Document created: 19 September 03
Air University Review, January-February
1974
Lieutenant
Kenneth C. Stoehrmann
In the continuing debate over West European security, a major problem concerns the region’s ability to defend itself adequately without the active support of the United States. This desire is heavily dependent on many factors, not least of which is the need for a common armaments effort among these nations.
Twenty-eight years after the devastation of Western Europe that was World War II, this conglomerate of small and middle-class powers is once again becoming a power center in an increasingly multipolar world. Yet this resurgence of power brings new and greater responsibilities that Western Europe might not yet be able to handle fully alone. Nowhere is this lack of ability more apparent than in the defense and security of Western Europe. The continued presence of American troops on European soil and the use by West Europeans of the American nuclear deterrent shield for their protection suggest that Western Europe cannot stand alone in her defense. Yet, someday, through events and factors not fully understood or apparent at present, Western Europe might need to stand alone and fully assume all her responsibilities. In order to do this, she will need the cooperation of all the component nations in many respects, the most important of which is the defense of the homeland.
Closely linked to this need for homeland defense are the many areas necessary to promote a successful defense and security program. Foremost among these is the ability to develop and procure weapon systems required to implement policy and act as a deterrent against any would-be aggressor. Because of the great strides made in technology in recent years, “The speed with which new techniques and discoveries result in the premature obsolescence of equipment . . . presents the military planner with highly formidable decisions.”1 Furthermore, there is no broad basis of agreement concerning defense needs in Western Europe. Many scholars feel that joint armament production and procurement offer a solution to these problems, the most prevalent and persuasive arguments paralleling the following lines of thought.
Initially, joint production and development can be motivated by a desire to
stimulate national economies. With the increased involvement of American
business in Western Europe, this joint action can also be used to produce
European goods competitive with American ones.2
Second, joint production and development would allow for greater use of
resources on a much larger scale than is presently available nationally. As
such, joint weapons collaboration “may have the effect of speeding up the
process of ‘innovation’; after basic research has made the discoveries, defense
R&D . . . may speed up the process of application of these discoveries to
civilian objectives.”3 This might also help to place Western Europe
on a “technological parity” with the superpowers. Closely related to this idea
is the fact that procurement policies themselves are basic to continued
security as well as economic growth. Therefore, joint efforts might create a
situation in which a security community in Western Europe could be established
to handle her own defense better.4
Finally, whether or not a security community is set up, it is undeniably
true that “the ability of Western Europe to assume a greater burden of European
defense and to lessen the American ‘hegemony’ is related to the creation of
collaborative arrangements in Europe itself.”5 Thus a strengthened
integrative movement would enhance a European deterrent and lessen
European technological dependence on the United States.6
If Western Europe is to remain independent, she must be willing to defend herself. Even though Europeans “find it hard to know how they can work together when their ideas about defense, the Alliance and the future of Europe are so fundamentally different,” they must try to solve these problems if they are to succeed.7 Common weapons development and procurement offer one such area of necessity coupled with practicality that can lead to further West European integration.
Through institutions and other bilateral and trilateral agreements, numerous collaborative efforts in West European armaments have been undertaken. A thorough analysis of all these endeavors is beyond the scope of this article.8 Presented here will be selected efforts to show (1) the range of collaboration available, (2) the types of collaboration attempted, (3) the present efforts at collaboration, and (4) the areas of concern and problems inherent in collaborative weapons development and procurement.
Most West European collaborative efforts have centered around the NATO structure. While the four examples discussed here—based on the F-104G, Sidewinder, Bullpup, and Hawk weapon systems—have different management setups, none proved more efficient or better suited for joint development than any other one.9 Furthermore, these four projects were all transferred to Western Europe after the research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) had been done in the United States, and all the projects “died” after their completion.10 Nevertheless, the projects allowed Western Europe to curb foreign exchange depletions while increasing NATO standardization.11 Their success seems great when viewed in the latter context but marginal in the former.
