Document created: 28 October 2003
Air University Review,
November-December 1973
Lieutenant
Colonel Jerold R. Mack
Captain Richard M. Williams
The Defense community widely holds as axiomatic that basic doctrine is best derived from experience gained in combat operations. Extensive historical programs, both retrospective and contemporary as well as the disciplines of operational and systems analysis, are testimony to the need to exploit this avenue of continual refinement, identifying and capitalizing on lessons learned in the throes of armed conflict. The conflict in Southeast Asia (SEA) marked the first combat tactical employment of an airborne radar platform in a command and control role. Accordingly, the lessons learned there are especially vital to determining operational doctrine to guide future employment of current and follow-on airborne command and control.
Certainly something can be learned from the COLLEGE EYE Task Force (CETF)—the deployed element of the 552d Airborne Early Warning and Control Wing—and its role in Southeast Asia, for deployment of the task force marked a dramatic departure from the traditional role of the EC-121. Designed and optimized for overwater radar detection to provide seaward extension of North American Air Defense Command’s contiguous radar coverage, the EC-121 was only marginally suited to the demands of the Southeast Asian tactical environment. Notwithstanding known deficiencies, the value of such a system was evident (though not universally recognized): it offered radar surveillance, warning, and autonomous weapons control capabilities where they had not existed.
So it was that in adapting themselves to this environment and aggressively pursuing the necessary changes to upgrade their responsiveness, the hard-core “believers” managing the task force transitioned an unwanted detachment into an extremely viable command and control force. The principal lessons to be studied, therefore, are those learned in this process.
The death of traditional Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C), characterized by its primary emphasis on surveillance extending ground-based coverage, was not mourned, for with it came the birth of a new era in the discipline of airborne command and control. In the evolutionary process, the EC-121D, mainstay of AEW&C, became the “EC-121D+,” incorporating add-on equipment to enhance its capability in SEA. Later, extensive retrofit gave the aircraft a new series designation, EC-121T, to be known as Airborne Surveillance and Control System (ASACS). The next milestone, yet to be realized, is an operational Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) that will repackage each subsystem proven essential into state-of-the-art hardware and a modern airframe.
Sunday, 4 April 1965, heralded the deployment of the Radar Constellations to Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Republic of Vietnam. The contingent was initially called BIG EYE and existed only as a mobility plan with its chain of command as Pacific Air Forces/Thirteenth Air Force/Second Air Division/BIG EYE. It later became COLLEGE EYE when Air Force Manual 205-1 was changed to assign standardized first words by command for use as project nicknames, and after February 1967 it operated from Thailand.
The settling-in phase was an arduous period fraught with resistance from all sides. The BIG EYE capabilities were not widely appreciated, which resulted in an atmosphere of suspicion from both the potential users of the service and the command structure that was responsible for operational control.
Through this turmoil and confusion surfaced the one hidden ingredient that gave BIG EYE an edge: twelve years of experience in the AEW&C business. Departing TDY as combat-ready crews, the large aircrew complement had long since polished internal procedures. To a man, they demonstrated uncommon enthusiasm in meeting the challenge of this new mission. These factors contributed to successes beyond the expectations of those knowledgeable concerning the system’s limitations imposed by inherent design characteristics and antiquated equipment.
The task force was augmented by two aircraft within the first month. The initially assigned mission was to fly orbits over the Gulf of Tonkin for surveillance of any hostile activity and control of the USAF fighter Combat Air Patrol (CAP) providing protective cover for airborne forces in the area.
When the initial 30-day period expired, BIG EYE became a very controversial issue. Should it stay or go home? Many skeptics felt it should leave; but, its initial value to the war effort having been established, it was retained for an indefinite period. Thus began the eight-year TDY of rotational 552 AEW&C Wing elements.
With such grave equipment limitations and command-established procedural concepts that did not lend themselves to the task force’s mode of operation, actions had to be initiated to resolve the deficiencies.
