Document created: 21 April 03
Air University Review, March-April 1976

Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Pocklington,
Canadian Forces

The role of the military has altered throughout recorded history by virtue of changing political demands, but it has stabilized, to some extent, since the emergence of the professional military officer. The origin of the profession can be traced to a government proclamation in Prussia in 1808, which stated that an officer's commission would be based on military education and professional knowledge. This departure from previous standards for officer candidates, such as aristocratic background or mercenary ideals, also projected the military professional as primarily a servant of the state. Modern nations have made provision for similar military establishments and depend on this professional corps to provide internal security and the means to exert military pressure, if deemed necessary, in the pursuit of national policy.

The advent of intercontinental strategy, nuclear stalemate, and cold war philosophy raises basic problems to the military as applied to their role and the effect on their expertise. The unification of the three National Defence operational elements into the present Canadian Forces has been a traumatic experience to many, but in the present era the military professional's role in society has not changed. However, his professional education must continue to expand to prepare him effectively for his contemporary responsibilities.

The military professional has advanced in expertise much as has the doctor or lawyer. This evolution has resulted in raised standards of education, but the change in education standards has not changed the basic philosophy behind the profession. Man advances within the structure of his chosen society, but the use of new tools has little impact on that basic structure. Sir Robert Aytoun (1570-1638) once wrote an essay to an inconstant mistress wherein he stated, "Thou art not what thou wast before, what reason I should be the same?" In this passage he was probably referring to tactics as applied to the art of love and not to his professional strategy as a poet. Similarly, the roles that modern states expect their military people to perform may affect the application of the military art but should not alter the basic education requirements of the professional officer per se. The problem becomes one of definition. At what point is there a division of expertise between military art and professionalism? By delineating these areas, we should be able to determine what expertise could be expanded to promote professionalism and how the Canadian military officer's education program could be adjusted to improve his professional capabilities.

The raising of the military art to professional status was a spiritual concept. It was recognized that the military officer a specialized skill that could be committed to the will of society. This military skill could be harnessed to the sociological aspirations of a nation by ensuring that institutions, controlled by the political factions, provided professional training. This training was distinguished from functional trade training in that the spectrum of knowledge was limited to that which was applicable to all aspects of the profession of arms. Through this medium a professional military concept evolved.

The common military knowledge acquired at service institutions is the driving force behind the military profession. Service traditions, ethics, and standards of performance are inevitable by-products of this interconnected military skill training. A military officer must be exposed to periodic intensive formal training throughout his career. In this manner the spiritual requirement of professionalism will be maintained. From this background the foundation is laid for professional character.

The distinguishing characteristics of the military profession as a special type of vocation meet the criteria of Professor Samuel Huntington, who indicates it must have three essential elements: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. The military professional is an expert with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of human endeavor. He is a responsible expert, working in a social context and performing a service that is essential to the functioning of society. He is a member of a corporate group, who share a unique social responsibility and who consider themselves apart from other groups or members of society. Apart from these three elements of professionalism, a distinct sphere of military competence does exist, which is common to most officers and which distinguishes them from most civilians. The direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence is the peculiar skill of the military professional.¹

From the foregoing, a distinction between military art and professionalism begins to take shape. The professional aspect could be stated simply as the management of manpower and resources in pursuit of any national policy that is designated as the responsibility of the military. The military art is the functional application of military resources to obtain a tactical advantage. Strategy must inevitably span and affect both these areas of expertise, and it is in this field that military education must continuously expand if professional competence is to be maintained.

To be effective, the military must be in a position to understand the political motivations behind any application of force. It has become increasingly apparent that any neglect of the political reasons behind a military action will result in the application of force out of proportion to the requirements of domestic or foreign policy. Professional advice submitted in the form of a military strategy based on a false understanding of the politico-military situation will lead inevitably to loss of prestige. A lack of confidence in the military to maintain the capability to propose strategic responses compatible with the civilian master plan will result in degradation of the profession. Conversely, if the nation-state is confident that the military officer is not only capable of managing his men and resources but can be counted on to propose rational strategy in accordance with the aspirations of society, the military profession will flourish.

The professional education of the military officer must be directed primarily to the arena of world strategy and the international position of his country as it is affected by the alliances and encumbrances of his government. It is obvious that expertise must be maintained in the command, control, and logistic support of modem weapon systems; but concern with this aspect of military affairs, at the expense of politico-military strategy, will result in misguidance.

It is not uncommon that a nation's military hierarchy is accused of neglecting science in the conduct of war. The evolution of a modern weapon was often opposed by the men it was designed to help. The cavalry or artillery officer who fought the changes in his tools of combat offered by the tank and aircraft neglected his trade to protect visual contact with his professional past.

Since World War II there has been an increasing tendency towards the reverse. The specialization of civilian industry has had its effect on the military profession. The competent military specialist is much in demand, and his advice is a necessity when dealing with the complexities of a modern weapon system or the movement of a modern army. However, a danger lies in depending too heavily on such experts when a whole problem must be considered logically. When the problem is strategic in nature, it will have political connotations, and then specialist and professional logic must intertwine to formulate a correct solution.

