially longer time period than present mobilization estimates. Accordingly the Commission recommended that the Selective Service System be reconstituted to conduct annual registration and classification of young men to make possible inductions within thirty days of the declaration of an emergency.

In the area of development and use, the Commission determined how the services select the person with appropriate education and. motivation to do a job, train him, and make certain that he is available at an appropriate time. Obviously no organization does this perfectly; usually the services perform well.

The Commission recommended that the Air Force not place undue emphasis on postgraduate work, illustrating that point by saying that except for scientific and technical assignments the baccalaureate degree should be a sufficient level of formal education to attain four star rank. The services should not establish education and training facilities where civilian institutions already are doing this work satisfactorily. Better uniformity in classifying civilian and military jobs would make possible the utilization of civilian training by the armed forces, thus reducing military training costs.

Instead of requiring advanced degrees by those assigned to certain positions, the Air Force should determine the percentage of people holding similar positions who need the degree. For example, the Air Force might want 40 percent of those filling certain management positions in the Logistics Command to hold a master's degree in business administration, rather than designating particular positions, amounting to 40 percent of the total, to be occupied by officers holding the M.B.A. The former system would probably provide equally effective management with far fewer assignment problems.

The services should encourage officers to improve themselves through voluntary education programs related to their occupational assignments but not at the expense of professional education. Either professional education is vital to the military person's preparation for advancement, and thus professional education should be linked to promotion, or the nation should avoid the expense of professional education. The Commission affirms the former.

One of the boldest recommendations of the Defense Manpower Commission relates to the military career force of the future. Considering the increasing liability of the nation to pay retirement benefits, one may conclude that this pattern cannot continue without seriously affecting the ability of the nation to maintain adequate defense activities in the future.

The military career force may be sized to provide the leadership for the armed services, or it may be sized to provide opportunities for advancement under an "up or out" system. The Commission recommends the former, tempered by personnel management considerations, rather than the latter which is now employed. Under this recommendation, the career force would include all officers and NCOs who had served ten years or longer. Coming to the ten-year point, a person would be chosen for the career force or separated. Only those who are needed to manage the total professional force would be selected. Once chosen, a person would not be required to advance in rank to remain in the force; a person would be separated only for failure to meet professional standards of performance or for a reduction service strength.

Career force grouped into combat, technical, professional. Promotion would be based upon years of service, time in grade, and performance. Normal retirement would not come before thirty years, except for those engaged in combat jobs where retirement could be earned at a faster rate. The elimination of the failure-oriented "up or out" system should improve both morale and performance.

The retirement system would reinforce this concept. Present annuities payable after twenty years of service would be phased out, replaced by annuities payable when normal retirement under the new program was reached. Increasing the length of service would reduce the numbers actually retired and thus those trained and educated. It probably would make possible somewhat longer tours as well. If a member of the career force departed voluntarily, he would be offered an annuity payable at age 65. Involuntary separatees would receive the annuity at age 65 plus a separation readjustment, or they could elect to receive a double readjustment payment.

The Commission staff tested this requirements-based concept on a USAF officer force of 97,841 people, the objective of the Defense Officer' Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). It is possible that in a requirements-based system a smaller career force would provide appropriate leadership, but no attempt was made to determine these possible savings. Comparing the costs of the DOPMA force against a requirements-based one, calculating personnel flows by computer simulation, the staff calculated that the DOPMA force, including retirement, would cost $3.3 billion annually, compared to the force of less than billion, or a saving each year of more $200 million. A similar study of the enlisted force indicated savings of more than twice that amount, indicating the magnitude of cost reductions possible (provided that Commission staff assumptions are valid) if this approach were taken throughout DOD. The matter obviously merits thoughtful consideration.

Commission recommendations on compensation were as varied as the elements of this baffling, complicated subject. The staff looked carefully at the various components of compensation, making in the process a detailed study of the military estate program. The Commission recommended that the services be given flexibility in the management of bonuses and special payments to military personnel so that these could be employed only when they are required to encourage that for which they were intended: enlistment, re-enlistment, acceptance of hazardous or unwelcome duty, or a variety of situations that mayor may not exist throughout the services. In order to eliminate differences in compensation between married and single persons, the Commission recommended that the items of regular military compensation be converted into a fully taxable military salary. It is understood that doing so would only eliminate the monetary disadvantage single persons now have; it would not save money because the salary would be augmented to compensate for the increased taxes. The Commission reported that institutional benefits, particularly commissary and post exchange privileges and medical care, are considered by military personnel to be much more important than their cost to the government and thus should be maintained.

One of the most difficult problems facing the Commission was to determine how the level of military and civilian salaries should be set. Presently, military compensation is geared to civil service salary levels through the linkage established by the Rivers Amendment. Introduced as a temporary expedient many years ago, that legislation continues to do imperfectly what various Administrations and the Congress have not otherwise determined: how to compensate military people in a manner that is both competitive and equitable.