The first order of business was to develop tactics and techniques to circumvent the design shortcomings, at least the most significant ones: (1) inadequate radar clutter rejection to allow overland detection; (2) manual, passive, one-at-a-time identification friend or foe/selective identification feature (IFF/SIF) decode; and (3) unreliable line-of-sight communications.
CETF was charged with the responsibility of providing radar coverage of the Red River Delta, a pie-shaped sector with its vertex northwest of Hanoi, broadening out to the irregular coastline stretching from Haiphong harbor approximately 60 miles to the southwest. A normal mission profile with medium flight altitude produced massive ground returns that blanked any aircraft radar returns from the area, though IFF/SIF coverage was excellent. To overcome this handicap, a low-altitude technique was employed for the second aircraft on station, putting the horizon between the airborne radar platform and the land mass and thus removing the clutter-producing terrain from line-of-sight. The word low is emphasized. Station altitude was adjusted for each mission to optimize radar performance for variables in sea state and propagation. With this method, a clear radar picture was achieved, at the sacrifice of low-altitude coverage over the land mass.
Since the nature of surveillance responsibility knows no beginning or end, the radar crews were occupied with the continual process of detection and identification of air traffic. With only the AN/APS-95 search radar and AN/APX-49 IFF/SIF recognition set available, manual correlation of radar returns with an offset SIF display was a never-ending process. The volume of traffic was immense, and identification of friendly forces became a major workload, further compounded when fighters did not “squawk” or meet their flight plans. The task force strove, through a vigorous “sales campaign,” to enlighten all its customers as to its capabilities/limitations, and by this method developed procedures for a check-in/check-out to speed, the process. This afforded personalized (by call sign) flight-following, which saved valuable reaction time if a threat was launched against them or they experienced an emergency over hostile territory.
Communication was a constant uphill battle for the task force. Regardless of the clarity of the tactical air situation to the on-board weapons controllers, there is no command and control without ability to pass this information to those who must react to it. COLLEGE EYE was handicapped by an aging, low-power UHF set, which was unreliable in providing this vital link. The line-of-sight communication problem was further complicated by low-level station-keeping, mountainous terrain, and friendlies at medium altitude. When on target, the fighters were almost always out of radio contact with the radar platform. Gravely concerned by this situation, the task force started a crusade for assignment of radio relay channels dedicated to their use, so that real-time situation information could be fed through a high-powered radio relay platform “guaranteeing delivery” to the friendlies.
Concurrent with these procedural methods, the task force launched a full-scale program to obtain minimum lead-time retrofit for inadequate hardware plus new, advanced state-of-the-art “add-ons” that would enhance the system in the key areas of hostile detection, friendly beacon tracking, and line-of-sight communications. A secure cross-tell capability and other classified programs were initiated to greatly enhance on-board threat assessment and lateral information exchange. When realized, this equipment formed the package previously identified as the “D +” model, which became fully operational in SEA prior to the bombing limitations announced by the President on 31 March 1968. Although minimal modification in terms of dollars, lead time, interface, or technical sophistication, integration of this equipment represented substantial qualitative improvements.
In turn, the increased system capability demanded new autonomous control authority and operational procedures. This is best demonstrated by a “before and after” look at the threat-warning process. Although threat-warning formats varied in different time frames, those used in the earlier years shared the following characteristics:
(1) Given on “Guard” (243.0 MHz) for all to hear.
(2) Area warnings, tied to ground reference systems such as GEOREF, color-coded areas, or sectored concentric circles from a reference point.
(3) Most often nonspecific as to type, quantity, heading, speed, altitude, or apparent intent.
(4) Issued too frequently by the same, or different, agencies without correlation as being either updated or additional threat reports.
(5) Issued “in the blind” and therefore unacknowledged, which always left receipt in question.
