Document created: 5 November 2003
Air University Review,
September-October 1974
On 2 February 1974 the USAF Chief of Staff sent a message to all major commanders announcing a major change in Air Force policy with regard to flying command assignments: a decision to seek the repeal of Section 8577, Title 10, U.S. Code, which limits command of flying units to pilots. The object in doing so is to allow navigators to become eligible for command of flying units. The justification stems, in part, from the fact that prohibiting navigators from commanding flying units “can be viewed by some (both within and outside of the Air Force) as discriminatory. . . .”1 That the issue should be considered in terms of discrimination is of particular significance, since discrimination in any form and its result—alienation and disaffection—unquestionably limit a group’s useful, relevant, and meaningful contribution to society. Hence, it is appropriate that the issue of navigators and flying command assignments be viewed in these terms.
Until now, Air Force officers trained and employed as navigators have been largely excluded from the rank of general officer, thus from opportunities to serve in high-level executive management positions and to participate fully in the policy-making processes of the USAF. This is discrimination. Although repeal of Section 8577 would ostensibly eliminate its basis, the issue is not dead. Indeed, it has much deeper significance requiring further consideration. This article, then, attempts to focus on the issue of the navigator and command assignments by discussing the result of years of professional discrimination, the problems that will have to be overcome to eliminate it, and, by way of recommendation, what might be done.
discrimination and its result
At the heart of the problem has been a statement included in Section 8577, Title 10, United States Code, upon which the discrimination has been based: “Flying units shall be commanded by commissioned officers of the Air Force who have received aeronautical ratings as pilots of service-types of aircraft.”2 Innocuous and logical on the surface, the provision has had much deeper significance when one considers that many high-level command positions requiring the rank of general officer are viewed as “flying unit” command positions, thus subject to the provisions of Title 10. When one considers, further, that the only opportunities for “flying unit” command experience lie in the operations flying areas and that these have been restricted to pilots, then the pilots have been the flying officers who have had opportunities to advance to general-officer rank and executive leadership.
Indeed, this assumption is confirmed in Air Force Manual 36-23, which outlines the officer career structure. Referring to pilot careers, the manual states: “The pilot, the military’s most expensive product, is a high value resource which commands special management effort and planning. . . as pilots become principal executives and planners in the Department of Defense. . . .”3 (Italics added.) Referring to navigator careers, however, the manual states: “Navigators provide a rated talent reservoir from which to select Air Force commanders and executives at all levels. . . [for] . . . command and staff management of functions associated with air operations. . . .”4 (Italics added.) Considering, again, that “air operations” include the principal executive and planning positions within the USAF and that qualification for these positions has included completion of pilot training,5 it becomes very apparent why navigators have indeed had to settle for positions “associated with air operations” and thus for limited careers. AFM 36-23 has most effectively assured that the important roles in USAF leadership and policy-making are reserved for pilots. The evidence and result: a 28.6-to-l ratio of pilot-rated to navigator-rated general officers.6 Moreover, results of the 1974 brigadier general selection board confirm the effect and indicate that an imbalance in favor of pilots will continue. Of the 66 colonels selected for promotion, 51 (77%) were pilots, and only 4 (6%) were navigators. The nonrated officers did better, with 8 selections (12%),7 although they make up more than 50% of the force.
While nonrated officers have also been excluded in the process, the issue concerns discrimination among flying officers. Indeed, few would argue that a nonflyer should command operational flying units; yet even this limitation allows for more general officers who are nonrated than those rated as navigators.8 Consequently, denying navigators equal opportunity with pilots for advancement into general-officer rank has appeared as a particularly selective form of discrimination.
