Document created: 18 August 03
Air University Review, March-April 1975

Counterforce in an Era of Essential Equivalence

While watching the national news on the evening of January 10, 1974, I was a bit startled to hear of a "new option," a "new targeting strategy" that the United States was implementing. The new option is "counterforce." I thought there must be some mistake. A misquote perhaps? But no, there in the next day's" New York Times was a short article entitled, "U.S. Says It Is Retargeting Some Missiles Under a New Strategic Concept."¹ This was followed on January 15 by an editorial in the same publication calling for "a great national debate" on the topic.² And then, lo and behold, Times on February 11 devoted its cover story to this issue and other matters relating to the defense policy of the United States.

I was beginning to feel a little like Rip Van Winkle must have felt when he awoke from his nap. Was I the only person alive who was either too young to forget or too old to remember that there once was a great debate on this very topic?

Was there not a young man called forth from the capitalistic dungeons of sweat-shop Detroit who slew the mighty dragons of missile gap and massive retaliation, who pursued the Holy Grail of flexible response, who provided to his king many and varied options, and who, while giving guidance to young scholars at Ann Arbor in 1962, first confounded and then tried to convince the mighty Red Knight of Moscovy that a new, more rational strategy existed, one that would save us all from disaster if one of us somehow "pressed to test"? This better option was labeled "counterforce." What happened to the millions of words, the thousands of dollars of speakers' fees, the gallons of ink, the wrinkled brows, the testimonies before Congress, the panic workloads in the Pentagon, and the heated conversations at cocktail parties that made up the resulting Great Debate over counterforce? Have we had a book burning, a return to the Dark Ages where the works of such strategic thinkers as Schelling, Snyder, Brodie, Halperin, and Kaufmann have been relegated to the depths of some monastery to be watched over by the Order of John Birch? Or is it simply a case of the media forgetting that we did this once before? Are we about to reinvent the wheel?

Having been in the position of teaching some of these concepts to future officers, I wondered whether, if a Great Debate is indeed needed, I might offer for consideration some of the arguments put forth during round one, so that, at the very least, readers of this journal would not have to waste precious time relearning and rethinking old arguments. Furthermore, since the basic strategic environment of the world has changed considerably since 1962, it might prove worthwhile to consider the basic arguments relating to counterforce in context of strategic balance today.

There are two general areas that should be examined in the Great Debate: counterforce itself and the provision options. Strictly defined, counterforce is a targeting strategy wherein the principle targets in a nuclear attack are those that have direct military significance. In particular, those targets are the opponent offensive nuclear capability, consisting of his missile complexes and fields, his bomber force and supporting bases, and his submarines and supporting facilities. This targeting strategy may be contrasted with the targeting strategy of counter-value, which is the striking of targets because of their value to the opponent. These values are normally conceived of in terms of population (cities), industry, and other types of culturally, politically, or economically significant objects. (To Hitler and the Soviets, Stalingrad had "value" in the countervalue sense not only by virtue of its population, geographical position, and industrial potential but also because of its name.) Part of the confusion marking the sixties' debate as well as today's stems from equating counterforce to a credible first strike or, in Defense Secretary Schlesinger's terms, a "disarming first strike." The two may be tied together, but there is nothing in the logic of either concept that requires them to be tied together. The logic behind a truly credible first-strike capability implicitly assumes either near totally effective counterforce application of offensive weapons or a nearly invulnerable defensive capability (one that protects all types of targets, value, and force).

In discussing counterforce and countervalue strategies, an immediate practical problem surfaces. What is the dividing line between the two? For example, is Offutt Air Force Base a counterforce or countervalue target? The intention represented in striking Offutt would be counterforce, but much of the resultant damage done to Omaha would provide a countervalue spin-off. (Herman Kahn would characterize an attack on Offutt as an example of "counterforce with bonus" strategy.)