The choice of military hardware or organization, or a national strategic policy, is dependent on constraints. The constraints emanate from society and are thus dependent, to some degree, on the whims of the civilian element that controls the military. To a large extent, all proposals are tempered by political, economic, and technical (PET) considerations. The specialist-oriented officer will be primarily concerned with the technological aspects of a problem, whereas the professional military officer will be cognizant of PET as an entity and will be in a position to offer technical advice based on a reasonable appreciation of the economic and political constraints applicable.

All too often a strategic concept will be proposed and urged by the military for the sole reason that it is the ultimate scientific solution. A narrow-minded approach can result in a military leader's urging the adoption of a strategy or procurement of a weapon based on his specialist expertise only. Such a leader may be demoralized when his proposal is turned down, but his error should be recognized in the proper light. He neglected the priorities of the PET situation, and, therefore, his professional education may be lapsing.

An analogy is apparent between the medical and the military professions. Both suffer from a contemporary loss of professional prestige. The medical general practitioner has given way in recent years to the medical specialist. At the same time the medical profession has become more suspect by society. The medical specialist has increased his technical expertise at the expense of the political (mental) and the economic restraints that may be apparent in his patients. Similarly, the surgeon who rises to be administrative head of a hospital may maintain his narrow specialty to the detriment of the hospital staff and the community that the hospital is designed to serve. It appears, then, that specialization could be the villain of the professional.

The military professional's role in society could be fractionalized if the specialized nature of his functional employment is allowed to interfere with his study of politico-military strategy. His role in society has not changed, but he is in danger of losing his professional status if he leaves the study and application of war to his political masters and applies himself only to his specialized function and its application to tactics.

The attempt to retain military officers in the service by granting extra professional pay to those trained in special trades is a poor expedient. Such action can do nothing but degrade the military profession per se, because line officers, such as aircrew, may be excluded from the organic group. Unless the military organization is prepared to exclude specialists who receive extra privileges from the profession of arms, the practice can do nothing but degrade the entire professional officer corps.

The military profession is presented with a dilemma. Military experts are required to adapt to rapid technological change and at the same time become more flexible and quick in their response to a multitude of military situations. Each strategic role assigned to the military has its political overtones. An officer is expected to apply his professional education and his military specialty with equal expertise.

The military professional has always studied history as a basis for individual self-improvement. However, there has been a tendency to study the military aspect of history and neglect, to some extent, the political nature of a conflict. In this age of rapid communications, such neglect is unacceptable. The military professional must be capable of keeping his forces at readiness during a cold war situation and performing a flexible response in the event of open armed conflict. The security requirements of his nation will force him to accept both defensive and offensive roles varying in intensity from local police action to total nuclear war. One avenue open to the specialist military officer in solving his dilemma is to intensify his effort to improve his education in the politico-military field of strategy.

The contemporary expedient of specialization has given rise to an erroneous ideal of professionalism. The business, scientific, and industrial communities have attempted to assume professional status because of their group cohesion and common goals. Although no formal oath of office is required within these specialized groups, an individual is often accepted or rejected on the basis of "professional" ethics. The major factor missing in these groups is their lack of dedication to society. Their dedication looks inward rather than outward to the world.

At this point it is interesting to note that society has attempted to maintain the medical profession by outside pressure on the group. It may develop that the basic reason for socialized medicine and universal medical insurance coverage was to revitalize the medical profession by removing the economic pressure between patient and doctor. By this expedient, society, through government intervention, has assumed responsibility for the continuation of the profession by paying the way. The doctor of medicine has assumed a closer relationship with the military, under government auspices, than ever before.

Socialization of the old professions is really an attempt by the people to free the individual specialist of some responsibility and allow him, while specializing, to remain within the profession. The court-appointed and -paid lawyer and the social welfare officer are specialists in the professions of law and nondenominational religion. The state is paying their way and thus ensuring that professional assistance is available to society regardless of specialization. Further, the corporate nature of a profession is maintained by the simple expedient of socialization.

Since Prussian military pre-eminence, the professional officer has always been paid by the state. The military officer, therefore, should be in a position to retain his professional qualifications and at the same time advance the expertise of his specialty. However, the military officer must appreciate that he will be required to devote more time and effort to the study of his basic profession or else he will relegate himself to the position of a nonprofessional in the eyes of society. He must also subjugate his specialist function to a secondary position and look with disfavor on those who attempt to place his specialty in a position of prominence over his professional knowledge and understanding of war.