A second result of long-standing professional discrimination toward the navigator is found in an examination of secondary-zone promotion selections, demonstrating again that navigators have not had opportunities for advancement equal to those of pilots. The secondary-zone promotion is significant because it provides a route by which officers showing exceptional ability and promise, and thus most likely to be selected as general officers, are allowed to progress at an accelerated rate. Of those officers considered for early promotion to major in 1972, for example, 38.6% were pilots and only 8.7% were navigators. The selection results illustrate a greater disparity, with pilots receiving 61.9% of the secondary promotions and navigators only 2.6%.9 Although secondary-zone selection of navigators to lieutenant colonel and colonel ranks reflects a slight percentage increase, it is not significant enough to indicate a departure from the established pattern of discrimination. A four-year average of lieutenant colonel and colonel secondary-zone selections by rating (1970-1973) reflects the following: for lieutenant colonel, 63% were pilots and 9% were navigators; for colonel 60% were pilots and 5% were navigators.10 (Compare these figures to the total rated force distribution in note 6.)
The imbalance in the general-officer ranks in favor of pilots and the difference between pilot and navigator secondary selection opportunities are not, hopefully, a result of conscious discrimination against navigators (indeed, the uniformity of low navigator secondary selections for all ranks suggests that this is unlikely). The obvious and significant implication, however, is that navigators have not been allowed the experience, recognized by promotion boards, that would enable them to compete with their pilot peers: that is, command experience in flying operations.
Having considered the results of professional discrimination toward the
navigator regarding his opportunity for secondary-zone promotion and
advancement to general-officer rank and high-level executive management
responsibility (reflected in the low number of general officers rated as
navigators), there is little point in arguing the issue if there were no
visible effect on the navigator group as a whole. However, a visible effect
does suggest itself, a third result of discrimination that is of immediate
concern to navigators and personnel administrators alike: disaffection and
estrangement. While the roots of alienation as it occurs in an organization are
in dispute among administrative theorists (being attributed to many causes, if
not to the basic hierarchical structure of organization itself), the term is
used here in a very specific sense: because navigators have not had career
opportunities equal to those of their rated peers, it is likely that
discouragement and disaffection among them has caused many to leave the USAF, creating
a navigator shortage.11 Evidence is suggested first by the
“voluntary navigator recall” program instituted in 1971 to induce separated
navigators to return to active duty; second, by the reduction in the number of
navigators serving in the rated supplement to lessen the immediate impact of
the shortage upon flying duties; and finally, by an increase in navigator
“production” from 800 to 1200 new navigators per year.12
While the shortage is admittedly no “proof” of navigator alienation, it is an indication that alienation may exist. Nonetheless, a link can be established by sampling the “Letters to the Editor” in the Air Force Times, a column providing a means for individuals to express their concern with USAF problems or practices. Regarding the issue of navigator disaffection and the resulting shortage, three examples illustrate the link:
Reference several letters on “why
the navigator shortage?” The answer is pretty obvious to me and many other
navigators in the AF.
. . . A navigator is treated as a second-class officer, completely subservient
to the pilot.
. . . What they mean is RHIP is for pilots only. [signed] Second
Class Officer.13
Another navigator states, referring also to the navigator shortage, “I now understand why [the shortage] after 11 years and my first pass-over. . . . Now that I have come up for majority, I have nothing on my record except navigator assignments. . . . Thus, I feel I’m not being judged fairly.”14 Finally, an individual who questioned the validity of command positions of all types being filled largely by pilots wrote: “From my personal observation it seems that pilots are given preferential treatment when it comes to filling command vacancies whether or not a pilot rating is required for the vacancy.”15 While it is not valid to claim that these samples represent a majority of navigator feeling, they do serve to illustrate a linkage between disaffection and the shortage, and they indicate its source: lack of opportunities equal to those of pilots. Nevertheless, the point of a navigator shortage can be summarized in a statement by Group Captain (Colonel) D. F. H. Grocott, Royal Air Force, made with regard to the RAF experience with a similar shortage. Referring specifically to navigators, he wrote, “. . . able men will not join if there are no prospects or will leave when they discover they have no future. Therefore, equality of opportunity with other able men is essential.”16
problems to overcome
We have considered three results of professional discrimination toward navigators. That the cause can be traced to denying them the opportunity to command flying units has been recognized, and the first step has been taken: the Hq USAF decision to seek repeal of Section 8577, Title 10. However, can we consider that step alone sufficient to eliminate the long-standing results of discrimination? Experience suggests that we cannot. Following are three reasons why this may be so.
