Who Needs Nuclear TACAIR?

The current and traditional role of nuclear tactical air power (TACAIR)--standing alert against preplanned, fixed targets--may be on the threshold of change. But there is considerable question as to the direction and scope this change should take: Should the nuclear role be modified, or should it be eliminated altogether? Two related questions are being raised that must necessarily cause the Air Force to reassess the nuclear TACAIR mission. One derives from the fact that some critics view nuclear TACAIR as obsolete; the other comes from a Presidential challenge to the military services.

Beginning with the Kennedy Administration, Presidents have asked for more flexibility within our nuclear forces; for instance, President Nixon's statement:

Accordingly, the Department of Defense has been examining and modifying our nuclear policy to provide such flexibility. This policy requires a clear and evident capability to fight, in concert with our allies, at any level of conflict, conventional as well as nuclear. The options must be visibly applicable with precision, discrimination, and restraint and therefore believable. The critical objective is deterrence or, if that fails, early war termination on terms acceptable to the United States and our allies.²

The credible war-fighting capability of our theater nuclear forces is a basic and essential element of the deterrence posture; moreover, in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, these forces provide much of the political and psychological glue that holds the Alliance together. Although NATO'S first line of defense against conventional attack under the Alliance's agreed strategy is its conventional forces, the strategic and tactical nuclear forces contribute greatly to deterrence of both conventional and nuclear attacks. The aim of our strategy is to deter attacks at all levels of conflict through a credible defense capability with a mutually supporting triad of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic forces.³Theater nuclear forces fill what would otherwise be a critical gap between strategic deterrent and conventional forces. This capability is required to avoid the undesirable alternatives of conventional defeat or, worse, escalation to general nuclear war. Our theater nuclear capability is derived from combined ground, sea, and air forces; this article focuses on the potential of tactical aircraft, recognizing that they constitute but one element of an integrated combat force.

NATO Triad

Strong Conventional Forces
Able to operate if necessary in combined conventional-nuclear combat

Theater Nuclear Forces
Tailored for limited, selective use or to complement conventional forces

Strategic Force Components
Deter escalation and provide limited response, to aid in conflict termination

This article is not intended to provide proven solutions to nuclear TACAIR questions; those must be developed by the Air Force primarily through the resources of TAC and USAFE. Hopefully, this discussion will serve instead as a catalyst by identifying the need for change and presenting some new concepts to stimulate thought. The concepts are aimed at giving the National Command Authority more flexibility of response so as to better counter the Warsaw Pact threat to NATO and take greater advantage of the inherent characteristics of manned aircraft. The ultimate goal, of course, is to enhance our deterrent posture.

First is the argument of critics that the current nuclear TACAIR posture has become obsolete, vulnerable, and destabilizing. For example, a recent and widely read book from the Brookings Institution called for

Some recent critics of nuclear tactical air power for NATO say that these aircraft

--tempt pre-emptive attacks because of their potential nuclear use and hence are destabilizing;

--are highly vulnerable to nuclear attack by IR/MRBM'S against their fixed air bases;

--cannot be relied upon to support the land battle because of sophisticated Soviet air defenses;

--no longer have a theater nuclear role because other systems are more suited to the mission; and

--degrade a large part of NATO's initial conventional capability when tied to nuclear alert commitments.

Unfortunately, this argument gains undue credibility because our concept for the employment of nuclear TACAIR is outdated. While other nuclear forces evolved along with the threat, nuclear TACAIR has been, in concept, essentially maintained as adopted in the 1950s and early 1960s, when forward-deployed fighters were used to augment our then limited--range strategic air forces. The capabilities of TACAIR delivery systems have greatly benefited from advancing technology, but the mission concept has remained unchanged since 1952, when the first F-84 fighter-bomber was given a nuclear role in Europe. This role was based on a massive-retaliation "trip wire" strategy, which is no longer credible. The present era of strategic parity with the Soviet Union requires more flexibility. Moreover, with our strategic Triad of bombers, ICBM's, and SLMB’s, plus the advent of MIRV'S, we have enough nuclear warheads to strike a broad range of high-priority, fixed targets. In a numerical sense, TACAIR adds little to this overall capability. Thus the role for nuclear TACAIR is being rightfully questioned.