Although it may not be particularly obvious, the act by the Canadian government unifying the armed forces affords the Canadian military officer corps an expedient to advance the profession of arms. The division of the forces into three distinct entities has been enigmatic to military professionalism in the past. For example, the officer who has followed a career as an aircrew specialist in the Air Force has had his professional education relegated to the periphery of his studies. His study of war has been channeled to the air arm, often at the expense of the other two elements. His understanding of political strategy has been narrow and subjective. As a result, he has been concerned primarily with developing an ability to further air force influence and prestige even at the expense of the army or navy--his professional brothers. In recent years, his pay has been increased over his fellow operational officers. This has tended to set him apart from the group. All these forces have degraded his possibilities of achieving professional status. He has been encouraged to assume the role of a middle income specialist, content within his specialty and his narrow comprehension of aerial warfare. His stature as a professional soldier has been built on a false foundation. He depends on his uniform, rank, position, and trade within the military structure to provide him with a semblance of professionalism. Society suspects his motives and rightly so.

One should not get the impression that the air arm is alone in the art of false professionalism. Examples can be drawn from any of the services. Further, the fact that an officer has been exposed to a professional military college or a civilian university during his early studies does not make him less susceptible. The early ties of a military education within a single service component can orient an officer to the traditions of his service rather than military professionalism. In a similar fashion, the university graduate may feel a closer fellowship with graduates of his science specialty than he does to fellow military officers or military traditions.

Unification of the Canadian military forces should assist the officer corps in its drive for professionalism. The melding of professional education into a single college system will promote understanding of all areas of military expertise. The professional officer must be a perennial student of all phases of the military art if he desires recognition by his political masters. His studies must continue to stress his role in society. He must recognize his responsibilities to the nation, and he must seek to attain and maintain those high intellectual and ethical standards requisite to a profession that merits the trust and respect of the society from which he draws his authority and which he is duty-bound to defend. A unified military education system could ensure that such ideals are projected into the Canadian military profession.

The doubts expressed in the Canadian Government 1964 White Paper on Defence, regarding the traditional patterns of organization by individual services, were an indication that military professionalism was slipping. The act of unification might never have been considered by the government if the three services had performed their military roles in a truly professional manner. In that respect, it is not suggested that the military avoided their responsibilities. On the contrary, the Canadian soldier, sailor, and airman each can be justly proud of the manner in which he achieved his assigned mission. The lack of professionalism was apparent, however, when duplication of effort and service rivalries were allowed to replace logic when a military solution was requested by the government.

The unification of the Canadian Armed Forces will not, in itself, promote professionalism. Unless the military hierarchy recognizes the potential that exists in unification to advance the professional outlook of the officer corps, the rivalries that existed between the three old forces will remain. Further, the act of dividing the Canadian Armed Forces officer corps into a multitude of service components may increase the tendency for an individual to give priority to his specialty at the expense of professionalism.

The Canadian military must not be complacent within the unified forces. The latent opposition to unification that still exists within the Canadian Forces has a subtle nature. It is apparent within the officer corps as a "wait it out" attitude. The professional officer cannot afford to wait when the basis of his career has been questioned and is still suspect by his employer. To make unification work effectively will require more than a change of clothes and adjustments to service organizations. There must be a redefinition of professional goals. The redefinition is necessary, not because the goals are outdated but because they must be placed in the context of the unified forces. A modified version of the "constabulary forces" suggested by Janowitz² may be the concept required by the unified forces if professionalism is to be maintained and promoted in the future.

Professionalism is distinguished by three distinct elements: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. In the military, the strategic concept of political security spans the areas of expertise and responsibility. The specialist function of an officer must not be allowed to take precedence over responsible strategic logic. All aspects of politics, economics, and technology must be considered in depth and with appropriate priority when devising a professional strategic concept.

The basis for military professionalism is inherent in the military officer corps. However, problems have been encountered in the corporate nature of the corps to the extent that intrinsic professionalism has been degraded. The officer corps has been offered a unique opportunity to revamp the corporate structure of professionalism in the Canadian Forces. What is necessary is a unified military education system, with a curriculum that expounds the military responsibility to society and the complete spectrum of national strategy.

Complacency cannot be tolerated. The opportunity to revitalize professionalism is present but may be lost if the military officer is forced to limit his professional perspective to the internal mechanics of integrating the forces. In such an event, specialization could become more important than his professional expertise, and professionalism in the military would be degraded.

Professional education and expertise must be the paramount goal of the military officer. To quote from The Armed Forces Officer (1950):

Given an officer corps composed through-out of men who would make the eternal try toward bettering their professional capacities and furthering the working efficiency and harmony within all forces, the United States would become thrice-armed though not producing one new weapon in its arsenals.³

Unification of the Canadian Forces can provide the catalyst for such a movement in the Canadian military.

Notes

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Random House, 1957), pp. 8-11.

2. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1960), Chapter 20.

3. P. 3.

Lieutenant Colonel James H. Pocklington, Canadian Forces, is Assistant Deputy for Operations, Hq 25^th NORAD Region, McChord AFB, Washington. He has served with several fighter interceptor squadrons in Canada and Europe and as Chief of Special Plans and Projects, Hq 4^th Allied Tactical Air Force, Germany. Prior to his present assignment he was Commanding Officer of 414 Electronic Warfare Squadron, North Bay, Ontario. Colonel Pocklington is a graduate of the Canadian Forces Staff College.

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