AIR-TO-AIR TRAINING UNDER THE DOC SYSTEM

PROBABLY the most glamorized and least understood aspect of aerial warfare has been air-to-air combat. Victories usually go to the best weapon system-an amalgamation of aircraft performance, aerial weapons, and aircrew skills. During the Korean War, sweptwing F-86 Sabres were pitted against MiG-15 jets. At the end of the war the Sabre pilots had established a ten-to-one margin of victory over the best in the Communist inventory, the MiG-15. From its growth and experience during the Korean hostilities, the USAF emerged with a powerful counterair force. However, the intervening years between 1953 and the start of the Southeast Asia conflict saw a gradual deterioration in the air-to-air capability of tactical air forces. Aircraft development emphasized the nuclear role; the air-to-air gun was considered anachronistic, and aircrew training was fragmented.

At the start of the Southeast Asia conflict, the capability of tactical air power to engage in air-to-air fighting was, at best, less than optimum. Early aerial engagements over North Vietnam made this evident, and it was much later in the conflict before this trend was reversed. Concentrated training, improved weapons development, and aircrew specialization allowed this reversal. The lesson was not to be forgotten, and major efforts within Tactical Air Command and the Air Staff were initiated. A training system was needed that would prevent a loss in capability such as occurred after the Korean War. This article will discuss the Designed Operational Capability (DOC) training system-its genesis, its implementation in the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing, and the degree of its success.

In 1972, the Tactical Fighter Symposium addressed two of the most vital issues confronting tactical aviation: tactics and training. The symposium concluded that both areas required a thorough review in light of Air Force combat experience in Southeast Asia. Two primary recommendations concerning training were made. First, training should be optimized; and second, training should be more realistic. Optimized training was to be based on reducing the number of roles required in multipurpose tactical aircraft. Aircrews would concentrate primarily on either the air-to-air or air-to-surface role, but not on both. They would maintain a secondary but less-demanding capability in the other role. Sorties and events rather than flying hours were to be used as a measure of merit. Realism was to be enhanced by providing au. authentic warlike environment during exercises and upgrading the facilities in which training was to be conducted.

The program remained in the conceptual stage until 1973, when the fuel crisis provided the catalyst necessary to transform talk into action. An important meeting was held to review tactical requirements in the late fall of 1973 at Headquarters USAF. Representatives from all commands that employ tactical air power were in attendance. As a result of this meeting, the entire training system for operational units was realigned. The operational capability of each tactical fighter squadron was designed to optimize training in either a primary air-to-air role or a primary air-to-surface role. Those units with multipurpose fighter aircraft (e.g., the F-4) would be assigned a primary and a secondary Designed Operational Capability.* Further delineation was provided in terms of sorties required versus aircrew proficiency level.

The program was structured within three levels of aircrew proficiency: (1) Basic proficiency aircrews were those that would maintain basic flying skills in the aircraft, including instrument and night proficiency. They would not be required to maintain weapons delivery qualification nor meet formal training requirements for weapons employment systems. (2) Mission capable aircrews were those that would require a minimum of additional training before introduction into combat. These aircrews were expected to complete formal training in both air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons employment but at a reduced level. Staff and/ or supervisory personnel were included in this category. (3) Mission ready was the designation applied to those aircrews that could be introduced directly into combat in the event of war. They would maintain the full complement of formal training requirements in both air-to-air and/ or air-to-surface roles.

Concurrent with the new DOC training system, a major effort was exerted to add realism to the program by upgrading the air-to-surface ranges, improving exercise scenarios, and providing realistic air-to-air targets. Thus, a generalized training program was transformed into a specialized program-one designed to enable the fighter force to gain a high degree of proficiency and combat capability and maintain this capability as a visible deterrent to aggression. Implementation of this program was the next step.

Within the Tactical Air Command the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing was assigned a primary DOC of air-to-air superiority and a secondary DOC of air-to-surface. Equipped with three squadrons of the latest models of the F -4E, the wing prepared to implement the training program on 1 July 1974. For an air-to-air unit, that meant providing sufficient training to ensure that tactical maneuvers to achieve missile- and gun-firing parameters were second nature to every mission ready aircrew in the wing. To accomplish this, a carefully structured stair-step approach was developed.

Air combat tactics

Air combat maneuvers

Basic fighter maneuvers

The academic program

Southeast Asia experience

SEA experience. The program was based on lessons learned in Southeast Asia. The majority of the aircrews were combat veterans and had, in varying degrees, some form of air-to-air experience. Some had MiG kills to their credit while many others had MiG engagements. All were eager to use their experience to develop an air-to-air capability second to none. Further, the introduction of new equipment and improved hardware capabilities dictated a look at fighter tactics from. a new vantage point. Major modifications were required in how we fight. For example, the TISEO, * which was introduced into combat during the waning days of the war, caused a minor revolution in fighter formations and employment. With Southeast Asia expertise as a basis, a review of current tactics, procedures, and employment formations was undertaken. The result was improved training scenarios, new proficiency exercises, and an expanded academic program. The foundation was laid, and the program commenced.

Academic training. The academic program was structured to provide a concentrated initial block of instruction followed by yearlong continuation training. Three major areas of ground training received emphasis: enemy threat capabilities, employment environment, and weapon systems employment. Experts from the Fighter Weapons School and Aggressor Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, provided comprehensive initial training. Each aircrew experienced in condensed form the same air-to-air syllabus training that is used in the USAF Fighter Weapons Instructor Course. Subsequently, extensive sessions on the entire gamut of enemy threats,

including information on man and machine, were provided each time the aggressor squadron deployed to Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina. Air defense networks were covered in detail, with emphasis on the European theater. However, the single most important aspect of the program was thorough and detailed training in the employment of F-4 weapon systems. Delivery and employment envelopes, switchology, and techniques were emphasized for each weapon system. The AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9 Sidewinder, and the20-mm cannon were the heart of academic training. Thus, the perennial problem of missed switches and improper ordnance release parameters was addressed and emphasized. Weapons employment was the forte of the academic training.

