Document created: 27 April 03
Air University Review, January-February 1976

Transnational Terrorism

WITHIN the past decade, and more precisely during the last six or seven years, two significant changes have taken place in many of those insurgent movements active within the non-Communist world. The first concerns a shift in the locus of most guerrilla activity from rural to urban areas. The second, which seems closely linked with this urbanization of insurgency, involves the increasingly transnational nature of modern terrorist operations. Whereas terrorist activity in the past involved operations within a single nation, carried out by groups indigenous to that state, these activities now reflect an increasing degree of collaboration between terrorist forces in widely separated geographic areas. In some cases this cooperation has extended to an exchange of personnel, weapons, and funding. Accordingly, it is no longer unusual for Asian and Middle Eastern terrorists to collaborate on joint operations, for Latin American and European revolutionaries to cooperate in the training of operational cadres, or for Asian, Middle Eastern, and Latin American urban guerrilla groups to support European-based revolutionary elements. In brief, the previously national scope of most terrorist activity is a thing of the past. Terrorism today, involving collaboration between widely separated and often ideologically divergent groups, is effectively transnational in scope. ^l

The expanding boundaries of terrorist activity may well be linked with the rural-to-urban migration of numerous guerrilla organizations during the last decade. Formed in the early 1960s, many of these groups were led by Marxist-influenced students and intellectuals drawn from a growing urban middle class in the nations of Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Sharing a common ideological outlook (usually anarchism or Marxism of the Maoist or Castroite variety), a disenchantment with the effectiveness of representative government, and a belief in the importance of guerrilla warfare and terrorism as the only effective tools for generating rapid sociopolitical change, these students-turned-insurgents attempted to implement the revolutionary doctrines of rural guerrilla strategists such as Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Often operating in the underpopulated rural backlands of a nation, the young revolutionaries encountered severe difficulties in developing effective guerrilla forces, much less in identifying with the problems of the peasantry and attracting them to a revolutionary cause. As a result, these rural guerrilla efforts collapsed during the mid-1960s, and their surviving members returned to the cities.

At the same time these failures were taking place, revolutionary theories stressing the primacy of urban terrorism began to attract increased attention. Articulated effectively by the Spanish exile Abraham Guillen (who formulated the strategy and tactics of the Uruguayan Tupamaro guerrillas), the Vietnamese Troung Chinh, and the Brazilian Carlos Marighella (whose Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla has been translated into numerous languages), this new approach to guerrilla warfare was particularly appealing to the urban revolutionaries who had been defeated in their efforts to implement rural guerrilla warfare during the 1960s. In urban terrorism they saw a strategy ideally suited to their metropolitan background as well as an effective mechanism for renewing the guerrilla effort. Of possibly even greater importance, however, was the fact that this new doctrine provided a single strategy which could be implemented with equal effectiveness, regardless of location. In contrast to the often radically different approaches to rural guerrilla operations (e.g., Maoist, Vietnamese, Cuban, etc.), urban guerrillas in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and even Europe could now utilize a common strategy, thereby facilitating increased cooperation and the implementation of joint operations. Taken together, the similarity in ideology, cultural background, and operational strategy of these urban terrorists provided a substantial push toward the growth of transnational terrorism.

Moves toward collaboration between geographically separated urban insurgent and terrorist elements were noted first on a regional basis, in Latin America. As early as February 1970, representatives of city-based guerrilla organizations in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Uruguay met in Córdoba, Argentina, to develop mutual support mechanisms, communication nets, and a joint operational strategy. By 1973-74 these initial contacts had developed into an active interchange of funds and personnel between the Uruguayan Tupamaros, the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo-ERP), the Movement of the Revolutionary Left in Chile (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria—MIR), and the Bolivian Army of National Liberation (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN). In early 1974, Domingo Mena, a spokesman for the ERP, announced creation of a Revolutionary Coordinating Council (Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria) to facilitate the expansion of joint operations and an acceleration of personnel exchanges and mutual support activities between these groups. By mid-1974 numerous reports indicated Uruguayan Tupamaros were being accorded sanctuary in Argentina as well as training by the ERP. Other sources reported the two groups had participated in joint operations. In the area of mutual support and financial assistance, the ERP loaned the Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR $5 million during late 1974. These funds were a portion of the $ 14.2-million ransom paid the ERP for release of Esso Argentina executive Victor Samuelson, who had been kidnapped on 6 December 1973.²