The provision of options is a somewhat different matter. In the era of the 1960’s, United States was shaking off effects of the Eisenhower/Dulles doctrine of massive retaliation. Under massive retaliation, the United States had effectively only two options should deterrence fail (in the form of a Soviet tack on Western Europe or the continental United States): either do nothing or attempt to destroy the Soviet Union in retaliation. Eisenhower began to retreat from pure massive retaliation after 1955. Despite modern-day revisionism concerning the actual application of massive retaliation as a deterrent strategy, the importance of the strategy to this brief historical synopsis is that skeptics and critics of the strategy saw only this choice. Therefore, the credibility of the strategy as a deterrent to any action short of a full-scale nuclear attack on the U.S. became suspect.

The McNamara strategy of flexible response was an attempt to change this basic strategic choice. At the nonnuclear level, flexible response was intended to provide a conventional defensive capability in those areas of threat to our security where deterrence by use of nuclear weapons was clearly irrational. On the strategic level, flexible response was also designed to provide, in any situation where deterrence failed, an alternative other than doing nothing or attempting to destroy the Soviet Union in retaliation. Thus, the original enunciation of counterforce was an option within flexible response.

The concern for options arises from the dilemma created by the difference between deterrence and defense. (The classic explanation of this dilemma was provided by Glenn Snyder.³) Options are only important if deterrence fails. The exercising of an option is to engage in actually fighting a war. In other words, if the deterrent threat has failed to deter, what can we then do to (1) win, or (2) stop the nuclear exchange, or (3) avoid being destroyed? Unfortunately for both theoretical and practical exercises, one's consideration of various strategies and options to be used if deterrence fails also affects the credibility of one's deterrent threat. That is, deterrence is maximized if one's threatened response contains no option other than immediate automatic massive response. Likewise, the perception of the threat to be deterred, as well as the opponent's "risk calculus," is affected. Once the options are present, at least in the form of the physical ability to exercise them, the deterrent environment increases in complexity. Such ruminations as Schelling's negotiation of risktaking⁴ and Kahn's escalation ladders and tension scenarios⁵ become vitally important, if for no other reason than that they have been enunciated and might be operating in the calculations of one or both sides in a given tension situation.

The overall name given the nuclear portion of the McNamara strategy was "controlled response." Counterforce and the various and sundry mutations of a basic counterforce targeting strategy are some of these options provided under controlled response. The debate, then as now, can therefore still be looked at in two ways: first, the rationality and effectiveness of counterforce itself as an option; and, second, the worth of pursuing options.

Perhaps the most concise formulation of round one of the great counterforce/option debate is found in Morton Halperin's Contemporary Military Strategy.⁶ Quoting Halperin:

The Strategy of Controlled Response, with its goals of limiting maximum damage in a general nuclear war, while giving first priority to deterring such a war, might seem unobjectionable. In fact, however, the enunciation of the doctrine by Mr. McNamara evoked a storm of criticism in the United States and elsewhere, which has continued. The objections which will be considered here are: the Soviets will not adopt the strategy given their inferiority; the strategy is of no value if both sides have well-protected strategic forces; it is only valuable in a first strike; the strategy increases the danger of an inadvertent nuclear war; and finally, it leads to an accelerated arms race.⁷

Halperin's counter arguments to the objections can also be viewed as summaries of the other side of the debate. First,

. . . even if the Soviets reject the strategy publicly, it is clearly in their interest to seek to limit damage, if war occurs. Such limitation concerns both sides; but it is even more in the interest of the weaker, rather than the stronger, power. Once war begins, the Soviet Union can do much less damage to the United States, even if it attacks American cities, than the United States can do to the Soviet Union, despite the greater concentration of American population. Moreover, the greatest Soviet objective—particularly as long as the Soviet Union is weaker than the United States—is to avoid general nuclear war.⁸

The second objection, that if nuclear forces are protected the strategy has no value, is answered by the charge that not all nuclear forces are protected. Eliminating reserve forces that can be destroyed in retaliation obviously increases negotiating power in that we would still have a usable reserve while the opponent's reserve would be lessened.

The objection that counterforce per se is a first-strike strategy is somewhat more difficult to answer. This is tied into the fourth objection, that opponent fear of a first strike makes inadvertent nuclear war more likely. Regarding the first-strike objection, Halperin claims that, the critics miss the point: that the use of such strategy is really designed to increase leverage in the effort to negotiate an end to the nuclear exchange. The attractiveness of first-strike motives' influencing decision-makers can only be reduced by the development of well-protected strategic forces on both sides.⁹ Therefore, the two objections are illogically linked in the first place.

