Air University Review, July-August 1976

Strategic Deterrence: 

the fragile balance

A review of Jerome Kahan's Security in the Nuclear Age.

Herman S. Wolk

. . . the only war a nation can really win is the one that never starts. When reason, good dill, and the accommodation of competing national interests give assurance of keeping the peace, the maintenance of deterrent forces will be unnecessary. Until that day comes, the striking power of atomic weapons in the hands of this country is a prerequisite of national and world security.

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg
August 1949

The timing of the publication of Jerome Kahan’s book Security in the Nuclear Age* could hardly have been better. Now that the United States is involved in strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Russians are in the process of another strategic arms buildup, there is desperate need for a sound historical consideration of strategic weapons competition. Kahan provides this and his own recommendations for American arms policy.

*Jerome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975, $5. 50, paper), 361 pages.

The first part ("Historical Perspectives") of the book provides a needed corrective to much nonsense that has been published over the years by self-styled "experts." As one who participated in several "great debates" on strategic weapons, I find that this section of Kahan's book is one of the best comprehensive discussions of the subject in many years.¹ It will be recalled that among the first significant books to generate a prolonged strategic dialogue were W. W. Kaufmann (editor), Military Policy and National Security (1956); Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957) and The Necessity for Choice (1960); Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (1959); Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (1960); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (1960); and Oskar Morgenstern, The Problem of National Defense (1961).² A torrent of books, articles, and discussion ensued, but these works charted the path that so many others were to follow.

Kahan begins after World War II, during the few years of America's atomic monopoly, when the U.S. atomic delivery capability was very limited. In August 1949 the Soviet Union broke the American monopoly. For the United States, this was a traumatic experience that many people thought would not happen for at least several more years. Yet, despite this event--General Curtis E. LeMay, SAC Commander, said it was equal in urgency to the start of World War II--there was little strategic movement in the Truman administration and no immediate increase in the military budget, a situation that figured prominently in Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington's decision to resign. Even promulgation of NSC-68 in April 1950, calling for a substantial defense buildup, failed to budge the administration. It took the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and subsequently the Red Chinese intervention, to shake the United States out of its lethargy. One result was a $50 billion defense budget.

Another consequence of Korea was President Dwight D. Eisenhower's determination to place more reliance on nuclear forces. Eisenhower was determined to end the war in Korea--having made it a campaign issue in 1952--and in May 1953 he had directed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to inform the Red Chinese (through Indian diplomats in New Delhi) that to continue the war would be to risk America's taking the war to the Chinese mainland, perhaps including atomic attack. In late July 1953 the war ended. Kahan correctly infers that Eisenhower's goal of achieving "security with solvency" was not new; the idea of "maximum safety at minimum cost" had been articulated before, notably by President Truman and Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal. Moreover, Eisenhower's view of the Soviet threat was similar to Truman's--Soviet power was much to be feared. The Eisenhower administration's defense policy would emphasize the strategic nuclear deterrent (an idea early and forcefully advocated by George M. Humphrey, Eisenhower's influential Secretary of the Treasury) and also tactical nuclear weapons.³

Though early formation of an American-Soviet adversary relationship clearly can be traced to the Truman years, Kahan notes that the major lines of weapons competition were formed during the Eisenhower administration. The 1950s marked the U.S. buildup in long-range bombers, development of ICBM'S, and the Polaris submarine. Also, at the end of the decade the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) was created at Strategic Air Command Headquarters, integrating all U.S. strategic weapons in a common targeting plan. Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates termed his decision to establish the JSTPS the most important he had made as Defense Secretary. This view was perhaps correct since the decision had been forced by the development and operation of the Polaris and came after a long period of friction between the Navy and Air Force over control of strategic targeting.

Kahan's opinion that New Look strategic programs "had many provocative and destabilizing effects that clouded the international political climate, increased the risk of nuclear war, and contributed to subsequent Soviet efforts to redress the nuclear balance" (p. 73) is a judgmental view that in specifics can neither be proved nor disproved. My own view is that whether Eisenhower had become President or not, whether there was a New Look or not, American technology would have developed long-range bombers and ICBM'S; development, of course, had started during the Truman administration, and a speculative case can be made that had events been different and had Truman remained as President, a policy similar to the New Look would have evolved. Moreover, the Soviets had started an atomic program long before the New Look. They tested an atomic device in August 1949 and made a hydrogen test in August 1953. Their bomber and missile programs were primarily conceived and developed independently of decisions made by U.S. administrations. The point is that for too long some have assumed an influence for U.S. defense policy on Soviet programs that is probably vastly overemphasized and, moreover, unknown as to specifics.

A conviction that American defense officials--by a combination of weapons restraint and various strategy signals--might be able to influence Soviet defense programs was honed with mixed results by the Kennedy--McNamara administration. As Kahan observes, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations "sought to diminish the political importance of nuclear power and the military utility of nuclear force." (p. 77) However, at the same time, Kahan emphasizes the "paradoxes" that Kennedy initiated an ICBM buildup and the Johnson administration procured MIRV’s.