Besides cooperating on a regional level, Latin American terrorists have worked closely with various Japanese, Palestinian, and European urban guerrilla groups. Spanish authorities report that at least one of those terrorists, who affiliated with the Basque liberation movement (Euskadi Ta Askatsuma—ETA) and was implicated in the August 1974 bombing of a Madrid cafe, underwent training with the Argentine ERP. From January to March 1974, this terrorist trained in Argentina and took part in several ERP operations, possibly including the unsuccessful kidnapping of U.S. Information Service Officer Alfred C. Laun III in Córdoba. Returning to Spain in March 1974, the Basque terrorist brought plans of those "people's jails" used by the ERP to house its kidnap victims. During August and September, Spanish authorities discovered a number these facilities in Madrid, constructed according to ERP plans.

In addition to links between the ERP and Basque terrorist elements, similar ties connect the ERP with French urban guerrilla units. During December 1974 a female ERP member was arrested at Ezeiza Airport, Buenos Aires, en route to Paris. In her possession were a number of coded messages to French terrorist cadres in Paris and Nice. Other Latin American-French guerrilla ties were evident in the 20 December 1974 assassination of Uruguayan Colonel Ramón Trabal in Paris. Serving as Uruguayan military attaché to France, Trabal previously had directed intelligence operations against Tupamaro guerrillas in Montevideo. In reprisal for these actions, he was assassinated by French terrorists on behalf of the Tupamaros. ³

Not only have Latin American urban guerrillas collaborated with other such groups in Latin America, Spain, and France but they have also participated in joint operations with Japanese and Palestinian revolutionaries. During July 1972 two Latin American terrorists traveling on Peruvian passports assisted members of the radical Marxist Japanese Red Army Faction (RAF) in hijacking a Japan Airlines (JAL) Boeing 747 over Utrecht in the Netherlands. Two years later, in the same month, a female Latin American terrorist was killed by a grenade during the hijacking of another JAL 747. In this case the team also included members of the Japanese RAF and a Palestinian. The aircraft eventually landed in Benghazi, Libya, where it was destroyed by the surviving guerrillas. ⁴

Close transnational linkages have developed also between the Basque liberation movement in Spain (Euskadi Ta Askatsuma—ETA) and several French anarchist groups, particularly the Groups of International Revolutionary Action (GARI). Composed of French nationals and exiled Spanish Basques, GARI has worked effectively with ETA. During 1973-74 these two groups collaborated in efforts to bomb the "Topo" trains between Paris and Madrid. More recently, both groups have been active in arms smuggling. During early February 1975 a French national, working as a member of an ETA arms-smuggling unit, was apprehended at the Belgian-French border with 39 Sten guns in his possession. The weapons were destined for delivery to ETA after movement from Belgium to GARI units in France. In addition to joint activities such as these, GARI, operating in behalf of ETA, kidnapped the Paris branch manager of the Spanish Bank of Bilbao during May 1974, executed three bombing efforts during the same year against the Tour de France bicycle race, kidnapped a Spanish citizen in Madrid during July, and placed bombs at Spanish consulates in several French cities. In Brussels, Belgium, GARI bombed Iberia Airline offices as well as several Spanish banks. A bombing was also attempted at a Paris soccer match between teams from Barcelona and Paris but failed. In January 1975, GARI cadres detonated bombs at a Spanish exhibit in the French maritime museum and at the Palace of Justice in Paris. Other GARI units burned a police headquarters in the French city of Clermont-Ferrand. Of particular interest in regard to all these operations is the fact that they were carried out by a French terrorist organization solely on behalf of another guerrilla group, the Spanish ETA.⁵

