Air University Review, September-October 1976

In the post-Vietnam era, the U.S. military faces stiff challenges. All services share common difficulties, which certainly must include meeting the problems of the all-volunteer concept, the integration of minority groups and women, the effects of inflation, and the influence of technology. In addition, the Air Force must resolve one issue that is unique to it and has the Air Force much in the news. That issue, of course, is the future of the strategic bomber. Even without growing congressional and public concern with the Soviet threat and the escalating costs of defense, the fate of the strategic bomber is of great importance to the entire country as well as to the future of the Air Force. Three recent books should aid in appraising its future.

The bomber achieved its greatest success during World War II. Since then much has been said for and against it, but the best studies on the effects of the strategic bombing in the war were produced by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS). Recently 30 of the survey's 321 reports have been reprinted,¹ and we are also fortunate to have an excellent study of the survey itself. David MacIsaac's Strategic Bombing in World War II: A Study of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey* should bolster the credibility of the survey. This fine book tells of the difficulties of organizing the survey, the how and who of personnel selection, and what was studied and how. Throughout, MacIsaac does a good job of weaving the history of the strategic air war into the narrative. Probably the most noteworthy section of the book is "The Great Anderson-Navy War," which says much of interservice rivalry and how myths (specifically that the airmen counterfeited USSBS Pacific Report #71a) are created and perpetuated.

*David MacIsaac, Strategic Bombing in World War II: A Study of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1976, $12.50), 231 pages.

MacIsaac is critical of the survey. He notes, for example, that USSBS was limited by not having among its leadership a labor leader, a ground commander, or, of all manner of men, a historian. The author believes that the survey's leaders relied too heavily on the adversary process. Nevertheless, MacIsaac concludes that the survey performed the appointed task--one that he claims was an impossible job--fairly well, "as well as could be reasonably expected." (pp. 163, 161)

The author's strengths are his prose style, his candor, and his research. MacIsaac's writing sparkles and keeps the reader interested even when he is being led through the intricacies of the bureaucracy. His candor helps, for one always knows where the author stands. For example, he writes that the top man was the fifteenth choice for the position, of how a colonel was eased out of the organization, and how the official Army Air Force history is less than straightforward. (p.189 fn. 12; p.63; p. 196 fn. 10) Finally, MacIsaac's research is truly deserving of the term "meticulous," so often used in book reviews and so often undeserved.

Criticisms of the book are principally two in number. First, and the only serious problem, is MacIsaac's failure to assess clearly how accurate the survey was. Did USSBS give history the best assessment there is on bombing, or not? Is it possible to write a better survey of the bombing? The author makes no attempt to compare USSBS with the British bombing survey or show how USSBS's findings have been used and misused since 1945.² Finally, the publisher must be admonished for using such very small type in the long quotations.

Air power became a primary weapon in World War II. As the survey concluded: " . . . allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe." (MacIsaac, 1976, p. 141) Those words should be carefully noted: "allied," not just Army Air Force; "air power," not just strategic bombing; and "Western Europe," not all of Europe. Air power did not win World War II, nor did USSBS make that claim. While some have tried to make more out of air power's role in the war than justified, certainly it is true that aviation played a vital part in the Allied victory. But the atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki ushered in a new era and may have invalidated some, if not most, of the operational value of USSBS’s findings and of the experience of the strategic air campaign during World War II. At the same time, nuclear weapons bolstered the potential of the strategic bomber.

Since the war the Air Force has played a major role in U.S. defense. But its nuclear armed bomber, after initially dominating all, is no longer a primary weapon. By 1976 the very future of the strategic bomber is threatened. What has changed? Briefly, in the 30 years since the end of the war, the bomber's position has been eroded by technology, two limited wars, and by costs.

Norman Polmar’s Strategic Weapons: An Introduction* is a good summary of what has happened in the development of strategic weapons in the U.S. and the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1975. The book is brief and very readable. Among its other virtues is the balanced coverage of both major powers as well as missiles, aircraft, and submarines. Unlike many books, this one delivers more than is promised, for it can be used not only as "an introduction" but also as a handy reference; in addition to the text there are six useful appendices. The Pentagon and Air Force view is included in a 35-page extract of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown's "United States Military Posture for Fiscal Year 1976." The other appendices list information on the various strategic bombers, missiles, and submarines of the nuclear powers.

