Air University Review, September-October 1976

still a stepchild

During the Vietnam conflict, one aspect of combat operations in which the United States Air Force took pride was that crew members downed in hostile territory would be promptly rescued, even in the face of stiff opposition from an enemy force present in the area. It was often unofficially stated that this assurance improved the morale of the aircrews and led them to press more aggressively against the enemy, but the assumption is easily dismissed. To field a professional air force, one knows, a priori, that targets will be attacked as ordered, with or without the comforting knowledge that rescue will be prompt. History is replete with examples of U.S. airmen, soldiers, and sailors who have faced the enemy knowing that rescue was improbable and that their survival depended on individual initiative. B-29 crews over Japan, the Son Tay rescue force, and submariners fall into this category.

However, the Vietnam war set a dangerous precedent which has had far-reaching effects on the thinking of USAF members flying the line. Because an aggressive recovery policy was believed necessary to maintain morale, and since the air resources were available, a tradition of immediate rescue was established. Such a thought process reached its logical conclusion (to engage in herculean rescue attempts) without examining the logic of the major premise in the light of military reality. That is, should other lives and millions of dollars of equipment be endangered to return one or two men?

Once the pattern had been set, it became ingrained in the thinking of flying personnel that, under most conditions, rescue would be imminent if they could just maintain radio contact. In fact, crews discarded other pieces of survival equipment to make room for extra batteries and radios. This type of thinking can have insidious long-term effects. If rescue is not forthcoming, the airman is physically and psychologically unprepared for long-term evasion.

Unfortunately, the Vietnam syndrome has persisted into the present era. It difficult to teach principles of evasion and survival techniques to individuals who categorize their fate after shootdown into the following: immediate rescue, capture, or death. The belief that the helicopter will arrive like a deus ex machina in a classical Greek play precludes serious consideration and planning for an extended stay on the ground. Perhaps the most valuable tool one can have in such a condition is not a compass or a map but a positive attitude toward evasion.¹

From a traditional military standpoint, the Vietnam experience was like a nightmare vacation from reality. Fighting a minor power and freed from the normal military requirement to defeat the enemy quickly on the battlefield, we had a vast array of hardware, aircraft, and technology available and no serious enemy offensive threat to force stringent husbandry of resources. It was this set of circumstances that could allow, for example, the loss of five aircraft in an attempt to save one crew.

In any future major conflict we may not have the same favorable air environment as existed over North Vietnam. We may be faced with the wide spectrum of antiaircraft artillery (AAA) that proved itself in the hands of the North Vietnamese: the whole family of Soviet-developed surface-to-air missiles (SAM), plus an advanced series of fighter aircraft with improved radar and air-to-air missiles. This combination could result in greater combat losses than were experienced in Southeast Asia and even more downed aircraft should search and rescue (SAR) forces be committed.

It is beyond the scope of this article to postulate the specific location where armed conflict may ensue, or what enemies we may face, or what the counterair threat may be. The purpose is to examine what search and rescue/evasion and escape (SAR/E&E) concepts are in vogue and contrast them with real life situations. Looking first at helicopter extraction, we find that the success ratio of SAR helicopters and their support aircraft remains unknown when pitted against an enemy equipped with modern air defense weapons. Again, we must not fall victim to the tunnel vision of Vietnam. Although successful rescues were made in the midst of AAA, SAM'S, and the MIG; threat, there were several mitigating factors. SAM opposition consisted primarily of the SA-2, which is the least modern of the family of Soviet SAM'S, and its altitude restrictions worked in our favor. As for the hostile interceptors, the North Vietnamese chose to conserve their resources and were heavily outgunned and outnumbered in most situations. We may not always be so fortunate in our opponents. Someday we may have to engage an enemy more prone to commit his air force, so it is doubtful that resources will be available for rescue missions when air superiority is an issue and tactical targets remain to be struck.

In any limited or general war with a nation on the receiving end of Soviet technology, there may be a vigorous confrontation for control of the air. Consequently, the number of aircraft downed could be quite high. It may be possible in some circumstances to effect a rescue with the use of low-flying helicopters, but with numerous crew members spread over a wide battle area the saturation point for helicopter resources would soon be reached. This buttresses the necessity that crews be prepared mentally and physically to evade capture, survive, and move considerable distances to await rescue. This is an old concept in the USAF but one that requires renewed, official emphasis.

