Document created: 18 August 03
Air University Review, March-April 1975

The Decision to Respond

What Forces Do We Need in a Crisis?

In a politically fragmented but economically interdependent world, the ability of the United States to use military strength is closely tied to the suitability of forces to support high-priority diplomatic objectives in a crisis.¹ Today many diplomatic and political factors are involved in shaping the world role of the is and setting the tempo of its foreign relations.

The future momentum of policy and force planning is already being influenced by a wide set of considerations. There are systems procurement or development decisions that create "multiplier" effects throughout the economy. Advanced technology itself makes a significant impact on the requirements for skilled personnel to man an all-volunteer military force. Such considerations and the capabilities they lead to in later years reflect some essential judgments about possible adversary intentions and our objectives concerning deterrence.

We have experienced a decade of necessary public concern about U.S. defense, and today any discussion of the directions it could take cannot exclude the impact of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations, not only on forces but on diplomacy as well. At the time of this writing, the publicly reported U.S. position at SALT II favored achieving mutual "equivalence" in the nuclear capabilities available to each side by means of overall ceilings on the number of strategic missiles and bombers, including limits on missile-borne multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV'S) and on the payload or "throw-weight" capabilities of land-based missiles.²

The Vladivostock SALT II accord, if confirmed by the U.S. Senate, reflects the desire for equivalence in delivery systems and vehicles while at the same time leaving room for basing and payload flexibility as new strategic systems phase in. The SALT effect on the nuclear balance only serves to heighten the importance of maintaining credibility in our armed forces to carry out U.S. foreign policy in a suddenly shifting period of international relations. It might even be illusory to hope for further understandings of the SALT type without forces adequate to strengthen diplomacy and prevent misunderstandings at the eleventh hour.

Any force can conceivably be used to increase or decrease the risks of war; the question is about how and when such use is justified and, equally important, how a decision-maker should assign values to the use of force in a crisis. The decision to respond is a judgment that may have to be made in the absence of many needed facts. A distinguished economist and president of the American Economic Association, Kenneth Arrow, recently said that "our lack of economic knowledge is, in good part, our difficulty in modelling the ignorance of the economic agent."³ In a similar vein, it may be said that while military forces are designed to operate under uncertain conditions, diplomacy feeds on certainty. Since payoffs are based on widely differing environments, any trade-offs between military and diplomatic requirements could be subject to a considerable margin of error. The crisis decision-maker needs harmony between military and diplomatic operations. He wants to reduce the possibility of miscalculation. Thus, the means by which military forces can contribute to crisis settlement deserve further attention because military options by themselves do not resolve crises.

While it is still too early to speculate on the effects of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks on U.S.—Soviet crisis behavior, SALT's current purposes appear to have important potential for the management of future crises in two ways. First, by providing a set of agreed-upon levels of strategic force capability, SALT influences, the way each side might deploy its forces in a crisis, including those not subject to SALT-negotiated ceilings. Second, SALT could institutionalize into another "hot line" for communicating some intentions as well as capabilities to the other side. Former President Nixon admitted using a "SALT channel" in 1971 or 1972 to persuade the Soviets to include ceilings on submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers in the SALT I Interim Agreement accompanying the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.⁴

Besides SALT channels, there are SALT related channels that could contribute to crisis management. The 1973 U.S.-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war has explicitly endorsed "urgent consultations" between the parties to avoid confrontation or escalation.⁵ Such agreements, of course, are not self-executing and are only as good as the reactions of the parties to a crisis. Viewed in their best light, "hot line" -type treaties and agreements could play a major long-term role in reducing the risk of miscalculation and contributing to what Secretary of State Kissinger calls "strategic stability"—a condition in which both sides understand that neither can "gain a substantial aggregate advantage" over the other.⁶

There is, of course, a certain amount of wishful thinking that tends to assign to institutions roles which they were not intended to have and for which they lack suitable resources and power. SALT is a negotiating forum, a weathervane showing the rest of the world which way the wind is blowing in U.S.-Soviet relations. At least for now, SALT is not a peace keeping institution. Agreements or treaties to the contrary, political pressure can still emerge that move the U.S. and the Soviet governments into high-risk taking positions in a crisis, as in the Middle East during 1973.⁷

In a world of imperfect knowledge there is an increasing prospect of crisis-connected misunderstandings that could repeatedly involve military and diplomatic resources of the U.S. in many areas and in many forums. Accordingly, there are likely to be new problems and new tests of fine-tuning the art of diplomacy to the military art. It may be true, as Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger has said, that the world is becoming "a single strategic theater," but there is yet some distance to go before that becomes a perceived reality.