While transnational terrorist ties exist between Latin American, European, Japanese, and Palestinian groups, as well as Spanish and French revolutionary organizations, the best-known linkages of this type developed between the Marxist Japanese Red Army Faction and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Although both groups are now somewhat fragmented, their close collaboration during the 1970-74 time span was facilitated by a shared ideology (radical Marxism that viewed guerrilla warfare as an essential tool for accelerating sociopolitical change within "imperialist" nations); a similarity in the social and cultural backgrounds of group members (both organizations were composed primarily of urban middle-class students and intellectuals); and a common revolutionary strategy (terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare). In late 1970 the two groups agreed to develop joint operations, exchange personnel, and create a mutual training facility. Moves toward this latter goal were implemented by a female RAF leader and Lelia Khalid, the Palestinian woman who participated in an unsuccessful hijacking of a New York-London El Al airliner in September 1970. By January 1971 a joint Red Army Faction/Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (RAF/PFLP) training base had been established near Baalbek, Lebanon. Links between the two organizations were strengthened in November 1971 when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine created a permanent liaison office in Tokyo. As might have been anticipated, this collaboration resulted in expanded RAF/PFLP operations. The first and most significant was the 30 May 1972 attack on Lod International Airport, Tel Aviv, Israel. Operating on behalf of the PFLP, three Japanese RAF members (trained at the camp in Baalbek) machine-gunned passengers and airline personnel in the waiting room at Lod, killing 28 and wounding an additional 78 persons. Traveling on false passports obtained in Frankfurt, Federal Republic of Germany, the terrorists entered Israel on a regular commercial flight from Rome. ⁶

Following the Lod "massacre," RAF and PFLP units participated in a number of highly successful joint operations during the years 1972 through 1974. In July 1972, collaborating with Latin American revolutionaries, the two groups hijacked a Japan Airlines Boeing 747 in the air over the Netherlands. Less than two years later, during February 1974, an RAF/PFLP terrorist team attempted to blow up the Shell Oil Corporation refinery in Singapore. Failing in this effort, the terrorists seized a local ferry boat and held a number of passengers hostage to secure safe passage from the country. When there was some governmental reluctance to take this action, another team of four RAF and five PFLP members captured the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait. Holding the ambassador and some staff members prisoner, the terrorists demanded—and obtained—the release of their Singapore unit as well as their own freedom. A few months later, RAF/PFLP units, again collaborating with Latin American terrorists, seized another JAL 747 and diverted it to Benghazi, Libya, where it was destroyed after landing.⁷

The RAF and PFLP maintained close ties on the European continent as well as in the Middle East. In France the RAF developed a highly sophisticated support net for PFLP activities. Not detected by French police until the summer of 1974, this net recruited members from the relatively large Japanese community in France. Headquartered in Paris, the RAF organization also had branches in various European cities; as of midFebruary 1975 at least one top-level RAF leader was still in Stockholm. Besides providing logistic support for PFLP operations, the RAF net conducted terrorist activities on behalf of the PFLP, as evidenced in the 13 September 1974 capture of the French Embassy in The Hague by a three-member RAF team. As an integral part of its assistance to the PFLP, the RAF maintained close contact with other European terrorist organizations. Key among these was the Baader-Meinhof (BM) gang in the Federal Republic of Germany. ⁸

Organized in April 1968, the BM group engaged in numerous terrorist acts during early 1970. In May of that year, members of the group traveled to the Middle East, where they made contact with the PFLP as well as the RAF and apparently underwent guerrilla training. Anarchistic in political outlook, group members returned to the Federal Republic after several months and resumed terrorist operations against German business firms and personalities. During the spring and summer of 1972, these activities were expanded to include the 5 May 1972 bombing of U.S. Fifth Army Corps Headquarters in Frankfurt and a 24 May 1972 bombing of the Headquarters of U.S. Army Europe, located in Heidelberg. In these two operations several U.S. personnel were killed and others wounded. Despite the June 1972 arrest of Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof, and other group leaders, the remaining members of the gang reorganized under the name Red Army Faction (RAF) and continued to carry out acts of terrorism throughout Germany. Also known as the "Berlin Tupamaros," this group patterned its operations after those of the Uruguayan Tupamaro urban guerrilla organization. Recruited primarily from middle-class students at various Berlin universities, RAF members carried out the December 1974 execution of Dr. Gunter von Drenkmann, President of the West Berlin Supreme Court, as well as the attempted assassination, in Frankfurt, of a deputy to the West German parliament. ⁹