The F-104G, a modification of the Lockheed F-104 interceptor, overcame
initial competition from the British Lightning and then ran into numerous
problems: the use of 500 subcontractors, inertial guidance and radar
malfunctions, delays in schedules for operational readiness, and a deplorable
system of production and procurement.12 As a collaborative effort by
West Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, the F-104G “was too
ambitious, and was initiated with inadequate appreciation of the problems and
difficulties involved.”13 Finally, even though unit costs were
decreased (approximately $2 million per aircraft), the $1 billion the United
States received in licensing fees left a bad taste in many Europeans’ mouths.14
The Hawk surface-to-air missiles were much less expensive. Scheduled to
produce 100 Hawk batteries and 4000 missiles, West European countries spent
$600 million to train their forces to use the system and buy licensing rights.
Used by France, West Germany, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, the Hawk
further improved NATO standardization. But problems soon arose: over 7000
modifications were made to the basic design during production, and by 1964 only
45 percent of scheduled deliveries were completed. Only one final assembly
checkout center was established (in Italy), further hampering Hawk’s ability to
enter operation. Finally, unit cost was higher than if the batteries had been
produced in the United States.15
Two smaller missile projects, Sidewinder and Bullpup, also underwent some
problems in their development and procurement. While the former was on a much
larger scale than previous joint efforts (eight nations were involved), both
systems ran into cost increases, delays, and the continued dominance of
American technology.16 Decreased dispersal of production plants
enhanced the programs, but both systems emphasized the problem of including
nations in joint procurement (such as Turkey and Portugal) whose technology is
not up to the requirements of the program.17
One area that has resulted in considerable success is the construction of a
standardized NATO infrastructure in Western Europe. Since its inception in
1950, 220 airfields, miles of pipeline and cable, POL supplies, fuel storage
containers, and the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) have been
constructed at an estimated cost of $4.3 billion, with yearly operating costs
of $20 million.18
Only two ab initio projects have come to fruition in Western Europe,
the Fiat G-91Y aircraft and the Breguet 1150 Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft.
The former began in 1953 as a tripartite project; when Italy won the contract
over France, the latter dropped out, leaving Italy and West Germany to produce
the aircraft.19 Although bought only by these two nations, the G-91Y
incorporated parts from Italy, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands in
its construction. The Atlantique was begun in 1958 with France, the
Netherlands, West Germany, and Belgium participating. Throughout its
development and production the aircraft met its schedule, but the withdrawal of
orders by some nations jeopardized an otherwise successful project.20
Paralleling defense-sector efforts, joint procurement in civilian areas grew, especially with the Concorde project and, more recently, the A-300 European airbus. With initial R&D now being handled by the West Europeans, the result has been a succession of projects, most notably aircraft, that are truly West European in all aspects. Their success or failure rests in the future.21 While most of these advanced programs have one thing in common—i.e., few if any firm orders for production in their early developmental stages—they are a “new generation” of systems being developed in Western Europe. The basic structure and purpose of some of these systems will serve to point up present problems in joint weapons production and procurement.
In the aircraft industry, the Jaguar, just entering service, has been a successful endeavor, 400 aircraft being ordered by Britain and France. Conceived in 1965 (and adopted by NATO in 1968), development of the Jaguar has been at one-third less cost than would a similar unilateral venture by either nation, with unit costs 10 to 15 percent lower.22 Hopefully, similar goals can be realized from the multirole combat aircraft (MRCA), the first major test of Western Europe’s “going it alone” in aircraft production and development.23 Only equal in performance to the F-111 (which was introduced into service in 1965), the MRCA has already been beset with problems. Full development began only in 1970 after much national infighting over the different versions to be produced, leaving MRCA to be constructed by Britain, Italy, and West Germany at costs 20 percent above initial estimates.24 Furthermore, national sentiments rose when the contract for the terrain-following radar went to an American firm;25 but if 1000 aircraft can be produced, unit costs will be only one-half that of a comparable American weapon system.26 NATO standardization continues, but army and navy joint ventures remain bleak. Some British engines are on French warships, and the 7.62mm NATO round is coming into increasing use. Yet, outside the aerospace and corresponding electronics industries, large-scale collaborative efforts do not appear to be materializing. What is taking place, though, obviously indicates a logical progression of joint ventures from dependence on others to more independent projects. The reasons for this progression bear analysis.