The first reason is reflected in the experience of the Royal Air Force when confronted with a similar problem. Since their experience has several points of comparison with that of the USAF, we may usefully consider its background. In 1948 the RAF suffered a serious shortage of navigators, much as the USAF has in recent years. A committee appointed to investigate the problem concluded that a lack of navigator career opportunities equaling those of pilots was the major factor in their inability to attract navigator candidates, a factor also affecting navigator retention. Consequently, the committee determined that the logical approach would be to give navigators prospects of promotion and assignment equal to their pilot peers. The recommendations were adopted, and an Air Ministry order was issued stating, “It is the intention that all navigators entering the Royal Air Force should have career prospects comparable with those open to pilots. . . [and] will be eligible for promotion [in the General Duties Branch] on the same basis as pilots.”17 (The General Duties Branch is the career category from which RAF squadron commanders are normally selected.)
Of significance to the USAF problem is the fact that RAF articulation of the policy was insufficient. Because of lead times insisted upon to allow navigators adequate preparation for command assignments, together with a hesitancy to move in a new direction, the system continued much as before, with the result that navigators who should have been gaining junior command or staff experience were retained in flying duties. This further deprived them of experience necessary to prepare for higher-level command positions, making it even more unlikely they would have careers equal to those of pilots. The result was widespread disappointment among RAF navigators, so much so that the entire issue was reviewed in 1954.
Even though the review authority determined that promotion boards had been considering pilots and navigators equally, making no distinction between the two aircrew categories, it admitted that in appointments to command and appropriate staff positions navigators had fared badly; even though equal opportunity was the policy, pilots were still receiving a disproportionate share of promotions and command assignments. Consequently, the Air Ministry found it necessary to restate in a policy letter that, “all other things being equal,” navigators were eligible to command flying units and would be assured the opportunity to do so. In effect, an “affirmative action” policy was necessary; that is, a conscious effort to identify flying units that navigators could command, “reserving” them for navigators. Unless the USAF undertakes a similar approach, the same problem is likely to affect the USAF navigator.
That the policy has worked successfully is reflected in the number of RAF navigators who command flying units. In 1970, 31% of flying units from squadron level upward, excluding units flying single-seat aircraft, were commanded by navigators, or 24% of the total number of flying units.18 These percentages are in about the same ratio as the overall RAF pilot-to-navigator ratios. The ratio of navigators holding the rank of group captain to pilots doing so is also about the same. (Compare this with USAF ratios: 28% of all rated officers are navigators, yet only 16% of rated colonels are navigators.) Proportional representation between navigator and pilot-rated air (general) officers in the RAF has not yet been achieved, but the trend is toward doing so; certainly it is much closer than in the USAF.19 Thus, the RAF experience with navigators is relevant to the USAF: a hesitancy to institute a new program and the lack of a positive effort to place navigators in command positions necessitated a delayed review and re-articulation of the policy. Certainly we can learn from their experience.
A second reason that repeal of Title 10 alone may not be sufficient to eliminate the results of discrimination can be found in long-standing and well-entrenched pilot attitudes toward navigators. Indeed, for decades it has been implied that pilots possess an inherent superiority over navigators with regard to qualifications for command; that only individuals who qualify as pilots have the capability to lead; and that non-pilots therefore lack the ability, intelligence, and skills necessary to provide leadership. As illogical and unlikely as these implications seem, they nonetheless have their proponents among pilots. Commenting on numerous complaints of discrimination made by navigators in the “Letters” column of Air Force Times, a pilot wrote, in response to a specific complaint:
He mentioned the lack of equal
opportunity for navigators. He had the same opportunity as anyone else to
command. For some reason, he didn’t qualify for the first prerequisite in the
long road to command. I’m speaking of pilot training, of course. Perhaps he did
qualify, but washed out—forgive me. Thank goodness the AF still feels that any
man must earn the right to command.20
Will repeal of Section 8577 change these attitudes? If they are not recognized and if efforts are not made to compensate for them, discrimination is likely to continue as before.