Of particular interest in regard to the Baader-Meinhof organization are its links to the PFLP and the Japanese Red Army Faction. In this latter context, it seems quite possible that the false travel documents obtained in Frankfurt and used by the Japanese RAF team that attacked Lod Airport came from Baader-Meinhof. In connection with linkages between BM and the Japanese RAF, it is also interesting to note mid-February 1975 reports from Stockholm indicating Japanese RAF members were still in that city. The objective of these individuals appeared to be a joinder of forces with Baader-Meinhof in a terrorist campaign to obtain freedom for BM members still imprisoned in the Federal Republic. The anarchist Second of June Movement in the FRG—an organization responsible for the sensational late February 1975 abduction of West Berlin Christian Democratic Union leader Peter Lorenz, also has close ties with Baader-Meinhof and its splinter element, the German Red Army Faction. Other equally close linkages exist between these three organizations and the Italian "Red Brigades" led by Renato Curcio. Anarchist in outlook, the Red Brigades have mounted an active terrorist campaign in numerous Italian cities during recent years. Paralleling a similarity in political views, the Red Brigades and the Second of June Movement also utilize almost identical terrorist tactics. For example, the abduction of West Berlin politician Lorenz bears a striking resemblance to the earlier Red Brigade kidnapping of Mario Rossi a Genoa legal official.¹⁰

In contrast to the rather spectacular events that have characterized collaboration between the Palestinian and the Japanese groups or between the Italian Red Brigades and the German groups, considerably less attention has been given to Palestinian ties with Turkish revolutionary organizations and the Irish Republican Army. Of note among the Turkish groups cooperating with the Palestinians is the Popular Liberation Front. Hard evidence of collaboration between this group and Palestinian liberation organizations came to light in the December 1973 arrest, by Paris police, of ten Turkish citizens, two Palestinians, and an Algerian. In their possession were substantial quantities of explosives, including those fabricated into book and letter bombs, as well as weapons, ammunition, and false documentation. The group was planning a European terrorist campaign for late 1973 and early 1974. ¹¹

In addition to linkages between the PFLP and various terrorist groups in Latin America, Europe, and Japan, PFLP ties to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) are worth noting. According to several sources, these links date back to 1968-69, when IRA cadres reportedly began training in various Palestinian guerrilla camps. During May 1972 this informal arrangement was formalized at a Dublin conference of several terrorist organizations. At this gathering the PFLP pledged assistance to the IRA in the form of arms shipments as well as diplomatic support from various radical Arab states. Among these, Libya had been prominent in its vocal endorsement of the IRA and reportedly has provided five million pounds sterling for IRA operations. Libya also seems to have become a significant source for IRA's weapons, as evidenced in the April 1973 capture of West German gunrunning vessel, the Claudia, off the Irish coast. The ship was loaded with arms sent from Libya the IRA.¹²