Lastly, the criticism that controlled response/counterforce would lead to an arms race is dismissed because the criticism confuses war control with a commitment to strategic dominance. Critics of counterforce assume that counterforce requires either complete superiority or high payloads and superaccuracy. This is not necessarily so. Various quality mixes can confer a counterforce capability. In the extreme, one missile capable of destroying one other missile can be targeted counterforce. What is actually being argued is credible first strike. The requirements for a credible first strike are substantially different.

What really happened in this round of the debate? Which side was right? It is difficult to find sure answers because we have not fought a nuclear war (thereby "proving" the critics wrong); we have had a kind of arms race (thereby "proving" the critics right), and the issues involved in the debate were never really resolved. The policy emphasis shifted from controlled response to assured destruction somewhere in the later McNamara years, and the issues of counterforce faded away into some nether region to re-emerge in 1974. This would tend to indicate that any Great Debate today would have similar results—that is, no results. In fact, it is difficult to understand, in my mind, why the issue is suddenly again so sensitive. There is no public evidence, as I recall, that we ever left counterforce strategy between 1962 and 1974, with the exception of the announcement that we were returning to it. (Logic compels the assumption that if we are returning to it, we must have left it, even without public announcement.) One may argue that enunciation of assured destruction meant leaving counterforce out of our strategy, but this is not necessarily true. Assured destruction essentially says to an opponent, "Regardless of what you do to us in a first strike, we can guarantee to you destruction that you cannot accept and still survive." The targeting of the second strike mayor may not be counterforce, or pure countervalue. In all probability, it would be a mixed strategy depending on many variables (enemy offensive forces in reserve, ability to retarget rapidly, desire for revenge, etc.). Assured destruction, if it fails to deter, may not be so "assured" because it might not even be used. In any case, the strategy of counterforce is definitely not new. It may be emphasized in a different manner, but it simply is not something new to the scene of strategic thought.¹⁰

Now, why did the first debate over counterforce abate? The answer is relatively simple. The debate was overcome by other issues, both in the strategic field and in other areas; namely, assured destruction leading to realistic deterrence in the former, Vietnam (among other things) in the latter. Other events crowded the minds and works of those who were the likely debaters. Likewise, the debate so fervently called for in January died down in the summer of 1974 for rather obvious reasons, i.e., Watergate and the constitutional questions surrounding impeachment. Now that these two issues are largely history, one might expect renewed interest in the strategic question. The debate has continued to exist, however, low key and back burner but there nonetheless. ¹¹

There is some evidence, and the claim has been made, that the original statement of counterforce had unfavorable results and did in fact lead to something of an arms race. However, even if true, this would not invalidate Halperin's claim that such a race was a result of strategic dominance rather than the having of a strategy of counterforce. The construction put on the events of 1962 can vary; we simply do not have enough information. One construction runs something like this. With all our late 1950s concern over Soviet ICBM's, Sputnik, and missile gap, the Soviets saw that we perceived a Soviet capability (an added first-strike potential aimed at the continental U.S.) that did not exist. (Soviet missile strength was quite pronounced in IRBM's--a threat to Europe--but very weak in ICBM'Ss) As long as we so perceived the situation, it only seemed to blow up the Soviets' strength to encourage this belief through missile-rattling. Why would the United States want to give the Soviets an apparent capability they did not possess and then be afraid of that apparition? However, when Mr. McNamara announced counterforce, rather than telling the Soviets that we wanted to control a nuclear war, whether it be inadvertent or calculated, we were actually telling them that we had realized our error in regard to their capabilities. More than that, it is conceivable that we were telling the Soviets that we had a credible first-strike capability and were willing to use it as part of our deterrent and/or confrontation posture. In other words, regardless of the content of Mr. McNamara's signal, the Soviets were hearing, "Look, we now know that you really don't have many ICBM's. We further know that we, the United States, possess a vast superiority in nuclear weapons. We know where your retaliatory forces are located, and we can destroy them, if we so desire." The Soviet response was threefold: a massive shift of emphasis, from IRBM'S to ICBM's, a quick-fix attempt to redress the balance by the Cuban episode, and, in time, the somewhat shaky decision (from a technical standpoint) to pour money into the development and deployment of the Golash ABM system around Moscow and its ICBM field. The Soviet ICBM panic then served as the trigger that led to the assured destruction concept and the arms racing of the later McNamara years.

