Document created: 29 September 03
Air University Review, May-June 1974
“. . . microminiaturization . . . could provide the capability for development of sophisticated built-in test and communications capabilities in all future weapon systems.”
We are currently living in an era of outstanding technological advancements. New developments and discoveries are being made almost daily. In addition, current trends toward more complex and costly weapon systems, together with increased budget limitations, present new constraints for Air Force planners to consider. There is little reason to believe that problems created by theses will change through the seventies or into the eighties. Consequently, logistics planning must be predicated on concepts that take advantage of modern technology to enhance weapon system mobility and provide the most effective logistics support of reduced weapon inventories of increased complexity.
The purpose of this article is to present one of many possible concepts of weapons support. Its intent is to stimulate thought and discussion on how we can cope with the future Air Force logistics environment.
Since achieving status as a separate service, the Air Force has been plagued with uncertainty, which has produced a yo-yo effect on logistics resources. In times of heightened tension, increased operational activity has resulted in panic buildups in logistics. Correspondingly, as soon as tensions were relieved, there has been accelerated decrease in logistics support. Korea, Berlin, Cuba, and now Vietnam are examples of this build up, then tear down, syndrome.
The Southeast Asia (SEA) buildup, which started in 1965, presented both operational and logistic support problems. Increased combat requirements necessitated the expedited building of six new air bases and the significant upgrading of thirteen others. This activity severely strained both the operational and logistics arms of the Air Force. Operationally, the Air Force was hard pressed to provide the required aircraft, combat crews, and direct support personnel with associated equipment and still maintain a programmed combat reserve and training capability to meet other threats. Also, even though units were previously programmed to have short-time deployment capabilities, the magnitude of the effort created problems of personnel availability, equipment shortages, and transportation scheduling. Logistics support presented even more complex and greater challenges.
Beginning early in the 1950s, the Air Force converted to the base self-sufficiency maintenance concept to support peacetime operations. This concept envisioned the location of sufficient people, equipment, and spare parts at operating-base level to repair most of the components required by the weapon systems they possessed.
Early in the Southeast Asia buildup, it was decided that the bases would be constructed in stages and be manned and equipped in basically the same way as zone of interior (ZI) peacetime operating bases. Initially, tent city camps were erected and aluminum runways and parking areas constructed. Then aircraft were deployed and started flying combat missions. Next, temporary buildings were established to house field maintenance and other support facilities. Meanwhile contractors, working under Navy supervision, were busy building permanent (concrete) runways, buildings, and support facilities.
Even with all of these actions taking place as concurrently as possible, it took from two to three years to complete bed-down of a single installation; but the most serious problem of all was that this caused the Air Force to invest in facilities it would have to abandon when the units were redeployed to their peacetime operating bases. With the subsequent Vietnamization program, some of these facilities have now been turned over to the Vietnam Air Force, and some will be converted to commercial industrial facilities. However, this type of support from future deployments of a similar nature might not be required and could result instead in abandonment or destruction of facilities involved. Also, they cost too much to establish and operate and take too long to build.
A typical SEA base, for example, required 3,400,000 square feet of aluminum matting; 1,500,000 square feet of pierced steel planking (PSP); 60,000 line items of equipment and spare parts; 600 vehicles; 120 functional packages (shops, mess halls, billets, etc.); 16 inflatable shelters; 80 combat aircraft; and housekeeping and administrative supplies to support 4400 personnel. At the height of the buildup, the Air Force had over 85,000 personnel in the SEA area, and their logistics resupply support averaged over 3 million pounds per month, not including munitions. A major point to remember is that, through the initial buildup and subsequent follow-on period, the bases were established and units supported as if they were permanent peacetime operating bases.
current ways of doing business
To understand fully the rationale for those actions, one must look at our current methods of doing business.
There are many functions related to logistics support of operational forces, but the majority of these can be categorized within the functional areas of maintenance, supply, distribution, and base support. Facilities are included within the base support function. Of all these, maintenance is the predominant or driving function. As maintenance requirements increase, there is a corresponding increase in supply, distribution, and base support. Likewise, a decrease in maintenance requirements will be reflected in reduced activity in the supply, distribution, and base support functions. Therefore, as maintenance goes, so go all related logistics functions.