Although some make the narrow argument for complete abolition of nuclear alert by TACAIR, the more prudent acknowledge the political and military value of maintaining some level of TACAIR on nuclear alert, particularly peacetime Quick Reaction Alert (QRA). For some targets, currently available yield/accuracy combinations for TACAIR will result in target destruction with lower collateral damage, as compared with missile systems now available. More important, TACAIR on nuclear alert is the only means whereby some of the NATO allies can participate in the nuclear strike role. This sharing of risks and responsibilities in nuclear strike missions among the NATO allies is an important political benefit. Nevertheless, improvements in utilization of TACAIR are needed.

Advocates are asking for TACAIR to do more, recognizing that the NATO Alliance faces some tough odds in the event of war. For example, NATO’s defense is complicated by a lack of depth and by long lines of communication between North America and Europe, whereas the Warsaw Pact has an advantage in both depth and location, which makes it easier to reinforce their battlefield units. "As far as can be judged, mobilization by the Soviet Union in particular could be very speedy, and it has been estimated that the 27 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe could be increased to between 70-80 in a few weeks--if mobilization were unimpeded."⁵Worthy of special note is the fact that surface-to-surface missiles and artillery cannot effectively engage these reinforcing units before their full force is thrown into the battle, primarily because of the difficulties that ground forces have in locating nonfixed targets more than a few kilometers from the front. Another problem is a legacy of the post-World War II occupation zones that now results in certain difficulties in shifting NATO ground forces rapidly across corps boundaries to offset any Warsaw Pact force concentrations. Consequently, NATO forces might be overrun rather rapidly unless added firepower were made available on a timely basis. In addition to the Pact's numerical superiority in manpower and combat divisions, they also have a considerable advantage in the number of tanks--about 20,000 compared to NATO’s 7000 in Northern and Central Europe--and a similar advantage in long-range artillery.⁶

It is not certain that NATO ground forces could hold their own against these odds; therefore, some advocates for a more responsive TACAIR posture feel that it would be useful to free greater numbers of aircraft to provide increased support to ground forces with nuclear as well as improved conventional ordnance, such as precision guided munitions, thereby offsetting the Warsaw Pact's advantages relative to NATO. Since TACAIR is no longer a necessary extension of the strategic nuclear forces, now is the time to look seriously at this tradeoff. Besides, the Secretary of Defense has given guidance that directs the services' attention toward providing increased support to the battlefield.⁷But to date we in the Air Force have been slow to accept this new and challenging opportunity. Unless we pick up the challenge soon, a much-needed capability may not be available when needed.

Characteristics of TACAIR

The often vociferous arguments against nuclear TACAIR generally ignore the fact that manned aircraft possess several inherent characteristics important to theater forces, particularly the flexible use of these forces.

TACAIR'S advantages in mobility, range, responsiveness, tactical versatility, penetrative ability, firepower delivery, target acquisition/battlefield assessment, and recovery and recycling--all give flexibility to theater forces.

Mobility. Tactical air forces may be rapidly deployed and are able to operate from relatively austere bases. This contributes to responsiveness, survivability, and concentration of firepower where it is most needed. Mobility includes vertical dispersal (launch for survival), which is a unique capability of aircraft.

Range. The range of tactical aircraft permits bases sufficiently distant from the land battle, which contributes to survivability and provides the theater commander the flexibility to shift the firepower quickly throughout the theater of operations.

Responsiveness. Having firepower where and when needed is of utmost importance to the land battle. TACAIR provides such responsiveness with quick and selective reaction. During early 1972 a deteriorating situation developed in Southeast Asia that required additional firepower. Within 36 hours of notification, elements of CONUS-based TACAIR were flying combat missions against enemy field forces. Forward--deployed units, of course, are more responsive and can be brought into action within minutes.

Tactical Versatility. TACAIR can conduct a variety of missions with a variety of munitions against a variety of targets, independent of or in conjunction with ground forces. Versatility is enhanced by having man--the most intelligent sensor available--on the scene with a weapon system that can immediately respond to his commands. This characteristic makes up for some target-acquisition deficiencies of other systems.

Penetrative Ability. TACAIR can employ a variety of tactics, including electronic countermeasures (ECM), to penetrate enemy defenses. This has been successfully demonstrated in each of our past wars. The sophisticated antiaircraft artillery, surface-to-air missile, and interceptor network established over North Vietnam was no exception; they were never able to prevent TACAIR (or SAC) from putting bombs on the target.

Firepower Delivery. TACAIR firepower is accurate and fast-reacting and can employ nuclear weapons with a wide range of yields. Selective target destruction accrues from on-the-spot target acquisition and use of rules-of-engagement, a variety of weapons, and high degrees of accuracy.