Now, this is not to say that it actually happened. It is but one of the constructions that can be built upon the known facts. Other constructions have been placed on the same events. It should be noted that counterforce enunciation only indirectly led to the arms race. The perceptions of superiority and what such superiority meant in political terms can be seen as the direct cause of the late 1960s race.

The last point that should be looked into before moving to consideration of today's strategic environment is whether or not counterforce is in fact a first-strike strategy. It is on this point that logic and morality, not to say national objectives, become confused and create paradoxes. Counterforce by itself does not imply either a first-strike or second-strike capability. The United States has repeatedly gone on record as ruling out a U.S. preemptive strike on any grounds. The logic of striking an opponent's force does imply, however, for maximum utility and benefit, a first strike. But this fact does not detract from the capability of a less than-maximally beneficial controlled second strike. There will, be missiles left (reliability being what it is). Not all of the bombers would have made it off the ground (maintenance aborts), and some reserves would logically be left to insure destruction of key targets that were somehow missed in the first shot. It would be to our advantage, if we were to retaliate at all, to destroy these targets so as to limit or eliminate further damage to ourselves in any follow-on attack.¹² Further, anybody can always strike first—it is a possibility. But this may be a far cry from a credible strike. Counterforce only equates to a credible first strike in an environment where it is coupled either with overwhelming superiority, so as to guarantee a disarming or nearly disarming strike, or with a defensive posture that guarantees or nearly guarantees invulnerability to retaliation.

The New York Times article calling for the great debate put forth many of the same arguments that first appeared in 1962.

Such a debate is vital because of the immediate impact of the new strategy on Soviet military planning, on the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II) and on the opportunity that still exists to halt a new arms race in MIRV multiple warhead missiles . . . .

Mr. Schlesinger insists that the retargeting Minuteman and projected deployment later of more accurate missiles would not constitute a true "first strike" capability since the United States would only be able to destroy some; not all, of Russia's ICBM's. But Soviet analysts, using traditional military "worst-possible-case" estimates, may see the American capability differently and press for a matching Soviet "first strike" force.

The advantages of shooting first in a crisis would be so great that both sides might become trigger happy . . .

The trouble with this approach is not only that it requires enormous numbers of new, highly accurate warheads, making a new round in the strategic arms race probable and dooming SALT II, but it would increase rather than decrease the likelihood of strategic nuclear war. If the consequence of using nuclear weapons is a limited enemy counterattack against military installations—on the dubious assumption on both sides that rapid escalation into all-out nuclear exchange could be avoided—the inhibition against the use of nuclear weapons would be much reduced.¹³

One is very much tempted to throw up one's hands and either sob or laugh hysterically. There is no particular evidence that the Soviets in their planning have ever paid much attention to what we do. We already have the "enormous numbers of . . . highly accurate warheads"—but so do the Soviets (bigger, but less accurate). And, although it is a weak argument, since we first instituted counterforce in 1962 and no war has resulted, can one assert that the inhibition against use of nuclear weapons has been reduced? Additionally, there are the U.S. and U.S.S.R. triads (ICBM's, SLBM's, and manned bombers); so a "limited disarming strike" is not a credible first strike.

Confusion arises here for several reasons. Whereas both the United States and the Soviet Union possess a triad of strategic forces, the view we ascribe to each respective triad differs. Each element of the U.S. triad is viewed by many to be a deterrent across the strategic spectrum in its own right. At the same time, we tend to concentrate on the Soviet missile force (sometimes including SLBM's) as their sole deterrent. And, in looking at our own forces, we tend to assume that one leg of the triad must deter all of the Soviet threat. In this particular case, a missile counterforce capability would only equate to a credible first strike if it were near totally disarming—if our MIRVed missile force possessed the accuracy, warhead quantity, and megatonnage necessary to destroy nearly every Soviet launcher, be it located in a submarine, in a silo, or on an airfield. Even prior to SALT I, this was not the case, and the limitations imposed by SALT I indicate that this is a physical impossibility for our ICBM force. Simply put, the numbers do not allow it.