The numerous problems that face Western Europe in the desire to proceed with joint armaments ventures can be reduced to several basic “issue areas” that affect every collaborative effort. Presented here are those areas that offer the greatest stumbling blocks to a more unified and coherent collaborative process.
The great force of nationalism is primary among these areas and might be the catalyst that triggers many of the other problems. Simply, it is extremely difficult for a nation to forego centuries of history to decide its future collectively with other sovereign nations. Nationalistic attitudes pervade even the most minor decisions to such an extent that “decisions on technical questions become, in effect, political decisions.”27 Thus the central problem of cooperation becomes a political one as national interests dovetail into economic means and demands as well as military strategy and overall goals. For example, when Britain needed a new tactical fighter, her decision to purchase the American F-111K was looked upon as “un-European” by France, since the French Mirage IVA (at least according to the French) could have been used by the British even though it was not suited for the British perception of her new aircraft’s mission.
This feeling of intense nationalism is even more common in NATO procurement procedures. As one author put it, “This attempt to spell out the responsibilities of delegates to their national governments on the one hand and to NATO on the other only serves to emphasize the basic division between ‘NATO interests’ and ‘national interests’ in the Alliance.”28 It is manifested by another fact:
In agreeing to collaborate in
developing and producing armaments, national governments not only tacitly
acknowledge their inability to maintain a full range of nationally produced
weapons systems, but limit their freedom of action to the extent that they
become dependent upon other nations for a part of their weaponry.29
No nation is willing to allow another nation to have a large enough say in
its defense that in the event of a threat to itself it cannot act in its own
interest.30 Undoubtedly, collaborative ventures do not necessitate
such action; but as the dispute over MRCA versions to be produced clearly
shows, collaborative actions do raise the possibility and the probability that
joint defense planning is the next step to be taken. Present nationalistic
tendencies abhor such action.31
A second general area of concern is United States domination of a
collaborative weapons production system. As has been the case for many years now,
“the United States possesses, in dealing with any of them [European nations], a
political and technological leverage that the Americans are willing, if
necessary, to exploit to the full.”32 It would be easier for Western
Europe to band together without the United States, but since Western Europe is dependent
on American technology, this presents an inherent contradiction.33
Only recently has Western Europe begun ab initio development of major
weapons (with the exception of the G-91Y and the Atlantique). Yet—and this is
crucial—even if these new projects do succeed, the problem remains. For if
Western Europe is to be entirely independent, she needs to produce her own
weapons; but to do this she still must have American technology to improve her
national industries, and to gain this technology she must “cater” to American
designs. Since the United States, too, is interested in its economic
well-being, achievement of American arms sales targets will mean that “existing
facilities for defense production in Europe will not be fully utilized.”34
It would thus seem that” cooperation with the United States. . . will be
essential to any European union, essential technologically, economically and
politically.”35
Another area of concern is economics. There are numerous reasons why, economically, collaboration is a good policy to follow,36 yet this analysis is concerned with the problems collaboration raises and, in this case, the particular ones of costs, “fair share,” and R&D and defense efforts as related to overall national budgetary constraints.
In treating the latter category first, it is apparent that numerous ramifications emerge from collaborative efforts. For West Germany, it means that she will no longer buy equipment from the United States, a necessity in order to “offset” American troops in Europe. For Britain, it means losing the “special relationship” with the United States (and lower prices). For all the nations that devote a much smaller percentage of their GNP to defense than the United States, it means a significant increase in defense spending overall and R&D spending in particular. This, of course, means a fundamental reordering of priorities that West European nations have not, as yet, been willing to make.
Finally, because of the government ownership of many defense industries in Western Europe and the fact that “the United States balance of payments problems have made it imperative for the American arms industry. . . to sell arms in Europe on a commercial basis,” many West European nations are being forced to choose between support for national industries at the expense of American technology and expertise.37 Thus, collaboration might be the wrong approach, since now West European industries must not only compete with American firms but also bid for contracts in the collaborative weapons procurement system in Western Europe. “Safe haven” contracts from their respective governments, in this case, have also been taken away, leaving many industries bankrupt if they do not win collaborative contracts.