At the other end of the recovery spectrum is the time-honored evasion net. This phenomenon appeared during World War II in the occupied countries of Europe and to some extent in China. The basic evasion net scenario is as follows: the evader makes his way to a prescribed location, where he is picked up and identified by an indigenous member of the net; and then he is moved clandestinely to a point where extraction by friendly forces can take place.² Each year this false god is slavishly worshipped during field training exercises (FTX). What worked in World War II to return over 4000 allied soldiers and airmen from Nazi Europe was the result of a set of fortunate circumstances that may or may not be reproduced in some future conflict.³ At best the evasion nets in France, Belgium, and Italy were manifestations of the humanitarian instinct of numerous groups and individuals, maturing over a long period of time and producing the most spectacular results during the rout of the German army. Even in the best of times the nets were constantly beset with informers and lax security practices.⁴

We may postulate certain initial assumptions based on the fact that evasion nets are manned by the native population. First, in a nation where measures to control the populace have been in effect for some time, the chance of cooperation is slim indeed. There is little hope of constructing a net before the conflict begins, and, afterward, the threat of retaliation against one's family by the security forces may deter all but the most stouthearted.⁵ Security regulations would be tightened and informer nets increased during war time.⁶ In addition, cooperation by a controlled population would be contingent upon evidence of victory by the United States government and its allies.⁷ In fact, the opposite may be true, for a long period. Also, to be successful, the net members must shed their ordinary attitudes and enter the dangerous and labyrinthian world of the conspirator. Clandestine techniques and sound security practices must quickly be learned and applied. When curfew and other security regulations are strictly enforced, to contact, recruit, and train net members, who may live many miles apart, is a monumental task. Finally, individuals must be found who will risk torture, death, or a combination of both to aid a foreign airman.⁸

In addressing the question of friendly nations overrun by an aggressor, one encounters the same type of problems. Few people want to back a loser. Even the much vaunted but generally overrated French resistance did not get off the ground until the Normandy landing. Many Frenchmen cooperated readily with the German army, their traditional enemy, and captured members of evasion nets were cast into French prisons to be guarded by their own countrymen.⁹

But the gaping hole in the theory behind the evasion net concerns the procedures used to gain entry into the net. Because of security considerations we are forced to assent to the argument that once a crew member is shot down, it must be considered that he has been captured and has divulged all the information he possesses to his interrogators. In theory, all the procedures known to him are now known to the enemy. A fellow airman who attempts later to use the potentially compromised methods may be initiating a long-lasting relationship with the hostile security service.¹⁰ The final factor, which militates against dependence upon the system, is the time lag. Assuming there is indigenous cooperation, it might be a long time before an evasion apparatus would become operational after the outbreak of hostilities. Meanwhile, the evader must be prepared both mentally and physically for an extended, unaided stay on the ground.

Not only is the evasion and escape net concept out of date, but the method for testing its procedures and simulating circumstances is hopelessly inadequate. Each year field training exercises doggedly stick to the same tired E&E format. No matter how the scenarios are juggled, they are still variations on a theme. And in addition to these complaints, the evasion nets are, with few exceptions, operated in an FTX atmosphere devoid of a counterintelligence opposition. What is put into practice are the mechanics of a theory over thirty years old and as yet unsuccessful outside of the unique environment that spawned it. However, since I have been so critical of this technique, I hasten to add that the clandestine and complicated nature of the E&E net demands that some individuals retain the capability to activate it, should the necessity arise. This means that the E&E technique must share some part in exercise play but certainly not the dominant one it now holds.

Another alternative to long-term evasion that must be mentioned is the use of personnel recovery teams, usually U.S. Army elements, to locate and escort evaders to safety. This technique may be viable when a downed wing commander is the target, but to apply it across the board is unworkable, just considering the sheer numbers involved. Aircrew recovery is not the primary mission of such forces, and substantial numbers cannot be committed to this effort when tasks of higher priority remain unaccomplished.

Thus far, only negative concepts have been presented. The purpose of this article is not just to criticize but to propose re-evaluation of SAR/E&E concepts regarding limited and general war.

With the realization that airmen must be prepared to survive for a long period in a hostile environment, one obvious conclusion is to expand the survival training presented to the crews. At the USAF Survival School this would mean more time in the field than is spent in the classroom; it also means increasing demands on the students in the field portion, especially in the area of plant food identification and collection. For example, students could be tested and required to identify certain survival foods in order to graduate.