However, this view of the triad is incorrect. Our purpose in the triad has been thus defined:

not to provide an independent assured destruction capability in each element of the strategic forces, as some people have presumed. Rather, it is to achieve a sufficient degree of diversification in our forces to hedge against both foreseeable and unforeseeable risks, and to enable us to continue to make available to the President a reasonable range of strategic options . . . ¹⁴

We must therefore look at the total strategic force and the total capabilities and limitations, not solely at ICBM versus ICBM. It likewise follows that if our ICBM force is counterforce targeted, this does not equate to a first-strike capability in and of itself. There is much more that must be accounted for in this determination.

The New York Times has erred once again in confusing deterrence with defense. As Glenn Snyder tried to point out in 1961, "the central theoretical problem in the field of national security policy is to clarify and distinguish between the two central concepts of deterrence and defense." ¹⁵ The New York Times, among others, has not paid attention or has forgotten. Things that contribute to deterrence may be useless in defense, and vice versa. With the increasing complexity of the defensive posture of both sides, complete reliance on deterrence may leave us totally unprepared for defense, if deterrence fails.

Unlike 1962, the United States no longer enjoys a massive strategic nuclear superiority. Like it or not, for the foreseeable future we are in an era of mutually assured destruction (MAD--Originally Donald Brennan's term). This situation exists primarily because of the hated "overkill" capabilities of both sides and the agreed-upon Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty leaving retaliatory forces relatively undefended against missile attack. It is difficult to see how any amount of MIRVing, accuracy increase, or any other qualitative offensive improvement could alter this basic fact, barring a completely unforeseen technological breakthrough of the scope of the invention of the airplane or the discovery of fire. SALT I and the ABM Treaty help freeze us into MAD, and MAD insures a high, mutually existing deterrent. (An invulnerable defense and/or an unstoppable totally effective offense would be needed to break the MAD deadlock—i.e., give somebody a credible first strike.) ¹⁶

A more serious objection is the possibility of an arms race, which is, in fact, being discussed. However, I would maintain, much as Halperin did in 1967, that if an arms race results, it does so because of a desire to maintain superiority, or to gain superiority, not because of preemption fears generated by a counterforce strategy. As Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated, "The decision to produce and deploy these systems will depend, among other things, upon the outcome of the strategic arms limitation negotiation."

Our defense policy in this age of SALT is now termed "essential equivalence." Unlike our previous "strategic sufficiency," the posture is now taking on some sort of definable shape. The United States has given up the desire or aim of clear-cut strategic superiority. This is not to say that by doing so we are willing to accept strategic inferiority. Rather, we will maintain some sort of rough parity or, if you will, equivalence with the Soviet Union. If they attempt to gain superiority, we will resist.

Much of this whole thing is involved in what has already been done in SALT I and the ABM Treaty and is hopefully to be continued in SALT II. While I do not care to indulge in a resume of the alleged pros and cons surrounding SALT I, it is imperative to make a few points in the context of superiority.

The Soviets possess an agreed-upon guaranteed quantitative superiority in launchers, approximately 40 percent. This numerical superiority also confers superiority in throw-weight and thus in maximum megatonnage. This superiority is offset by U.S. MIRV technology and deployment, U.S. accuracy, and number of warheads (particularly the result of MIRV). The U.S. also possesses a vast, but aging, superiority in manned bombers. The sea-launched systems can likewise be considered roughly equal—more launchers on the Soviet side, better accuracy and MIRVing on the U.S. side. (The ABM Treaty really means that neither side will defend its forces in a way involving an imperative to increase numbers of missiles to offset the defense.) Essentially, the static position of mid-1974 is a Soviet missile numerical superiority balanced by an American qualitative superiority—or essential equivalence.

