Document created: 17 November 03
Air University Review, September-October 1974

Salt and the Blue-Water Strategy

OVER the past few years, there has been increasing discussion of a so-called “Blue-Water Strategy.” Several articles have appeared in the general press as well as in Service-oriented magazines concerning the subject. This article will examine one feature of the proposed strategy—moving our nuclear deterrent to sea—to determine how it is affected by the recently concluded Arms Limitation agreements.

An article that appeared in The Nation in November 1970 discussed “the adoption of the ‘Blue-Water’ option, which would rely solely on sea-based missiles and eliminate vulnerable land-based ICBMs and manned bombers.”¹ In the April 1971 issue of United States Naval Institute Proceedings an article advocated “increasing the movement of the strategic deterrent to sea while there is still time.” Why? “Because the inexorable advance of technology in both the United States and the Soviet Union is making all fixed, land-based deterrent systems vulnerable, obsolete and highly risky and tempting for pre-emptive attack.”² The author further recommended immediate deployment of between 300 and 400 Minuteman missiles at sea aboard specially designed or modified missile ships. He also recommended the phase-out of land-based strategic bombers and an increase in the strategic delivery capability of attack aircraft carriers. Then, in the December 1971 issue of Sea Power, Rear Admiral George H. Miller proposed a new national strategy that stressed movement of more of our nuclear deterrent, as well as general purpose military power, to sea.³

These authors are proposing that the “blue-water” strategy or option be applied both to general purpose forces and to the nuclear deterrent at sea. This article, however, will deal only with the latter aspect of the blue-water strategy, since it is more directly related to the agreements under the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Although SALT may eventually have an indirect impact on planning general purpose forces, possibly as in such matters as freeing some money that would otherwise have been spent on strategic forces, the extent of the impact is not evident at this time.

Credibility of the 
Blue-Water Strategy

It is evident that, even prior to the SALT agreements, most defense planners did not accept a strategy that would place complete reliance on only one element of our nuclear deterrent. Most students of defense planning also saw the obvious flaws in this strategy of placing “all our eggs in one basket.” Air Force Magazine, in a March 1972 editorial, exposed the dangers of this strategy very well.⁴ It is not the purpose here to reiterate these arguments. However, it is evident that we must maintain the strength of all three elements of our strategic deterrent: land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. In his Annual Defense Department Report FY 1973, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird stated:

Turning to specifics in our planning, although each element of our strategic offensive forces at the present time possesses a substantial capability in its own right, we plan to maintain a combination of land and sea-based missiles and manned bombers during the program period. This will enable us to take advantage of the unique capabilities inherent in these different systems, to provide a hedge against enemy technological breakthroughs or unforeseen operational failures, either of which might adversely affect our deterrent, and to complicate Soviet and PRC [People’s Republic of China] offensive and defensive strategic planning.⁵

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, in his Military Posture Report for FY 1973, lent further support to the need for a mix of strategic offensive forces with this statement: “In this connection, I want to state once again the firm conviction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that an appropriate mix of mutually supporting strategic forces is still essential to the maintenance of our deterrent.”⁶

Programs to continue this strategic mix, including an option to increase the numbers of Minuteman III in the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, were advanced by the Administration in FY 74 budget requests.⁷

In spite of arguments against relying solely on a sea-based nuclear deterrent, it is unlikely that we have heard the last of these proposals. For one thing, some critics of Defense spending see the blue-water strategy as an opportunity to cut Defense budgets drastically. For another, there are those who still believe in the “assured destruction” theory of the early 1960s, i.e., that the capability to cause fatalities to a quarter or a third of the population of the Soviet Union is all that is required for deterrence.

SALT Agreements

Therefore, let’s look at the SALT agreements to see if they support or nullify the arguments made by the advocates of a blue-water strategy.

The SALT agreements consist of two principal parts: the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Offensive Agreement.⁸ The ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration and prohibits either the Soviet Union or the United States from deploying a nationwide ABM defense or a base for such a defense. Each side is permitted to deploy a limited defense of two areas—the national capital and one ICBM complex. No more than one hundred ABM launchers and interceptors are permitted at each site. The Interim Offensive Agreement lasts for five years and permits each side to keep any fixed land-based ICBM launchers currently operational or under construction. Additionally, neither side may convert any other ICBM launchers to modern large ballistic missile launchers. Each side may keep any submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers operational or under construction. Also, newer SLBM launchers may be built as replacements for older SLBM launchers or for older heavy ICBM launchers. The Soviet Union is limited to 950 SLBM launchers and 62 modern ballistic missile submarines. The United States is limited to 710 SLBM’S and 44 modem ballistic missile submarines. Bombers are not included in the agreement.

