Document created: 4 September 03
Air University Review, September-October
1975
On 26 May 1972 in Moscow, the Secretary of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, Leonid I. Brezhnev, and the President of the United
States, Richard M. Nixon, signed two historic strategic arms limitation
agreements constraining part of the strategic forces of the two signatories.
The treaty limited antiballistic missile (ABM) systems, and the interim
agreement on strategic offensive arms limited the number of intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) launchers. The interim agreement on strategic offensive arms, however,
was a far less comprehensive agreement than was originally envisioned in the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) by the United States.1 Even
during the final preparations of these documents, the United States did not fed
comfortable with an “interim” and incomplete agreement limiting strategic
offensive weapons. As United States Ambassador, Gerard Smith stated on 9 May
1972 that if an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms
limitation were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be
jeopardized, and this could constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM
treaty. 2
From that historic day in Moscow in 1972 until the meeting between Secretary Brezhnev and President Gerald R. Ford in Vladivostok in the latter part of November 1974, the second phase of SALT had been distinguished only by the lack of progress in negotiating a more complete agreement on strategic offensive arms. With the apparent breakthrough at Vladivostok, however, it would seem that the basis for an agreement, which appears on the surface to be equitable, has been reached by the leaders of the two countries. It remains to be seen whether this progress can be translated into a formal agreement acceptable to the two governments.
Although the details of the Vladivostok agreement are somewhat sketchy,
apparently the new agreement would limit both sides to an aggregate total of
2400 strategic offensive systems, consisting of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers,
and heavy bombers. 3 Further, each side would be allowed a maximum
of 1320 missile launchers deployed with multiple independently targetable
re-entry vehicles (MIRV’s). The new agreement is to extend until 1985, assuming
signature in the summer of 1975. There will be freedom to change the mix of
strategic systems within the 2400 ceiling, although it is not clear whether
each side will be free to build additional fixed ICBM launchers as
replacements. However, three major issues which the Soviets attempted to raise
in SALT have apparently been dropped: their demands for (1) compensation for
modern ballistic missile submarines belonging to U.S. NATO allies, (2) the
liquidation of U.S. ballistic missile submarine bases out-side the U.S., and
(3) an appropriate solution to the question of U.S. nuclear-capable systems
deployed in third countries and on aircraft carriers in range of targets in the
Soviet Union.4
There are many important details to be worked out before the agreement would be complete. For example, there may be several necessary collateral constraints to incorporate into the agreement in order to improve each side’s confidence in the verification of MIRVed launcher limits. There will need to be an agreed definition of a heavy ICBM if that distinction is to be retained from the interim agreement. Appropriate destruction and dismantling procedures will have to be established to insure acceptable exercise of the freedom-to-mix option.
Although it may be prudent to remain somewhat skeptical with regard to the
Vladivostok agreement, there is a basis for some optimism as to the conclusion
of a follow-on SALT accord more equitable to the U.S. in terms of limitations
than the present interim agreement. The outlines of the Vladivostok agreement
appear to satisfy the requirements of the Jackson Amendment5 in that
the United States would not be limited to levels of strategic forces inferior
to those of the Soviet Union. The United States, however, has made its goal in
this phase of SALT more explicit. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger has
stated that the United States’ objective in SALT is to maintain “essential
equivalence” with the Soviet Union in strategic offensive capability.6
In elaborating on this concept Secretary Schlesinger has stated that the United
States is willing to tolerate the existence of asymmetries in the strategic
forces of the two sides provided that these asymmetries balance to provide
essential equivalence in fact as well as in perception. 7
It would appear that, in regard to the criteria that determine strategic capability, the principle of essential equivalence would require equality in those criteria whose attainment is practical and that, where equality is not practical, one side’s advantage in one criterion must be balanced by the other side’s advantage or advantages in comparable criteria, i.e., there must be balancing asymmetries. However, the term “essential equivalence” has been used to describe both the U.S. objective in SALT and the overall U.S. strategic objective. A new SALT agreement along the lines of the Vladivostok accord would limit those strategic systems that have the most influence on the strategic balance between the two countries. There are other strategic systems less central to the strategic equation than those to be limited but which also play a role in the strategic relationship between the two countries, e.g., aerial tankers and early-warning systems. A new SALT agreement may have no impact on these systems. Should there be two calculations of essential equivalence, one based on the terms of a new SALT agreement and the other based on overall strategic capabilities? More important, should essential equivalence be the U.S. strategic objective in or outside of SALT?
First of all, the goal of essential equivalence in strategic offensive capability with a potential adversary does not have much appeal to a military man. In the event of hostilities, any sane military commander wants everything he can get going for him. It is difficult to imagine how a strategic conflict could be terminated in a way favorable to the U.S. when the initial strategic forces of the two sides are essentially equal and the U.S. would concede as a matter of national policy the advantage of the initiative. Some people may object that it is ridiculous to consider “winning” a strategic nuclear war—the levels of destruction on both sides could be so high that there would only be losers. The difficulty with this line of reasoning is that there is no indication that the Soviets subscribe to it. The Soviets may well believe that, with the deployment of their new generation of ICBM’s and with other force improvements, they could gain strategic superiority over the United States even within a new SALT agreement. The Soviets may convince themselves that they could destroy so many of the U.S. offensive forces in an initial attack that any retaliatory strike would cause damage deemed acceptable to the Soviet Union. The Soviets might then decide it would be in their best interest to eliminate the United States as a major power.