Many analysts would perhaps disagree his formulation. However, by agreeing on these measures, both sides have accepted them and would appear to be satisfied with the parity presently existing. The future is another matter. If the Soviets move to MIRV deployment, and there is as yet no indication that they are doing so, then the balance could start shifting to Soviet superiority. In August 1973 the Soviet Union tested a MIRV, so the technological knowledge is there Deployment is another matter. If the Soviets MIRV, the agreed-upon existing level of U.S. qualitative superiority could well disappear, and the already existing numerical and megatonnage superiority of the Soviets would be relatively strengthened. Secretary, Schlesinger has asked for R&D funding to continue to develop U.S. qualitative options. An arms race, if it develops, will come only if Soviet deployments occur to erase the U.S. qualitative margin and we deploy new systems to keep it. Secretary Schlesinger has made it clear that we are willing to accept asymmetries in comparison of triad legs. This is a far cry, however, from accepting a major asymmetry in the overall strategic balance, or a series of asymmetries that "all point in one direction." ¹⁷

Secretary Schlesinger has separated the sizing issue from the counterforce or targeting issue. This in itself has caused some mental confusion because there are linkages between the two issues.¹⁸ The targeting, or option issue, relates to possible gaps in our deterrent threat, as well as the defensive ability (in Glenn Snyder's concept) to fight a nuclear war and provide intrawar deterrence should deterrence fail to deter. The view is expressed that deterrence based on assured destruction/countervalue is becoming less credible in a world where full-scale nuclear war is considered to be more irrational and less probable. If China was not deterred from supplying the Viet Minh by the possibility of massive retaliation, can we expect that the Soviet Union will be deterred from contemplating, threatening, or even using, in a limited manner, nuclear weapons in a confrontation with the United States or a NATO member over some strategic area? The options are to give us the ability to threaten less than maximal response and therefore increase the credibility of our deterrent threat. The linkage to the sizing question lies in the nature of the strategic balance, or more precisely, the question of parity or superiority. An option represents two things in this context: first, it is a rung on the escalation ladder that must logically be topped by superiority (whose ladder goes higher in thinking out the unthinkable); and second, it represents the physical capability in numbers of launchers, warheads, and/or megatonnage set aside for that option while still meeting the physical requirements of other options, including full-scale second-strike response.

Détente notwithstanding, Americans must ask themselves if this is an acceptable position to be in: a world with Soviet strategic superiority across the board. This is properly the central question to be answered. What price superiority, or more accurately, what price prevention of inferiority? While a discussion of superiority is beyond the scope of this article, some observations are in order.

I would agree with Colin Gray¹⁹ that there is a lot of confusion in American strategic thinking today. Old arguments continue to be heard, still unsubstantiated by events or meaningful data. This holds true for the small but growing debate on the meaning of strategic superiority. Many of the arguments used to refute the view that superiority is meaningful beg the question by using examples where U.S. superiority never entered the equation (specifically, the example of Hungary, 1956).²⁰ Huntington has made the point that the political implication of superiority essentially lies in the eyes of the beholder. ²¹ If we are confused as to what superiority means and if the Soviets gain strategic superiority, are we as a nation not automatically at a political disadvantage? Would not our deterrent posture immediately suffer from a lack of credibility simply because we could not agree on the meaning of superiority that is now hostile? ²²

The central point is that there are many questions of great importance that need investigation by strategic thinkers, and this investigation is needed now. Counterforce is not, in my opinion, one of these burning issues. (If for no other reason than that counterforce has been with us as a concept/policy for over 12 full calendar years now.) The meaning of superiority is a burning issue, as is Mutual Force Reduction (MFR),²³ the desirability of MAD and what to do about it if we don't like it, and SALT II. ²⁴ I would also add the warning (?) that the superiority question should be considered across the board, including escalation scenarios, intervention capabilities, and conventional situations. It is inconceivable to me that any individual, group, or "players in positions" would contemplate disarming the opponent's ICBM force when he/it/they would be deluged with bombers and SLBM's in retaliation. If we are going to indulge in a great debate, let us at least indulge in a meaningful one that can clarify significant issues today and in a manner that does not rely on emotional fears.

Notes

I. John W. Finney, "U.S. Says It Is Retargeting Some Missiles Under a New Strategic Concept," New York Times, January 11, 1974.