While there is some prospect for eventual negotiated force reductions in Central Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact through the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) discussions, the rest of the world is experiencing a proliferation of military force and "theaters" for conflict. It takes little imagination, unfortunately, to write realistic-sounding scenarios for U.S., Soviet, or Chinese confrontation along a global crisis path which, when traced, passes through the Middle East, northern and southern Africa, Latin America, the Indian subcontinent, and back into the Persian Gulf. In addition, the risks of a Soviet-Chinese dispute escalating from their border conflict into a wider war gives pause for concerned thought.

Crises that erupted into both World Wars and many limited wars began either because one of the parties could not (or would not) construct a timely, credible military-diplomatic position against the other or because one side simply failed to perceive the danger posed by the other side. As a result of this initial imbalance or blindness, modern wars have had an almost uniform tendency to escalate to a scale of violence (and involvement) where the ultimate outcome was highly disproportionate to the issues involved. Of course, there are occasional indication that increased U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese diplomacy can shed new light on ways in which superpowers and third parties alike can manage conflicting interests if not resolve them.⁸ Successful crisis management by the involved parties depends on a complicated process of identifying those diplomatic and military aspects of a situation that can be reliably controlled with available resources and then using these resources in ways that maximize the incentives for a peaceful settlement of the crisis. These are demanding requirements, in a conceptual as well as a practical sense. Yet, at a time when the U.S. and the Soviet Union together could hurl over 10,000 nuclear weapons at each other (in a purely two-sided, two nation exchange), an uncontrolled crisis involving the superpowers could lead to disaster.⁹

Insurance against war by miscalculation is not the least of the many things that an $82-billion defense budget has to buy and maintain. Even if contingencies do not arise from the somewhat frantic scrambling about for more arms and prestige, the high risks and costs of the 1973 Middle East experience and the ensuing U.S. worldwide nuclear alert have impressed even critics of increased defense spending that the country requires a more credible nonnuclear "ready force" option from which to choose, to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation in the existing powder-keg areas of the world. As a defense analyst wrote some years ago:

The concept of deterrence is aimed . . . not only against the use of nuclear weapons but also against the use of the threat of nuclear weapons in vital circumstances. ¹⁰ (Emphasis added.)

In addition, credibility in "vital circumstances" means having nonnuclear "safety catches," as well as nuclear ones, by means of which a U.S. decision-maker can positively control and alert forces, deploy them to create a presence in the crisis or threat areas, use them to engage in threshold bargaining, and expeditiously withdraw, commit, or reinforce them, as appropriate.

Forces designed to be managed in this way must also support a parallel track of diplomatic actions aimed at restoring, creating, or maintaining communications with the parties involved—all in the hope of achieving peace. Although we may not know what stability is, we are in a century replete with the national and human toll of war and instability.

Should the United States (and the Soviet Union) be disposed toward crisis management? This is a question of utmost importance because it is becoming customary for smaller powers to emphasize nationalistic aims while seeking superpower assistance or mediation in a crisis. Moreover, this paradox is likely to recur because the reach of small powers for modern armed forces is exceeding their grasp in utilizing them.

Modern wars are very expensive to fight—economically, politically, and socially. Even an advanced small power can quickly exhaust its abilities on the battlefield if it has to be burdened with maintenance, repair, or replacement of sophisticated weapon systems, radars, and fire-control apparatus while providing adequate food, fuel, and other logistic support for its forces.¹¹ The loss of a highly trained pilot or missile specialist may not be easily compensated for, so it is little wonder that many states, including the U.S., the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Iran, Pakistan, India, North Korea, and Cuba, have undertaken what may best be called management contracts to operate and man advanced air strike, air defense, or armored assault components for various clients, principally in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.¹²

While some future wars could quickly expire through technological exhaustion, others occurring under different conditions might be easily extended through either contracting out or stepping aside for new or existing sponsors to take charge. Either way could result in dangerous escalation if a satisfactory diplomatic solution is not reached by the time one or both parties need more military capability. In such circumstances the U.S., Soviet Union, and China could have increasingly significant opportunities for both, diplomatic and military participation in future regional conflicts and crises.

