Document created: 23 September 03
Air University Review, March-April 1974

Simulation

The New Approach

The intercom came on: “Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, this is your captain speaking. Welcome aboard Easy Airways’ DC-10 flight to San Antonio. Be assured that the flight crew is highly experienced and professionally competent. As captain, I have logged a total of three hours on the DC-10. Relax and enjoy your trip.”

No airline in its right mind would ever announce to its passengers that the pilot could claim only three hours’ experience in the airplane. The point is that many of them could! The secret is simulation, the new approach to flying training.

Actually, simulation is not new. In some form, it has been with us since soon after man learned to fly. Two of the earliest examples of flight trainers, or simulators, were in use in England in 1910. One was called the “Sanders Teacher,” the other the “Eardly-Billing Oscillator.” Both were replicas of early aircraft and were mounted on a base that allowed the trainer to move, in a limited manner, in pitch, roll, and yaw. The Sanders Teacher was described, in part, as follows:

Those wishing to take up aviation either as a recreation or a profession find many drawbacks at the commencement of their undertaking, but one of the most formidable, especially to those not blessed with a long purse, is the risk of smashing the machine while endeavoring to learn how to control and fly it.

Even the most apt pupil is certain to find himself in difficulties at some time or another during his probation, and owing to lack of skill the machine is necessarily sacrificed to save his life, or at least to prevent a serious accident. The invention, therefore, of a device which will enable the novice to obtain a clear conception of the workings of the control of an aeroplane, and of the conditions existent in the air, without any risk personally or otherwise, is to be welcomed without a doubt. . . .”¹

That was 63 years ago, yet some people still don’t believe it.

During and after World War I, aircraft trainers continued to be developed for the purpose of ground-based flight instruction and training safety. A trainer developed in France in 1917 included such features as control feel, response, assumed speed, engine noise, rudder-aileron crossover, and a simple visual approach.² By the late 1920s aircraft development had accelerated, and aircraft were flying higher and faster than ever before. Complexity had increased, and instrument or blind flying was introduced. Since blind-flying training in the aircraft was both dangerous and uneconomical, research and development of ground trainers was undertaken to provide solutions to this new training problem. In 1929 Edwin A. Link built his first flight trainer.

By the beginning of World War II, Link trainers were extensively used in commercial and military aviation training. Data on the effectiveness of these trainers are lacking; however, their contributions to military and civilian aviation training were apparently acceptable.

Since World War II, flight simulators have progressed from the simple mechanical machine built by Link to sophisticated, computerized trainers that nearly duplicate the aircraft they represent. As complexity increased, so did cost. Consequently, training value of simulators, heretofore accepted by the military, was seriously questioned. Numerous studies have been conducted sine 1949 in an effort to determine how much of what is learned in simulators is actually transferred to the real aircraft. Some of these studies on transfer of training or learning transfer were controversial. Older experienced pilots tended to discount the utility of simulation while younger trainees profited readily from simulated experiences. However, the value of trainers for increasing proficiency and reducing flight time was generally acknowledged. C. B. Westbrook, discussing this aspect of simulators a decade ago, said: “As a matter of fact, . . . numerous analyses have shown that these trainers can quickly save far more than they cost in reducing expensive flight time needed to maintain pilot proficiency particularly in such areas as instrument flight and simulated emergencies.”³

Flight simulators, in general, were used through the sixties time frame to provide training in basic cockpit, instrument, and emergency procedures. The addition of digital computers and motion systems during this period increased the fidelity and, to a limited degree, the potential transfer of training. Studies have indicated the need for these motion stimuli, and further research has documented that:

a. A fixed-base cockpit should not be used to judge pilot performance or to judge the fitness of an individual to be a pilot.

b. A moving-base cockpit, even for an instrument trainer, provides a substantial improvement in training realism.

c. Sophisticated flight simulators should not be purchased by the United States Air Force without motion systems of comparable sophistication.⁴

