Document created: 10 October 2003
Air University Review,
July-August
1974
Colonel Roy L.
Thompson
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph N. Hoffman, Jr.
Recently there have been a number of studies published regarding strategic nuclear deterrence that have focused on the saving of money with respect to U. S. strategic forces.1 Although these studies undoubtedly represent a sincere approach to reducing defense costs, they basically tend to address only the cost-saving point of view. The purpose of this article is to explore other perspectives that seem to us to be more reasonable when viewed from a military cost-threat standpoint. In treating this subject, we have focused on Air Force systems and have not attempted to detail the development and employment of sea-launched strategic systems.
This article by no means
represents a total answer to this very complex question. It is our hope,
however, that it will stimulate further thinking and discussion in this vital
area of national concern.
RLT
and RNH, Jr.
Since its inception, the Triad has served the country well by insuring strategic nuclear deterrence. Built on three separate legs—the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the bomber, and the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—the Triad has worked in a synergistic way to reap deterrent benefits greater than those of the three individual weapon systems. The Triad concept began when total reliance on strategic bombers changed to dependence upon a combination of missiles and bombers, and it evolved during a period in which the United States had unquestioned nuclear superiority.
Today, of course, the strategic situation and needs are changing. We are in a position of strategic parity with the Soviet Union; we have concluded negotiations in the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) and are now engaged in SALT II. In addition to the efforts toward U.S.-U.S.S.R. détente, of which SAL negotiations are a part, there has been a recent trend toward the reordering of our national priorities. This tendency has resulted in increased pressures to reduce military budgets. Higher personnel and hardware costs add to these budget pressures, and the end result is a force structure reduced in quantity. Moreover, where formerly our strategic objectives placed strong emphasis on assured destruction, the President has called in addition for flexible strategic options to provide for strategic sufficiency.
Although an all-out strike by the Soviet Union is the least likely of the nuclear possibilities, it is the most significant in terms of national survival. The priority for our forces to meet this eventuality, of course, is of the first order.
Nevertheless, as the President has noted, there are other possible nuclear threats or provocations that are grave in themselves though on a more limited scale. Our strategic forces should be capable of dealing with such enemy limited nuclear choices in order to maintain a credible deterrence across the entire scale of nuclear contingencies, which can range from the use of a few weapons to an all-out disarming attack.
Thus, the first-priority security need is to maintain our strategic nuclear forces both to deter against all-out attack and also as the anchor of deterrence against lesser nuclear provocations. This must be done within the quantitative constraints established by the SAL agreements. An even more significant constraint may be cost, not only because of the obviously tightening budget pressures but also for a more subtle reason that concerns deterrence itself.
An overemphasis on the strategic area vis-à-vis conventional power could increase the possibility of an eventual failure of deterrence. In a period of stringent budgets, expenditures for strategic forces of greater than optimum levels or rates could lead to excessive cutbacks in conventional forces. U.S. political and military leverage might then become inadequate at the conventional level to meet possible future challenges to vital national interests, thereby increasing the probability that deterrence may fail at a lower level. And if the U.S. is unable to deal with such failures at the conventional level, there would be an accordant higher probability of escalation to the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons in seeking solutions. This is not to say that under such circumstances the United States would choose to resort to a nuclear solution. It is to say that the lack of adequate conventional capabilities might create an environment for unstable situations in which the U.S. would have but two unsatisfactory options—yield to the conventional challenge or respond with nuclear weapons.
These factors point to what we think is a fresh perception of future strategic deterrent needs, using the best of the Triad rationale as a point of departure. Such a new viewpoint may help illuminate ways of thinking about how best to structure and balance costs of future strategic forces within an overall framework that should permit continued credible deterrence across the warfare spectrum.