Closely linked to this problem is the idea of “fair share.”38 Simply stated, “there must be a political or technological return for co-operation, and in the case of a European country, it is more likely that it will be political.”39 As such, many nations feel that a collaborative venture is, as they see it, taking needed resources from national priorities in return for marginal outputs. Political outputs are fine, but they do not help prevent industries from going bankrupt or people from starving. More tangible results are desired, but so far these results have been far below what was expected. Besides the obvious fact that many collaboratively produced systems fail to measure up to the necessary performance characteristics originally set out, West European nations balk at any project that does not employ their national industries to the same or greater extent than their initial (mainly monetary) inputs.
If, on the other hand, the problem were “solved” by strict adherence to the “fair share” theory, would collaborative efforts proceed any better? In all probability, no, mainly because there are among West European nations various levels of technological competence not necessarily commensurate with monetary wealth. Thus, it is conceivable for a nation to contribute 15 percent of the funds for a collaborative project but be unable to absorb 15 percent of the project’s development in its national industries because of technological “backwardness.” Consequently, the idea of “fair share” presents a problem whether it is implemented or not.
The final economic area under discussion is that of the costs of collaborative efforts. As suggested before, collaborative efforts will require increased national spending if first-rate technological weapon systems are to be produced. Present national procurement policies and defense industries are geared to national desires, with collaborative efforts acting only as a welcome addition of revenue.40 To change these industries into parts of a larger collaborative armament system will require a great deal of both faith and money. Furthermore, numerous other costs are involved, most of which spring from the basic premise that “there is little practical recognition that interdependence in defense procurement also forms an essential part of economic policy.”41 The problem is manifested in the fact that even though collaborative efforts will allow more projects to be undertaken, these more costly projects require more costly procurement as well. Procurement is a major portion of each West European nation’s defense budget, and the probability of procuring more costly items might increase this level to such an extent that other factors in the defense budget (like initial R&D into the collaborative efforts) will suffer.
There is no question that collaboration releases more money, especially in R&D, for development and procurement of new weapon systems initially. But this newfound storehouse of R&D funds has pitfalls:
The proportion of all defense
R&D which would be available for co-operative projects would differ from
one country to another, but no government would be likely to put all its eggs
in one basket, either by devoting all its funds to one project or by putting
all its funds into co-operative ventures.42
Without pooled R&D funds, no nation could afford to develop any weapon above a tank or artillery piece.43 Yet, can pooled R&D funds produce the needed weapons, or should continued reliance on the United States be maintained? At present, it seems that a mixture of both is being followed, which is ultimately unsuitable to West European efforts to maintain a self-reliant defense posture.
Finally costs become apparent in terms of the dominance of certain nations in certain defense-related industries. Collaborative efforts would seem to do nothing to change this domination.44 As such, with each nation maintaining a particular expertise, nationalistic tendencies become even more hardened, and the cost of gearing a nation to a specific “expertise” industry or of trying to maintain all industries even though contracts are awarded competitively grows. Although efforts at common funding have achieved some success, most notably in NATO-sponsored projects,45 no nation is willing to place all its monetary efforts in one particular industry with the hope that that industry will continue to dominate its particular field. Variety continues to be a basic premise of a stable national economy and collaborative projects could act as force opposing such action.
A final area of concern is the catch-all one adequately described only as “attitudinal”: the always present notion that each participant in a problem-solving session has his own way of analyzing and solving the problem and that, unless his wishes are followed, he can sometimes make things quite unpleasant for the rest of the participants. In Western Europe, no government seems to be opposed to the basic idea that “trade-offs are required among efficiency, time urgency, learning process specialization, sharing, and political arrangement” if progress is to be made.46 Exactly what these trade-offs are to be and to what degree constitute the crux of the problem. Some governments are mainly concerned with percentages and “are willing to sacrifice either efficiency or economy . . . if necessary to generate an acceptable degree of participation and sharing.”47 Others favor collaboration at any price while a third group opposes any such efforts as an invasion of national sovereignty.
It is not my purpose to judge these positions, rather only to point them out and expose their importance in presenting national decision-makers with one more area of problems that they must confront. Perhaps it is the hardest area of all to handle, since many of these attitudinal stands are the result of personal and national biases, biases that the decision-makers themselves might not even be aware of.
