Document created: 27 April 03
Air University Review, January-February 1976

Faith Restored—The F-15 Program

THE credibility of the United States military forces is becoming increasingly dependent upon our arsenal of modern weapon systems. As U.S. military manpower levels are gradually reduced throughout the world, the U.S. defensive posture must rely more heavily on the capabilities of our weapon systems. The development and procurement of these systems, however, are among the most difficult and challenging tasks facing today's military leaders.

Weapon system acquisition managers must operate in an environment that is both hostile and austere. Reduced national support for defense appropriations, minimal threat perception by the public, and intolerance of past acquisition inefficiencies have greatly reduced national support for new weapon systems.

This environment is compounded by the unprecedented competition among all government elements for limited federal resources, which have been severely eroded by both inflation and recession. As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain the financial resources necessary for new weapon system programs. The lack of resources has been further impacted by the skyrocketing military expenses. Superimposed on this environment is an alarming Soviet military threat that is greater than ever, and constantly increasing.

Past program failures and inefficiencies have been well publicized and have greatly contributed to the hostile environment. Cost growth, schedule delays, and compromised technical performance have been common occurrences, as experienced on the F-111, the C-5, and numerous other programs. It is little wonder that Congress, the media, and the general public have lost confidence in the military's ability manage weapon system programs effectively.

To counter this lost confidence, the Department of Defense (DOD), beginning in 1969, made an intensive effort to improve the effectiveness of the entire weapon system process by developing. innovative and forward-looking policies. The F-15 serves as a primary example of a program that has been managed from its inception under these DOD policies. Ultimately, the F-15 program proved that the military could acquire a complex weapon system on time and within the cost objective while meeting performance requirements.

This article will present the key elements of the management approach taken on the F-15 program. Our purpose is to share this approach with those involved in the weapon systems business, in an attempt to help preclude future program failures.

WITH the initiation of full-scale development on 1 January 1970, the F-15 System Program Office (SPO) was charged by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard to develop the world's best air superiority fighter aircraft and, at the same time, restore Congress's and the public's faith in the ability of DOD to manage weapon system programs successfully.

The concepts and techniques used on the F-15 were not all new. Many had existed for quite some time. The significant fact was that the F-15 represented the first instance where all appropriate management concepts were successfully integrated and implemented. In short, the F-15 served as the model and test program for what was to become Secretary Packard's documented philosophy, as provided in DOD Directive 5000.1: "Acquisition of Major Defense Systems."

This brief introduction sets the stage for a discussion of the F-15 weapon system acquisition concepts implemented in response to the demand for effective efficient program management.

The single most critical factor in the successful acquisition of a weapon system is the personnel responsible for gram accomplishment. Above all else, the program must be directed by an individual with proven management ability. He must possess a complete understanding of the weapon system acquisition process and its inherent problems. Furthermore, he must be given full responsibility and authority for the success or failure of the program.

The selection of the F-15 System Program Director (SPD), Major General Benjamin N. Bellis (then a B/G selectee), in mid-1969 reflected these considerations. Having acquired extensive program experience during previous assignments, he was given full responsibility and authority for the direction of the F-15 program. To complement his position, the SPD was allowed to operate under the "Blueline Management Concept," which streamlined the chain of command. This concept gave the SPD immediate access to top USAF and OSD decision-makers. Blueline management proved to be extremely valuable during the course of the F-15 program and resulted in timely and effective decisions on critical program issues.

Just as the selection of the SPD is critical to the success of a program, so is the selection of all key subordinate personnel. The F-15 SPD was given complete authority to handpick all personnel. Consequently, each person assigned to the F-15 SPO was carefully screened and selected on the basis of proven performance. SPO personnel were given tremendous responsibility and authority to carry out their assigned tasks.

Continuity of key military personnel, usually a problem on most programs, was maintained by a personnel freeze for a period of five years. Reassignment prior to five years was at the option of the individual and the SPD. Consequently, it was rare when a key manager was transferred at an inopportune time. 