Target Acquisition/Battlefield Assessment. TACAIR has an advantage over artillery and missiles in its ability to acquire targets, particularly maneuvering targets that are five kilometers or more from the front. Additionally, aircrews can often detect changing priorities that develop during fluid combat situations and can shift their attack to more important targets. An integral feature of this characteristic is battlefield damage assessment and timely intelligence of enemy positions and movements. In recent conflicts air reconnaissance has provided approximately 85 percent of all intelligence information once the conflict was started.⁸

Recovery and Recycling. Tactical air forces are not one-shot systems. They can be used repeatedly for a wide variety of missions, thereby increasing options available to battlefield commanders.

Granted, the present nuclear posture does not take full advantage of TACAIR'S characteristics. For example, alert aircraft ready to strike fixed, preplanned targets are, in the final analysis, being used somewhat like missiles. But TACAIR has much more to offer; therefore, new concepts should be considered.

TACAIR should continue with the alert role, particularly peacetime QRA; however, the overall alert concept needs to be modified to allow more flexibility. The total number of fighter aircraft currently committed to nuclear strikes on fixed targets during increased levels of nuclear alert should be significantly reduced. Allocating additional Poseidon SLBM'S to NATO would provide a prudent trade-off; the fixed targets would still be covered, and additional TACAIR would be available for a wider variety of tasks.

Probably the most important aspect of TACAIR in the QRA role is the evidence of readiness and resolve. To our allies, QRA aircraft provide a link to U.S. strategic forces. To potential enemies, they represent a retaliatory capability against both conventional and nuclear attack. QRA aircraft that are visibly ready and tested on a routine basis demonstrate better than anything else that we have the capability and will to use theater nuclear weapons should the need arise. This role is well established and influences the Pact's perception, which in turn enhances deterrence; however, this posture could be improved.

QRA aircraft could be postured against mobile/on-call targets as well as the currently preplanned fixed targets. There are several benefits to be derived from such a concept, but the principal advantage would be the added flexibility given theater commanders to strike the fixed targets or shift resources to battlefield support. It would be attractive for flexibility purposes to relieve all TACAIR from their current requirement for preplanned missions against fixed targets, but some number must remain committed for reasons such as the following:

Another consideration is the impact of terminally guided conventional munitions. It seems reasonable that this technological advancement, so successfully demonstrated in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, provides opportunities for trade-offs. For example, terminally guided 2000-pound conventional bombs used in favorable weather conditions now provide single-shot probabilities of kill for certain categories of targets that were previously only achievable with nuclear weapons. As technology improves the all-weather capability of terminally guided weapons, some portion of TACAIR on QRA or in an increased readiness posture could be loaded with conventional munitions. This segment of the force would be more flexible because it would not be tied to the rigid command and control requirements essential for nuclear forces.

Another approach with considerably more potential would be a QRA posture that loads both conventional ordnance and nuclear weapons on the same aircraft. It is time consuming (up to an hour in some cases) to up-load an aircraft with weapons; however, selective downloading can be rather quick. This quick downloading could lead to greatly increased flexibility.

An F-4, for example, could have a nuclear bomb on its centerline station and conventional ordnance on others. If launched for a conventional strike, the nuclear weapon could be downloaded in less than five minutes, detracting little, if any, from responsiveness. If launched for a nuclear strike, the crew would take off with all stores, incurring no delay. The conventional weapons could be jettisoned after takeoff, if desired. This conventional-nuclear QRA mix would be a capability uniquely adaptable to TACAIR, since no other weapon system can be launched against an enemy with both nuclear and conventional munitions on board. It would have the advantages of nuclear QRA plus the flexibility to release conventional resources rapidly to support the battlefield.

Air interdiction operations are conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces.⁹ Deep interdiction attacks do not have immediate effect on the battlefield but can be of considerable importance in long wars of attrition or in areas where the enemy's lines of communication are severely restricted. Hence, interdiction well beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) would be a rather marginal investment of TACAIR during a conflict with the Warsaw Pact; however, shallow interdiction against Warsaw Pact maneuver units to cut off immediate reinforcements and relieve pressure at the FEBA would have prompt effect and would be particularly appropriate for nuclear TACAIR.

It is estimated that the Warsaw Pact would organize in two echelons. The reinforcing echelon would be located well behind the initial front and in position to augment the main effort or to exploit a breakthrough. These second-echelon divisions, maneuver units in assembly areas, or units on the move--20 kilometers or more from the FEBA--constitute valuable targets for TACAIR in preventing these forces from being used to sustain the offensive.¹⁰The targets would consist mainly of enemy armor, artillery, mobile surface-to-surface missiles, command posts, and surface-to-air missiles. Their destruction would have a prompt impact on the ground war, and, because of their distance from the FEBA, coordination with ground forces would be simplified. TACAIR, more than any other system, has the target-acquisition capability and weapon-delivery accuracy to neutralize these nonfixed targets before they can influence the battle.