The primary activities within the maintenance function are problem diagnosis to identify malfunctioning systems, removing and replacing inoperative components, and repairing items. As Air Force weapon systems became more complex, the diagnostic problem became more difficult, generating increased requirements for more highly skilled technicians and sophisticated test equipment. The current “maximum base maintenance self-sufficiency” concept is a product of this environment. Under this concept it was reasoned that since highly trained technical personnel and equipment were needed at the base for diagnostic testing they could also be used to repair faulty equipment. Therefore, equipment and spare parts were positioned on each base to repair most items related to the prime weapon system. Where the repair capability is not available at the base, reparable items are returned to an Air Force depot or a contractor’s facility for overhaul.
Although the maximum base maintenance self-sufficiency concept has met past requirements for sustained operational support, it has also generated or contributed to many of the problems we are experiencing today. It generates a requirement for a full range of maintenance facilities, thousands of support people, and 35,000 to 40,000 line item base supply accounts no matter where the base is located, whether it be in the continental United States or overseas. It has also increased the number of personnel, amount of equipment, and spare parts at main operating locations each time a new system enters the inventory. Big bases overseas have been a particular problem in that they have increased distribution requirements that have resulted from the stationing of large numbers of Air Force personnel and dependents on foreign soil and have increased the U.S. balance of problems. The maximum base maintenance self-sufficiency concept has also fostered the “hoarding” syndrome, where bases are reluctant to return reparable items even when they exceed or overload their repair capabilities. This hoarding of items of course, creates critical shortages and places increased requirements on the logistics support system. If the Air Force is to remain a viable and dynamic force in the future, less expensive methods of providing logistic support must be devised and implemented.
projected hardware and
management systems advances
Before I postulate a logistics concept for future, let us review some of the technological advancements that are currently taking place or are projected for the 1980 time period.
Microminiaturization. There is an extremely strong trend today toward microminiaturization, particularly in the electronics area. This trend could provide the capability for development of sophisticated built-in test and communications capabilities in all future weapon systems.
Improved communications. In the area of communications, a 20 to 1 reduction in the size of electronic components in new systems is expected by 1980. More instantaneous, reliable, and usable data will be available to the users. The use of “fail safe” satellite communications systems to expedite the transmission of logistics data will greatly enhance support effectiveness.
Design for support. Forecasts are that reliability indices of components will improve tenfold between 1970 and 1980. Mean time between failures will be long enough to permit hermetic sealing during manufacture, with assurance that equipment will have an adequate span of military field life.
Coupled with increased reliability, there will be a corresponding increase in equipment maintainability. Remove and replace maintenance will be the order of the day not only for components but also for items within components. All this will be accomplished without degradation in performance.
Enhanced distribution. There will be a dramatic increase in the Air Force airlift distribution capability as additional C-5s join the operational fleet. Furthermore, additional backup capacity will be available in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet now that the airlines are increasingly utilizing the larger jumbo jets.
Concurrently, improved in-transit control techniques will provide complete, continuous, and real-time visibility of in-transit materiel. In addition, standardizing packaging systems and containers designed for ease of handling by all modes of transportation will provide protection and easy offload accessibility for DOD materiel.
Electronic data processing equipment. Computers are a phenomenon that appeared in the early 1950s. From the beginning, the Air Force has been a leading proponent in their use.
Current computers in the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) are due for replacement by third-generation hardware in the near future, and those in other elements of the logistics function are also being updated. The new AFLC hardware, with its resultant management systems, is known as the Advanced Logistics System (ALS). This system is laying the groundwork for machine-to-machine capabilities as well as providing a direct interface between user and machines. The results will be an ever increasing spiral of expanding computer applications, with an accompanying rise in data processing capabilities.