Another critical factor is the level of self-confidence a man possesses when faced with an extended period in a hostile area. This is something that cannot be taught but must be acquired and then reinforced. If during survival training the individual is exposed to a solitary environment where he can depend only on himself, then an actual survival experience should have a less traumatic effect. The current use of the "buddy system" may conform to accepted safety procedures, but it fosters a false sense of security during training and precludes a sense of realism from taking hold of the trainee. The intended product of the training is an individual who has the physical and mental preparation to survive and return to friendly control. To achieve this, the theoretical evasion situation should closely approximate actual circumstances. At the very least the crew member should be allowed to come to grips with isolation and fear of the unknown in a training environment, as achieved by solitude in a wilderness area. This technique is not the safest way to get to know oneself, and of course there may be injuries or perhaps even fatalities. But such training can increase the number of people who successfully evade capture and return to friendly territory. And from the USAF viewpoint this is the intent of the E&E program--to get valuable resources back in the cockpit. 

The entire program may be approached in monetary terms. If the return rate from hostile areas can be increased by improved and realistic training, then that very training, which might cost the Air Force the use of several pilots from injuries, is actually responsible for a net gain of men and dollars in the long run, since the returning crews do not need expensive replacements.

The final argument against overprotection and undertraining is the attitude expressed by many aircrew members concerning their chances for evasion in North Vietnam if rescue attempts failed. The general attitude of literally hundreds of flying personnel with whom I had contact was thus: if helicopter rescue was not possible, then capture was a sure thing. To the serious observer it was clear that their attitude was not "I might be captured," but "I will be captured." This state of mind spread throughout the Air Force because there was no real, positive attitude, reinforced by training, that led men to believe they could be successful evaders.

Once an individual is trained, his skills should be rehoned and reinforced by additional exposure to field conditions. Those aircrews that will be exposed to the greatest threat should receive the bulk of the training. This could be provided during the numerous field training exercises held each year under conditions that range from arctic to desert. In fact, the exercises could answer the basic question of whether present training is adequate. To do this, certain men would be selected at random and immediately projected into a survival situation during an exercise. This training of course has already been provided, but I propose one further refinement--the men are to stay in the field for two weeks, alone, and with only the standard survival equipment, including an emergency radio. Past exercises have always avoided the central issue. Can crews survive using just skills learned at Survival School? On one exercise the evaders were provided with "C" rations; another allowed the men only several hours alone before they were taken in by the evasion net. We need to test the results of survival training in a controlled atmosphere that approaches the real thing. The FTX could be such a vehicle, if we would so use it.

If tests show that follow-on training is necessary, then the E&E portion of the exercise could be changed to include an increased number of aircrews. The scenario would be expanded, and a significant number of evaders would be put into operational areas with instructions to make their way to a predetermined point through significant troop concentrations. The combination of terrain, weather and ground troops, plus the possible cooperation of local police as a hostile force, would form an inexpensive, realistic training ground. In present exercises, relatively few aircrewmen are used, and their survival and evasion skills are not heavily taxed.

In any long-range, unassisted evasion program, the evaders will need additional survival gear, clothing, and perhaps dehydrated emergency rations for extremely hostile climatic conditions, such as severe winter weather. However, this is not the forum for presenting a detailed account of the means which would be used to resupply evaders. There are ways of making such a system work.

All of the techniques for recovery discussed throughout this article have their place if employed under the proper circumstances. However, circumstances and capabilities change, and our response must also undergo a metamorphosis. The helicopter rescue, the evasion net, and recovery teams may again have their day; hence, we must devote some effort to keeping up the skill banks in these areas. Not to do so would be plainly unwise.

But the current situation dictates that more emphasis be placed on the individual's personal effort, and this is where the USAF must expend its effort if it wants its people back. Aircrews are a most valuable asset and not easily duplicated. To assure that they are available for return to combat in times of dire need, a major effort should be expended to increase their repertoire of survival skills, foster a positive mental attitude, and present them with a realistic evasion training program.

1. Based on personal observation as Search and Rescue/Evasion and Escape Briefing Officer over a cumulative period of four years between 1968 and 1973.

2. Airey Neave, Escape Room (New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 207.

3. Ibid., p. viii.

4.Vincent Brome, The Way Back (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958), p. 162.

5. John Bradley, Lidice (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), p. 159.

6. J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939-45 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1972), p. 188.

7. Airpower and Russian Partisan Warfare, USAF Historical Study No. 177 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1962), p. xi.

8. Special Operations Research Office, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Washington, D.C., American University, 1965), p. 112.

9. Neave, p.108.

10. Ibid., p. 207.