In analyzing many of the problems that might arise in collaborative efforts, one would do well to remember that these problems do not exist in a vacuum. They must be handled in the overall context of world, as well as West European, politics. This facet of the overall collaborative effort, often overlooked, just might be the most significant of all.48 For no matter what becomes of such efforts, their effects will be felt in both Western Europe and the rest of the world. What might become of these efforts is the final topic of analysis.
There can be no doubt that the problems addressed in the previous analysis are central to the overall collaborative weapons development and procurement effort. Solution of these problems will take time and a great deal of energy, as well as fresh approaches to the problems themselves. There can be no accurate way of predicting exactly what will happen, yet what can be stated with some certainty is that the present so-so record of collaboration will not improve if these problems are not adequately dealt with.
Through the institutions used and the efforts made toward collaboration,
several basic conclusions have arisen. While there is not overall agreement on
these conclusions, some of the more generally accepted ones include:
(1) Central funding, at least in the feasibility and design
stages of development, is needed.
(2) Programs should be initiated by multinational organs
(like NATO), rather than by national governments.
(3) Each project should be carefully planned and “costed
out,” with agreements to purchase by governments made at certain points in a
system’s development.
(4) Overall military strategy must be accepted by all
participants and material needs tailored to fit this strategy.
(5) Projects must be technologically beneficial to keep
Western Europe in the technological forefront.
(6) Timing of needs by each participant must be considered.
(7) And finally, existing political institutions do not
offer a good framework in which to accomplish a common armaments effort.49
This final point will be discussed below as it is indeed the crux of many of
the present problems facing Western Europe in collaborative efforts. For it is
in the setting up of an organ to handle collaborative armaments efforts that
the greatest amount of disagreement occurs today. Initially, the entire idea of
supranationality is called into question, with many seeing no hope in
collaborative efforts.50 Others insist that supranationality is a
viable means of getting people to work together and, in fact, the only
plausible means given the situation of nation-states today. These arguments are
based on the actual setup of supranational organizations, each one supposedly
offering the best solution to both the acceptance of supranationality as a
means to achieve cooperation and the successful management of collaborative
efforts.
In weapons development, five major structures have been proposed:
While each solution is feasible, Western Europe at present is not prepared to accept any of them as a means to increase collaborative armaments efforts. The problems described in the preceding analysis all become involved in each organizational solution put forth. This present failure to solve these problems effectively prevents any new organization from being set up. It now seems to be abundantly clear that the nations of Western Europe are only proceeding with collaborative efforts on a one-for-one basis, renegotiating each one to avoid or solve numerous problems. They are unwilling to make a commitment to a supranational organization that might possibly solve these problems because the risk appears to be too great; i.e., possible success is outweighed by the possible failure that would mean a continuation of present problems plus the additional one of coping with the new organization itself.
Finally, it must be realized that there is a definite possibility that not all armament production lends itself to collaboration. As one author put it,
The projects which are most
suitable for co-operation are those in which R&D cost is such a large part
of the cost per unit that dividing it equally with another country saves each
side some money, even if the total cost rises, or else in which the production
cost per unit drops very sharply with each additional unit ordered.56
It is entirely possible for collaborative efforts to be more beneficial and cost-effective on a bilateral or trilateral basis than on a NATO-style production level. Undoubtedly, as many present projects clearly show, a few West European nations feel the same way. Again, the entire question comes down to the element of risk involved in a bilateral or trilateral effort versus a truly multinational one. As the history shows, no definite answer has been supplied so far.
Whatever the outcome of collaborative armaments efforts in Western Europe, the picture at present looks somewhat dim for a truly multinational effort structured around a multinational organization. Continued bilateral and trilateral collaborative efforts seem to be the favored route at present. Thus, the problems inherent in all the collaborative efforts analyzed in this article must be solved to the satisfaction of all nations concerned before a common armaments effort in Western Europe can be realized.
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Notes
1. Robert Rhodes James, “Standardization and Common Production of Weapons in NATO,” Defense, Technology and the Western Alliance, 6 studies (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), no. 3, p. 1.