Typical flight simulators or trainers have not simulated external stimuli such as those generated by an out-the-window visual display. Again, more conclusive data were required to justify the considerable additional expense associated with simulator visual display systems. Smode, Hall, and Meyer, in their comments on visual displays for flight trainers, said: “Apparently, for student pilots at least, even very crude contact displays have considerable training value, provided that ‘good’ instruction is given in relation to the device. Quality of instruction may substitute for absent contact cues in many instances.”⁵

As late as 1967 it was apparent that visual display systems had not been accepted. Visual systems, representing the current technology, had been procured for several Air Force simulators. The lack of acceptance of these systems is exemplified in a 1967 study made by Hall, Parker, and Meyer.⁶ In their survey of six different flying-training locations, they were unable to evaluate the training effectiveness of visual simulation because the visual attachments were inoperative at all bases visited. The devices were not used for extended periods of time because of maintenance problems and lack of spare parts. Motion-system capability was available and usable at all the bases visited, but its use appeared to be optional with the instructor.

Many reasons can be given for the failure of the military to accept visual simulation in the late sixties, such reasons as the lack of resolution, poor light level, and maintenance. However, the potential of visually equipped flight simulators was clearly understood by commercial aviation training managers. In February 1968, American Airlines petitioned the Director of Flight Standards, Federal Aviation Administration, for waivers of Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121.418 and other parts of FAR 121 and 61 as necessary in order to conduct an Optimized Flight Training Program study.⁷ This study reached several conclusions regarding the Optimized Flight Training Program as compared to standard airline training: “It . . . will produce safer and better qualified crewmen than conventional training programs. Training in the flight simulator can be conducted to a level of proficiency that will assure a high level of success in the airplane: . . . Evaluation in the flight simulator is indicative of performance in the airplane.”⁸

Constant refinements to this study have been made by American Airlines flight training managers, and today all training programs conducted at the Flight Training Academy reflect less than five hours’ aircraft time necessary to transition a pilot to a new aircraft. The most dramatic example is the average of 2.1 hours’ flight time needed to transition a captain to the DC-10 aircraft.⁹

Acceptance of this type of program in military aviation training has been less than enthusiastic. It is only natural that many flyers who have gained years of experience without great exposure to simulation devices might still profess that “the only way man can learn to fly is to fly,” Inroads on this attitude are occurring slowly, but they are taking place. In 1972 alone, over 200 senior Air Force officers visited the American Airlines training facility. Most were very favorably impressed with the advances made in training and simulator technology and agreed that the systematized training they witnessed had definite applicability to Air Force flight training.¹⁰ Credit for these advances in training has generally been ascribed to the quantum jumps made in simulator technology. While this cannot be discounted, more credit is due to the quantum jumps in the way simulators are used and the technology of learning or instructing.

Instructional technology, known in the Air Force as instructional system development (ISD),^l1 has shown the training manager how best to design, use, and integrate the various training media into the instructional system. Without this guidance, lockstep traditional training would still hold sway. Economies would probably result from better equipment and methods, to be sure, but training would still be essentially the same as that conducted prior to World War II. In some respects, it still is. For many reasons, the Air Force has not been able to keep pace and take full advantage of the advances in simulation. But there are good and valid reasons why we must now do so.

The facts are that total defense manpower is at the lowest level since 1950; dollar outlays for manpower have increased; and budget authority for manpower is being held roughly constant. The conclusion is unavoidable that we have fewer people to work with; they cost us more; and manpower funding is limited.¹² The sum of these factors is a continuing squeeze of defense dollars. Our option is to accomplish more with less, or, in a word, efficiency.

The urgency is clear when we note the disparity between Department of Defense personnel-related costs and those of the Soviet Union. Our people-related cost rose to 53 percent of our defense budget in 1973, while the Soviets devoted only 30 to 35 percent to such costs. Given roughly comparable total budgets, the U.S.S.R. has a significant advantage in purchasing power available for weapons-related programs.¹³

The need for efficiency in all Air Force activities is obvious, but it is of paramount importance in those activities of a support nature. Dollars expended in support are dollars unavailable for operational tasks and equipment. Training is such an activity, and, unlike other facets of the total manpower costs, it is under our immediate control.