The superpowers have the means to "quarantine" a crisis to see that it does not erupt into a nuclear holocaust, but there is nothing automatic in this that assures restraint. By way of contrast, international organizations such as the United Nations may be conferred legal but ineffectual powers to become involved in a crisis. U.N. peace-keeping forces can provide a presence to police a cease-fire, but they can do little to put out the fire unless there is also a force contribution by a major power. Article 51 of the U.N. charter permits national acts of self-defense, making appeals to the U.N. unnecessary if one is "winning" and irrelevant if one is "losing." Other forms of U.N. crisis intervention can only be triggered by a recognized attack on a U.N. member state.

Since the U.N. leaves much to b desired in a crisis, the U.S. is no doubt resigned to choices other than paralysis or Armageddon in searching for definable and credible "ready" forces that can checkmate a crisis, hoping for but not counting on Soviet, Chinese, or even allied cooperation.

Military forces that are to play a major part in creating the atmosphere for crisis settlement must add credibility to the settlement process. They can do this in two basic ways: through (a) selective response and (b) controllable effect. This is no more and no less than being able to create a match between diplomatic and military moves in a crisis. For example, the reliable communications at H-hour must also be sufficient at the eleventh hour to flexibly apply or withhold force. The implications of crisis capabilities must ultimately be understood by all parties to the crisis. After all, having crisis "credibility" is having a means of assuring all concerned that the use of force is not inconceivable if a settlement is not arrived at. Put another way, the U.S. requires both military and diplomatic means of maximizing the incentives to settle the matter peaceably, whether through tacit or negotiated understandings.

The "safety-catch" capabilities that a given force may require for crisis-control purposes will in turn affect the way this force is brought into the arena and its ability to react to situations encountered while there. For selective response, three initial operational capabilities appear to be required by a decision-maker:

Positive Control: The force must be able to have secure contact with national authorities—the "word" must get through at all times.

Quick Reaction: Specific procedures are required to facilitate the conversion or activation of the force to achieve its mission.

Presence: Range, speed, and the ability to penetrate into or near the crisis area are obviously desirable, especially in a contingency where the United States has no forces stationed in the area. There should also be a capability to "signal" the other parties that such presence exists.

Being present in the area—and assuming that diplomatic measures have not abated tensions as yet--the deployed force requires further operational capabilities:

Maintaining Threshold: Depending on the intensity of the crisis, a threshold dividing tension and war may be at hand for times ranging from hours to weeks after the initial alert. This means that forces may have to be rotated or reinforced.

Force Application or Withdrawal: If the crisis becomes a war in which the United States, despite all other efforts, is involved, the deployed force must be ready to defend itself and/or attack targets on a selective, sustained basis. If the crisis is resolved, the force should be capable of timely disengagement and redeployment to home bases.

Without going into a detailed crisis scenario, we can illustrate these capabilities schematically as a package of demands varying in intensity as the crisis proceeds. (Figure 1)

Ideally, the decision-maker ranks his requirements for each major capability according to what his information tells him is most important to have at a given point in a crisis.¹³ As Figure 1 indicates, his demand for receiving and acquiring information (e.g., positive control) is uniformly high (in economic terms, infinitely elastic) at all times. This is not as true regarding other capabilities, although, as reflected by the ultimate convergence of the curves, they all become crucially important at the eleventh hour.

As the crisis extends, action priorities can, and should, change. The importance of sound but flexible judgment was chronicled by Robert Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis deliberations:

It is no reflection on them [the 17 members of the "Excomm," the specially created Executive Committee of the National Security Council] that none was consistent in his opinion from the very beginning to the very end. That kind of open, unfettered mind was essential. For some there were only small changes, perhaps varieties of a single idea. For others there were continuous changes of opinion each day; some, because of the pressure of events, even appeared to lose their judgment and stability.¹⁴

The decision-maker is likely to prize quick reaction above all other capabilities (except positive control) at the beginning of the crisis. Later on, he may want the forces to maneuver in such a way as to signal our intentions to the other party (or parties) involved. At another subsequent point, the forces will have to be applied, disengaged, or reinforced—hence the U shape of the quick-reaction demand curve.

Assuming the illustrative crisis demand pattern shown in Figure 1, we can carry the analysis a step further by asking: "How available are certain forces to meet the requirements of a crisis?" The answer- is that some forces are not as available as the public usually believes. To understand why, let us add some shadows and tones to the crisis picture:

(a) The crisis occurs without prior warning some 3000 to 5000 miles from the shores of continental U.S. (ConUS).

(b) No U.S. forces are within 400 miles of the crisis area.