It is not clear what level of improved strategic capability might lead the Soviets into believing they could accomplish a disarming first strike against the United States. Nor is it clear what impact the nuclear capabilities of other nations might have on Soviet planning. As other nations improve their nuclear forces, most notably the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Soviet strategic calculations would undoubtedly take into account the nuclear capabilities and political aspirations of these other powers. In the case of the PRC, however, the Soviets have made massive deployments of theater nuclear-capable systems and conventional forces along the Sino-Soviet border.8 It would not appear that the Soviets would need to divert any of their intercontinental-range nuclear delivery systems to Chinese targets. In any event, it would not be prudent for U.S. strategic planners to give much weight to any perceived inhibiting effect that the Communist Chinese might exercise on Soviet actions.
Moreover, it would appear that essential equivalence in strategic capability with the Soviet Union is not a particularly desirable position politically. After World War II and until the late 1960s, the United States enjoyed a distinct superiority in strategic nuclear capability compared to that of the Soviet Union. Now that our nuclear superiority has eroded to a position of apparent parity, it is not clear what long-term impact this basic change in strategic relationships will have on international affairs. In any event, the United States is in a less confident military position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union now than we enjoyed until the late 1960s.
One thing is certain, however: although essential equivalence is not as desirable a strategic posture for the U.S. as superiority, it is infinitely preferable to inferiority.
The most basic question to answer with regard to essential equivalence is,
Can our strategic offensive forces still accomplish their mission from such a
position? The primary mission of our strategic offensive forces is to deter an
attack on the United States. Our strategic offensive forces deter such an
attack by retaining the ability to retaliate effectively regardless of how the
Soviets or any other adversary might initiate hostilities. Against the threat
of an all-out attack on the U.S., this capability to inflict unacceptable
damage implies the targeting by our forces of the cities and industrial
resources of the enemy-it is our “assured destruction” capability. Although
Secretary Schlesinger has indicated by his requirement for a changed targeting
strategy9 that additional options and increased flexibility in
strategic force applications are necessary to respond to other hostile
initiatives, the ability to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation remains
an essential mission for our strategic forces.
During the tenure of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union was quantitatively defined as the loss of 20 to 25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of the Soviet industrial capacity. 10 Although it has not been publicly affirmed that these figures are still the U.S. criteria for unacceptable damage, there has been no official rejection of them by subsequent administrations.11Assuming that these figures still generally represent the current U.S. concept of what would constitute unacceptable damage, it may not be certain that a threat of inflicting this level of damage would be sufficient to deter the Soviet Union in all circumstances (which could be one reason for redefining the concept and looking at other options). More important, however, is the fact that as the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has changed from a position of clear U.S. superiority to roughly one of equality, we should no longer be confident that the U.S. ability to deter a Soviet attack on the United States is independent of the amount of damage the U.S.S.R. could inflict on the U.S. Moreover, there is the possibility that these damage calculations may not be believed. In war, events have rarely correlated with plans, and in an endeavor as complex and as fraught with uncertainty as engaging in a strategic nuclear war, the results of a retaliatory strike could be much in doubt.
Whatever concern there may be about the military desirability of a strategic posture that restricts the United States to no more than rough equality with the Soviet Union, essential equivalence with the U.S.S.R. in strategic offensive capability is U.S. national policy.12 The practical question, then, is not whether essential equivalence is a desirable goal but rather, Can we maintain essential equivalence with an agreement along the lines of the Vladivostok accord?
There are many criteria of strategic capability that may be used to calculate essential equivalence, e.g., throw-weight/ payload capability, prelaunch survivability, system reliability, accuracy, warhead numbers and yields, range and penetration capability. There are other, less quantifiable factors that directly affect the performance and therefore the effectiveness of strategic systems, e.g., state of crew training and morale, quality of the maintenance support, and efficiency of the supporting supply system. Although all these criteria influence the calculation of essential equivalence, few of them lend themselves to limitation in a formal agreement because such limitations could not be verified. Therefore, no verifiable SALT agreement, no matter how comprehensive it may be, could insure that essential equivalence would in fact be maintained even if both sides strictly observed the letter of the agreement. There will always be significant strategic system characteristics that cannot be constrained. If one side concentrated its development efforts on improving a system characteristic, upon which any limitations cannot be verified, e.g., ICBM accuracy, that side might achieve a decisive strategic advantage.
Accordingly, the new SALT agreement should not be approached as the panacea for all U.S. strategic problems. Although essential equivalence may be maintained with an agreement along the lines of the Vladivostok accord, major U.S. strategic programs will still be required. The question then becomes, What approach for formalizing essential equivalence in the next SALT agreement is most in the U.S. interest?