One immediately evident impact of SALT is a freeze on the present balance of U.S. ICBM’S and SLBM’S, except that the 54 Titan II ICBM’S (the only heavy U.S. missile and our only “older type deployed prior to 1964”) could be phased out in favor of 54 additional SLBM’S. Any reduction of the Minuteman force could not, under terms of the Protocol to the Interim Agreement, open the way for additional U.S. SLBM’S.

Survivability

Since the vulnerability of land-based missiles and bombers has been cited as the primary reason for moving the nuclear deterrent to sea, let’s look at the effect of the SALT agreements on the survivability of each of the three elements.

A potential threat to the survivability of the Minuteman force could be posed by an increase in the numbers, yield, and accuracy of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads on SS-9 or SS-9-type ICBM’S. Admiral Moorer noted this potential threat as follows:

If these new or modified ICBMs also turn out to be MIRVed systems with significantly improved CEPs, the potential threat to our MINUTEMAN force, which has been of such great concern to us over the last few years, could become a reality. The severity of the threat, however, would depend on the number, accuracy, and yield of the RVs carried by the new missiles.

Let me hasten to add that this assessment is not meant to be a forecast. It is simply one of the more likely possibilities which must now be taken into account, particularly in the absence of a meaningful agreement to limit the deployment of missiles.⁹  

Although the agreement does not limit the accuracy or yield of the re-entry vehicles (RV), it does limit the number of ICBM and SLBM launchers and the dimensions of ICBM launchers, and hence it indirectly limits the payload that could be deployed for a given level of technology (which remains unconstrained). Therefore, while the number of RV’S allowable can be said to be indirectly limited, neither side has yet realized its full potential. Thus the Interim Offensive Agreement impact on the potential threat to Minuteman appears now to be marked by Soviet technological developments. In testifying before the House Armed Services Committee in July 1972, Admiral Moorer provided the following information:

With respect to our research and development efforts, while analyses conducted within DOD using Soviet force levels comparable to those constrained by SAL indicate that sufficient MINUTEMAN missiles would survive to accomplish a retaliatory mission, it is still necessary to maintain a hedge against possible Soviet qualitative improvements or abrogation of the agreement.¹⁰ (Emphasis added.)

The hedge referred to in the testimony was the site defense research and development program. From the above information, it would appear that, under SALT, the land-based ICBM force is still a viable part of our deterrent. Even complete vulnerability of the Minuteman force, unlikely as that is, would not eliminate Minuteman’s deterrent value. Its destruction would require an enemy to expend heavily from his constrained forces, after which he would face the prospect of retaliation from surviving U.S. strategic force elements. Minuteman would continue to have deterrent value.

Turning now to the next element of our strategic nuclear deterrent, the submarine-launched ballistic missiles, what effect does SALT have on the survivability of this system? At first glance, the answer seems to be none, since Soviet antisubmarine warfare improvements pose the primary threat to our SLBM’S and ASW systems are not included in the SALT agreements. There is an indirect effect on SLBM survivability, however, in that ICBM’S could be used to attack ballistic missile submarines if their location were known. The SALT agreement limits the total number of Soviet ICBM’S and, therefore, could affect the desirability of using them for this purpose. A counter to this argument is evident in the large number of ICBM’S the Soviets are permitted under SALT—in the neighborhood of 1500. Another factor is the omission of limitations on bombers. The Soviets have a large number of Badger medium bombers assigned to their naval forces. A technological breakthrough in submarine localization could facilitate the use of these Badgers against our SLBM forces. It should be noted, however, that solutions to the localization problem will not come easily.

What about the impact of SALT on the survivability of our land-based bombers? Here again, the threat is a postulated one and consists of Soviet SLBM’S launched against bomber bases with insufficient warning time to permit safe escape of the alert bombers.¹¹ The Interim Offensive Agreement limits the number of SLBM launchers the Soviets may deploy but, because of the relatively large numbers permitted, does little to limit this postulated threat. However, other measures are being taken which will greatly reduce the threat to bomber bases from SLBM’S, and these measures outweigh the limitations on the numbers of Soviet SLBM’S. These measures were described by Secretary Laird in his FY 1973 Defense Report and include: (1) dispersing the alert aircraft over a greater number of bases, generally farther inland than in the past; and (2) deployment of a new satellite early-warning system that will greatly improve the overall capability of our warning network, especially against SLBM launches.¹²

In summary, then, the Interim Offensive Agreement will probably have a favorable impact on the survivability of all three elements of our strategic deterrent.

One final point should be mentioned concerning survivability. The threats that have been postulated against Minuteman and the bomber force have usually been considered in isolation against each component, rather than as part of a carefully considered overall plan. It is unlikely that a prudent Soviet planner would target all of his most efficient weapons in this manner. In other words, the presence of the other two elements of the deterrent must be considered, as well as other potential targets that must be struck. The SALT agreement makes it even less likely that the Soviet planners would use their SALT-constrained forces to attack only one or two elements of a comprehensive target system.