WHILE the initiation and growth of ties between diverse terrorist organizations in widely separated geographic areas is now an established fact, little attention has been focused on those social, political, and technological factors facilitating the development of transnational terrorism or the problem of how to cope with this growing phenomenon. In regard to the social and political elements associated with the growth of terrorism, mention already has been made of the common characteristics of most terrorist organizations today: similar social origins (urban middle class), similar ideological outlook (often a combination of radical Marxism or anarchism with virulent nationalism), and a standard operational strategy (terrorism and urban guerrilla warfare). Beyond these similarities, however, a more deeply seated element common to these groups is their total lack of faith in the ability of representative government to bring about effective, significant, and lasting sociopolitical change. Distrusting "democratic" governments and the electoral process, these minority elements are unwilling and unable to exert influence through the ballot box. Accordingly, they have turned to terrorism as the best weapon available in their efforts to destroy "established governments," the "capitalist economic system," and those "exploitive classes" which—in their view—dominate both. Although numerically minuscule, these organizations publicize their goals as well as confront, and sometimes defeat, national governments through the selective use of terror. The assassination or kidnapping of prominent national figures, attacks against domestic and foreign business facilities, or the hijacking of commercial airliners—all focus world attention on terrorist goals. They also demonstrate graphically the inability of a government to protect its nationals, and foreign guests, from terrorist violence.

Difficult to detect and hard to eliminate, the small and cohesive terrorist group is adept at exploiting the vulnerabilities of Western society as well as the advantages provided by modern technology. Making excellent use of those limited passport and other travel controls in force within the West, terrorist cadres encounter little difficulty in crossing national frontiers. The movement of units from one country through another to a target within a third nation has been accomplished with ease. Where legitimate travel documents cannot be used, fraudulent passports, visas, and other documentation seem to suffice. Facilitating this travel is the mobility provided by international air carriers. All these elements, coupled with technological advances in explosives, timing devices, and the miniaturization of weaponry have made the modern transnational terrorist group a formidable adversary.

While terrorist organizations have been relatively successful in solving their operational problems, governments within the free world have had considerably less success in coping with the continued growth of terrorism. To a significant degree, this failure may stem from a misreading of terrorist aims. In contrast to most rural guerrillas, the indigenous urban terrorist or transnational terrorist group has no desire to engage the armed forces of any nation in face-to-face combat. Instead, these terrorist organizations carry out acts of violence to embarrass an established regime; to demonstrate the regime's inability to protect its nationals or foreign visitors; to create a feeling of insecurity and lack of confidence within the general populace and business community; to publicize terrorist goals and objectives; and, finally, to force the imposition of highly restrictive antiterrorist controls that will alienate the populace and possibly spark a general revolutionary uprising. ¹³

In attempting to meet the challenge of transnational terrorism, some nations have chosen the path of least resistance and adopted a general policy of acceding to terrorist demands for the release of prisoners or the payment of a substantial ransom in exchange for a kidnapped hostage. In general, these same states have adopted a generous policy toward captured terrorists, sometimes freeing them on their own recognizance or meting out only limited prison sentences, which often are revoked subsequently.

In contrast, countries, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and several others, have opted for a much harder line, often refusing to negotiate with any terrorist organization. These same nations have accelerated the exchange of data on terrorist operations gathered by their intelligence organs. In this context, most of these states also mete out relatively severe prison sentences (and sometimes the death penalty) for terrorist acts. While this hard-line approach may appear somewhat harsh from the short-term point of view—particularly when it results in the death of a hostage—it seems essential for the reduction and ultimate elimination transnational terrorism. ¹⁴

These goals will not be realized, however, until substantially stronger and more resolute governmental action on an international scale convinces terrorist organizations that acts of violence do not advance their cause and will not result in political, financial, or propaganda gain. Until that time, transnational terrorism will continue to pose a significant security problem for the international community.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. For additional information on the subject of transnational terrorism, see the following papers by RAND Corporation member Brian M. Jenkins: Soldiers Versus Gunmen: The Challenge of Urban Guerrilla Warfare, RAND Paper 5182, March 1974; International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare, RAND Paper 5261, June 1974; Terrorism and Kidnapping, RAND Paper 5255, June 1974; Terrorism Works-Sometimes, RAND Paper 5217, April 1974.

2. For detailed information on the transnational aspects of urban terrorism in Latin America see Charles A. Russell, James A. Miller, Robert E. Hildner, "The Urban Guerrilla in Latin America: A Select Bibliography, "Latin America Research Review, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1974), pp. 37-79; Charles A. Russell, James E. Schenkel, James A. Miller, "Urban Guerrillas in Argentina: A Selected Bibliography," Latin American Research Review, vol. 9, no. 3 (Fall 1974), pp. 53-89.