Not unexpectedly, flying training stands out because of the inordinately high individual training costs.¹⁴ It is costly in terms of people, time, money, and equipment. It is not surprising, then, that the conduct of flying training should be under close scrutiny and that every effort is being made to achieve improvements. As with other support functions, our objective in flying training must be to achieve the highest order of efficiency possible. It is to this end that the present article is prepared.

The concern of Headquarters USAF with training effectiveness is expressed in a series of policy statements and directives aimed at enhancing our training posture generally and improving flying training in particular. General John D. Ryan’s leadership in this endeavor was reflected in his direction to major commands early in 1970: “We can be proud of our past achievements, but our past successes should not diminish our efforts to seek better solutions to our training methods. To make dramatic increases in efficiency requires that we be innovative and have a willingness to depart from traditional methods.”¹⁵ The current Air Force policy on training course development, embodied in AFM 50-2, Instructional System Development, expands the principles outlined in General Ryan’s letter and establishes a systematic methodology for the development of training to achieve our goal of efficiency. The Air Force is committed to this policy.

Simulation, properly used, stands out as our best bet for simplifying the learning tasks of the pilot trainee and improving the quality without increasing the cost of training. This realization is the product of testing and evaluation as old as aviation itself; it is one we have been slow to acknowledge, partly because of difficult design problems and tenuous utility claims but mostly because we could not afford the risk, however remote, of poorly trained combat pilots. Step by step, in a long, agonizingly slow development process, these deficiencies and fear have been overcome. Now, a recognition of their utility and productivity, which is based on documented evidence, and our conviction that better training will result from their use have collectively enlightened our outlook and demanded a new approach. We can no longer deny the validity of simulation, nor can we afford to disregard its potential for cost reductions.

This has not occurred by happenstance. It is the product of Air Force efforts in research and development and accomplishments in training program design methodology. The structure of a training program is the essential ingredient for success, and an understanding of the development process of such programs is basic to the new approach.

The instructional system development process described in AFM 50-2 is one of most significant breakthroughs of recent decades. It is a combination of the logical and systematic approach used in engineering development and of analytical investigations with evolving education and training technologies. Together they form a methodology for instructional system development.

Applying the systems approach in instructional system development is the orderly process of (a) gathering and analyzing job performance requirements; (b) translating job performance requirements into behaviorally stated learning objectives; (c) identifying, developing, and integrating operating resources and instructional techniques and procedures, based on effective technological advancements in education and training, to provide the required instruction; and (d) assuring achievement of behavioral objectives and confirming that these objectives fully support the job performance requirements.

The process identifies the best possible combination of desirable features and alternatives. On the basis of objectives and limiting factors, the most cost-effective alternative is then selected. The output of the process is an integrated combination of resources (students, instructors, materials, equipment, and facilities), techniques, and procedures, efficiently performing the functions required to achieve specified learning objectives.¹⁶

The ISD model for course development is the key to simulators and training equipment in flying training. Step four begins by answering two questions: (1) What training equipment is needed to bring a person of known capability to a job-specified level of proficiency in a particular set of tasks at least cost? and (2) How should the training course be structured, sequenced, and integrated to make best use of the training equipment selected? As a part of the study of instructional strategies, several approaches are investigated. The spectrum analyzed might well extend from the use of a traditional classroom-aircraft approach, to a sequence beginning with programmed texts and progressing through a series of part and whole task trainers, to a sophisticated full mission simulator, and then to the aircraft.

The determination of what is needed and how it is used results from cost/benefit analysis applied to each possible strategy. For each learning strategy option, the analysis considers such factors as cost of training equipment, cost of flying time required, program length, number of students programmed, the degree of proficiency required, anticipated life of the system in the force program, and the speed of learning transfer expected. With all these (and other items) quantified in a decision matrix, the optimum strategy results. Now we know the optimum learning sequence and the equipment necessary. The course developers can start planning specific segments of the course, and the acquisitions people can develop the specifications and start procurement action.