Evidence is abundant, Kahan infers, that Kennedy--McNamara came to power determined publicly to downgrade the utility of nuclear weapons--as Kennedy said, to put "the nuclear genie back in the bottle." In order to demonstrate this policy, conventional weapons would be emphasized. However, nasty things have a way of happening. In October-November 1962, President Kennedy was faced with the Cuban missile crisis. Commentators and historians are doomed forever to discuss whether U.S. conventional or nuclear power tipped the scales to the American advantage and thus persuaded Khrushchev to remove the missiles from Cuba. Kahan comes down toward the middle, noting that conventional and nuclear strength complemented each other. Nonetheless, he appropriately quotes McNamara that "Khrushchev knew . . . that he faced the full military power of the United States, including its nuclear weapons. . . that is the reason, and the only reason, why he withdrew those weapons." And Kennedy himself warned the Soviet Premier that a missile fired from Cuba at the United States would call for "a full retaliatory response" against the Soviet Union. This made Khrushchev uncomfortable.

The Kennedy-McNamara resolve to demonstrate utility of conventional power to the Communists ran aground in Vietnam. Encouraged among others by General Maxwell Taylor (the only Chief of Staff to retire, then be appointed a Presidential advisor, and subsequently Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Kennedy and McNamara wanted to use Vietnam as an example of how to defeat Communist insurgency. In so doing, the Kennedy administration underestimated the determination and capability of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Within the restraints of its own policy, it overestimated the ability of U.S. forces to influence the conflict. The result was disastrous.

President Nixon came to power determined gradually to phaseout American forces in Vietnam and to enter SALT negotiations carefully, first making a comprehensive review of national security policy. For the Nixon administration, potential strategic arms accords were tied to the President's resolve to move "from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation." The Moscow and Vladivostok accords as well as the "opening" to China must be seen in this general framework.

On January 27, 1969, at his first press conference, Nixon announced his policy of strategic "sufficiency." In historical context, it recalled the doctrine of sufficiency explained in August 1956 by Secretary of the Air Force Donald Quarles. His exposition ("we must make a determination of sufficiency") publicly marked the start of change by the Eisenhower administration away from so-called superiority towards sufficiency, induced primarily by insistent pressure for increased economy within the administration itself. Superiority, Quarles stated, could not guarantee immunity from nuclear attack. The important thing was the American ability to launch a retaliatory strike against the U.S.S.R. By the late 1950s assured destruction was already on the way to becoming the linchpin of U.S. nuclear strategy. Interestingly, despite the desire and attempt of succeeding administrations to frame "new" defense policies, a study of the record indicates substantial legacy from one to the next.

Considering U.S.--Soviet strategic arms competition, what programs does Jerome Kahan recommend for the United States in the 1970s? First, he properly stresses that neither can deny its opponent a retaliatory capability. This would require weapons "capable of destroying a substantial proportion of the adversary's weapons in a first strike, combined with defensive systems capable of blunting strikes from remaining forces." (p. 328) This cannot be accomplished by either side. Both sides have accepted the idea that security must be based primarily on deterrence.

For the 1970s, Kahan advocates "stable deterrence." He thinks the U.S. should base its strategic policy on three principles; (1) Maintaining a confident retaliatory deterrent posture comparable in effectiveness and size to that of the Soviet Union; (2) Avoiding weapons and doctrines that pose a threat to the U.S.S.R.'s deterrent and seeking security through negotiated arms limitations; and (3) Reducing the relative reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. defense and foreign policy.

How do these basic principles translate into weapons programs? Jerome Kahan proposes a survivable" diad instead of the present triad, recommending eventual elimination of land-based ICBM'S. "The first principle of stable deterrence,"' emphasizes Kahan, "is that preservation of a secure retaliatory capability against the Soviet Union should be the cornerstone of our strategic doctrine and the major determinant of our force posture and budget." (p. 330) An "unacceptable" level of damage to the Soviet Union is calculated at a minimum of 20-25 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s population and more than 70 percent of its industrial base. The prospect of this level of destruction, according to Kahan, should deter the Soviets.

Each part of the American strategic deterrent should be survivable enough to withstand attack. Also, the United States should be certain that the strategic numerical equation "does not tilt to our disadvantage." Kahan acknowledges that conflicts may arise between these objectives. Based on his conviction that "vulnerable systems create instability, he recommends that, as the Minuteman ICBM's become vulnerable to Soviet counterforce attack, they be reduced and eventually eliminated, "thus removing any incentive for the USSR to attack our land-based missiles." (p. 331) Somehow, Kahan neglects to mention Titan II ICBM's, although it is clear he suggests gradual elimination of all land-based ICBM's.