(c) No allied forces are available, and in fact the U.S. has been denied permission to operate out of certain allied-owned airbases and seaports (à la the 1973 Middle East crisis), which further complicates the assembly of air, naval, and ground units.

If diplomatic activity increases but the use of force is not ruled out, what kinds of response do we have left? If the decision-maker considers (in our case) a nonnuclear response, he is compelled, for all practical purposes, to alert and deploy ConUS or sea-based forces to the scene of the crisis, whether it be for a friendly government endangered by external threats or to a troubled region beset by warring governments.

In addition to aspirin, let us afford the U.S. decision-maker four ready forces to choose from, given a crisis during the mid to late 1970s:

• one bomber squadron with aerial tanker support (ConUS-based)*
• one airmobile Army brigade consisting of 3 to 5 airborne, armored, mechanized, or ranger battalions (Con US-based)*
• one amphibious task force (stationed in the Pacific, Mediterranean, or Caribbean area)**

• one all-nuclear-power carrier task group (stationed in the Pacific, Mediterranean, or Indian Oceans areas). ***

*As experienced in the 1973 Middle East crisis, there is a possibility of last-minute foreign-government restrictions on movement of prepositioned U.S. forces and equipment in NATO Europe or the Far East. Therefore, forces based or home-ported in those areas are not considered available to the decision-maker in the situation discussed.

**Generally consists of one or two marine regiments in amphibious shipping plus some armed Naval escorts.

***Availability depending on overhaul cycle—generally two carriers required to support one on station. Consists of one nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVAN) and associated air wing, (two interceptor squadrons with air-to-air missiles, two clear-weather attack squadrons, two all-weather attack and electronic warfare squadrons) with four nuclear-powered frigates (DLGN) in antisubmarme warfare (ASW) and antiaircraft surface-to-air (SAM) roles. (At present, the U.S. has only sufficient nuclear frigates—at over $260 million each—to outfit one carrier task group. Two task groups of this kind could not be formed prior to 1978, assuming a reasonable period for sea trials after delivery of new DLGNs to the fleet.)

In considering these alternatives, one might construct a general measure of the utility generated by a given military force by estimating its surge rate—the increase in utilization (usually in hours per day) of which a force is capable for wartime as compared with peacetime purposes. For example, increases in crew-to-ship or crew-to-aircraft ratios, maintenance personnel, and war reserve material are all major indicators of increased surge rates.¹⁵

The surge rate indicates the overall response that can be reasonably expected of a given force, involving highly coordinated operations with the requisite mobility and firepower to sustain combat or withdraw as appropriate. Just as operational capabilities desired by the decision-maker at a certain point in time define his demand for them, the respective surge rates of the forces constitute streams of military capabilities which the decision-maker can call upon at any given point in the crisis. (Figure 2)

Bombers are likely to have the highest initial utility because their initial peace-time utilization is relatively high. Significant numbers of alert aircraft and crews are based in the U.S. that could be quickly used, and their post H-hour transit time into a crisis area is likely to be much less than that required by the other forces considered. Even while air-borne, detailed mission plans and procedures could be received by the bomber crew, and the mission could be prolonged through aerial refueling at selective altitudes to avoid bad weather.

The airmobile brigade may require hours to days in assembling and onloading of troops, weapons, and mechanized or armored equipment, depending on the mix of active or reserve units being mobilized. Even if the brigade is quickly transportable via long-range transport aircraft; the brigade's potential utility may be degraded by terrain unsuited for deployment of ground power or by political difficulties in coordinating field operations with a host government.

At the time the bombers arrive, the amphibious and carrier forces may be just beginning to form up. As indicated by their comparative surge rates (Figure 2), amphibious forces may have higher initial utility than a carrier force if the latter takes longer to form up or if amphibious forces happen to be deployed significantly closer to an area where a crisis occurs.

Amphibrous task force operations share some of the geographic and weather limitations applicable to carrier force operations plus some of the political risks encountered by ground forces, depending on the size and role of the force landed. As regards carrier movements, then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt estimated in May 1973 that dispatching an all-nuclear 28-knot carrier task group into the Persian Gulf could take from 9 days out of Guam with an intact 5-ship formation to 21 days if formed from Norfolk, assuming the Suez Canal is closed or denied.¹⁶ The progress of forces at sea may be delayed by storm tracks or the need to rendezvous with escorts, fleet oilers (exception: nuclear vessels), or other support ships. If the crisis extends, the nuclear-powered fast carrier force is likely to close on its assigned objective at a higher rate than conventionally fueled amphibious forces.