3. "El ERP se conecta con la IV internacional asentada en francia", Arriba (Madrid), 14 December 1974, p. 15; "Captura de ocho personas que intervenieron en el atentado de la calle de correo", Ya (Madrid), 24 September 1974, pp. 1-2; "Dicen que son franceses los asesinos del coronel Trabal", Ya, 21 December 1974, p. 10; "Segundo comunicado tupamaro", Arriba, 2 December 1974, p. 15; "Bordaberry condena el terrorismo internacional", Arriba, 21 December 1974, p. 15.

4. "JAL Jetliner Hijacked to Middle East," Washington Post, 21 July 1972; "Kuwait Bows to Guerril1as," Washington Post, 8 February 1974.

5. As a result of links between GARI and the Basque ETA, the Spanish press has published a number of excellent articles on the former group. See "Atentados de GARI en Paris y Clermont-Ferrand", ABC (Madrid), 16 January 1975, p. 25; "Atentado del GARI en el museo de la marina en Paris", ABC, 7 January 1975, p. 16; "Irritación en francia por los ultimos atentados del GARI", Ya, 17 January 1975, p. 8; "Es fácil confundir las ventas oflciales de armas con las clandestinas", Ya, 4 February 1975, p. 1; "Explosion de dos artefactos al paso de un tren fronterizo", ABC, 21 September 1974, p. 21; "Los siete del GARI detenidos en francia no serán considerados presos politicos", Ya, 15 March 1975, p. 3; "Tres miembros del GARI encarcelados",Arriba, 12 December 1974, p. 14.

6. Tad Szulc, "World Terrorist Link Hinted," Washington Star, 14 July 1972.

7. "Kuwait Bows to Guerrillas," Washington Post, 8 February 1974; "4 Terrorists Attack Singapore Refinery," Washington Post, 1 February 1974.

8. "Ejército rojo japones", Arriba, 11 February 1975, p. 16.

9. "Notable triunfo electoral democrata cristiano en Berlin", Informacianes (Madrid), 3 March 1975, p. 3; "La banda Baader-Meinhof no ha cesado de actuar", Arriba, 30 November 1974, p. 12; "Se preparaba un vasto plan terrorista", Arriba, 28 November 1974, p. 16.

10. "Terroristas japoneses en europa", Ya, 11 February 1974, p. 6; "Ejército rojo japonés", Arriba, 5 March 1975, p. 11; "Los cinco anarquistas rumba a siria", Informaciones, 3 March 1975, p. 1.

11. "Paris Police Arrest Terror Ring," Washington Post, 27 December 1973.

12. "Palestinian Guerrillas and IRA Establish Fraternal Ties," Washington Post, 5 October 1972; "Gadhafi ayuda al IRA segun informa 'Sunday Telegraph' ", ABC, 24 December 1974, p. 40; "Gun Runner Links Libya to IRA," Washington Post, 3 April 1973.

13. For example, these were, essentially, the goals of the urban resistance element (Llano Wing) in Fidel Castro's 26 of July Movement. In the view of most analysts of the Cuban Revolution, it was the largely unheralded activities of the Llano Wing which were responsible for provoking the Batista government into the increasingly harsh antiterrorist measures that ultimately alienated most of the Cuban population.

14. In this context, most nations adopting the hard-line approach have been less frequent targets for transnational terrorist operations than those that have endorsed the softer position.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of Defense or United States Government.

Dr. Charles A. Russell (J.D., Georgetown University; Ph.D., American University) is Chief, Acquisitions and Analysis Division, Directorate of Counterintelligence, Hq AFOSI. He has served in AFOSI offices in PACAF, 1951-54, and since in Hq AFOSI. He lectures on revolutionary warfare and insurgency at the Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, and USAF Special Operations School and has contributed articles on various aspects of insurgency to Air University Review and Latin American Research Review.

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