This process was employed by the Tactical Air Command in developing the A-7D course now being presented to undergraduate pilot training (UPT) graduates at TAC A-7 Combat Crew Training School (CCTS) bases. The analysis specified a requirement for a wide spectrum of training equipment, the apex of which was a sophisticated simulator for the A-7D. This device is one of the most sophisticated pieces of training equipment in the Air Force operational inventory today. The three copies cost the Air Force about $18 million. This machine is a fully operational A-7D cockpit mounted on a motion base (rotational motion around pitch, roll, and yaw axes and translational motion in the vertical) and is driven by a high-capacity digital computer. This simulator cannot fully duplicate weapons delivery, air-to-air combat, or refueling—it can do only part of those jobs; but it can simulate a standard flight profile from engine start to shutdown, instrument procedures, and emergency procedures. It does not have an out-the-window visual display, but we are working on that problem and expect to have it soon. The machine has very high fidelity, matching the aircraft in every respect, even to motion feel.

Remember, we started the whole argument on the basis of efficiency in flying training. Simply building and providing such a machine is only part of the task. Let us now look at how it is used in conjunction with other equipment and the magnitude of the resultant benefits.

In the ISD process we first state the specifics of a task. A hypothetical example might read like this: “The student will be able to start the A-7D engine and taxi to the end of the runway with sufficient proficiency to pass a combat-ready standboard check on this portion of the checklist.” This is a critical task objective, stated in terms of the actual behavior, degree of proficiency required, and the equipment on which the proficiency must be demonstrated.

Our immediate reaction, under a more traditional approach, would be classroom teaching, using mockups and charts, and then to match up the student with an instructor pilot (IP) and an aircraft and have him practice until he was proficient. This requires lockstep classroom teaching for groups of students, ties up aircraft for training, generates additional maintenance workload, and risks equipment breakage and other problems. This concept unnecessarily consumes operational resources at the expense of Air Force mission capabilities.

The fledgling A-7 pilot will find a quite different approach to learning, which might go something like this: His initial direction would be to go to the learning center, check out Programmed Text # 1 on engine start and taxi, study it and take the included self-test, insuring 100 percent accuracy—repeat if necessary. The last page of the text sends him to the learning center library, where he checks out sound/slide lesson 123 on the same subject. He completes this lesson in a carrel and answers the visually presented test that concludes the lesson. The last audio direction is to proceed to another room, check out video cassette #321, observe the engine start and taxi procedures demonstrated, and then follow through on the cockpit mockup provided. This cassette, after he has checked his own progress, sends him to a cockpit procedures trainer, where he meets an IP. The instructor reviews his cockpit familiarization and clears him for a simulator, where he practices his skills and demonstrates the required proficiency. After following this same approach for other objectives (such as ground and air, egress and aircraft systems—learning how to operate the systems, not just how they operate), culminating with aircraft ground operation, our pilot finally arrives at an A-7 on the line with an IP. After one practice he is expected to pass his proficiency check on engine start and taxi, ground egress, emergency procedures, etc. We are willing to wager that he can. TAC experience with the A-7 confirms our view.

The foregoing is actually a comparison of the extreme in traditional training with a hypothetical optimum system using the A-7D for illustration. There are several points here that contribute to improved training and should be noted. First, the objective told our pilot, his instructors, commanders, TAC, Air Force, and the world what he was supposed to do, to what degree of proficiency, and the equipment used.