The utility of forces in crises, however measured, cannot be isolated from the needs of the moment. One way to compare various force utilities is to contrast their surge rates with the decision-makers' priorities at a given moment in the crisis. (Figure 3)

A representative "slice" of the crisis at an early time, ^ta, shows that, as far as the decision-maker is concerned, the bomber squadron satisfies his requirement to get forces there as quickly as possible. At a subsequent stage of the crisis, time ^ta, he wishes to create a credible presence and, to a lesser extent, have forces available to respond to hostile military actions. Again, the bombers are present and capable of carrying out armed reconnaissance or combat sorties. Alternatively, ground forces might also be available for action, subject to the geographical or political limitations mentioned earlier.

If the crisis proceeds to the eleventh hour, as represented by time slice ^tc, the decision-maker has a practical option of also responding with amphibious or carrier forces, subject to climatological, geographical, and political uncertainties. Like the bombers, the carrier-based air wings pack a versatile punch in the number and kind of weapons (guided and unguided), sensing equipment, and penetrating tactics that might be needed in a delicate situation. Being "fragged" from U.S. bases, long-range bombers and tankers can conduct, sustain, or reinforce operations in a more discreet and recallable manner than forward-based carrier aircraft can.

Which force should one choose? As Figure 3 indicates, the choice would basically depend on what point the decision-maker believes the crisis is approaching. In the real world we do not usually know until it is over and we can look back on it. Uncertainty, however, does not preclude choice. Other things being equal, our short exercise indicates that the potential use of bombers in a contemporary crisis affords a high-confidence option for satisfying likely crisis objectives throughout the crisis.

This conclusion might surprise those who do not fully understand the difficulty of assembling forces where foreign bases could be politically denied, or those who regard the bomber as capable only of more Hiroshimas or Hanois. Although it is not generally known by the public, bombers have been utilized in other ways appropriate to crisis management. For several years now, minelaying of harbors and other vital approaches has been a secondary task of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber force. In addition, the emergence of new technologies for surveillance could enhance the utility of the bomber for crisis operations: technologies including air-launched, remote-control pilotless drone aircraft; precision strike weapons guided by TV, laser, infrared, and radar; electronic defense jamming devices; and enlarged-capacity tanker aircraft.

The important point to be underscored is that crisis response should lead away from war by providing a measured deterrent force. The dynamics of a crisis situation—the decisions involved and the operational capabilities required—may go against conventional wisdom and lead us to support our diplomacy by utilizing long-range forces that are independent of foreign basing.

Washington, D.C.

Notes

1. "Crisis" has been well defined by one observer as a series of events where the parties involved realize that "an important turning point in history is imminent and that there is an increased danger of war."—Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior," IISS Adelphi Paper 101 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), p. 3. I would add that governments can be highly selective in attaching a "crisis" label to events—especially where another party is merely suspected of being involved—e.g., the Dominican crisis of 1965 and the Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

2. Department of Defense, Annual Defense Department Report FY 1975, 4 March 1974, pp. 29, 44; also see articles by Leslie H. Gelb in New York Times, 24 March 1974, p. E3, and 31 March 1974, p. 2. If the public statements are accurate, the U.S. position appears to be an internal compromise between the technology-limiting viewpoint of the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)—as reflected in Senate Resolution 283 of 8 February 1974 (introduced by Senator Mathias, R., Md.)—and the Department of Defense's preference for equalizing throw-weight which Senator Jackson's (D., Wash.) SALT proposal of 4 December 1973 reflects; see Congressional Record-Senate, Vol. 119, No. 189, 4 December 1973, and Vol. 119, No. 230, 8 February 1974. In his news conference of 2 December 1974, President Ford acknowledged that the Vladivostok agreement allows the U.S. and U.S.S.R. each a ceiling of 2400 missile and bomber delivery systems (forward-based U.S. systems and probably the Soviet Backfire bomber excluded) with a constraint of 1320 missiles permitted to be equipped with multiple independently targeted warheads (MIRVs). Washington Star News, 3 December 1974, p. A-7.

3. Kenneth Arrow, "Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis," address delivered to the American Economic Association convention, 29 December 1973, published in American Economic Review, March 1974, p. 1.

4. U.S., United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace-The President's Report to the Congress, 3 May 1973, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 9, No. 19, 14 May 1973, p. 625. Text of the "Interim Agreement between the USA and the USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" of 26 May 1972 in U.S., Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Legislation on Foreign Relations: Joint Committee Print, 93d Congress, 2d Session (Washington: GPO, March 1974), pp. 1180-82. Hereafter cited as Legislation on Foreign Relations.