Flexibility and Effectiveness

Even though the advocates of a blue-water strategy focus their attention only on the vulnerability aspects of land-based ICBM’S and bombers, we should not neglect the other characteristics that are essential to deterrence. Not only must our strategic forces survive, they must be effectively employed. Furthermore, they must possess the flexibility to permit their employment across the spectrum of nuclear warfare. The SALT agreements have given tacit recognition to the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are now in a position of parity with respect to strategic forces. The parity position has given rise to the President’s use of “sufficiency” in prescribing our planning goals for strategic forces. It has also led to the statement by the President that he must have strategic options other than simple “assured destruction.” The President has said:

A simple “assured destruction” doctrine does not meet our present requirements for a flexible range of strategic options. No President should be left with only one strategic course of action, particularly that of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians and facilities.¹³ (Emphasis added.)

How can this flexibility and range of options be provided? An obvious requirement is to insure that we have the command and control and communications systems to permit carefully controlled employment of parts or all of our strategic forces. A second requirement is that these forces be capable of attacking a wide variety of targets, both hard and soft, minimizing collateral damage to population and civilian facilities when required.

Now, what is the impact of SALT on these requirements? First, since the ABM Treaty precludes an area ABM defense, fewer of our offensive warheads will be required to penetrate and neutralize that defense. This means that a greater number of our weapons could be targeted against other targets, providing greater flexibility of employment. How does this consideration affect the “blue-water” options? The bombers with their recall, strike assessment, and reconstitution capability, provide the greatest flexibility. However, one drawback is the longer time they require to reach their targets. For attacking time-sensitive targets, then, missiles must be used. The Minuteman systems, because of their accuracy and yield combinations, have greater employment flexibility than do the submarine-launched ballistic missiles. An interesting aspect of the ABM Treaty is its effect on the employment of Poseidon, in particular. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has noted, the Poseidon, with its many MIRV’S, was specifically developed to penetrate a sophisticated Soviet ABM defense, relying upon the exhaustion of interceptors rather than upon penetration aids. Neither our current SLBM’S nor our ICBM’S were designed to have a hard target kill capability, as the Chairman told a Congressional Committee last year.¹⁴ For this purpose, the manned bomber remains preeminent.

The survivable submarine-launched systems can be withheld and retargeted. They thus provide flexibility to withhold a retaliatory decision until the nature of the attack can be fully assessed. This flexibility depends upon equally survivable command, control, and communications. For a carefully controlled strategic response, reliable communications are essential. Since the ballistic missile submarine’s strong point is invulnerability, which is dependent on keeping its location unknown, submarine-to-shore communications are difficult. Exposure of a communications antenna on or near the surface could give away the submarine’s position. An ELF (extremely low frequency) system is being developed to communicate with submarines while they are submerged at operating depth. However, this would be a low data-rate system. A satellite communications system under development ¹⁵ may provide better two-way communications with our submarines, but once again it may be necessary to expose an antenna, with the possible compromise of location.

This is not to say that we should adopt an “anti-blue-water” strategy and retire this portion of our deterrent. The SLBM’S provide a large number of warheads, which currently gives the United States a numerical superiority in warheads, offsetting the Soviet advantage in delivery vehicles and megatonnage. In addition, at the present time, the SLBM’S provide a survivable retaliatory force that enforces the overall viability of our strategic force mix. However, neither should we consider retiring our bomber or Minuteman forces. As we have seen, each has its strong points, and all are essential. The SALT agreements have done nothing to change this fact.

Air War College

Notes

1. Steve d’Arazien, “Blue Water Boondoggle,” The Nation, November 10, 1970, p. 13.

2. George E. Lowe, “The Only Option?” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 97, April 1971, p. 23.

3. George H. Miller, “Needed—A New Strategy for Preservation of the Republic,” Sea Power, vol. 14, December 1971, pp. 5-11.

4. John L. Frisbee, “Blue-Water Booby Trap,” Air Force Magazine, vol. 55, March 1972, p. 2.

5. Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the FY 1973 Defense Budget and FY 1973-1977 Program, February 15, 1972, p. 66. Hereafter cited as FY 1973 Defense Report.

6. Statement by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the House Armed Services Committee on 17 February 1972, p. 21. Hereafter cited as Military Posture for FY 1973.

7. Statement of Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY 1974 Defense Budget and FY 1974-1978 Program, Tuesday, April 10, 1973, pp. 9, 10.

8. Commanders Digest, Department of Defense, vol. 12, August 10, 1972, pp. 7-27.

9. Military Posture for FY 1973, pp. 8, 9.

10. Full Committee Hearings on the Military Implications of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreements, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Washington, July 25, 1972, p. 15148.

11. FY 1973 Defense Report, p. 71.

12. Ibid., pp. 71, 75.

13. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 9, 1972, p. 158.

14. Military Posture for FY 1973, p. 11.

15. FY 1973 Defense Report, p. 74.

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