* Norman Polmar, Strategic Weapons: An Introduction (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1975, $7.50, $3.95 paper), 161 pages.

Although it is a good book, it easily could have been better. Strategic Weapons lacks the supporting footnotes of the other two books reviewed here. This omission as well as the lack of a bibliography seriously restricts the book's usefulness for further study. Second, the author fell off in his conclusions. To be blunt, Polmar pulled his punches, implying, hinting, but never directly expressing his views.

Polmar describes how the USAF, since only its bombers could deliver nuclear weapons, became the major service after the war, with the Navy and Army becoming token forces. Strategic bombers developed from the piston-powered B-29s, B-50s, and B-36s to the jet-powered B-47s and B-52s. These were the aircraft that the top Air Force leadership flew and with which it identifies. Despite the lack of strategic bombing during the Korean conflict, the USAF built its dominance over both the Soviet and the American defense establishment with the strategic bomber.

The golden age of the bomber lasted little more than ten years, however, and was challenged in the late 1950s by the land-based ballistic missile. The Air Force neglected ballistic missiles, electing instead to develop air-breathing missiles. While Polmar omits the case of the Navaho, a clear failure, he does tell how another, the Snark, was abandoned in 1961, only four months after being declared combat-ready. When the Russians put Sputnik up in 1957, Americans were jarred. The USAF got the liquid-fueled Atlas into operation in 1959, and while the Soviet missiles were larger, American intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) were more numerous until 1970. For the Russians accepted a poor second in strategic bombers, while contesting superiority in land-based missiles. And, because of its many advantages, the ICBM replaced the bomber as the chief strategic weapon of both countries.

The second technological challenge to the bomber came from the Navy. As Polmar indicates, carrier-based aircraft could pose little threat to the bomber's ascendancy, but the nuclear-powered submarine armed with ballistic missiles could and did. The first Polaris submarine armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) went to sea in 1960.

Although we talk of the Triad of bombers, ICBM's, and SLBM's, in fact the bombers have become a supplement for the two missile systems. Quite a turn about, for as late as 1959 the commander of Strategic Air Command wrote that "for the foreseeable future, missiles will supplement and complement rather than replace the manned bomber."³

Polmar tells of Air Force efforts initiated in the 1950s to upgrade bomber performance with two follow-on programs: the supersonic B-58 and B-70. The first was in service during the 1960s but was then retired, while the second was canceled by the Kennedy administration in 1961 as unnecessary and economically unjustifiable." (p. 30) Polmar relates how a third follow-on project, the FB-111, was forced on the USAF by then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Although 66 of these bombers are presently in operation, the Air Force does not think it is the answer to its problems, claiming that its range and payload are too limited.⁴

In addition to the two ballistic missiles, the bomber's position was further undermined by changes in a third technology, improved antibomber defense. Polmar briefly discusses how Soviet fighters, radar, and surface-to-air missiles forced a change in bomber tactics from high-level operations to low-level attacks. These defensive advances have raised the question, Can the penetrating bomber survive?

The place of the strategic bomber also has been questioned because of the two wars America has fought in the last 30 years. In both wars high-level decisions prohibited the full-scale use of strategic bombing and the use of nuclear weapons. The use and usefulness of the B-52 in Vietnam have been seriously questioned. B-52 efforts against guerrillas in South Vietnam (more realistically against jungle) can be characterized as pathetic while the bomber's effect on North Vietnam has yet to be decided. Certainly both wars emphasize that the Air Force has other missions besides deterrence and nuclear war. In view of the efficacy of ballistic missiles for these missions, the bombers' other missions may now be as important or even more important. If the USAF is to fill nonnuclear roles successfully in future interventions and guerrilla wars, aircraft other than strategic bombers must be available.

Finally the bomber is being questioned on the matter of cost. Even the U.S., the richest country in the world, cannot afford all that it wants. With inflation becoming a greater and greater concern to the public and the politicians, this factor will have increasing significance in the future.