5. See text of "Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention of Nuclear War" of 23 June 1973 in Legislation on Foreign Relations, pp. 1196-97. Especially relevant for crisis behavior is Article IV: "If at any time relations between the Parties or between either Party and other countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if relations between:.countries not parties to this Agreement appear to involve the risk of nudear war between the [U.S.] and the [U.S.S.R.] or between either party and other countries, the [U.S.] and the [U.S.S.R.] acting in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, shall immediately enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to avert this risk." (Emphasis added.)

6. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger, 93d Congress, 1st session (Washington: GPO, 1973), Part I of II, p. 127. Hereafter cited as Hearings.

7. Expressing concern about U.S.--Soviet relations after the Middle East crisis and possibly over the threat to Soviet influence in Latin America after the fall of the friendly Allende regime in Chile, CPSU Chairman Brezhnev paid a state visit to Cuba and told (or warned) a Cuban revolution-day rally in early 1974: "We are not pacifists, we are by no means for freezing of the social and political processes that are taking place inside particular countries." On the other, hand, he lauded the usefulness to world peace of the "improvement that has begun in Soviet-American relations"; see Pravda and Izvestia dispatches of 31 January 1974 as translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 26, No. 5, 27 February 1974, p. 4.

8. From contacts with Moscow and Peking during 1971 and 1972, the United States was apparently able to ascertain certain limits on the nature of Soviet and Chinese support for North Vietnam. Such maneuvering may have been a sine qua non for the United States to harness military force and diplomatic activity (via the May 1972 Haiphong mining operations and the December 1972 LINEBACKER saturation bombing raids) in achieving the Vietnam cease-fire of January 1973. Laurence Martin, Arms and Strategy (New York: David McKay Co., 1973), pp. 207-9.

9. Total weapons count (force loadings) in terms of strategic offensive (ICBM/SLBM or bomber-launched) weapons available to the U.S. and Soviet Union estimated as of mid-1974 to be 7940 and 2600, respectively, excluding some 7000 U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons in NATO Europe; see table provided by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to the Senate Armed Services, Committee in early 1974. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Fiscal Year 1975 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 93d Congress, 2d session (Washington: GPO, 5 February 1974), Part I, p. 290.

10. Amoretta Hoeber, "Strategic Stability," Air University Review, July-August 1968, p. 67.

11. According to information released by Mr. Pinhas Sapir, Israel's Finance Minister, the 18-day 1973 war cost Israel $396 million per day to fight. Washington Post, 5 March 1974, p. A24. This total was nearly four times Israel's daily war expenditures in the 1967 war. U.S., Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Report of the Special Subcommittee on the Middle East, 93d Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 13 December 1973), p. 13.

12. When merger talks failed between Egypt and Libya, Pakistani Air Force pilots replaced Egyptians in the cockpits of French-made Mirage interceptors of the Libyan Air Force. Washington Post, 18 February 1974, p. A1. According to Israel's Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan, North Korean pilots manned a squadron of Egyptian MIGs in the 1973 Middle East war, and at least a brigade of Cuban "volunteers" have been helping operate Syria's Soviet-supplied forces in the Golan engagements with Israel in 1974. Washington Post, 1 April 1974, p. A14. In April 1974, a Beirut magazine reported that Iranian pilots would replace British contract pilots operating Oman's small air force in strike operations against rebel strongholds. Iranian tank and artillery personnel are also operating in Oman under a cooperation agreement with that state to secure the Persian Gulf entrance. Washington Post, 5 April 1974, p. A27.

13. In the "real world," things can be much different. In the USS Pueblo crisis of 1968, there was an apparent lack of information vis-à-vis a possibly troublesome situation, although previous North Korean attacks against South Korean vessels were known. The U.S. had detected some North Korean threats against the Pueblo several weeks prior to the ship's seizure, but such information was not properly routed into National Command Authority Channels. U.S., Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry into the USS Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on the USS Pueblo; 91st Congress, 2d Session (Washington: GPO, 1969), pp. 683-85, 704, 728, 896.

14. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Signet Edition, 1969), p. 31.

15. Statement of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Part I, p. 121.

16. See Addendum II to statement of the Chief of Naval Operations in U.S., Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Cost Escalation in Defense Procurement Contracts and Military Posture and H.R. 6722, Part I, 93d Congress, 1st Session (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 937.

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