Second, the learning process was individualized and self-paced. The student and his classmates did not at any time have to go to classrooms together; each proceeded at his own pace. Third, progress was frequently checked to insure desired proficiency levels. Fourth, the instructors did not directly teach; rather, they managed the student’s learning and built the materials he used. Fifth, he used only equipment necessary to the proper stage of proficiency, using the most expensive training equipment (the A-7D) last and as little as possible to insure desired proficiency. It is these items, resulting from ISD analysis that incorporates simulation as the least-cost learning medium, which produce quality training. The TAC A-7D course was built using this kind of logic and approach to focus training on the mission performance requirements. While traditional classroom methods are still used, self-paced and individualized instruction remain as objectives of the A-7D instructional system.

All these increases in training efficiency, while initially difficult and time consuming to accomplish, produce highly significant improvements. They help insure that the operational mission can be fulfilled by well-prepared aircrew members even though the time spent on training is reduced. The undergraduate pilot training input student to the A-7D course is trained in less time than his F-4 contemporary. His course is 37 days shorter and requires 26 percent less student flying and 27 percent less support flying per student than a conventional training program; and he is graduated “combat ready.” In comparison, the F-4 graduate of the equivalent conventional training program is “mission capable” and needs further training by his end assignment unit.

The ratio of flight-to-simulator hours in the two programs is interesting and revealing. In the A-7D program the student spends 45 hours in the simulator and 85 in the aircraft. In a comparable conventional program he spent about 117 hours in the aircraft and only 27 in the simulator. TAC has revised all major weapon systems CCTS syllabi along lines similar to the A-7D course, and an advanced visual system for the F-4 is under development to simulate air-to-ground weapons delivery that will revolutionize tactics training.

Other completed examples of the efficiency of simulation in systems-developed flying training programs abound, and many more are in the offing. ISD and better use of present training equipment have reduced the length of the C-130A and E programs by 20 flying hours and 15 training days, with no reduction of performance standards. Similarly, the RF-4 program has been reduced by 13 flying hours. Except for the A-7D, this has been done without the cost of new simulation equipment. New simulators have been proposed for the C-130 system that will be integrated into a revised training program. Expenditures for the simulators will be amortized during the life of the weapon systems and will provide net gains in quality and reduced training costs.

Lest we forget, Air Force aircraft rather frequently fly with navigators aboard, without whom many a weapon system is reduced to a rather expensive mode of transportation, ineffective as a weapon system. Their training is also expensive and lends itself to the application of simulation techniques. In the past few years highly significant changes have been taking place at Mather AFB in California, the focus of all ATC navigator training. Just this last August, as a result of careful application of the ISD process, ATC, in cooperation with SAC, determined that navigator-bombardier training for the B-52 could be conducted to SAC’s high standards without flying by using presently available simulation. The result is a nav-bomb course of 14 weeks (versus the previous 27 weeks), using 89 instead of 60 simulator hours, and with flight time reduced from 48 hours to zero. SAC is pleased with the graduates, and 190 officer and enlisted spaces were recouped, largely in pilot and maintenance support for 18 T-29D aircraft no longer needed in nav-bomb training.

A similar adjustment will be made in electronic warfare officer training beginning this summer with the arrival of as new simulator for electronic warfare training (SEWT). This machine and its use will free 12 more T-29s with their attendant support spaces, reduce course length by about three weeks, and preclude the need for 70 flight hours by students in electronic warfare officer training.

The systems approach effort on the undergraduate navigator training (UNT) program has already produced a requirement for two rather spectacular items of training equipment. They are new T-43 aircraft and the T-45 simulator, which we call UNT’s. These two machines, in combination, will replace 56 T-29s, with their attendant support spaces beginning in fiscal year 1975. Training improvements at the undergraduate level allow further refinements in navigator training in SAC, TAC, and MAC CCTS programs as a result of the increased capability of the Mather graduate.

In April of 1972 MAC launched a very ambitious effort to restructure training in the C-5, the C-141, and all Air Force helicopters. This four-year project will apply ISD course design methods to 39 formal training courses. Simulator visual capability will be added to the C-5 and C-141 simulators at the MAC Transport Training Unit (TTU) at Altus AFB, Oklahoma. New H-3 and H-53 simulators are being added to helicopter training at Hill AFB, Utah. The careful application of ISD methods and the acquisition of cockpit procedures trainers (CPT) and simulator visual systems are expected to achieve significant training improvements in C-5 and C-141 initial qualification training.