This perception is one that views future strategic nuclear deterrent needs in terms of an integrated strategic deterrent system. This concept is formed from three basic interwoven ideas: (1) the entity of strategic force, (2) the “weak-link” principle, and (3) mutually supportive strategic subsystems.
strategic entity
The first idea of this concept is that strategic nuclear forces, regardless of the number of primary subsystems, offer an inseparable total nuclear deterrent when viewed by a potential enemy. For example, should an enemy consider an all-out attack against the United States, he must insure sufficient destruction of the total strategic system, not just one primary subsystem, or risk unacceptable retaliation. On the other hand, should the enemy consider a limited nuclear strike against the U.S., he would have to consider the possibility of a response from any or all of the subsystems within the strategic entity. This perspective of the entity formed by our strategic forces allows for sufficient nuclear deterrence at the all-out level while simultaneously providing for flexible options and hedges to meet a range of lesser nuclear provocations.
The idea of a strategic entity suggests that, like the Triad but in a more pervasive way, it would capitalize on total subsystem strengths and guard against individual subsystem weaknesses without necessarily having to give each subsystem the same degree of capabilities. It is the overall capability of this totality that is critical to the credibility of the future U.S. strategic deterrent; the individual capabilities of the separate subsystems are significant not only in themselves but, more important, for their additive contributions to the totality. This “System” view, however, unlike the Triad, is not envisaged as limited to three primary subsystems. More will be said on this point later.
weak-link principle
The second idea concerns a principle that seems to apply particularly to the planning of future nuclear capabilities. The generally accepted view of military capability was expressed by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the former Director of Defense Research and Engineering:
The military capability is made
up of a chain of many links—command, control, communication, logistics, trained
personnel, weapons and their maintenance, the strategy and tactics to be
employed. It is not enough to make any single link overwhelmingly strong. That
is why a tenfold improvement in any one military function seldom results in a
major overall improvement—unless we are strengthening the weakest link.2
Dr. Foster’s statement has great validity. In this context, the enemy can probe for and exploit the weak link in conventional military operations. He can do this frequently with relatively little risk, while at the same time such an isolated success might be the key to winning a battle. In planning for nuclear operations, an enemy, there is reason to believe, would be tempted to exploit a weak point in the chain alluded to by Dr. Foster.
This weak-link principle, then, would apply to nuclear deterrence and force capabilities: command, control, and communications must function effectively; logistics and trained personnel must be in place; weapons must operate as planned. The penalty for having a weakness in the strategic arena, however, is so great that it could mean the failure not only of deterrence, loss of a “battle,” but of national survival itself. Each link, therefore, must be critically assessed in strategic force planning. If deterrence should fail, it should not be because an enemy perceives that a successful “low risk” search for our strategic “weak link” is possible.
mutually supportive strategic subsystems
The contributions of individual subsystem capabilities in guarding against weak links of the strategic entity can be illustrated by some of the features of our current weapon systems—and the rational is equally applicable to future systems.
Survivability. In terms of current weapon systems, each has some level of and unique features for survivability under all-out attack. For the all-out nuclear situation, these separate features unique to ICBM’s, SLBM’s, or bombers support each other in ways that ensure a credible retaliatory response of the strategic entity.
For example, an, advantage of the on-station U.S. SLBM force is that it would be extremely difficult for any enemy to insure complete and immediate destruction of this subsystem through massive nuclear attack because of its widely spaced operating areas. Although it might be possible for an enemy to neutralize perhaps one or two of our Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines, he could not do so with impunity. In such an event, existence of the other subsystems allows for a range of options appropriate to the level of provocation. It might be pointed out, however, that while an attack on forces at sea is possible, even a small-scale attack would almost certainly not be so severe as to call for the same kind of response as would a strike against our land-based forces.