The third reason—and the third problem to overcome—is implied in an organizational “administrative” assumption: the institutionalized tradition of “pilot.” USAF organizational doctrine and practice have long maintained that pilots receive their first “taste” of command experience while functioning as aircraft or flight commanders and that all other crew members are therefore subordinates who must accept limited careers. (Indeed, even a copilot cannot expect to become a general officer unless he first becomes an aircraft commander.) Thus, the long tradition of “pilot” has become institutionalized, so much so that it has become the basis for command selection even though the functional validity of so doing has passed. Hence, it is necessary to consider the probability that air crews really function as “collective” decision-making bodies, since no single individual can perform all skills of all crew members, and that decisions are made collectively, not by the pilot alone, even in emergency situations: the navigator determines which field is closest and most suitable for landing; the engineer determines the “systems” conditions and aircraft emergency performance capabilities. By the time the aircraft commander reacts, the decision has effectively been made by all. (The same situation exists to a lesser degree in two-place aircraft.) Thus, unless the USAF recognizes that the institutionalized tradition of “pilot” is not the only means by which one can gain leadership, that the navigator sitting either three feet to the side or six feet to the rear of the pilot also shares in it, then it is unlikely that repeal of Section 8577 will have much effect in overcoming the results of long-term professional discrimination toward the navigator.
recommendations
Experience suggests—and this article points out—that actions beyond seeking repeal of Section 8577 are necessary. What those actions might be follow.
First, the pattern to overcome the effects of discrimination toward the
navigator has already been established in other contexts: the “affirmative
action” program. In this context, it must include an overt, well-planned, and
carefully instituted program to ensure that navigators will have the
opportunity to experience flying unit command. The program should begin with a
recognition that, since navigators have operated with pilots in the same
milieu, they too have gained “an intimate knowledge of tactical, strategic and
defensive warfare and its logistical requirements, including techniques of employment
of appropriate type aircraft.”21
Second, positions that navigators can fill in preparation for actual command should be identified and a percentage reserved for them. Examples include squadron and wing operations officer positions, command-post controller positions, and, perhaps most important, “mission” command positions: that is, flying missions in which pilots retain command of the aircraft but command of the mission or task is given to the navigator. The mission commander would receive “inputs” from the pilot as necessary regarding the aircraft status when making decisions. Indeed, some missions, particularly those of a strategic nature, are navigator-oriented: the navigator plans the mission profile and is thus in a better position to direct and control its operation, leaving the pilots free to operate the aircraft. (The RAF bomber and maritime forces have long and successfully used the principle.) Such mission commands would be invaluable in giving navigators operational flying command experience and would go a long way in overcoming the traditional “pilot” institution limitation.
Third, selected flying units that could be commanded by navigators should be identified, chosen from among all strategic flying units (airlift and bomber), but limited among tactical units to those flying aircraft in which navigators regularly fly as crew members.
Fourth, navigators with broad flying experience who have demonstrated command ability in “additional duties” or in the rated supplement should be identified and appointed on a planned, progressive basis to command the selected flying units.