Another important aspect of personnel management was the phased manning concept used to staff the SPO. Personnel who normally are not assigned to an SPO until the development or production phases were assigned to the F-15 during the conceptual and validation phases. This allowed experts in test, production, logistics, as well as other functional disciplines, to be involved during the basic program planning, thereby reducing the possibility of problems and misunderstandings.

The F-15 organization was based on a matrix that integrated two types of traditional organizations: project and functional. A project manager was designated for each major program development area, including airframe, engine, avionics, armament, TEWS, AGE, training, and support.

The project organization was overlaid onto a functional organization, consisting of Engineering, Configuration Management, Test and Deployment, Integrated Logistics Support, Production and Procurement, and Program Control Directorates. Each directorate was charged with specific functional tasks across all project areas. Both project and functional personnel performed their tasks in accordance with the overall program plan. Project managers were focal points for specific program areas, reporting directly to the SPD. For problems and tasks not detailed in the program plan, project managers were responsible for resolution and implementation. In short, each project manager was a mini-SPD for his area of responsibility. 

The strength of this type of organization rested on two separate internal SPO interfaces. The first was the daily interface between the project and functional managers, which facilitated early problem identification and resolution. The second was the interface between the project managers and the functional managers with the SPD. This latter interface was extremely successful in assuring that problems would surface before permanent impacts could result.

Early involvement of using and supporting command personnel greatly contributed to the success of the F-15 program. From early in the conceptual phase, TAC, AFLC, and ATC personnel were involved during requirements formulation and Request for Proposal (RFP) preparation. Collocated in the spa, these personnel were an integral part of the F-15 team. Reporting directly to the top levels of their respective commands, they could handle problems and misunderstandings in a timely and effective manner. Further, specific individuals within the respective command headquarters were designated as focal points, which facilitated rapid and effective communications.

The Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) Directorate was staffed with both AFLC and AFSC personnel. The director of this organization reported both to the SPD and through the AFLC chain of command. This individual would ultimately become the AFLC System Manager (SM) for the F-15. The ILS Directorate was vitally concerned with weapon system supportability, and they, along with the Engineering Directorate, had a tremendous effect on reducing projected F-15 operations and maintenance costs.

 The three elements just presented (personnel, organization, and command interface) provided the framework upon which the success of all other management concepts rests. As the remaining concepts are discussed, these elements should be kept in mind.

The F-15 SPO placed maximum emphasis on early and definitized planning in an effort to stabilize and control the program in terms of cost, schedule, and technical performance. The primary objectives of this extensive planning were to identify potential problems early enough to allow timely corrective action, minimize misunderstandings between the SPO and contractors, and, above all else, optimize the F-15 weapon system cost-of-ownership.

In support of this latter objective, the F-15 weapon system design emphasized simplicity, complete subsystem integration and testing, and designed-in reliability and maintainability. The early involvement of using and supporting commands facilitated planning and enabled early stabilization of program, requirements.

Comprehensive plans and specifications, which documented program requirements and time-phased cost objectives for all program segments, were completed well in advance of contract award. This effort was not limited to just the air vehicle. It also provided for air vehicle support: training, spares, technical data, and facility requirements. This total planning approach proved to be an immeasurable asset in the success of the F-15 program.

The most important result of F-15 planning was realistic system definition. Unrealistic performance requirements, which are either unnecessary or push the state of the art to an unreasonable limit, often result in significant cost growth and/or schedule delays. Indiscriminate application of military standards and specifications can further impact the accomplishment of program objectives.

F-15 planners within OSD, Hq USAF, Hq TAC, Hq AFSC, and the SPO recognized these dangers. Consequently, the F-15 weapon system was designed primarily for a single mission requirement—air superiority. The design philosophy stressed utilization of existing state-of-the-art equipment and the discriminate application and tailoring of military standards and specifications.

The basic test philosophy of the F-15 program emphasized early and complete subsystem and system ground testing well in advance of flight testing. Complete ground subsystems functional, static and fatigue tests were accomplished before significant hardware was committed to test aircraft fabrication. This philosophy, coupled with the extensive planning effort, minimized the possibility of surprises during flight-test program and subsequent costly and time-consuming system modifications.