In other ways, also, sufficient system survivability could be assured because of the mutually supportive subsystems within the integrated deterrent system. For instance, should the Soviet Union contemplate a major attack consisting of simultaneous ICBM and SLBM impacts, U.S. bombers as well as ICBM’s would have ample time to launch due to the advance warning time provided by the Soviet ICBM launch. Conversely, should the Soviets consider the same kind of weapons employment but with simultaneous launch instead of simultaneous impact, U.S. land-based ICBM’s would have sufficient escape time. It is this kind of mutual support that is aimed at strengthening the strategic entity under a variety of possible nuclear contingencies.
Rapid reaction. Still another example of mutual support is offered by a separate characteristic: reaction time. To illustrate, the Minuteman missile can be launched in one-seventh the time it takes to launch an on-station SLBM. This characteristic adds to our list of possible options—given the quality of U.S. attack assessment capabilities—namely, that rapid reaction time could provide an alternative to launching before the attack arrives. Today, our attack assessment capabilities are far more than simple warning devices; they include accurate and timely attack determination through overlapping and complementary means.
Of course, this option would require the expenditure of a portion of the Minuteman force. Nevertheless, the inherent rapid response of the Minuteman could permit launch upon a verified assessment of attack in time to retaliate effectively against the attacker. It is not suggested that launch after assessment become a declared policy, but the actual existence of the capability places a prohibitive uncertainty and deterrent upon a potential enemy. Should he consider a disarming nuclear strike, he could never be certain that the rapid reaction would not be exercised.
Because of this rapid reaction option, survivability is strengthened and future economies may be possible. For instance, rapid Minuteman and bomber reaction would appear to give the integrated strategic system sufficient capability of deterring an enemy who may wish to gamble on a late U.S. response to an attack. Thus, there may be little need to expend scarce funds to achieve an equivalent degree of quick reaction in the sea-launched subsystem.
Given these different unique features of missiles and bombers, there would seem to be little reason to spend limited resources for equivalent capabilities in all subsystems for all possible scenarios. For the near term, the quick reaction link of the strategic entity appears sufficient for assuring deterrence.
Flexibility. For deterring less than all-out nuclear attacks, flexibility becomes the paramount characteristic of the integrated strategic deterrent system.
A number of facets to flexibility are of importance. Major among these is the need to provide adequate strategic options. This means the ability to select the required capabilities, and not more than the number of weapons needed, for application in less than all-out possibilities. This may mean a few ICBM’s, SLBM’s, or bombers or some combination of the three. It would seem imperative, however, that whatever subsystems are selected, they be accompanied by positive command and control to insure that the response does not exceed what is necessary. Further, the need for selected subsystems to be highly responsive to positive command and control is a crucial element of flexibility. Such features allow political options (threat of use) as well as selective controlled use of weapons in various ways, with retention of the option of escalating or de-escalating when required.
Within the strategic entity, the manned bomber provides those key advantages beyond missiles that have been often stated: high mobility, posturing, recallability, reusability, damage assessment capabilities. But an additional advantage—one not frequently cited—is the complex U.S. response options the U.S. bomber force provides to discourage a potential enemy from executing a nuclear attack.
Most notable among the advantages provided by the bomber is insurance in the event of a Soviet breakthrough in defenses against strategic missiles and missile submarines that would jeopardize the U.S. strategic deterrent. Furthermore, the bomber allows for a variety of selective responses to provocations ranging from the threat or employment of nonnuclear to nuclear weapons. Bombers have been combat-tested, to some extent, against sophisticated defenses, and in this respect they provide a relatively high level of confidence in their effectiveness. In addition, bombers permit an extremely complex mix of employment options —in terms of altitudes, speeds, penetration tactics, weapons, and directions of approach—all of which complicate enemy defenses and make them very costly.
In another vein, a further advantage of bombers is that, when deployed in response to a crisis scenario, they make a highly visible force to signal our national determination and resolve to the enemy. When complemented by strategic missiles, the numbers and kinds of strategic options available provide a latitude of selectivity through the interplay of the subsystems that is not possible with only a single subsystem.
