Document created: 4 September 03
Air University Review, September-October
1975
The Fighter Pilot in Systems
Acquisition Management
Becoming a “Victim” of the rated supplement can be a rude shock to an aggressive young fighter pilot. Yet in today’s Air Force a rated supplement tour may be the norm. Most ambitious officers already realize that simply being a “good stick” is not enough to assure progression to the top; they therefore accept staff and rated supplement tours as a necessity. Most pilots, however, try not to venture too far from flying, thereby glutting the market for those challenging and rewarding staff jobs in operations. The flying gate system probably will make rated supplement tours more common as more pilots must serve some time in the supplement so that others may return to meet flying gates. Therefore, I would like to make some observations from my own tour in the rated supplement.
I served in the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) as a project manager for a subsystem on the F-15 aircraft. This tour made me aware of the immense satisfaction available from such assignments and the vital importance of the operational viewpoint to the working level of the acquisition process. However, my earlier experience in the Tactical Air Command as an F-4 pilot taught me that few fighter pilots seek jobs outside the operations area. This view has been reinforced by discussions with fighter pilots attending the Air Command and Staff College. Most of the students who are not returning to flying assignments are seeking assignments at TAC or USAF headquarters. The lack of fighter pilots in AFSC creates a problem for the Air Force and for the Tactical Air Command in that the rated positions involved in the development of tactical weapon systems are not being filled by currently qualified fighter pilots, and many of the positions are not even filled by fighter pilots. By writing this article I hope to convince fellow fighter pilots of the need for, and the advantages of, their service in the development of the weapon systems we will be using in the near future.
The Air Force has not overlooked the need for operational experience in weapon systems development. The equipment requirement itself comes from the operational command in the form of a Requirement for Operational Capability (ROC). The ROC, however, gives only broad performance requirements and rightly leaves the method of meeting those requirements to the development engineers. There is also extensive coordination between the TAC Requirements Division and the Air Force Systems Command and between the Requirements Division at Hq USAF and AFSC during concept formulation. Additionally, a TAC liaison office is located at the Aeronautical Systems Division of AFSC for the purpose of continued coordination. All these efforts are expended to assist in communicating operational requirements to AFSC working-level managers and to keep TAC advised of the nature of the systems under development. Unfortunately, there are inherent limitations to the effectiveness of these provisions for cross-feed. The different backgrounds, experience, and points of view of user and developer inevitably lead to lack of communication and to misunderstanding. These provisions do not make operational information immediately available to the project manager or engineer who must make the day-to-day decisions required during the course of the development. The number and complexity of projects that must be monitored limit the degree to which the TAC liaison officers can understand every action taken on each, and it is not only the big decisions that may affect operational use.
An example serves to illustrate how an operationally experienced project manager can avoid mistakes that may be made by someone else who is an equally good manager but has no operational experience. In this case, a warning device was under development for an aircraft. The performance requirement was stated in terms of minimum acceptable range. The nonoperationally oriented engineer insured that system specifications were written in such a manner that detection capability was at least the minimum stated in all areas of coverage. As the equipment began taking form, the detection capability met minimum range requirements even in the edges of coverage and exceeded minimum requirements many times over in most regions of coverage. The operational monitors and advisers were not close enough to the actual situation to realize that the system would detect threats at extremely long ranges but would not display the specific range. It was not until a pilot was assigned to the project that it became known that there was a problem. From his experience he knew that threats detected at long ranges but not distinguishable from close threats were equivalent to false alarms and would unduly distract the pilot. Fortunately, this problem was discovered before the system went into production, but this is not always assured. The problem developed because the operational personnel who submitted the requirement for a minimum range did not realize that from an antenna design viewpoint they were driving peak detection range to unacceptable limits. The technical experts, who very early in the design phase understood what the detection range would be, did not realize the operational implications.
This example illustrates only one manner in which operational experience at the working level can eliminate a potentially large problem before costs become excessive. In a more complex weapon system, such as an aircraft, there are many more opportunities for such errors to occur. The importance of the physical interface between various components of a system is obvious. The interface between the user and developer is no less important to the success of a weapon system and is perhaps even more difficult to achieve. As noted earlier, good communication is difficult at best between operational personnel and systems developers. This problem of communication is exacerbated by a lack of complete trust among the parties. TAC personnel see a legitimate need and realize that the opportunity for new equipment to meet that need comes infrequently. They therefore want to get the most performance possible in a given development and are impatient with anyone they perceive as reluctant to comply with their stated requirements. On the other hand, the AFSC personnel are faced with very real budget restrictions and sometimes with just as real state-of-the-art limitations. There is a natural conflict between TAC users and AFSC developers about where to draw the line on specifications for a given project. TAC requirements become suspect as possible “pie in the sky” desires, and AFSC is suspected of foot-dragging. The fighter pilot serving in AFSC is in a unique position to understand both sides of the situation and communicate with both sides, while receiving a reasonable amount of trust from both.