F-15 testing utilized the "test-before-fly and fly-before-buy" concepts wherever possible. During the validation phase, two prototype development contracts were awarded for each of three critical subsystems: the engine, the fire control radar, and the advanced 25-mm gun. Competitive development of these three systems significantly reduced the degree of risk to an acceptable level before full-scale development was undertaken by a single source.

Although highly desirable, "fly-before-buy" cannot always be applied in full prototype sense, because of the prohibitive costs and time associated with large complex systems such as the F-15. However, extensive wind-tunnel testing, simulation, and subsystem prototype testing and analysis can be quite effective when total system prototyping is not feasible. This approach was used on the F-15 program and effectively minimized unnecessary risks prior to contract award and flight-testing. The "test-before-fly" and "fly-before-buy" philosophy resulted in a highly successful, on-schedule flight-test program with an excellent safety record.

Additionally, early participation of Air Force flight-test and support personnel from AFSC, TAC, AFLC, and ATC in what was then called the Contractor Development, Test and Evaluation Program (CDT&E) was a key element of the F-15 test plan. Past programs have demonstrated the need for early identification of weapon system deficiencies in order to minimize retrofit liability, ensure early production effectivity of flight-test changes, and minimize operational configurations.

Integrated Logistics Support was another key concept effectively employed in the F-15 program. Integrated plans and schedules for all support activities including hardware and software, were prepared well in advance of contract award and were integral elements of both the RFP and contract specifications. Supportability is usually the last consideration on most acquisition programs, and it often results in enormous support costs and maintenance problems. Not so for the F-15. Supportability considerations were as much a part of the F-15 program planning as was the basic aircraft design. The ultimate benefit of this benefit of the approach will be reduced O&M an F-15 squadron.

Traditionally, weapon system managers design-the-support and support-the-design, but rarely do they design-for-support in terms of incorporating supportability considerations into the basic system design. In the case of the F-15, maximum emphasis was placed on this latter activity in an attempt to achieve one of the major program goals: minimum cost of ownership.

F-15 planning also placed early emphasis on determining the optimum level of repair for all F-15 hardware and identifying those items that would be best repaired at the organizational, intermediate, or depot levels. The importance of AGE, spares, technical data, facilities, and training requirements was recognized, and they were planned and developed concurrently with the air vehicle. This effort helped ensure that adequate support would be available at the time of initial operations. In spite of this excellent support planning, initial support of F-15 operations was not without its problems. Had supportability considerations not been given such a high priority early in the development program, weapon system support would have been impacted even more. Hopefully, the lessons learned in this critical area of weapon system acquisition can be transfused to new acquisitions to provide an improved initial support posture.

Suffice it to say that supportability considerations were given a high priority along with the performance of the air vehicle. As a result, the forecasted F-15 O&M costs are almost 35 percent less than those for the F -4 when the F-15 reaches maturity.

The F-15 contracting approach enabled the program to capitalize on the strong points of current acquisition philosophies and concepts. The contract on any program is undoubtedly a major factor in determining the success or failure of that program. The contract, its specifications, plans, and data requirements must be specifically defined to clearly delineate contractor and government responsibilities. At the same time, the contact must provide the flexibility demanded by the dynamic weapon system acquisition environment. In particular, Congressional actions and program changes must be handled without breaking the contract, if at all possible. With these points as guides, F-15 contracts were written to reflect the degree of risk involved in the development and production programs.

To provide the control and flexibility required, the F-15 contracts contained many innovative management clauses. One of the most successful is the Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) clause. This clause clearly charged the air vehicle prime contractor (McDonnell Aircraft Company [McAIR]) with responsibility for total system integration, performance, and support. This provision covered all components of the F-15, whether built by the TSPR contractor, subcontracted by him, or provided to him in the form of government-furnished equipment (GFE). This clause shifted a great deal of responsibility and risk from the government to the TSPR contractor.