From the beginning, COLLEGE EYE recognized the problems this created for the strike pilot and could envision the hardware and procedural changes necessary to resolve them. Unfortunately, the changes could not occur overnight. With multiple transmissions on “Guard,” air-to-air “chatter” on discrete tactical channels, which was vital to coordinating final strike profiles, was often blocked. Area threat formats required each pilot to estimate his position in the same ground reference system first, then compute relative position of the hostile to assess the threat. This process took time, interrupted concentration on other vital in-flight procedures, and unnecessarily concerned flights to which the hostiles posed no threat. When analyzed as a potential threat, the large area encompassed within the threat warning (necessary to compensate for its non-real-time nature) and its nonspecific information left the friendly with little more than a heads-up warning. He had no idea if a challenge would materialize, or when, or if it might come from port, starboard, astern, or head-on. Did he jettison his ordnance and prepare for aerial engagement? Did he alter his ingress/egress route? Did he split out his flight? Did he press on as planned? There was little help in answering these questions. It is small wonder, then, that out-country flyers had little faith in the warnings issued, nor were they interested in excuses for the shortcomings. They are important in retrospect, however, if we are to learn the lessons.
We required the ability to pass real-time threat warning by flight call sign directly from COLLEGE EYE to the threatened aircraft over discrete control channels, giving hostile position in relative range and bearing. This necessitated improved detection capability, rapid identification of friendlies, reliable line-of-sight communications, and other improvements of the D-model “add-on” configuration.
Because of its integration as an extension of the semiautomatic ground environment (SAGE), the EC-121 had not been configured for the identification responsibility. Whereas the system originally deployed was limited to one-at-a-time passive decode of SIF returns, the D + configuration, with its AN/GPA-122, allowed each weapons controller to passively track six discrete SIF codes, selectively identify any one of the six in real time, and actively read out the mode and code of any squawking aircraft as fast as he could” gate” the return (similar to the light-gun technique used in SAGE and other ground environments). Such capability was a first step toward realizing the discrete warning process discussed earlier.
Similarly, retrofit of obsolete UHF sets with the latest inventory item, AN/ARC-109, and assignment of additional external high-power relay channels gave COLLEGE EYE the ability to communicate with selected elements of the strike force throughout their mission profiles. When fully implemented, the procedures called for three discrete UHF frequencies, assigned to the wings from which most strike forces were drawn. Complementing systems, increased lateral coordination, and procedural discipline resolved the few remaining problems previously identified. While threat warning was used as an example, other taskings benefitted equally from the equipment upgrade.
The bombing cease did not end the COLLEGE EYE efforts but simply altered their direction. The task force entered a period of tailoring its capabilities to the requirements of the remaining combat missions in SEA. The total Aerospace Defense Command EC-121 force found itself tasked to support JCS-directed commitments worldwide, performing many diverse missions against a number of mobility plans in support of global contingencies.
Even though the SEA employment had less emphasis, there was no corresponding curtailment to extensive modifications in progress to upgrade the D + to a fully automated EC-121T. This second step in a two-phase transition in system configuration followed updated thinking that placed airborne command and control resources in a worldwide role. In response to these changes and to avoid stereotyping, the name was changed from Airborne Early Warning and Control to Airborne Surveillance and Control System (ASACS), which would more closely associate it with the next phase, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).
The ASACS retained all basic EC-121D capabilities plus those derived from thirty-three additional major end items of hardware. Enhanced capabilities include
—IFF/SIF beacon tracking/decode through a real-time on-board digital computer
—Computer “rate-aided” tracking of manually initiated hostile detections
—Addition of symbology to display systems
—Computer-assisted intercept control programs
—Computer-formated air-to-air control data link message transmission
—Software flexibility to tailor tactics to mission type and geography
—Capability for in-flight reprogramming to adjust to dynamic tactical situation
—Redundant digital data down link (beyond line-of-sight and relayed line-of-sight media)
—Secure, high-power, beyond line-of-sight voice mode
—New navigation systems and computer interface to increase radar stabilization accuracy in ground reference
—Other classified complementing subsystems to enhance real-time battle management, warning, threat assessment, and weapons control functions.