It might be possible to engage the fast-moving spearhead units before they come into contact with the friendly ground forces, but this would be a brief, transitory phase. Once these units are in contact with friendly troops, air attacks would fall within the purview of close air support. However, the bulk of Warsaw Pact divisions--the reinforcing units--would not be engaged, and if significant numbers of these could be rapidly attrited, the momentum of the attack would be blunted.¹¹NATO ground forces--with close air support and nuclear artillery, if needed--could cope much more easily with the reduced pressures of spearhead units denied their expected replacements.

To a large degree, the necessary fighter aircraft, weapons (conventional and nuclear), and trained personnel are in place to take on this task. What is lacking are doctrinal concepts and joint planning and training by Air Force and Army units. In time, other refinements should be added to enhance the capabilities, but there is no need to wait for such developments; the basic ingredients are now available.

Although the current stockpile of nuclear weapons can be employed in this role, we should pursue some improvements to enhance the capability. Because of the way current nuclear bombs have been designed, TACAIR is somewhat limited in its ability to airburst these weapons accurately over nonfixed targets or to ground-burst "clean" nuclear weapons. Either of these capabilities would be useful to minimize collateral damage.

Information-gathering systems also are needed to detect tactical targets to a depth of several hundred kilometers. Reconnaissance (recce) platforms, such as RF-4s or remotely piloted vehicles (RPV's), could cover the area of interest. Also, the SR-7l could make a valuable contribution, particularly for high-altitude/wide-area coverage. Moreover, near real-time readout of the reconnaissance data is now being developed.

Of particular interest is Tactical Air Command's Quick Strike Recon activities. The objective of this project is to provide battlefield decision-makers (Army and Air Force) with near real-time reconnaissance. The concept envisions recce aircraft relaying important segments of images via data link to a ground processing/interpretation unit, which in turn would extract appropriate intelligence and pass it to computerized map displays available to decision-makers. The concept also considers the use of recce aircraft in a forward air control role (FAST FAC).

This looks attractive in that the recce aircraft has potential for more "hunting" time than munition-laden fighters; and after finding and fixing the target, the recce aircraft is already on scene to assist with the kill. It is easy to visualize scenarios where this would be productive; for example: (1) a recce aircraft covers area of interest; (2) target images relayed to ground; (3) recce aircraft prepares to assume role of FAC while fighters are en route; (4) FAC directs conventional or nuclear attack. In the nuclear situation he could deliver a marker (approximately 100 feet CEP) that a standoff weapon could terminally guide on for an airburst delivery, or the FAC could direct strike aircraft to the target for other types of delivery. The FAST FAC aircraft could also be equipped with LORAN and act as a Pathfinder for strike aircraft. These uses suggest some of the possibilities for striking on-call / moving targets with precision and reducing collateral damage through airburst of a relatively small nuclear bomb.

Close air support, air action against targets in close proximity to friendly forces, requires close, accurate coordination. Close air support complements the organic firepower of land forces and can provide the additional strength necessary to break enemy strong points, exploit breakthroughs, and prevent friendly defensive positions from being breached or overrun. It can also be employed to cover withdrawal movements or reconnaissance patrols into enemy territory.¹²

There does not appear to be significant reason to perfect a nuclear close air support capability with TACAIR. Since nuclear artillery can possess the necessary range and has good all-weather accuracy plus other advantages, it should be the preferred delivery system if nuclear firepower is needed. The constraints on TACAIR would obviously be very rigid to protect friendly forces and consequently would limit its potential use against enemy forces in contact with friendly units. Moreover, improved conventional close air support aircraft such as the tank-killing A-10 should be able to provide enough firepower to complement the ground forces' organic firepower, particularly if reinforcing Warsaw Pact units are placed in jeopardy through shallow interdiction.

TACAIR could be a supplement or hedge against poor artillery survival or availability; but the word "close" would require a new definition in the nuclear environment: five (?) to 20 kilometers from friendly troops. In the case of Europe, most Warsaw Pact artillery would fall within this region.

