Document created: 23 September 03
Air University Review,
March-April 1974
Officers attending the Air War College in 1973-74 are
participating in a computer exercise that introduces new dimensions of
realistic complexity to their force posture planning study. This computer
application is in answer to a question being asked within the Air University
academic complex at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: How can the computer be
used to improve the quality of professional military education? This is an
especially pertinent question today because the Air University schools have
local computer support for the first time.1
The Air Force Data Systems Design Center, located at nearby Gunter Air Force Station, began operating the Honeywell 6060 computer in October 1973 and was made responsible for providing time-sharing and data processing service to Air University.2 This local capability enables the schools to explore and exploit use of the computer to a degree not possible before.
Through the years all the military services have experimented with the computer in their education programs. Interest has been particularly high in the senior service schools, where projects have ranged in size from small experiments involving a few students working in highly specialized disciplines to the large, complex project involving an entire class.
Though the Air University schools have engaged in such activities, the degree of participation has been necessarily limited because of the absence of local computer capability. Computers at distant bases have been tried. For example, IBM cards and computer print-outs were at one time carried by air courier between Maxwell and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Also, teletypewriter terminals have been used to access the Rome Air Force Depot computer in New York. But these arrangements were less than satisfactory because of inconvenience, poor reliability of the remote terminal operation, and low priority of student problems in the computer work schedules. Now the situation has changed.
In 1973, in anticipation of the nearby computer capability, the Air War College performed an experiment. From twenty-four student seminars, two were selected to use the RAND Corporation computer and force posture planning model for support in their accomplishment of the force structure part of the National Security Study.3 The other twenty-two seminars developed forces without these tools. They, as previous classes, accomplished the task manually with pencil and paper. The success of this pilot program has led to a research project designed to provide force structure planning computer support simultaneously for all student seminars.
At the Air War College, this is a time of change. The curriculum is under special scrutiny to make sure it is in phase with shifting Air Force needs. New subjects and approaches vie with old ones for a place in the schedule. In this climate, the application of the computer to the National Security Study is progressing with unusual success. The National Security Study was developed in response to Air Force concern that senior officers who are preparing for high command and staff positions should acquire an appreciation for the difficulties associated with functions such as:
Perceiving threats to the nation
Postulating national objectives and policies
Estimating constraints on the defense budget
Formulating national security strategy
Developing a total force posture
Coping with crisis situations.
These six major parts to the study are approached consecutively in the year-long academic schedule, each following the presentation of closely associated subject material. The study is a “common thread problem” because responses to its requirements tend to summarize and interrelate major areas of instruction.
The study addresses an assumed twelve-year time period. Students analyze current five-year force and financial programs for all the services before looking at force requirements in the far term, the last seven years of the study. The final step in the student exercise is the most important group project, for each seminar must present and defend its results to civilian guests during the week of the National Security Forum in May.4 Since this presentation is the last student requirement of the academic year, it in many respects resembles a final examination. Many of the guests are knowledgeable in defense matters, and all are interested in learning what the students believe should be done to preserve the security of the United States. The experience is an excellent proving ground for the students, and guests describe the session as the high point of the National Security Forum week
The force posture exercise has been the most heavily emphasized single element in the National Security Study. It carries the urgency of the present, and it projects into the future the impact of difficult decisions. Consequently, students should tackle this problem with considerable interest because the size, composition, and mix of weapon systems and force elements, along with their associated costs, are at the heart of national security planning. The academic exercises tries in a few classroom hours to provide the Air War College student a better appreciation of the enormity, complexity, and importance of the force planning task.
Application of the computer to the force posture exercise culminates step-by-step, essentially year-by-year, revisions to relieve the student of voluminous, almost unmanageable detail and to afford him the means of organizing and determining costs of force elements and weapon systems meaningful to his solution. For example, four years ago students worked the problem from the published service five-year programs.5 The size of these documents and their detail made them difficult for seminars to hurdle in the short time allotted in the schedule. Then in March 1972 RAND published a document for the college that aggregated data from the service programs and simplified the presentation and organization so that students could accelerate their familiarization with pertinent forces and more readily build and cost their force structure for the National Security Study.6
Still the process had to be accomplished in the classroom at the blackboard, and arithmetic operations had to be done by hand. Obviously, the pace was slow, and the force development was crude. Under these circumstances, the introduction of a simulated national or international crisis was virtually impossible. As a consequence, students did not experience a formal opportunity either to review their problem-solving methods critically or analyze the interrelationships among the parts of the National Security Study.