Basic fighter maneuvers. The third level on the stairsteps, basic fighter maneuvers (BFM), enabled the aircrews to practice in the air what they had learned on the ground. Basic fighter maneuvers were practiced single ship against a cooperative target. The cooperative target need not be equipped with a complex fire control system, and. the aggressor squadron T-38s became an excellent vehicle for this purpose. The saving in fuel by using a T-38 instead of an F-4 provided an added benefit. Proper weapons employment parameters and switchology, emphasized during the academic sessions, were evaluated during the BFM and subsequent phases. Trigger squeeze, missile tone, and frames on target were all evaluated and compared against standards.

A maneuver called "cine track" was introduced into the BFM phase. This maneuver requires the fighter to track an adversary through a predetermined maneuver. The aircrew must ensure coordinated tracking with proper switchology and trigger discipline. Simulated bullets fired and gun camera frames on target are counted and must meet a definitive standard to be awarded a "kill" Cine track is a good example of the well ordered and structured phase which is BFM.

Congeneric with that exercise was another useful tool called "agility exercises." As the name implies, the maneuver requires agile thought as well as coordination. These one-versus-one exercises tested the aircrews' skill at interpreting the opposing aircraft's maneuver as well as applying a countermaneuver to achieve a missile or cannon tracking solution. Time criteria were specified for each distinct maneuver; ammunition expended and frames on target were evaluated. The same type of structured and controlled environment was maintained that characterized the cine track. Both maneuvers have specific training objectives, and even the best aircrews benefited from frequent practice of these exercises.

Air combat maneuvers. The final two stairsteps are closely related. The air combat maneuvers (ACM) phase is, in a word, structured. Innovative tactics were not the objective; rather, canned practice in offensive and defensive maneuvering was required. Aircrew coordination and precise radio transmissions, two areas which pose continuous problems, were especially emphasized. Again, dissimilar sorties were especially valuable, and ideas were crossfed from other fighter units by the aggressor pilots. Missions ranged from defensive two-ship patrol formation, practicing initial moves, to offensive sequential attack.*

Air combat tactics. At the top of the stairs were the air combat tactics (ACT) missions. All the lessons learned and practiced in the preceding steps were integrated into this phase. Good procedures, strong supervision, and strict aircrew discipline are the guts of ACT training. Emphasis was shifted from air-crew coordination to the tactical partnership. Formed elements were utilized in so far as possible, so that a higher level of coordination and understanding could evolve among the tactical partners. The tactical partnership became the new watchword in air-to-air circles. It is more flexible and has replaced the fighting wing formation, which was sacrosanct during the salad days of rigid "fluid four" tactics.

The heresy of a wingman taking a shot is now considered antiquated. Each member of the flight is considered a potential shooter, but strict flight discipline is observed. Nothing has been taken away from the leader; he has more resources now at his disposal, namely, one or two aircraft with good ordnance and fire control systems, depending upon the formation. On the attack, confusion is avoided by a set of "free or engaged fighter responsibilities," which are as familiar to the aircrews as the checklist. The engaged fighter still has the responsibility of killing the bandits, while the free fighter checks six, monitors fuel, and directs the fight to bring continuous pressure on the enemy aircraft. Lookout responsibilities have changed somewhat although doctrine is the same.

While ACT is the apex, it is not all-inclusive. It is open-ended, allowing for growth and refinement of tactics. It is the area in which overall air-to-air capability should be measured. When aircrews can effectively employ their weapon system in this arena, they are mission ready.

MORE THAN two years have passed since the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing implemented an air-to-air training program under the Designed Operational Capability system. Specialization has enabled the standards and the realism of the training to be raised. The stair-step approach has permitted real growth in effectiveness. The overall readiness of the command has increased significantly. The glamor of air-to-air combat remains undiminished, but the DOC system has provided a method to prevent the valleys in experience that have occurred in the past. Air-to-air training has been transformed from its previous rocky course to one that is optimized and realistic. This method has been accomplished without compromising safety; indeed, its cause has been promoted by the structured nature of the training and the increase in proficiency of the aircrews. We may expect that changes will continue to occur; however, the system has demonstrated the latitude to be accommodating.

In summary, the DOC system of training has enabled the fighter force to gain and maintain that high degree of proficiency and combat capability so essential in maintaining our deterrent posture. Baron Manfred von Richthofen is credited with the words: "Fighter pilots have to rove in the area allotted them in any way they like. And when they spot an enemy they attack and shoot them down . . . anything else is rubbish." The DOC training system cannot add anything to his message. It can and does permit us to train the way we should fight.

Colonel Robert D. Russ ( M.B.A., George Washington University) is commander,4^th Tactical Fighter Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, where he previously served as Vice Commander. Following pilot training, he attended gunnery school and was then assigned to RAF Bentwaters and stateside flying slots. He is a command pilot with more than 4000 flying hours and 242 combat missions in Southeast Asia. At the Pentagon he served as Plans Officer on the Air Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Colonel Russ is a Distinguished Graduate of Air Command and Staff College and National War College.

Air-to-Air Training Under the Doc System

Air-to-Air Training
Under the Doc System