The foregoing points do not exhaust the potential uses of TACAIR in theater nuclear conflict. For example, nuclear TACAIR could also be used against Warsaw Pact forces that might succeed in penetrating the FEBA and are no longer in direct contact with NATO ground forces. Attack of these units by TACAIR could quickly inhibit movement and reduce the breakthrough force's effectiveness. Also, nuclear TACAIR could be used in air defense suppression by attacking major AAA and SAM positions that have multiple guns or launchers. These concepts should be added to those that merit serious consideration by the Air Force.

Vulnerability of TACAIR

Before this article is concluded, a brief look at the TACAIR vulnerability argument is in order.

Yes, TACAIR bases are vulnerable to nuclear attack, but this is true whether or not TACAIR has a nuclear capability. Moreover, if conventional TACAIR is as essential for defense in Europe as is claimed by those arguing to take TACAIR off nuclear alert, then the Warsaw Pact has as much incentive for nuclear attack on a "conventional" TACAIR base as on a "nuclear base."

The solution is to reduce vulnerability through a combination of measures such as dispersal, hardening, rear bases, and perhaps some limited airborne alert but not to denuclearize TACAIR. Denuclearizing would not change the vulnerability issue, and it would seriously degrade the capabilities--and consequently the credibility--of our theater nuclear forces. We must depend to a considerable extent on deterring Warsaw Pact nuclear attacks on NATO air bases by striving to keep the nuclear conflict limited (an argument for shallow interdiction/battlefield support with nuclear. TACAIR) and by having a highly survivable system such as Pershing, Poseidon, and B-52s for nuclear attacks on Warsaw Pact air bases in retaliation for nuclear attacks on NATO air bases. This concept is clearly recognized in USAF'S Basic Doctrine:

There is need for nuclear TACAIR, and the need extends beyond our current posture of standing alert against preplanned, fixed targets. This does not suggest that we should terminate nuclear alert. Fighter aircraft on QRA are the most visible demonstration of our capability and willingness to use nuclear weapons should the need arise. The Soviets perceive and respect this, and NATO'S theater deterrence may not be credible without TACAIR on constant alert. But today's nuclear alert concept, which ties large numbers of fighter aircraft to targets that could be covered in part by other systems, is outdated. More aircraft must be made available for battlefield support--conventional or nuclear, whatever the case may be because TACAIR has unique and important capabilities that could be brought to bear against Warsaw Pact maneuver units. These units, which are vital to Soviet grand strategy, can be placed in jeopardy by TACAIR more than by any other system we possess. Effectively attriting these units before they influence the land battle would likely be critical to the outcome of a NATO/Warsaw Pact war; therefore, it would seem incumbent upon us to exploit TACAIR'S potential in this area to the fullest extent.

Now is the time for the Air Force to accept the challenge and answer, in no uncertain terms, the question: "Who needs nuclear TACAIR?" If the Air Force does not take this initiative, the critics of TACAIR will become more vocal, and if not convincingly challenged they may prevail in altering the force structure by default. In answering the question and developing the capability, the Air Force will have to work closely with the Army in several areas:

This obviously is not an easy task, but TACAIR can do it. If this opportunity is missed, the alternative may be a future theater force denied the vital capabilities of nuclear TACAIR.

1. U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 9 February 1972, p. 158.

2. A Statement by the Honorable Donald H. Cotter, Chairman, Military Liaison Committee to the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, United States Congress, in support of the ERDA FY 1976 budget, 12 March 1975.

4. Jeffrey Record, U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Issues and Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 60.

5. Quoted in "The Theatre Balance Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact," Air Force Magazine, December 1974, p. 100.

7. Program Decision Memorandum for Defense Agencies and Defense-Wide Programs, 29 July 1974.

8. Tactical Fighter Weapons Employment, Tactical Air Command Manual 3-1, Pact Two, Department of the Air Force, 30 September 1971, p. 7-11.

9. Tactical Fighter Weapons Employment, Tactical Air Command Manual 3-1, Volume III, Department of the Air Force, 15 August 1974, p. 1-1.

10. Major General Leslie W. Bray, Jr., USAF (Ret), "Tactical Counterforce," Air Force Magazine, June 1974, p. 38.

12. United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, Air Force Manual 1-1, Department of the Air Force, 15 January 1975, p. 3-2.

Colonel David L. Nichols (M.S., University of Southern California) is Chief of Staff, Ninth Air Force, Shaw AFB, South Carolina. His experience has been primarily in tactical fighters, including a tour in Southeast Asia flying the F-105. He has served as Chief of Safety for the 23d and 18th Tactical Fighter Wings and as Commander, 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Kadena AB, Okinawa; and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy). Colonel Nichols is a Distinguished Gradate of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.