Finally, any rated distinction between navigators and pilots should be eliminated from promotion folders and consideration, allowing only experience to reflect an officer’s qualification. Flying officers could be identified only as “rated,” not as “pilot” or “navigator.” If navigators are then allowed flying command experience, they will be able to compete equally with pilots for promotion selection. As a result, individual qualification alone will eventually assure equitable representation of pilots and navigators at all levels, even among general officers.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Notes
1. Message dated 021501Z Feb 74, from CSAF WASH DC to AIG ALMAJCOM “For: Personal for Commanders. Subject: Restriction on command of flying units (10 USC 8577). The Chief of Staff has reviewed the past decisions that have been made with respect to proposals to amend or repeal the statute which prohibits the utilization of navigators as commanders of flying units (10 USC 8577). After considering all aspects, including the fact that this legal prohibition can be viewed by some (both within and outside of the Air Force) as discriminatory, he has decided that initiative should be taken to repeal the prohibition. Accordingly, action was taken on 29 January to advise Mr. Hebert and other members of Congress of Air Force intent to seek repeal of 10 USC 8577. You will be advised when this action has been completed at which time appropriate publicity will be handled by this Headquarters.”
2. Sec. 8577, Title 10, US Code, as quoted by George Foster in “Law Limits Commands,” Air Force Times, June 6, 1973, p. 1.
3. Air Force Manual 36-23, Officer Career Management, 1971, p. 8-1.
4. Ibid., p. 9-1.
5. AFM 36-1, Officer Classification Manual, 1971, p. 9-3.
6. Of 375 rated general officers (out of 411), 359 (96%) are pilots, 16 (4%) are navigators. (Source: General Officer section, DCS Personnel, Hq USAF, 12 December 1973.) Compare these figures with the total rated-force distribution: pilots 72%, navigators 28%.
7. Air Force Times, 13 February 1974, p. 18. The remaining 7% (4 officers) were 2 flight surgeons, 1 flight nurse, 1 flight observer.
8. General officers: 16 navigators (4%), 32 nonrated (9%). See note 6. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that a navigator could have become a USAF Vice Chief of Staff, yet a nonrated officer has held the position.
9. Analysis of FY 1971 Temporary Majors Promotions, USAF Military Personnel Center, undated. FY 1972 results show a slight increase in favor of navigators; 3½% of those selected for secondary promotion were navigators. (Source: Air Force Times, January 5, 1972, p. 4.)
10. Figures provided by the Promotion Secretariat, USAF Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, Texas, 11 December 1973.
11. While it is recognized that the navigator shortages are “officially” attributed to a greater demand for navigators than planners anticipated in the 1960s (long life of the B-52 force, the use of navigators in the back seats of fighters, etc.), it is argued here that the shortages are due to navigator disaffection.
12. The Air Force Officers’ Career Newsletter, August/September 1971, p. 1.
13. “Letters to the Editor,” Air Force Times, September 1, 1971, p. 64. See also Air Force Times, September 27, 1972, p. 60.
14. Ibid., August 4, 1971, p. 52.
15. Ibid., November 21, 1973.
16. D. F. H. Grocott, “Navigators’ Careers,” letter to Lieutenant Colonel Robert O. McCartan, Hq USAF AFPIRR, 13 July 1970. Photostatic copy.
17. P Plans 1 a (RAF), “Specific questions posed by Capt. C. L. Jefferies, USAF,” Letter to Capt. C. L. Jefferies, 8 Feb 1974.
18. Grocott.
19. P Plans 1 a (RAF). In addition, an indication can be inferred by comparing the number of one-star navigators in the two air forces to their total officer strengths: As of July 1970, there were six one-star navigators out of a total of 20,000 officers in the RAF, or a ratio of 1:3333. In the USAF, there are presently 10 one-star navigators out of a total officer force of 113,500, or a ratio of 1:11350.
20. Air Force Times, “Letters,” October 11, 1972, p. 13.
21. AFM 36-23, p. 8-1, referring to qualifications for AFSC 0066 (Air Commander).
Captain Chris L. Jefferies (M.P.A., University of Pittsburgh) is an instructor in the Department of Political Science, USAF Academy. As a navigator, he has flown 817 combat airlift missions in C-130s, strategic airlift in MAC C-141s, and in the Belfast transport aircraft while on exchange assignment with the Royal Air Force. Captain Jefferies is a Distinguished Graduate of Squadron Officer School and of the Junior Management Course, RAF School of Administration.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the
U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air
University.
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