A second unique contract clause provided funding stability to the F-15 program. The Limitation of Government obligation (LOGO) requires the contractor to identify any changes in negotiated fiscal year (FY) funding requirements seventeen (17) months prior to the start of the FY. If appropriate notification was not received, any additional funding required during a given FY would have to be funded by the contractor until the SPO could obtain the additional funding during the next budget cycle. Interest on any loan or lost interest from investment was not reimbursable. The incentive, therefore, to forecast funding requirements accurately was considerable.

A third clause, Correction of Deficiency (COD), defined the contractor's responsibility for correcting defective equipment once accepted by the government. This clause protected the government from long-range defects that could not be identified at the time of acceptance.

These three contract provisions serve as examples of the type of well-planned and innovative approaches that the F-15 SPO took in formulating its contracts to ensure control of the program. During the course of the program, the F-15 contracts proved to be a cornerstone for effective program management.

The interface between F-15 SPO personnel and the contractors was critical to the execution of the contract and the attainment of program goals. All levels of SPO management were totally involved in the day-to-day problems facing the prime contractors as well as many of their primary subcontractors and vendors. This total management engagement philosophy was implemented in order to prevent, or at least minimize, surprises at the contract level. This is not to say that resolution of problems immediately became a joint effort. On the contrary, it was the contractor's responsibility to develop solutions, submit them for approval (when required), and implement them to satisfy contract requirements. Early SPO awareness, however, ensures timely contractor action and spa/higher-headquarters decisions (when required) and minimizes the risk of a serious impact to program cost, schedule, or technical objectives.

To operate effectively under this total engagement philosophy, temporary duty (TDY) was an essential element of the F-15 program approach. To fully engage the contractor and his key vendors (with prime contractor coordination) and obtain full visibility, personnel from the SPO and the contractors traveled extensively. Daily interfaces, problem-solving sessions, and in-plant reviews at all working levels were essential to ensure problem identification and prompt corrective action. A successful SPD must look at his TDY budget as a cost-effective tool in terms of the rate of return obtained from total engagement.

Establishment of a reasonable time-phased initial program cost estimate is the key to achieving financial stability and credibility with Congress. After clearly defining program requirements, solid cost estimates for the F-15 were developed and time-phased with the program schedule plan. Anticipated scope and schedule changes were appropriately considered. Stabilized requirements, rigorous change control, and early identification of problems enabled F-15 financial managers to forecast budget requirements accurately. For more than four years, the F-15 program budget remained unchanged. Only unforeseen double-digit inflation and the withdrawal of the Navy from the joint engine program impacted the initial program budget as prepared in 1969. This was a singular accomplishment.

From a performance measurement standpoint, the F-15 implemented the Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria (C/SCSC). This management approach required all F-15 prime contractors and the McAIR radar subcontractor to design, develop, and implement management control systems MCS'S, which provided timely and valid cost and schedule status. These MCS's were based on existing contractor business practices and management techniques but were appropriately modified to meet the broad guidelines of C/SCSC. The most important benefit derived from C/SCSC application was the disciplined, detailed planning required early in the program.

Control of program costs and. schedules directly relates to many of the technical management concepts discussed previously. However, to control these parameters, it is essential to know the program's status and potential problem areas. The cost/schedule control techniques employed on the F-15 proved to be extremely valuable in this regard.

The production and quality assurance management philosophy also contributed significantly to the success of the F-15 program.

Preparation of the F-15 production and quality plans involved SPO, contractor" and government plant representative personnel. This joint effort, conducted prior to development contract award, ensured mutual understanding of procedures and techniques to be used by both the contractor and the government. Production and quality requirements were levied on all prime contractors, with the stipulation that they require all their subcontractors and vendors to comply with the same type of contractual provisions. The F-15 program excelled in this area because of the degree to which these requirements were implemented, practiced, and monitored. Production and quality assurance discipline helped to ensure minimum rework and acceptable performance, thereby assisting in the control of program costs.