Just as rapid reaction provided support to the characteristic of survivability, so can the characteristic of accuracy support flexibility. Current land-based missile and bomber subsystems have the highest degree of strategic weapon accuracy. This characteristic is important where precision in target damage or a wider range of targeting possibilities is desired. Accuracy not only increases system flexibility and the deterrent value of the strategic entity but also permits a broader range of deterrence. Since the accuracies represented by the present land-based systems are extremely high, further improvements in accuracy of subsystems across the board would probably result in only marginal returns on high investment costs.
These attributes—positive subsystem command and control, rapid reaction, selectability, and accuracy—are the kinds of subsystem capabilities needed for total strategic system flexibility. Though not discussed here, there are other attributes, such as rapid and in-flight retargeting by bombers and the flight speeds of ballistic“ missiles, that are also important to overall system flexibility.
This “System” approach, as mentioned earlier, differs from the Triad in
several ways. The most obvious difference is that, heretofore, strategic
deterrence thinking has focused almost solely on three strategic weapons for “Assured
Destruction.” The System perspective, on the other hand, allows for the
assimilation of whatever future strategic subsystems, and therefore options,
are required to provide a sufficient deterrent entity. This view would seem to
support the recent statements by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
concerning “Essential Equivalence.”3
Second, while the Triad focuses on the deterrence contributions of each element to overall deterrent objectives and relates one element to the other with regard to the total deterrent effect, the System concept starts with the “entity” idea, and the totality of strategic deterrence objectives determines the additional subsystem capabilities required.
Third, while the Triad is based on the synergistic relationship of the three elements to the performance of the deterrent task and this effect is also recognizable in the System approach, there is explicit recognition in the System approach—as there is not in the Triad—that not all subsystems need to possess the same capabilities for all tasks. The mutually supporting subsystem capabilities support the totality of strategic missions.
The integrated strategic deterrent system concept provides a basis for viewing possible future strategic subsystem alternatives. In weighing these future alternatives, their design and selection will largely be influenced by cost considerations, the need for new contributions to the total nuclear deterrent system, and hedges against future uncertainties. It may be that current and relatively inexpensive strategic force modernizations cannot continue indefinitely, particularly in the face of changing threats. Eventually, as some subsystems age or face obsolescence, new and advanced subsystems designed against these changing threats will be needed.
One possible new subsystem is an advanced fixed ICBM (AICBM) as a follow-on to the Minuteman or a portion of that land-based missile force. An advantage of the AICBM is that it could be smaller than current ICBM’s but have greater throw weight: These new weapons might be placed in current silos and operated in a manner similar to Minuteman. Such improved weapons might be necessary to take advantage of U.S. technological potentials in a variety of areas or to meet new Soviet force improvements. In addition, an AICBM might provide hedges against a wide range of possible, yet unforeseen, future contingencies. For example, in a nuclear scenario in which rapid launch is not crucial, an ICBM that could be operated in a dormant mode could be useful for a delayed response. At the same time, an AICBM that could be operated in a quick reaction mode could be retained for missions calling for a high degree of responsiveness. A small number of these missiles might be integrated into the Minuteman force, combining into one missile the flexibility required for quick reaction or rapid retargeting capability or dormancy. In the dormant configuration, maintenance might prove to be simpler and less costly than for our current ICBM’s.
Another possibility was highlighted in an article that quoted Air Force Lieutenant General Otto Glasser on the air-launched ICBM.4 Its primary attribute is that it would combine some of the best characteristics of the land-based ICBM with the manned aircraft—characteristics of recallability and positive control, for instance, which might be needed in the future. Development of a subsystem with such capabilities might permit future economies and reductions in other subsystems, depending upon the strategic environment and requirements at that time.