Now that we have reviewed the technology that will be available, let’s look at a logistics concept that could exploit this technology, rectify many of today’s problems, and allow the Air Force to cope with its environment on into the 1980s and beyond.
diagnostic center concept
As previously indicated, microminiaturization will enable the built-in diagnostic capability to become a way of life, and it should be considered for use in each new weapon system and all major equipment the Air Force receives. Then, by establishment of an electronic link between this built-in diagnostic capability and a diagnostic center computer, it would be possible to activate a signal that would pass through the weapon system or equipment and initiate all required test and related logistics actions. This signal could also do the operational reporting required by the operating command or higher headquarters.
In operation the system would work in something like the following manner. The signal would generate at the aircraft, either on the ground or in flight. When the signal is received at the operating base, it is automatically transmitted to the diagnostic center, where it is fed into a central data computer. By comparing signals received against previously prepared programs, the diagnostic center computer is able to indicate the serviceability of the weapon or identify problem areas and pinpoint item failures. This information is then transmitted back to the weapon and operating base. In a high majority of instances, only communications between the weapon and the diagnostic center computer, without human involvement, should be necessary. Where the diagnostic center computer cannot handle the problem, appropriate data could be relayed to a maintenance expert at the diagnostic center; he, in turn, through a communication link, is in touch with the base maintenance control technician, who has direct access to the weapon and the problem. This type of diagnosis could be performed on one or any number of aircraft simultaneously, whether in the air or on the ground.
component repair
Systems of the future could be designed for remove-and-replacement of components with off-equipment components repair being accomplished at specialized repair activities. The forward base of the future would then accomplish only remove-and-replacement of unserviceable components, no component repair.
area support point
With the diagnostic center performing troubleshooting and equipment being signed for remove-and-replacement, any further maintenance of components would be done at a specialized repair activity. This arrangement would preclude unnecessary logistics support responsibilities at forward locations, reduce materiel and manpower at operating bases, and give the forward commander more time to concentrate on mission accomplishment.
With the removal of many of the currently assigned maintenance functions from forward locations, a full range of repair or support items at each base would be unnecessary. Under LOGCON 80, base stock would be reduced to just a few days’ supply of high-consumption items. To ensure rapid response for items not stocked at the base, or resupply of high-consumption items, an area support point would be established at a centralized base in the geographic area. This base would support itself and act as the area support point for five or six other bases located nearby.
The area support point concept would enable us to take advantage of economies of scale by reducing the number of individual items needed in an area to support for a given number of bases. For example, if under the present system two of a given item are required at each of ten bases to meet requirements for a total of 20 items, by using the area support concept we might be able to provide the same support with a third or half that number. In addition, the area support point could provide a wider range of limited-availability or quantity items than could have been stocked at each operating base. This then would provide each base with access to more stock than under the present system while reducing total Air Force materiel and personnel support investments appreciably. Stockage at the area support point would also include pipeline time from the suppliers and predetermined war readiness materiel.
The area support point would act in a manner similar to that of a neighborhood grocery store, servicing assigned bases as the store does neighborhood customers. Serviceable materiel would be provided by the area support point, and reparable components would be returned to the area support point for consolidated shipment back to the applicable repair activity.
The area support point would also have a selected maintenance capability, consisting of men and materiel that could be deployed to the bases to accomplish essential functions such as battle damage and facility repair, emergency maintenance, and other functions as required.
flying resupply
Under LOGCON 80 we would make extensive use of a flying resupply service for both overseas and ZI installations. This is, in essence, an expansion of the current Logistics Airlift (LOGAIR) system in the ZI. The flying resupply service would provide daily service from the area support point to each operating base.
It would operate much like a milkman who shows up at approximately the same time each day to provide the next day’s needs. The flying resupply service would also bring in technicians from the area support point to accomplish nonrecurring maintenance or repair that must be performed on site.
logistics
With the instant visibility of logistics information that will be available in the environment of the 1980s, it will be possible and probably very desirable for a logistics manager (LM) to manage logistics worldwide. Since the diagnostic center would decide what is damaged or consumed and what is required to fix it, the diagnostic center would determine the majority of requirements. This information could then be provided to the LM. With remote consoles on the base connected to a central logistics computer, the LM could also control movement of all materiel at both the bases and the area support points. If a requirement did generate at the base, base personnel could immediately communicate this information to the LM through the area support point. With all materiel requirements flowing to the LM, he could order the materiel, pay the bill, and maintain the accountability.