2. For an excellent analysis of this problem, see Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge, trans. Ronald Steel (New York: Avon Books, 1967).
3. C. J. E. Harlow, “The European Armaments Base: A Survey: Part 1: Economic Aspects of Defense Procurement,” Defense, Technology and the Western Alliance, 6 studies (London: Institute for Strategic Studies 1967), no. 2, p. 21.
4. See John Simpson and Frank Gregory, “West European Collaboration in Weapons Procurement,” Orbis, vol. 16 (Summer 1972), p. 435.
5. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,” The Atlantic Community: A Complex Imbalance (New York: Van Nostrand Reinbold Co., 1969), pp. 55-57.
6. Ibid.
7. John Calmann, “European Co-operation in Defense Technology: The Political Aspect,” Defense, Technology and the Western Alliance, 6 studies (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), no. 1, p. 2.
8. See Mary Kaldor, Defense Industries—National and International Implications (mimeograph), (University of Sussex: Institute for the Study of International Organization, 1971-72); and Harlow, table 13.
9. Jack N. Behrmann, Multinational Production Consortia: Lessons from the NATO Experience (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 15.
10. Ibid., p. 1.
11. Ibid., p. 3.
12. James, p. 15.
13. Ibid., p. 16.
14. Ibid., pp. 16-17. These fees were extremely important for political purposes more than for actual monetary worth, although Lockheed welcomed the added revenue.
15. Ibid., pp. 16-18.
16. Ibid., p. 18.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., pp. 19-20. Also Neville Brown, European Security, 1972-1980 (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1972), p. 149.
19. James, p. 11.
20. Ibid., p. 12.
21. Simpson and Gregory, pp. 439-40.
22. Brown, p. 148.
23. Behrmann, p. 23.
24. Brown, p. 148. Britain wants a deep strike/reconnaissance aircraft, West Germany desires close air support as MRCA’s role, while Italy wants an air superiority fighter.
25. Ibid., p. 149.
26. Ibid.
27. Behrmann, p. 9.
28. James, p. 6.
29. Pfaltzgraff, pp. 177-78.
30. See Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Science, Technology and American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 183.
31. See Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., “NATO and European Security: Prospects for the 1970’s,” Orbis, vol. 15 (Spring 1971), p. 172.
32. Calmann, p. 15.
33. Behrmann, p. 23,
34, Harlow, p. 31.
35. Calmann, p. 21.
36. Simpson and Gregory, pp. 445-47.
37. James, p. 3. This choice is by no means clear-cut, as the following discussion indicates.
36. See Servan-Schreiber, pp. 113 ff.
39. Calmann, p. 14.
40, See C. J. E. Harlow, “The European Armaments Base: A Survey: Part 2: National Procurement Policies,” Defense, Technology and the Western Alliance (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967).
41. Calmann, p. 7.
42. Harlow, Part I, p. 22.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., pages 9-12 give an overview of national domination.
45. See E. Vandevanter, Jr., Common Funding in NATO (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1967).
46. Behrmann, p. 13.
47. Ibid., pp. 4 and 11.
48. For our nation’s opinion, see Charles L. Schultze et al., Setting National Priorities, The 1973 Budget (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 26.
49. See the following for elaboration of these conclusions: James pp. 22-24; Calmann, pp. 16-17, and Pfaltzgraff, “NATO and European Security,” p. 176.
50. Behrmann, p. 16.
51. Simpson and Gregory, p. 460.
52. Western European Union, Report Submitted on Behalf of the Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments, 10th Ordinary Session, vol. 1, part I, Assembly Documents (Rome: Western European Union, 1964), p. 34.
53. Behrmann, p. 25.
54. Calmann, pp. 20-21.
55. Behrmann, p. 2.
56. Harlow, Part 1, p. 23.
Lieutenant Kenneth C. Stoehrmann (USAFA; M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy) is presently assigned to the 323d Flying Training Wing, Mather Air Force Base, California, where he is undergoing undergraduate navigator training. Lieutenant Stoehrmann is a 1972 Distinguished Graduate of the Air Force Academy and a previous contributor to Air University Review.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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