Purchase of new simulators is obviously expensive, but the rewards are great. Routinely, they amortize themselves before the last item of a sequenced buy is in place. This will be true of the proposed simulators for the C-130, the UNT’s, and the SEWT. It is true of the visual additions to the C-5 and C-141 simulators, the H-3, and the H-53 simulators and will be true of a new set of simulators for undergraduate pilot training that are being procured for Air Training Command.

In addition to the very real efficiency gains, there are other less tangible benefits from careful use of simulation in flying training. For instance, MAC visual additions to the TTU simulators at Altus will extend the useful life of the C-5 and C-141 fleet in proportion to the associated reduction of flying hours devoted to training. As with all other simulator procurements, the potential for aircraft accident is reduced during the high-risk period of an aircrewman’s relatively low proficiency period during training, simply due to less exposure to the chance of an accident; yet when he graduates he is as well or better qualified than those who previously trained primarily in the aircraft. Airspace congestion is significantly reduced. This is no small problem with our increasingly crowded skies. Primarily for this reason several nations have expressed interest in our growing use of simulation and ISD efforts as they are faced with even more severe airspace problems than we.

With less time expended on training, of the total available flying hours allocated each year, more time is available for direct mission flight activities. In this sense we gain an increased operations capability without increased cost: with fewer aircraft devoted to training, more are available for operational units—which can increase the number of units within expected budgetary constraints. This last observation alone justifies increased use of simulation because it makes a direct contribution to the Air Force portion of the national defense posture.

We are not alone in the increased use of simulation. The Army has purchased new simulation equipment for the UH-1 helicopter and now teaches all helicopter instrument flying, except the proficiency check, in the simulator. The Navy is buying new sophisticated equipment for its undergraduate pilot training and state-of-the-art simulation capability for the new F-14 Tomcat fighter and is finding simulation to be a valuable plus in training the systems operator in the F-14 in his extremely complex task structure. The airlines have almost universally diverted more and more of their flight training flying time into simulation, finding that it produces a better pilot more quickly and at much less expense. They are just about to reach what we call zero time transition from one aircraft to another for experienced pilots. The Federal Aviation Administration has certified American Airlines training in the simulator as adequate to demonstrate proficiency on 20 of the 27 maneuvers required of a new DC-10 pilot.

The utility and cost effectiveness of simulation for the achievement and maintenance of combat readiness in missile training programs are conclusively established by the Air Force successes in that difficult field. Operational commitments and the design of launch complexes preclude the use of operations equipment for training launch or maintenance crews. Simulation replaces the traditional method of crew training. In fact, there is no practical alternative in this case. While it is true that occasionally a missile is fired for test purposes and an opportunity for observation is afforded trainees, the firing is accomplished by an operational crew. To provide an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for each crew would be like expending a B-52 for each flight-crew training mission.

The ballistic launch crew trainers replicate the actual launch facility and simulate all crew functions. Unlike crews for manned systems, missile crews are largely committed to synthetic means of determining combat readiness. But here too, as in flying training, the utility of the devices hinges on their proper integration into the course structure. The provisions of AFM 50-2, Instructional System Development, are closely followed in the design of missile training programs and in establishing future requirements for trainer modifications and new procurements.

The complexity of training in relation to the extensive requirement for highly competent crews is a major challenge today. We recognize and accept the unavoidable conclusion that, as part of a properly structured program, simulation is a high-payoff training tool. We are working on all major weapon systems and undergraduate aircrew training systems and looking around the corner at next-generation F-15, A-10, AWACS, B-1, airborne command post weapon systems.