This system would reduce forward base logistics support resource requirements (men, materiel, and money), give much greater materiel asset control, and provide more accurate and timely logistics visibility and status of Air Force units. Also, since most of the logistics support would be located out of the combat zone, a unit could evacuate a forward base during an emergency without having to abandon or destroy the majority of its logistics support capability, as would be the case with the current logistics system in today’s combat environment.
Now that we have identified the various elements of the LOGCON 80 concept, let’s combine them into an integrated LOGCON 80 support system in action.
To begin with, the diagnostic center and certain other command levels must have access to operational data. Each time the aircraft’s built-in test equipment is activated, either in the air or on the ground, a signal would be relayed to the base, the major operating command, the theater headquarters, the area support point, and the system manager. This feedback would provide needed operational data and constitute an operational history file on each individual weapon.
During systems check or mission performance, the built-in test equipment would continually monitor the systems and subsystems on board the aircraft. When a systems check reveals a deviation from the norm in the fire control system, the test results are transmitted to the diagnostic center, which diagnoses the problem as a failure on the part of item X and, in turn, notifies the flight crew and base of the condition. The diagnostic center then notifies the base to replace the item and at the same time informs the supply component of the logistics manager that the base needs one each of item X. After mission completion, when the item is replaced, the built-in test equipment is reactivated to ensure that the system is once again in a serviceable condition. The diagnostic center also provides the base with a facsimile of the remove-and-replacement instructions, thus eliminating the need for maintenance publication libraries at forward locations.
At the same time the base is told what maintenance action to take, it will be told the corresponding supply action. The logistics manager’s computer then checks its worldwide stock records. If item X is available at the base, the computer notifies the area support point to replenish item X at the forward base since it is a high-consumption and mission-essential item. If the item can be repaired, it is directed to be returned to the area support point. The next mission of the flying resupply service then returns it to the area support point for subsequent consolidated shipment back to the appropriate specialized repair activity.
Knowing the base’s aircraft flying-hour program and personnel population, the system manager will be able to automatically direct movement of the daily support needs such as food, clothing, and fuel to the forward bases. When a unit moves into combat, the logistics manager will be able to compute and control movement of needed war consumables such as fuel and ammunition.
I have indicated that anticipated future economic constraints and technological advances make it mandatory that today’s operational and logistics personnel define a new logistics process—a process that will take advantage of improved technology, be economical, and be responsive within the environmental realities of the 1980s and beyond. LOGCON 80 could provide such a process. It is recognized that any new logistics concept such as this would impact on current Air Force policy, missions, and organizations. How much can only be determined as comparisons are made against old ways of doing business versus LOGCON 80 recommendations. Whether LOGCON 80 is the best logistics concept for the future environment, of course, can only be determined during these detailed studies. It is essential that such studies be accomplished in the very near future.
Hq Air Force Logistics Command
Bibliography
AFLC Corona Harvest, Project Books, 1970-1972.
DeLonga, Peter R., Brigadier General, USAF, “Logistics Planning for the 1980’s,” Air University Review, July-August 1970, pp. 41-50.
Goldsworthy, Harry E., Lieutenant General, USAF, “The Logistics Challenge of the Seventies,” Air University Review, July-August 1970, pp. 2-10.
“Logistics Considerations and Capabilities” (U), Annex to USAF Planning Concepts, 1970 Addendum.
Logistics Support of USAF Worldwide Operations, Air War College, 6th edition, chapter 8.
Martino, Joseph, “What Computers May Do Tomorrow,” The Futurist Magazine, October 1969, p. 134.
Walter M. Wilson is Chief, Posture Plans Division, Directorate of Plans and Programs, DCS/P&O, Hq AFLC, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. In government service since 1941, he served in the Air Corps, 1943-46. He has specialized in support of tactical forces and development of the Air Force mobility plan, being involved in deployments to Lebanon, Taiwan Straits, Berlin, Cuba, and Southeast Asia. Mr. Wilson has attended the DOD Computer Institute and the Air War College Seminar Program.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force
or the Air University.
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