Air University Review - September-October 1976

For over two decades United States military planners have endeavored to establish and maintain a credible deterrent against a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact (Pact) nations; and, if deterrence failed, to effect a favorable outcome in the conflict. These efforts necessarily commanded a significant amount of attention because of the enormity of the potential threat that such a conflict would pose to U.S. national interests. In a European conflict, the Soviet Union would have a strategic advantage over the United States in supplying and reinforcing its principal allies. The Pact nations also have a numerical advantage over NATO countries in ground combat forces, especially artillery and tanks. The numbers of opposing tactical combat aircraft deployed near the Central Region of Europe are roughly equal, although NATO tactical air (TACAIR) forces are believed to have a qualitative advantage because they are made up of a large number of more modern offensive aircraft. (TACAIR forces which the Pact could launch against the NATO Central Region, with very little warning, consist of about 2800 aircraft-of which the majority are primarily air-to-air fighters. To counter this immediate threat, NATO deploys more than 2700 tactical combat aircraft--about half of which are fighter bombers--in a roughly comparable area of Western Europe.)¹

Tactical Air Forces 
as a Deterrent

TACAIR forces are counted on to offset, in part, possible numerical inferiorities in land forces as compared to those of potential adversaries. The U.S. bears a proportionally greater responsibility for carrying out tactical air combat missions than do our allies, particularly in NATO where our TACAIR resources serve as an "equalizer."² While the needs of NATO's Central Region provide the basis for most of our general purpose forces, we cannot ignore the possibility of conflict on the flanks. The northern and southern NATO regions might invite separate or simultaneous attack in the absence of adequate deterrent forces.³ TACAIR forces can be used to mass firepower rapidly to counter enemy aggression either along the borders of the Central Region or the northern and southern flanks of NATO Europe. Hence, NATO TACAIR power serves as a major deterrent against a limited conventional war by reducing the potential advantages to be gained by initiating a surprise attack and by providing an "equalizer" to serve as a balance to the numerical superiority of the Pact land forces.

However, this balance provided by TACAIR combat forces could be upset if the Pact nations were able to make air base attack a more lucrative tactic. For example, the scales would be tipped in favor of the Pact nations if they were able to rapidly destroy a major portion of the NATO tactical aircraft or essential logistical assets on the ground or, in any way, inflict a major disruption of the NATO TACAIR sortie rate at the outset of hostilities. Were they to achieve either of these objectives, Pact armored forces, operating relatively unhampered by NATO TACAIR forces, probably could advance more rapidly. Having the capability greatly to reduce the effectiveness of NATO TACAIR power could provide a strong incentive for the Pact nations to initiate a surprise attack in the pursuit of an aggressive strategy.

The continued value of NATO TACAIR forces as a deterrent, then, may depend upon: (1) how well they can continue to survive while on the ground, get airborne before, during, and after being attacked, and how well they can sustain operations in the face of intensive antiairbase tactics; and (2) how well they can accomplish their assigned tasks in an extremely hostile environment.

TACAIR ground survivability will continue to be increasingly threatened by technological advances in offensive weapon systems and munitions. As protective shelters on air bases are progressively hardened, determined and technically capable nations most likely will continue to develop munitions that can penetrate these shelters and destroy the aircraft and other mission-essential resources they contain. Such weapons might be employed against individually sheltered resources using precision guided munitions (PGM); or when the concentration of lucrative targets is exceptionally dense (as it is on many NATO air bases), random area bombing techniques may be very effective. Further, small and lightweight penetrating munitions have been successfully developed and tested. These could make it operationally possible for a relatively small payload to "blanket" an airstrip and inflict damage to steel reinforced, concrete runways that is much more difficult to repair than simple cratering. Methods for delivering these munitions potentially are so varied that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to provide an active defense offering total protection.

Parked aircraft and other mission-essential resources, even though concealed and hardened, very likely can be detected (if necessary) and destroyed so long as they are concentrated and clustered on an air base-specially in the vicinity of a conspicuous landmark such as a runway. Runways attract attention to other nearby resources and are themselves targets. Even if the aircraft and the logistics infrastructure survive attack, sortie rates of conventional take-off/landing (CTOL) aircraft can be disrupted by the damaging of runways.

These factors combine to make a sudden mass attack on air bases inviting to the Pact forces. One alternative for improving ground survivability and thereby improving the deterrent value of TACAIR power is by increasing the effectiveness of existing active and passive defense measures. This could be achieved through dispersal of aircraft and logistics infrastructure to smaller, more numerous bases or operating sites. This kind of proliferation of bases and dispersal of assets would be helpful against both conventional and nuclear weapons. However, dependence on runways and taxiways is a pivotal liability that first must be reduced because it limits the extent to which TACAIR bases feasibly can be proliferated as well as the value that can be gained by dispersal. This disadvantage can be circumvented by using TACAIR forces that can be "zero" launched and recovered, such as is possible with manned vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft and unmanned drone/remotely piloted vehicles (RPV).