In November 1972, local computer support appeared a certainty, and this, in combination with a RAND presentation of its force posture planning model at Air University headquarters, sparked the conception of a pilot program in which the computer was to be applied to the force posture exercise.7 The computer and the model offered a way to handle the reams of force posture information so that it could be quickly, mechanically, and accurately organized, arithmetically manipulated, and presented. Thus, the student would be removed from the morass of tedium and elevated from the role of accountant to that of national decision-maker.
Over the years, the theme of the National Security Study has remained the same—to provide students an appreciation for the difficulties associated with building an adequate and responsive force posture from limited resources. Only the scope and thrust of individual parts of the study have changed. Usually, variations have reflected fine tuning whereby the college updated and refined student tasks. But introduction of the computer promised several major changes. Consequently, a pilot program was devised to explore the possibilities.
RAND made its computer available to the Air War College, and a team of Air University and RAND personnel modified and expanded the RAND model so that it could be tested under actual classroom conditions in April 1973.
The RAND model is available in two independent but compatible versions. One is for quick response. It is programmed on RAND’s on-line, time-shared computer. The other version is programmed for batch processing on general-purpose computers. In the pilot program, only the quick-response version could be used. The batch model promised scheduling flexibility and more extensive and informative print-outs, but it was incomplete. Furthermore, a nearby computer on which the batch program could be run was not readily available. Consequently, special force posture problem requirements and instructions were prepared so that the two student seminars in the pilot program could utilize teletype terminals at the Air War College to access the quick-response version on the RAND computer.
Originally, the RAND model addressed only strategic forces. This limitation was removed by a series of modifications that enabled the model to exercise data also on general-purpose, airlift/sealift, national guard, and reserve force programs. The model calculates time-phased funding over a twelve-year span for the various weapon systems, force elements, and the complete military force posture. Particular costs that are forecast include research and development, investment, operating, and totals. The model accepts either single or multiple changes in the weapon systems line items and provides the associated costs to permit comparison and identification of spending requirements and trends.
In contrast to students in the regular course who could work only superficially with the very major line elements, participants in the pilot program were able to develop rapidly in some detail the size, composition, and mix of strategic, general-purpose, airlift/sealift, national guard and reserve, and committed allied forces with little manual effort. The total force was designed to support their national security strategy from 1974 through 1985. The computer took into account the seminar’s research and development programs and determined the cost of the entire force for each year of the study.
Seminars began the exercise with a given data bank on some 150 key weapon systems/force element aggregates that together represented a reasonable facsimile of the United States line force posture for the current year. These line items were identified and briefly described in a systems list. This “menu” included systems currently in inventory, those in research and development, and conceptual systems that could be brought to fruition in the time frame of the study.
R&D costs are allocated either for the development of a conceptual weapon system, line item 5—Air Mobile Missile Carrier (AMMC), or for continuing development of an existing system, line 6-B52 Advanced Model (ADV). Total cost and years for the R&D program are specified. An algorithm in the model takes this input and divides the outlay among the years of the program. Another option is illustrated after line 4-B1. The total R&D cost and program length are entered as zeros, then the annual R&D costs are printed out after the “1.” Thus, 475 million dollars appears in 1974, 370 million in ‘75, 275 million in ‘76, and so on through ‘85.
Numbers in the “Slope” column, ranging from 0 to 1, give the value of the investment learning curve slope, which states that as the total quantity of units produced doubles, the cost/unit declines by some constant percentage.
The next column, $/UE, gives the investment costs beyond the development phase to deploy a weapon system as a mission-capable force.
The lead time in years from initial funding to deployment appears next.
The final column, AO/UE, shows the annual costs to operate and maintain each of the weapon systems.
Initially, each seminar had either to accept or modify this data base so that it conformed with the seminar’s view of the current-year force posture. For example, seminars could add or delete systems, change cost factors, and introduce other conceptual packages. Then they used planning worksheets to project their force year by year. The RAND model provides several informative data output options so that organized tabulations of weapon systems and associated cost information were readily available. Whole force programs or single line elements were readily manipulated at the terminal according to the designs of the student.
Next, students compared the cost of their objective force with a given budget that incorporated the spendout phenomenon. “Spendout” is the downward projection of expenditures for weapons that occurs in the out years because weapon systems and their costs are not well defined far out in time. This improvised defense budget effected an economic constraint in the far term, which forced students to control their force projections carefully.