2. John W. Finney, "Nixon's Nuclear Doctrine," New York Times, January 15, 1974.

3. Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 5-40.

4. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

5. Herman Kahn's own triad, On Thermonuclear War (1960); On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (1965); and Thinking About the Unthinkable (1962).

6. Morton H. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967).

7. Ibid., p. 84.

8. Ibid., p. 85.

9. Ibid., p. 86.

10. There does seem to be agreement in most learned circles that we did indeed leave counterforce behind after about 1964, not so much from choice as from the physical necessity to provide warheads and vehicles to meet our criteria of what constituted a level of assured destruction. Secretary Schlesinger indicates, however, that we still maintained some element of counterforce targeting in our overall countervalue assured destruction deterrent threat.

11. The editorials and short articles buried in back pages of newspapers throughout the country are too numerous to mention. However, attention should be drawn to: Herbert Schoville, Jr., "The Balance of Arms," The New Republic, March 30, 1974; U.S. Representative Robert Price's letter to the Op-Ed editor, "Of Counterforce and the Prospects of War," New York Times, March 22, 1974; editorial, "New Strategic Nuclear Policy," Aviation Week, March 18, 1974: Herbert York, "Deterrence by Means of Mass Destruction," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1974; Chalmers M. Roberts, "Expanding U.S. Options," Washington Post, April 10, 1974; and, for balance, Julius Duscha, "Military Spending: The Juggernaut Rolls On," Progressive Magazine, April 1974. Particular attention should be paid to those articles highlighting Senator McIntyre's position during testimony on the issues. If testimony is not readily available, a good set of articles can be found in the Wall Street journal of June 12 and 13, 1974, entitled, "A Choice on Deterrence" and "Power Struggle: Critics Condemn Congress for Defense Budget."

12. In the era of SALT I, and assuming the Interim Agreement holds, the "open-hole" alleged illogic takes on new meaning, perhaps. (The open holes are the "launchers" into which new missiles must go in order to be launched in 2d, 3d, . . . nth wave attacks.)

13. New York Times, editorial; January 15, 1974.

14. James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report: FY 1975 (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1974), p. 49.

15. Snyder, p. 3.

16. For a rather short discussion of SALT I/MAD implication, see Donald J. Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," National Review, Vol. XXIV (June 23, 1972), pp. 685-92.

17. Schlesinger, p. 43.

18. Laurence Martin, in "Changes in American Strategic Doctrine," Survival, Vol. XVI, No.4 (July-August 1974), pp. 158-64, provides an interesting look at the debate from a European point of view. Part of the article's value lies in proving once again that vastly different, yet objective and reasonable, conclusions can be drawn from the same printed word.

19. Colin S. Gray, "Defense and Negotiation," Air Force, January 1974, pp. 32-36. However, I would disagree with some of Gray's conclusions as to the importance of strategic questions. A "limited but substantial counterforce capability," in my mind, has been possessed by both sides for several years. What is in question and unknowable to the publishing analyst is the degree of certainty or probability of kill, thus credibility of this capability. We could strike a number of Soviet silos today and destroy their missiles. So what? Can we assuredly get them all? The Soviets could likewise expend their SS-9s over several of our missile fields in a "limited but substantial counterforce strike." Again, so what? —we could launch rest in retaliation—we are not disarmed.

20. See, for example, Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Deterrence in the MIRV era" contained in Richard G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke editors, American Defense Policy, 3d edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973) pp. 117-20.

21. Samuel P. Huntington, "After Containment: The Functions of the Military Establishment." The Annals March 1973, p. 10.

22. For an interesting piece and a new term for the jargon, see Lewis A. Frank, "Soviet Power after Salt I: A Strategic-Coercive Capability?" Strategic Review, Spring 1974.

23. The designation of MFR is recent. Previously the term was MBFR, or Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction. The Soviets had strenuously objected to "Balanced." Once again, the U.S. and NATO compromised on the unaltered Soviet position.

24. Not being able to resist a parochial self-institutional plug, I refer the readers to an excellent volume, already cited, Head and Rokke, in the field of national security policy. See also the newly published book by Frank B. Horton III, Anthony C. Rogerson, and Edward L. Warner III, editors, Comparative Defense Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974)

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