The vision gained in SEA toward the worldwide application of airborne command and control was not lost. ASACS is still in the stage of operational refinement. Expertise derived in the brief but intense interaction between the add-on configuration and combat forces is being exploited to bridge the gap between present-day resources and the fruition of a state-of-the-art follow-on.
The continuing development of ASACS, encompassing the embryonic stages of AWACS, is guided by a newly commissioned System Support Facility (SSF), truly the nucleus of the system.
The SSF was designed to provide organic design, testing, production, and analysis of computer software, to maximize the system’s responsiveness to any environmental/tactical changes. It also provides system diagnostic support and dynamic crew simulation. Through this facility will come the reality of interfacing ASACS with all major environments.
Ongoing emphasis is being placed on conducting exercises with all commands and services, from which can be gleaned knowledge and skill vital to making ASACS viable to command and control needs.
Throughout this eight-year development, one common ingredient is noted. Continued successes have been achieved through the dedicated efforts of a small body of believers, charged with single managership. These specialists, often with an entire career devoted to this single discipline, applied their years of experience in airborne radar technology within this single-managership concept to realizing accomplishments not otherwise obtainable. Through single managership, airborne command and control has grown and will continue to grow into a responsive system providing immediate reaction to a dynamic threat. The 552 AEW&C Wing’s vast experience in airborne early warning and control, teamed with ADC’S unequaled knowledge of radar command and control systems, has provided expertise in depth, allowing system development beyond anything ever envisioned for the EC-121. Originating as a by-product of ADC’S single CONUS role, airborne command and control by ADC in a global role has since become a way of life.
The employment of the 552 AEW&C Wing’s resources in Southeast Asia confirmed without doubt the validity of USAF Basic Doctrine, which states the requirement for airborne command and control to exhibit characteristics of survivability, mobility, responsiveness, and tactical versatility. That employment further defined the requirements for follow-on systems and afforded a proving ground for both system employment and procedural techniques. The data base so derived is invaluable to the current development of follow-on systems.
Such a requirement knows no geography or set scenario. System design therefore must incorporate the flexibility necessary to respond worldwide to dynamic tactical situations. In peacetime, caution must be exercised to avoid so optimizing the system to a particular role that flexibility is lost.
To maximize the effectiveness of the limited fleet size that may be reasonably expected in the current fiscal atmosphere, the single-manager concept should be maintained for current and follow-on systems. Should developmental or appropriation milestones slip for the AWACS, the ASACS program should be continued to avoid a lapse in operational capability and provide smooth transition into the new airframe.
When priorities for future Defense dollar allocations are being weighed, airborne command and control must receive enlightened recognition as an essential, cost-effective element of any total force structure.
AWACS Special Project Office
and
Hq United States Air Force
Lieutenant Colonel Jerold R. Mack is Aerospace Defense Command Liaison Officer to the AWACS System Project Office, Hanscom Field, Massachusetts. His assignments have been in Tactical Air Command, flying F-86s and F-100s, and with ADC as Weapons Controller in EC-121, manual and SAGE systems; as Wing Stan/Eval pilot, EC-121; COLLEGE EYE Task Force Operations Officer, SEA, 1967-68; Hq ADC EC-121 Stan/Eval; and as Chief, Airborne System Branch, Command Control Division, DCS/Ops, Hq ADC.
Captain Richard M. Williams, after completing the Communications-Electronics Systems Staff Officer Course, was assigned to 823d Radar Squadron, Spokane International Airport. With the 552 AEW&C Wing, he has been Wing Communications Officer, COLLEGE EYE Task Force C&E Staff Officer, and Chief, C&E Division. He has served in Communications Systems Division, DCS/Ops, Hq ADC, and an ASTRA tour in Directorate of Command Control Communications, DCS/Programs and Resources, Hq USAF.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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