Deterring Warsaw Pact Aggression

Apparently, no one system can provide all that is needed to cope with the two-part problem of ensuring that NATO TACAIR forces remain survivable and effective in the face of advancing Warsaw Pact munitions and standoff delivery technology. Each system alone—CTOL, V/STOL, or drone/RPV--has both strengths and serious weaknesses.

Manned CTOL aircraft generally are quite capable because of their flexibility and versatility. But since they must depend on runways, they can be denied a full range of operating sites and held on or off an airfield whose take-off and landing areas have been damaged. Also, CTOL aircraft tend to become more and more expensive as they acquire the sophistication to carry out their mission in an increasingly hostile combat environment. 

Manned V/STOL aircraft would be expensive for the same reasons as well as for the added costs necessary to provide vertical operational capability. And, although vertical capability offers versatility in some operational modes, it imposes a penalty on the sum of possible tradeoffs in range, payload, and endurance. Technological advances that increase the effectiveness of manned systems generally would be applicable to both CTOL and V/STOL aircraft. Yet one realizes that the marginal utility of such advances, depending upon their nature, could be significantly greater for the V/STOL system because of its relatively primitive stage of development.

Drone/RPV appear to have a tremendous potential in being cheaper to build, operate, and maintain than manned aircraft-in part because there is no need to pay the high costs to accommodate, support, and protect man on board the system. On the other hand, until technological advances provide a secure and reliable data link between the vehicle and its remote controller, unmanned aircraft will continue to be severely limited in the ways they can supplement the manned TACAIR force.

However, as we shall see, these three types of systems can be combined to capitalize on their strengths and minimize weaknesses. If such a force were structured properly, it would not be essential that any one system be invulnerable, for each would be able to complement the other's deficiency in some way while making its own unique contribution. The fatal consequences of placing total reliance on runways could be avoided by acquiring zero launch /recovery systems; relative to CTOL systems, the higher costs of acquiring, operating, and maintaining V/STOL aircraft could be offset by the lower costs projected for drone/RPV; the expected high loss rates for manned systems performing certain tasks in intensely hostile environments for which drone/RPV were capable could be mitigated through the use of these unmanned systems; and while this field of technology evolves, the operational limitations of drone/RPV could be compensated for by manned systems. Differing from the Strategic Triad, in which each of the three components serves to deter by its own unique contribution, the force resulting from a mix of CTOL,V/STOL, and drone/RPV would be a synergistic deterrent--stronger than the sum of its parts--and serve as a "Tactical Triad."*A structure composed of manned and unmanned systems would be in consonance with the high-low cost mix philosophy for optimizing force size within tight budgetary constraints. Additional savings would be possible if the capabilities of the component systems comprising the total force each were tailored into high-low mixes for countering the extremes of the threat spectrum.

*An unofficial term coined by the author.

In addition to its ability to survive, such a high-low mix would offer certain advantages by increasing basing options. For example, substantially greater numbers of the CTOL portion of the force could be based farther to the rear of the expected area of operations, e.g., in the United Kingdom, where they would be easier to protect against most threats. The V/STOL and drone/RVP aircraft, able to disperse widely, could be stationed closer to the actual or expected combat area. This basing strategy would allow the United States to exploit its superiority in stand-off technology, in-flight refueling, and CTOL aircraft range. At the same time, the capability of the zero launch and recovery systems to survive, respond rapidly, and sustain operations in the face of intensive major air base attack could be exploited.

Feasibility of the Concept

The Air Force has investigated V/STOL systems with varying degrees of interest for many years but, for several reasons, has never chosen to acquire an operational capability. For one thing, gross weight limitations for vertical operations severely constrain fuel and payload capacity. Various recent technological advances have alleviated the adverse effects of this limitation, and projected advances in weapons, fuels, and designs hold promise for reducing the constraint itself. For example, the use of precision guided munitions (PGM) is not greatly affected by the small payload factor because PGM are relatively small and lightweight, and not as many are required to equal the lethality of comparable unguided bombs against hard point targets. Improvements in aerodynamic and propulsion design are underway to make vertical operations more efficient. Achievements in other areas such as exotic fuel research and subsystem miniaturization will also offset the payload constraint and enhance the utility of V/STOL systems.

Historically, another major drawback to V/STOL systems has been that they were expensive to develop, fly, and maintain. Although this is still true, the differences in costs between conventional and V/STOL operations have been reduced greatly and show potential for further reduction--again, largely through technological advances.

There are other ways in which specific cost barriers to V/STOL exploitation could be mitigated. For example, economies in research and development could be realized by (1) selectively buying into ongoing U.S. Navy and Royal Air Force (RAF) programs; (2) exploring and evaluating new and high-risk theories in ways that minimize cost and uncertainty--as is the aim of the Air Force Technology Integration program; or (3) employing some combination of these two methods. Buying into other Services' programs also can cut procurement costs through larger production orders where operational requirements are compatible.