Configuration management, or change control discipline, was one more key to the successful management of the F-15 development program. Changing requirements and the resultant rework are expensive and time consuming. To maintain change control, the SPD established stringent criteria for the evaluation of changes. Prior to the submittal of any change to the SPO, a coordinated SPO/contractor analysis was accomplished to justify formal submittal of the change. There had to be a sound technical basis for the change or else it was not considered. Furthermore, proposed changes had to be justified and related to standard practice, development testing, or operational experience.

Unforeseen changes to any program, no matter how well planned and defined, are inevitable. Therefore, an effective means of handling them is essential. Change administration on the F-15 program had to meet one major constraint. No changes would be authorized without completing negotiations, including cost, schedule, and technical modifications.

All proposed changes, regardless of their source, were challenged for need. Proposals were thoroughly reviewed by all SPO activities, contractors, and the using and supporting commands. After a complete review, the proposed change was submitted to the SPO Configuration Control Board (CCB). The CCB, consisting of a representative of each SPO directorate, TAC, AFLC, ATC, and the Judge Advocate's office, discussed each change and then recommended approval or disapproval. Integral to this entire process was the relationship between cost, contractual, and technical disciplines. If the change was determined to be essential, the funds had to be available and authorized for use before the change could be negotiated and contractually authorized. Rigorous adherence to change control procedures by all contractor and SPO personnel maintained program stability and facilitated cost and schedule control.

THE F-15 PROGRAM stands out among weapon system acquisitions in terms of its cost, schedule, and technical accomplishments. This was no accident. The total management approach to the F-15 program was directed toward the goal of developing and procuring the world's best air superiority aircraft while at the same time restoring the faith of Congress, the media, and the general public in DOD's acquisition management ability.

Considerable credit for the success of the F-15 program must go to the advanced and forward-looking policies of the DOD that were just being established at the time the F-15 program was being initiated. Most of the credit, however, must go to the F-15 team, which implemented those policies and invented new ones along the way.

The ultimate purpose of this article is to highlight many successful techniques and concepts used to acquire a complex weapon system. It was not by magic that the F-15 acquisition was as relatively trouble-free as it was. Comprehensive, detailed, and exhaustive effort toward one common goal--to build the best, on time and within the budget--contributed to the F-15 success.

If DOD is to succeed in providing for the nation's continued national security, weapon system managers must learn from the successes and failures of past program. The F-15’s lessons learned can provide considerable help to ensure future acquisition successes. Specifically, many of the techniques and concepts applied to the F-15 program are as applicable in today's environment as they were at the height of F-15 development. Each new program, however, must be evaluated individually and appropriate concepts selected and tailored for successful application in the ever changing weapon system acquisition environment.

Major Gilbert B. Guarino (M.A., Rutgers University) is a member of the newly formed Program Management Assistance Group, Hq AFSC, Andrews AFB, Maryland. He was the Automatic Test Equipment Project Manager for the F-15 Air Superiority Fighter Program. Prior to that he served in the F-15 program as Chief of the Programming Branch, Chief of the Management Systems & Program Integration Branch, and Financial Manager for the F-15 system contractor. Major Guarino also was assigned to the Space and Missile Systems Organization as Project Officer, Unmanned Spacecraft Cost Model. He is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College.

Major Relva L. Lully (USAF A; M.S., University of Southern California) is DOD Instructor Pilot (F-5), Fighter Operations Technical Assistance Field Team to the Royal Saudi Air Force. He spent six years as a pilot, aircraft commander, and instructor pilot in the F-4, including tours in SEA and USAFE. Entering the rated supplement in Air Force Systems Command, he was project manager for the F-15 Electronic Warfare Warning Set and advanced countermeasures concepts. Major Lilly is a graduate of USAF Fighter Weapons School and Air Command and Staff College.

Major James J. Lindenfelser (M.S., Ohio State University) is a Program Management Inspector for the Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, Norton AFB, California. Previously he served as Chief of the Management Systems Division in the F-15 SPO. His experience includes design and implementation of management systems, Program Life Cycle Costs, estimate, master program schedules, and force structure and program plans. He is a 1975 graduate of Air Command and Staff College.

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