Throughout the exercise, the computer contributed significantly to the decision process, providing an elevated perspective of the problem. Students were able to concentrate on the more important aspects of problem solving: addressing and assessing their goals, hypotheses, criteria, guidelines, approach, and judgment.8 Also, the time the computer saved and the capability it provided allowed introduction of the exercise section, Crisis Situations. As a result, the study acquired new dimensions. Hypothetical crises with which students had to cope—a defense budget slash of several billion dollars or a technological breakthrough in surveillance equipment that degrades one leg of the TRIAD—caused repercussions that reverberated through every element of the study. Consequently, the entire package was viewed from a different perspective. The prime question, of course, remains: What is your force posture? Now, however, students have the opportunity to address in some detail very relevant questions that previously could only be treated superficially. How does a major change in any one part of the National Security Study impact the other parts? How can we improve the problem-solving methodology?
The pilot program manifested the real and important benefits that accrue from the application of the computer to the National Security Study. Accordingly, the Air War College has expanded the program. In April 1974, all twenty-six seminars will be using the computer to satisfy the requirements of the study.9 This decision has led to a rather large Air War College research project.
The work necessary to prepare a force posture planning model for simultaneous use by all the student seminars exceeded the manpower resources of the Air War College faculty and staff. Several areas of research are involved, and all must be integrated into a schedule that leads to a final product in less than an academic year.
The manpower problem was resolved by the formation of a team of Air War College faculty and students and professional computer personnel from other Air University organizations. The nature of the research qualified the project for student participation under the college’s Professional Studies Program. In fact, it is particularly appropriate to that program. Students are concerned with a primary military subject, force posture. They interact directly with a computer and contribute to the improvement of the college curriculum. The project has first priority in the professional computer personnel work schedules, and three officers have been assigned full-time to develop the model and make it operational.
The thirty participating officers were organized into groups to address the five major research areas, each having a specific purpose:
Before the groups embarked on their research, team members went through an intensive orientation program. They learned to operate the teletype terminals and to access and use the RAND computer and model just as the student seminars had in the pilot program. The trial of the new model and data base by the faculty earl in February 1974 assured time to fine-tune the entire package—computer model, data base, special instructions, and documentation—before use by the class in April.
As illustrated by this example, productive uses for the computer in professional military education are waiting to be discovered. Certainly, the Air University academic complex at Maxwell Air Force Base will be employing the machine more and more in the future, now that it is readily available. And every worthwhile application will advance the curriculum in which it occurs. The ultimate result will be an improved University product—a better qualified and more fully informed officer graduate.
Air War College
References
1. The Air University academic complex includes Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, Squadron Officer School, AU Institute for Professional Development, Academic Instructor and Allied Officer School, and the Senior Noncommissioned Officer Academy.
2. The Honeywell 6060, a worldwide military command and control system type of computer, became operational in 1973. Air University is custodian.
3. K. J. Hoffmayer, D. C. Kephart, and B. A. Horner, “Force Posture Planning Model,” Rl150-PR, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, March 1973.
4. The National Security Forum week always occurs close to the end of the academic year. The forum provides prominent American citizens and Air War College students the opportunity to exchange ideas on national security affairs.
5. “Department of the Navy Five Year Program, FY 73-79,” Department of the Navy Program Information Center, Washington, D.C., October 1973. (Report is SECRET.)
“Department of the Army Five Year Defense Program, FY 69-82,” Office,
Director of Army Budget, Comptroller of the Army, Washington D.C., February
1973. (Report is SECRET.)
“USAF Force and Financial Program, FY 72-78,” Office, Director
of Budget, Washington, D.C., February 1973. (Report is SECRET.)
6. J. C. Davidson, “Cost and Building Block Data for the Air War College’s ‘National Security Problem’ Study,” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica California, March 1972. (Report is CONFIDENTIAL.)
7. Colonel J. L. Sibley, Deputy Chief of Staff, Education, Air University, invited personnel of RAND Corporation to demonstrate its force posture planning model at Maxwell Air Force Base. K. J. Hoffmayer and D.C. Kephart made the presentation in November 1972.
8. Lieutenant Colonel James E. Hughes, “The Next Decade in Computer Development,” Air University Review, May-June 1966, pp. 64-70.
9. The Air War College class of 1974 was expanded to 315 students, causing the increase from 24 to 26 seminars.
Colonel Fredrick R. Westfall (USMA; Ph.D., North Carolina State University) is Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Education, Hq Air University. Other assignments have been as assistant professor, mathematics, U.S., Military Academy; associate professor, physics, U.S. Air Fore Academy; head, McClellan Central Laboratory, AFTAC; USAF Research Associate, Stanford Research Institute; head, Radiation Directorate, Defense Nuclear Agency; and faculty member, Air War College. Colonel Westfall is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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