Innovative concepts for providing logistical support (including major maintenance and repair) to operating sites dispersed from main bases may suggest both feasible and substantial improvements and economies over current V/STOL support systems. Creative application of new technology as typified by modular, easy-access components, remove-and-replace techniques, and simplified, more reliable subsystems should continue to make maintenance and repair easier and cheaper. The RAF and the U.S. Marine Corps conducted field exercises with the AV-8A Harrier from dispersed, undeveloped locations and substantiated the theory that operations could be sustained from other than main bases. Although just a first-generation version of operational, tactical V/STOL aircraft, the Harrier has repeatedly demonstrated its maintainability by sustaining high sortie availability rates that equal or excel those of comparable conventional aircraft conducting field exercises from bare bases. According to technical representatives of the civilian aircraft industry and engineers from the Flight Dynamics Laboratory, Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, there is no reason--from the standpoint of maintainability--why designs for V/STOL aircraft capable of sustaining operations from undeveloped sites dispersed from main bases could not be improved further.

Operational economies could be realized in a variety of ways. In peacetime, and in some wartime situations, V/STOL systems could be operated from existing main bases. Except where vertical operations would be required, such as during hostilities or when conducting training and tactical field exercises, short and conventional rolling takeoffs could be used to save fuel. Other techniques that might be used to cut operational costs include (1) cutting flight endurance needs by using ground alert in forward areas rather than in-flight loiter over the battlefield; (2) forward basing to reduce enroute distances; and (3) making maximum use of standoff weapons delivery capability to reduce penetration distances and requirements for penetration aids.

Although V/STOL systems may cost more to operate and maintain than CTOL, the increased insurance they offer against the success of a sudden, massive air base attack at the outset of a NATO conflict could prove invaluable by denying the Pact an opportunity to gain an unrecoverable advantage.

Drone/RPV’s offer an even wider range of basing options for survivability than V/STOL systems because they can be designed to be interchangeably air or zero ground launched and recovered. This flexibility would allow them, as an aid to ground survival, to be based in-theater at widely dispersed sites or employed from host aircraft operating from sanctuary bases located outside the combat area. Aside from having a potentially high degree of basing survivability, drone/RPV provide a possibility for penetrating and operating in hostile environments where the expected high loss-rate might tend to prohibit or constrain operations by manned aircraft.

Numerous studies and analyses, both military and civilian, have explored the applicability of drone/RPV systems to modern aerial combat. Conceivably, unmanned aircraft can perform tasks across the spectrum of warfare. Even though it may take considerable time for technology to reach the point where the concepts for some of the more sophisticated applications are realized, existing technology does enable a wide range of options for performing the simpler tasks to supplement or substitute for manned aircraft. Because drone/RPV can be made smaller and more maneuverable than manned aircraft, they are expected to be less vulnerable to both air-to-air and ground-to-air defenses in an intensely hostile environment. For this reason, including drone/RPV in the force mix can add a new dimension to the deterrence value of TACAIR power. For even if air base attack were made less desirable by a V/STOL capability, the Pact nations still might be tempted to attack if they felt that their air defenses could neutralize or greatly reduce the effectiveness of NATO manned TACAIR forces over the battlefield.

However, with all their potential advantages, drone/RPV alone will not provide a panacea. The more sophisticated tasks that they are expected to perform--such things as selected types of surveillance, reconnaissance, defense suppression, and strike or strike designation against some categories of fixed targets--will require secure, reliable communications between the vehicle and its remote controller. Therefore, while drone/RPV might add much to TACAIR survivability and combat effectiveness, this contribution is contingent upon maintaining a somewhat vulnerable data link for all but the simpler missions where the tasks can be preprogrammed into the vehicle. To preclude a catastrophic loss of capability, there must be a hedge to ensure that the complex tasks can be performed even if the enemy should succeed in negating a drone/RPV force by breaking the communications links.

Retaining manned aircraft in the force ensures that some residual, integral capability will continue to exist. For even if there were no interface with the Tactical Air Control System, a manned aircraft still could operate with some degree of effectiveness. Technology is nowhere near capable of producing an electronic computer that can duplicate the functions of the human brain--especially the ability to create or innovate unprogrammed alternatives and synthesize this information into useful form--much less be small enough to fit into the cockpit of an aircraft. Therefore, in order to preserve an adequate, self-contained command and control capability, some major portion of the force will probably have to consist of manned systems for the foreseeable future.

The existence of a significant TACAIR force that could not be readily neutralized should make an all-out, surprise attack on major NATO air bases less productive and therefore less desirable for Pact leaders. It appears that a high-low mixed force of manned and unmanned and conventional and zero launch/recovery aircraft could optimize TACAIR ground survivability and combat capability and, in doing so, greatly increase its value as a deterrent.

Notes

1. Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program, 4 March 1974, pp. 87-88.

2. Ibid., p. 143.

3. Ibid., p. 91.