One other possibility lies in the development of an advanced air-launched subsonic strategic cruise missile. This possibility combines the advantages of the manned bomber with some of the key features of strategic missiles but at lower costs than some of the other future strategic subsystem candidates. One of the drawbacks, of course, is that subsonic cruise missiles are subject to relatively high attrition from enemy air defense weapons. This means a continued major role for the manned bomber in tandem with the use of such missiles. For these as well as other reasons, the cruise missile cannot be viewed as a substitute for the unique capabilities possessed by the manned bomber.
A further possibility is a land mobile ICBM, which shares some advantages found in the air-launched ICBM’s but to differing degrees. It is mobile and thus could present the enemy with extreme targeting problems, but it also suffers the drawback of being “soft.” Another drawback underscored by various lay strategists is that land mobile ICBM’s could be very destabilizing, militarily.
Diversities in subsystems—such as the air-launched ICBM and the air-launched strategic cruise missile—can be combined to provide advanced system survivability and flexibility and hedges against future uncertainties in the strategic environment. Diversity also forces the enemy to expend considerably more resources on his strategic defensive systems to cope with ours.
As for more near-term alternatives, the System perspective suggests cost trade-off possibilities between new subsystems and current force modernization. Some of these have been mentioned for the. Minuteman, which is the lowest-cost subsystem to provide a given quantity of weapons.
As long as Minuteman remains the most economical force and can be exploited for this feature, more latitude is available in the near term for necessary expenditures on other forces such as those mentioned above for deterrence at the strategic level as well as for conventional forces. The economic latitude permitted by the Minuteman force should reasonably allow the upgrading of the bomber force initially and, once that program is completed, the upgrading or replacement of other subsystems in a sequential manner. This would seem to be an even more attractive approach if one considers the full cost implications of the U.S. intent to maintain a balance of qualitative and quantitative equivalence in the strategic area.
A number of contemporary factors have provided the impetus for looking anew at strategic force concepts: increased pressures to reduce military spending, the continued Soviet strategic buildup, new needs for flexibility and options, deterrence across the warfare spectrum, and the fragile environment of détente. Together, these factors point to a new perspective that may offer significant economies in dealing with new strategic and deterrent needs.
As long as strategic deterrence remains our first priority, there will be a pre-eminent and continuing requirement to adjust our strategic concepts in order to meet new challenges adequately. The System view, built as it is on the substantial beginnings offered by the Triad rationale and incorporating the ideas of strategic entity, weak-link principle, and mutually supporting strategic subsystems, seems a reasonable beginning in fulfilling that demand. This approach to viewing future U.S. strategic needs is not, we realize, a deus ex machina. However, it is hoped that this perspective will prove useful in guiding the design and tailoring of an adaptable, balanced, and economical future strategic posture in the attainment of Essential Equivalence.
Hq United States Air Force
Notes
1. See, for example, the two recent Brookings studies: Strategic Forces, Issues for the Mid-Seventies by Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman and The Next Phase in Foreign Policy, edited by Henry Owen.
2. Speech by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Washington, D.C., 10 January 1973.
3. Speech by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Overseas Writers Association Club, Washington, D.C., 10 January 1974.
4. Edgar Ulsamer, “M-X: The Missile System for the Year 2000,” Air Force Magazine, March 1973.
Colonel Roy L. Thompson (M.S., George Washington University) is Planning and Programming Officer, Concepts and Objectives Division, DCS/P&O, Hq USAF. He has served as a radar intercept officer and aircraft controller at various locations; staff officer in Germany; C-130 navigator; Chief, Mission Planning, 15th Air Commando Squadron (RVN); and as faculty member, Air Command and Staff College. Colonel Thompson is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air War College, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Lieutenant Colonel Ralph N. Hoffman, Jr. (Ph.D., Syracuse University) is International Politico-Military Affairs Officer, Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives, Hq USAF. He has served in education, training, and personnel assignments, concluding two hours at USAF Academy as Chairman of Instruction and Associate Professor, Department of Political Science. He was an AF Research Associate, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, and a Distinguished Graduate of Air War College, 1972.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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