However, recognizing that unilateral action could upset the numerical balance, if mutual missile reductions could not be negotiated, he recommends additional survivable systems such as submarine-launched missiles. Trident I missiles should be procured and, eventually, an entirely new submarine system. He does reject the "blue water" option, the concept of relying only on a sea-based deterrent, citing the possibility of a breakthrough in antisubmarine technology and the fact that submarines have less reliable command control communications than land-based ICBM's. Moreover, a blue water concept "would permit 'clean' counterforce wars to be fought at sea without collateral damage to populations," thus weakening deterrence 'by making a nuclear conflict more likely." (p.220) What about strategic bombers? The author favors retention of bombers as a survivable deterrent and thus recommends procurement of a suitable replacement for the B-52--the B-1 or a "less costly system."

Generally opposed to developing a strong counterforce capability, Kahan argues that the U.S. should not

permit the desire to improve the flexibility of its strategic forces to dominate its military doctrine or to lead to "warfighting" strategies and the acquisition of a counterforce capability against Soviet ICBM's through the development of hard-target kill capabilities for missile systems carrying . . MIRV’s or the procurement of accurate maneuvering reentry vehicles. (p. 333)

Thus, Kahan's proposed "stable deterrence also depends on the negotiation track and on the premise that the U.S. should not take steps "that threaten or appear to threaten the Soviet Union's retaliatory capability." (p. 334) This leads to downgrading counter-force weapons, such as ICBM's with MIRV's, while emphasizing Polaris and strategic bombers. Further, the author observes that strategic forces should be complemented by conventional forces "adequate to minimize situations in which nuclear weapons might be used." (p. 336)

As to SALT accords, Kahan notes that the Moscow and Vladivostok agreements do not remove the Soviet threat. The Russians continue quantitative and qualitative strategic programs: "Unless Soviet restraint or follow-on SALT agreements eliminate or significantly alleviate these dangers, the United States must pursue programs needed to maintain an assured destruction capability, keeping current forces effective and replacing them when necessary." (p. 341)

The author's program for "stable deterrence" is of course debatable, in its rationale and in its weapons recommendations. The ongoing Soviet strategic buildup has focused attention on the U.S. strategic deterrent and brought into question the rationale and force structure for assured destruction. The present Soviet buildup is cause for deep concern. In historical terms, it can be seen as part of the Soviet strategic thrust for over thirty years since the immediate post--World War II period. Successive Soviet leaders have convincingly demonstrated their ability to hold down consumer production to build up defense industry.

As to specifics, the case for the present strategic triad is well known. A combination of bombers, submarines, and land-based ICBM's makes a pre-emptive assault against the U.S. nuclear force tremendously complex. And even increasing vulnerability of the Minuteman force fails to shake this complexity. There is also the possibility of modifying the Minuteman force to give it increased survivability (this would be costly).⁴ Further, the Air Force is working on the concept for "MX," the "next generation ICBM." The important point remains that with a triad, Soviet leaders know they would have to attack U.S. missile sites and bomber bases in this country. They have to assume that such an attack would guarantee a response. Even Kahan admits that eliminating ICBM'S "would diminish the benefits of full diversity and, in some respects, weaken the credibility of our deterrent." (p. 222)

The question of a credible, efficient deterrent is vastly complicated. It involves strategy, budget, weapons, politics, public opinion, and, perhaps most important, perception. The basis for deterrence is the enemy’s perception of the certainty of American retaliation. Though Kahan emphasizes potential instability of possible future programs, one cannot dismiss the possibility of instability should the United States fail to develop future systems and/or improve present ones. What might be the consequences should Kremlin leaders perceive their growing nuclear force as superior to the American deterrent? At the least, this image of superior strength would work to U.S. disadvantage in many ways throughout the world. Even these possibilities that fall short of nuclear war are many and painful to contemplate. Instability, it should always be remembered, might conceivably evolve from American inaction in the face of important Soviet qualitative advances.

Some time ago, Walter Lippmann noted that the really important thing was to maintain the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is because we cannot allow a total war to happen. Nothing is more important than credibility of the U.S. strategic deterrent. The deterrent must claim first priority on our defense resources. It "will have to remain as the Constant Monitor," Bernard Brodie has written, "and its efficiency in that role should never be subject to doubt."

Historically, U.S. restraint has not been matched by the Soviets. Mutual restraint remains one of the great hopes of mankind. The United States cannot afford to establish strategy and forces based on hopeful premises. Jerome Kahan has provided a balanced history of the arms race and has presented the crucial issues. They remain urgent and complex. There are no panaceas. The credibility of the American strategic nuclear deterrent is fragile. There is no room for critical judgmental error.

Notes

1. For a consideration of some earlier works on arms competition, see Herman S. Wolk, "Deterrence under Fire," Air Force Magazine, March 1962, and "The Great Deterrent Dialogue," Air Force Magazine, March 1963.

2. For an interesting discussion of those involved in the strategic debate of the late 1950s and early 1960s, see Robert A. Levine, The Arms Debate, Harvard University Press, 1963.

3. For an assessment of the New Look defense policy and its impact on the U. S. Air Force, see Herman S Wolk, "The New Look in Retrospect," Air Force Magazine, March 1974.

4. See Paul Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability," Foreign Affairs, January 1976.