It is the combination of these factors, new technology, the experience of Korea and Vietnam, and cost that has challenged the Air Force's symbol, the bomber. In some ways airmen have an almost mystical bond with the bomber, critics snicker, like the cavalryman with his horse and the sailor with his battleship and now his carrier. All the Air Force's chiefs of staff have flown bombers. Air Force autonomy and Air Force fame were won chiefly by the bomber. So we should not be surprised that the questioning of the bombers' future triggers great emotion and anxiety within the Air Force. But the importance of the issue demands clear and thorough thought.

The issue is: Does the U.S. require strategic bombers? If so, should they be penetrating bombers? And if so, should they be B-1s, the Air Force's desired replacement for its present strategic bombers? Although this summer Congress provided funds to begin production of the B-1, the considerable cost and controversy surrounding the aircraft, and the Presidential election, may force a reassessment of this decision. First flying in December 1974, the Mach two aircraft has twice the payload, increased prelaunch and increased penetration survivability relative to the present bomber mainstay, the B-52. However, questions concerning the B-1's cost (latest estimates run between $80 and $100 million per copy), technical problems, and the need for an advanced penetrating bomber have stirred considerable reaction. Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force: Why and How* by Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood examines the issue in 98 pages of sober, detailed, scholarly text.

*Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood, Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force: Why and How (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976, $2.95 paper), 116 pages.

Based primarily on Department of Defense reports and congressional hearings, this study supports the need for a bomber force but not the need for a penetrating bomber or for the B-1. The authors maintain that the bomber force serves as insurance against a failure of the missile force (although unexpected technological breakthroughs) and insurance against surprise attack, for an opponent must disable all three of America's strategic forces or face a devastating counterattack. American strategic bombers can serve as a counter to the greater throw-weight of Soviet missiles. The book tells, however, how missiles are superior to bombers in fighting a nuclear war, whether it is general or a limited exchange. It holds that bombers have little or no advantage over missiles in accuracy and that the correlation between the Soviet air defense and the American bomber fleet is insufficient to justify the bomber.

The study concludes that our present bomber force is more than adequate now and with minor modification it will be adequate for the foreseeable future. Further, the authors believe that a penetrating bomber has no significant military advantage over the standoff bomber; the latter, however, has a significant economic advantage, amounting, they estimated, to a savings of $10 to $15 billion in the first ten years. In what would appear to be deliberate omissions, the authors do not discuss such issues as the use of bombers as bargaining chips and force mix (ICBM’s, and SLBM's, and bombers).

Bomber flexibility and the vulnerability and problems of standoff bombers and cruise missiles are all too briefly mentioned.⁵

The B-1 issue is of vital importance to all Americans and of special interest to members of the USAF. The need for bombers, penetrating bombers, and the B-1 should all be carefully determined. In view of the gravity of the question and the cost and technical problems of the B-1, we must be sure that the best alternative is chosen. The decision to procure the B-1 should be made because it is the best of the possible alternatives: considering modified B-52s (with turbofan engines and rocket assisted takeoff), penetrating bombers without Mach two capability, and standoff bombers. The B-1 should not be built because of a technical imperative, or because of Air Force identification with bombers, or because it will help certain areas of the economy.

In 1975 General George S. Brown stated it bluntly: "I consider the B-1 capability as a virtually indispensable element of our deterrent force."⁶ Whether the American public and the U.S. Congress will agree remains to be seen. In any event, these three books will help provide a useful starting point--data, provocation, and alternatives. Certainly all of these and clear thought are needed to ensure that America's defense is properly maintained.

Notes

1. David MacIsaac, editor, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 10 volumes (New York: Garland Publishing Co., Inc., 1976). While realizing that it is a judgment call as to which reports will or will not be published, I would recommend that three others be considered for future reprinting: "Fire Raids on German Cities," "Relative Performance of British and American Fighters against German Fighters: 1940-1945," but most of all, "Statistical Appendix to Over-all Report (European War)."

2. However, see MacIsaac's "What the Bombing Survey Really Says," Air Force (June 1973), pp. 60-63 and "A New Look at Old Lessons," Air Force (September 1970), pp. 121-27.

3. General Thomas S. Powers, "Ballistic Missiles and the SAC Mission" in John Loosebrock's Space Weapons (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959) p. 93.

4. Speech by H. M. Darmstandler, Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff USAF, "The B-1 Bomber," to the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, 24 July 1975.

5. However, see Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry Blechman, Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1973).

6. Quoted in Polmar, p. 131.