Systems acquisition needs the fighter pilot; but does the fighter pilot need systems acquisition? Although it cannot be denied that better weapon systems are in the pilot’s interest, let’s look a little closer to home to see why a Sierra Hotel fighter jock should seek a job in Systems Command. Of all the complaints I have heard in nearly twelve years’ service, by far the most common has been lack of real responsibility. However, I did not hear that complaint very many times in the systems acquisition career field. Cost is a convenient measurement of project size and is some indication of the degree of responsibility. Even small projects are measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars, and a minor avionics system can amount to millions in the development phase alone. If you should be so fortunate as to play a major role in an airframe development, the responsibility can be staggering at today’s development costs. You do not have to be a general officer to play such a major role, either. For example, the airframe project manager for the F-15 was a lieutenant colonel position.
The real satisfaction, however, is not calibrated according to budget size. It comes from working on an important and difficult management job and from working with professionally dedicated people who accept you as a professional. You work with such people on both the Air Force and the industry side of the defense business. There is something about working on the development of equipment destined to enter the inventory—and which you may use one day in combat—that creates tremendous awareness of its relevance. There is a great incentive to make sure that you do everything in your power to develop the best equipment possible. Much satisfaction is gained as you see the results of your efforts taking form. As a project manager, you would coordinate all activities related to your project. You would require the efforts of people from many disciplines; but you yourself would be responsible for the successful completion of the project. The project manager monitors the progress of the civilian contractor by frequent visits and review of status reports. You will find that the Air Force has many personnel widely recognized as experts in their specialty. You will also find that the Air Force keeps both responsibility and authority vested at a much lower level and in younger personnel than does industry. As the Air Force officer directly responsible for a project, you will gain a feeling of accomplishment from working on an equal level with such experts and high-level industry officials.
A discussion of any rated supplement tour is not complete without mentioning the flying gates requirements. It is my opinion that the gate system should not deter anyone from seeking career-broadening assignments. I believe that more officers can expect to enter the rated supplement in the future whether they wish to or not. By the same token, fewer officers should become stuck in the rated supplement. The gate system requires that officers return to flying if they have not met gate requirements. Thus, to assure return to flying assignments, one should enter the rated supplement prior to meeting the second gate requirement. Since more officers will probably serve in the supplement so that all may meet flying requirements, it behooves each individual to seek out an assignment satisfactory to his career plans.
Perhaps a brief word is in order about a final advantage of AFSC duty as a rated supplement tour: that is, from the aspect of promotion opportunity. A review of promotion board statistics quickly confirms that AFSC personnel more than hold their own in promotions (see accompanying tabulation). As a normal rule, officer effectiveness reports will be reviewed by a general officer. The level of responsibility and type of management experience involved in most acquisition management jobs should stand out as a high point in most officers’ records.
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The need for operational experience of all types is recognized by AFSC, and many positions are designated as requiring rated experience. This article was written because of the failure of fighter pilots to realize the attractiveness of these jobs. The satisfaction and experience to be gained from such assignments should place them in high demand. For those interested, here are some of the requirements for the jobs.
An educational background suitable to the type of position sought is, of course, desirable. Engineers of many types are needed. Operations experience is applicable to many engineering positions. Training in management or business administration would be helpful in the management positions. It is not necessary to be an expert in systems management techniques, however, unless you wish to work on the program control staff. The management positions most needing operational experience are in project management and in test and deployment management. Attendance at one of the System Program Management Schools en route to the assignment is highly desirable because later attendance is difficult. Lack of formal management education should not be allowed to deter you from seeking a position in systems acquisition management, because experience is the best teacher. You should not be frightened by the lack of experience in systems management but should keep it in mind and realize your need to listen to those around you who have more experience with the unique pitfalls in such work. At first, your primary qualifications will be your operational experience and the innate abilities that you must have if you are to be successful in being selected for AFSC duty. As you become more experienced, you will be more comfortable in your new role.
I have pointed out the need for fighter pilots in AFSC to provide a readily available input of operational experience. They are needed to insure that the weapon systems being developed will meet operational needs in such a way as to be fully compatible with the conditions under which they will be used. Everyone who has flown F-4s from the early models to the latest is well aware of the many changes that have been required in the area of cockpit layout. These changes were not the result of advances in the state of the art but were required because in the original designing the operational use by the pilot was not kept in mind. Careful application of operational experience, such as has been applied in the F-15 program, can prevent the recurrence of such problems. This requires that highly qualified fighter pilots be willing to serve in positions of responsibility during equipment development.
Before I am accused of being overly impressed with the importance of fighter pilots, let me add that other pilots are just as important to their equipment developments, as in fact are all the other people in operational disciplines, including the maintainers and suppliers.
Not only is it important for operations personnel to seek development assignments but such an assignment can be highly rewarding for the individual in terms of satisfaction and experience for later use as an operational manager or commander. Thus, the Air Force will profit from better weapon systems and better managers, and the individual will be better qualified to manage or command as the result of his opportunity to practice management in a very difficult arena.
Air Command and Staff College
Major Relva L. Lilly (USAFA; M. S., University of Southern California) is Chief, Target Management Branch, Joint Operations Staff (J-3), United States Support Activities Group, Thailand. He spent six years as a pilot, aircraft commander, and instructor pilot in the F-4, including tours in SEA and USAFE. Entering the rated supplement in Air Force Systems Command, he was project manager for the F-15 Electronic Warfare Warning Set and advanced countermeasures concepts. Major Lilly is a graduate of USAF Fighter Weapons School and Air Command and Staff College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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