The imperfection of the present system has at least two major causes. Civil service salaries now are set by determining comparability between government jobs and those in private enterprise. Although appearing straightforward, the actual process of finding comparable jobs is difficult and in many cases not possible; the process of soliciting information necessarily involves flaws; and application of this information usually favors the civil servant. The Commission accordingly accepted the concept of comparability as a guide to judgment, but not in the way it currently is being used.

The second cause for doubt is that military jobs often have little connection with those in civil service. The assumption that the relationship between ranks and grades for military purposes will be nearly the same as for civilian purposes has serious limitations.

But finding an alternative to this procedure is likewise perplexing. To abandon the Rivers Amendment could threaten the orderly advance of military compensation during periods of inflation, whereas linking military and civilian compensation brings together an impressive variety of interests in the Congress. Thus any approach should be one that continues to view the total problem of Federal compensation rather than military salaries alone.

Accordingly, the Commission recommended the establishment of a permanent and independent Federal Compensation Board, composed of fulltime members charged with the responsibility of studying and recommending levels of compensation for those in all major Federal pay systems. The Board should be authorized to employ a staff large enough to study the circumstances related to recruitment and retention of personnel in each of these systems, establishing equity between various occupations and conditions of service. The Board would report both to the President and to the Congress under appropriate procedures for publication and implementation, providing an opportunity to either the President or the Congress to set aside recommendations within a specified time before they would take effect. Establishing such a board would be a major departure from present methods. But the Commission concluded that the immediate system for' determining military compensation needs major revision, and this means of doing so should be assessed.

The leadership of the Air Force impressed the Commission. Commanders usually are responsible, imaginative, and competent. Morale of the people of the Air Force seems good; it appears that units can carry out their missions, as they did with such skill in Southeast Asia.

But that is not to say that there are no problems. Many young people, and sometimes career personnel, believe that the nation has failed to keep its implied promises to them. When they hear national leaders speak against the military, they often take that criticism personally. It is difficult to maintain pride in a force that is pilloried as wasteful, lazy, corrupt, gluttonous, or lawless. Although most of us realize that the balance of judgment in the nation lauds our military forces, a few comments by candidates, Congressmen, or other national leaders can disillusion some of our most patriotic military people.

Who represents us, they question? The Commission answered that the Chief of Staff should do so, and that to serve this function he must have the freedom to speak. No one questions the necessity for military personnel, including the Chief of Staff, to take orders. But until the order is given, the Chief of Staff should be permitted to express concern. This has been possible less frequently as the roles of the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget have grown more prominent in the determination of national policy.

Without an effective spokesman, young people in the ranks will think more about the apparent advantages of inviting unions to represent them. If this occurs, then command authority and union membership will vie for the primary allegiance of the military person, all to the confusion of operations and the ultimate detriment of the nation's defense. This issue presently demands the attention of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress.

In the AVF, human considerations eventually will help to determine what weapons we can employ and where we can employ them. As options increase for young people in a growing economy, military personnel will have less interest, in unaccompanied tours, isolated posts, demanding hours, and harsh conditions of life and service. By this I do not imply that the youth of America will not accept the challenge of the difficult, the unusual, the dangerous: a glance at what they face in athletics dismisses that fear. But the services cannot assume dedication to a professional life that involves too much drudgery or misery, or too many lonely hours plagued by concern for loved ones. Thus human considerations must be assessed in the determination of what the nation should undertake and how it should do so. The real test of Air Force is performance when the nation needs air power. This may be during an emergency or a demonstration of force or a war. We maintain costly forces to prevent their use as well as to employ them if need be. In either case, flawless performance is the means to success.

Too often we think in terms of superior design, or better manufacturing, or larger numbers, or more skillful deployments. But behind all of these concepts, people will determine success, just as they always have in all human enterprise. Agamemnon's warriors before Troy or Alexander's forces at Arbela have their modern counterparts. We remember how the Luftwaffe collapsed in World War II after the best German pilots had been lost, and those who replaced them were not trained well enough to match Allied airmen. Today the individual in the cockpit remains, although with a much different assignment than in former days. But behind him are other heroes, crucial to success and in greater numbers: those who design, procure, and maintain complicated weapon systems.

Thus the management of human resources will be an important determinant of Air Force success in America's future. To affirm that, for the Air Force and the other services as well, the Commission concluded that Defense Manpower management truly is the keystone of national security.

Dr. Curtis W. Tarr (Ph.D., Stanford University) is a Vice President of Deere & Company, Moline, Illinois. Dr. Tarr spent five years in the federal government as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Reserve Affairs; Director, Selective Service System; and Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance and Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management. Before going to Washington, he was President of Lawrence University at Appleton, Wisconsin.

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