The options for handling essential equivalence vary from dealing grossly with one or two system characteristics to constraining or comparing as many characteristics as are feasible (and verifiable). The more characteristics are constrained, however, the less flexibility there is to respond to unforeseen developments or even foreseen threats. Secretary Schlesinger has identified the potential Soviet advantage in fixed ICBM throw-weight as an asymmetry of particular concern. This potential Soviet ICBM throw-weight advantage, combined with increased accuracy and MIRV’s, could give the Soviets a major one-sided counter force capability that would be impermissible.13 Within the scope of the Vladivostok accord and its allowance of 1320 MIRVed launchers, it would appear that the Soviets could achieve this advantage if they chose to maximize the deployment of their new MIRVed ICBM’s currently under development.
The actions the U.S. could take to offset this asymmetry militarily would be to improve the survivability of its existing ICBM force. This improvement could be accomplished by developing and deploying land-mobile and air-mobile ICBM’s.
There are also political concerns. Secretary Schlesinger’s emphasis on the perception of equality by the Soviet Union and third countries, as well as the reality of equality in a follow-on agreement, would require the U.S. to obtain a comparable counterforce capability. This U.S. capability can be improved through more-accurate and higher-yield warheads, but to attain a comparable capability would also require the U.S. to deploy a fixed land-based ICBM with a higher throw-weight. For the foreseeable future, only this type of system would possess the necessary yield/accuracy combination to provide the U.S. with a counterforce capability against hardened targets comparable to a Soviet force of its new generation of ICBM’s.
The high levels of strategic systems and MIRVed launchers outlined in the Vladivostok accord lead to the conclusion that maintaining essential equivalence in the next SALT agreement should be approached in as simple a manner as possible and with minimal limitations on strategic system characteristics. In this context, the first objective should be to achieve a limit on the total number of strategic systems. As for other limitations that may be possible—the number of launchers for MIRVed missiles looms most important—these issues must be resolved on the basis of adequate verification.
This simple approach to essential equivalence would place boundaries on key aspects of the strategic arms competition and allow each side the flexibility to structure its forces as it deems necessary to support its critical security interests. It would also enable the U.S. to maintain a strong base from which to expand its strategic capabilities if it were determined that essential equivalence would no longer be a desirable posture and that strategic superiority should be reattained. The U.S. cannot accept the risk that would be inherent in unverifiable SALT constraints on weapon system technology. Avoiding an unrestrained strategic arms competition and reducing defense expenditures are admirable goals, but they are secondary to national security. SALT will probably continue indefinitely, even if a new agreement is reached in the summer of 1975. There will be other opportunities to attempt to negotiate lower strategic force levels and discover new verification techniques. Additional time is required for the United States to gain confidence in arms control as a method of maintaining national security. Measured steps are best.
University of Southern California
Notes
1. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn – The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), Chapter 5 of this book is a detailed account of the SALT 1 negotiations.
2. Message of Transmittal and the texts of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, including an Associate Protocol, signed in Moscow on 26 May 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 13 (Unilateral Statement A), (hereafter cited as Message of Transmittal).
3. An apparently complete account of the results of the Vladivostok summit is contained in an article by Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., “SALT Proposals Facing Hurdles,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9 December 1974, pp. 12-14.
4. Message of Transmittal, pp. 15-16, The Soviet demands for compensation for U.S. NATO allies’ modern ballistic missile submarine lasses outside the U.S. are contained in the Soviet unilateral statement of 17 May 1972. The Soviet concern about U.S. nuclear-capable systems in third countries within range of the Soviet Union has been identified in many sources. See, for example, John Newhouse, Cold Dawn-The Story of SALT, pp. 174-75.
5. Legislative History of the Jackson Amendment, 1972 (including the full record of Congressional debate on the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons—3 August 1972 through 25 September 1972).
6. Remarks by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, Overseas Writers Association Luncheon. International Club, Washington, D.C., 10 January 1974. Mimeo transcript, OASD/DA.
7. Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 defense budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program, 4 March 1974, p. 6 (hereafter cited as FY75 DOD Report).
8. The Military Balance 1973-1974, The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1973, p. 6. This publication credits the Soviets with 45 army divisions deployed along the Sino-Soviet border.
9. FY 75 DOD Report, pp. 35-42.
10. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 175.
11. In an article published in the Fall 1974 edition of ORBIS entitled “Strategic Adaptability” by William R. Van Cleave and Roger W. Barnett, the authors discuss the genesis of the concept of assured destruction and go on to state that the U.S. “ . . . may now prefer to judge the adequacy of the assured destruction capability with regard not so much to population fatalities and urban destruction as to objectives of greater political-military relevance to a war and its aftermath,” p. 666.
12. FY 75 DOD Report, p. 43.
13. Ibid., p. 6.
Colonel Richard D. Youngflesh (USMA); M. S., Air Force Institute of Technology) was USAF Research Associate at the School of International Relations, University of Southern California, until his recent assignment to the 4000th Aerospace Applications Group (SAC), Offutt AFB. He served on the Joint Staff, J-5, as a military staff assistant at Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and on the Air Staff in Plans. He is a command pilot and flew C-123s in Vietnam. Colonel Youngflesh is a graduate of Armed Forces Staff College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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