We do not yet have all the answers, but our instructional system development concept will highlight problem areas that need investigation. Our research programs are aggressive, addressing the critical areas of flight training that pose difficult learning problems. The Simulator for Air-to-Air Combat (SAAC) Study is investigating one aspect of combat training that is now exclusively limited to airborne instruction. The Advanced Simulator for Undergraduate Pilot Training (ASUPT) Study will seek answers to the questions of degree of fidelity required for specific learning situations; it should suggest a complete family of learning devices that will revolutionize pilot training. These and other research programs are indicative of management support of innovation. They reflect a growing awareness at all levels of management of the potential for efficiency inherent in this new approach to training.

The USAF Scientific Advisory Board has commented on the progress made and future needs:

These actions are encouraging; but there must be more aggressive actions if the Air Force is to capitalize on simulator technology in a timely way. Expanded use of flight simulation appears less limited by insufficiencies in hardware technology than by management constraints, budget problems, and long-established negative attitudes.¹⁷

Thus, while we recognize the potential value of simulation, we should not be content with present achievements. We must continually assess our management posture and procedures to judge their relevance to our objective of flying training efficiency. Where necessary to achieve it, we must be disposed to accept change. To this end we present this explanation of simulation as the new approach in Air Force training.

Hq United States Air Force

Notes

1. The Connecting Link, Link Group, General Precision Systems, Inc., Binghamton, New York, vol. 5, no. 1 (1968), pp. 10-11.

2. Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory Technical Report 68-97, Aerospace Medical Division, Air Force Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, p. 1.

3. C. B. Westbrook, “Background of Piloted Simulator Development,” Air Force F1ight Dynamics Laboratory, Research and Technology Division, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, TM 64-28, August 1964, 13 pages, AD 457 592.

4. D. J. Gibino, “Effects of Presence or Absence of Cockpit Motion in Instrument Flight Trainers and Flight Simulators,” Aeronautical Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Technical Report ASD-TR-68-24, June 1968.

5. “An assessment of Research Relevant to Pilot Training,” Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio (Biotechnology, Inc., Arlington, Virginia), Technical Report AMRL-TR-66-196, November 1966, 241 pages, AD 804 600.

6. “A study of Air Force Flight Simulator Programs,” Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio (Biotechnology, Inc., Arlington, Virginia), Technical Report AMRL-TR-67-111, June 1967, 113 pages.

7. “Optimized Flight Crew Training, A Step Toward Safer Operations,” American Airlines, Inc., Flight Training Academy, Greater Southwest International Airport, Fort Worth, Texas, April 24, 1969, Appendix I, p. 1.

8. Ibid., p. 37.

9. Briefing given to Major General Oliver W. Lewis by Captain Walter Moran, Chief of Flight Training, American Airlines.

10. Ibid.

11. Air Force Manual 50-2, Instructional System of Development, December 1971.

12. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird’s Annual Defense Department Report FY 1973, p. 61.

13. Ibid, p. 31.

14. AFCCS Ltr, “F1ying Training Efficiency,” to ADC, ATC, MAC, SAC, and TAC. The attachment to General Ryan’s letter provides examples of USAF flying training costs: e.g., F-106, $218,310; F-105, $237,640; UPT, $82,640.

15. Ibid.

16. AFM 50-2.

17. USAF Scientific Advisory Board Report on the Ad Hoc Committee on Air Force Simulation Needs, January 1973, p. 7.

Contributor

Major General Oliver W. Lewis (B.A., George Washington University) is Director of Personnel Programs, DCS/P, Hq USAF. He completed flying training in 1944 and in 1946 went to the South Pacific as a B-17 and B-29 pilot. Other assignments have been as instructor pilot; B-26 combat pilot in Korea; project officer, DCS/AI, Hq Japan Air Defense Force; in R&D, DCS/D, Hq USAF; KC-135 aircrew commander; Chief of Operations, Atlas-F unit; Commander, 26th Bombardment Squadron (B-52E); Commander, Grand Forks AFB (Minuteman II); Commander, 355th Combat Support Group, Takhli RTAFB; Commander, Norton AFB; and DCS/P, Hq MAC.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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