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Document created: 29 December 03
Air University Review, May-June
1973
Captain Raymond S.
Blunt
Captain Thomas O. Cason
Air Force doctrine is
not a thing apart nor a code sufficient unto itself. The Air Force is a national
instrument and evolves no doctrine, makes no plans, and makes no preparations
other than those clearly and unmistakably called for or anticipated by the
national policy.
General Thomas D. White1
The study of economics has often half humorously been referred to as “the dismal science”2 To those students puzzling over a confusing array of demand, supply, cost, and revenue curves, this might seem a rather apt label. The student of military affairs would perhaps likewise assign to military doctrine a similar epithet.
In fact, Dr. Robert Futrell, in his definitive study of the development of basic thought in the Air Force, identified the predilection of AF leaders for action rather than thinking and writing as a major reason for the slow development of a significant body of Air Force doctrine.3 While the study of Air Force doctrine may not rank in excitement with the strapping of oneself to a jet engine or with seeing the bottom of one’s in-basket, it is nevertheless a critical area for concern by those in the military profession. In fact, in any true profession, the study, understanding, and development of fundamental guiding principles is an essential for members of that profession.
In the military, intellectual fogginess or misunderstanding can be the precursor of loss of life, whether it be the lives of those whom we are sworn to protect or the lives of men in battle. In a similar vein, in a time of clarifying and redefining national priorities, our profession must be able to explain clearly and logically why what we believe is of importance to the security of our nation. This explanation is important both to ourselves and to those who must make the decisions on national priorities. Thus doctrine acts as a definitive and accepted guideline in times of peace and war for the development and employment of the force that is unique to our service.
In its most basic form, doctrine, to paraphrase General white, is a conduit of thought between the interests and objectives of our nation and the plans and preparations that involve our daily lives as military men. Between these two poles lie certain layers of abstracted thinking. This is not to say that doctrine ignores the lessons of history and experience, the principles of war, and other traditional sources of military thinking. Doctrine is still in essence what we believe. Yet doctrine should be viewed as a way to incorporate proven and sound ideas within the intellectual framework established by the people and leaders of our nation.
The year 1971 marked something of a milestone in military thinking in general and Air Force thinking in particular. The first key development was the issuance of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird’s budget statement to the House Armed Services Conmittee.4 This defense report was to be the best defined and most widely distributed statement yet of the meshing of foreign policy and national security policy and strategy. The second key event was the long-awaited publication of the new Air Force Manual 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine.5 It had been seven years since this manual was updated, a period of some upheaval in military thought that had yet to be reflected in printed doctrinal change.
In this article, we will attempt to sketch briefly the general guidance offered in Secretary Laird’s defense report, to show some of the more important changes in Air Force thought, to define the nature of the relationship between the two key documents mentioned, and, finally, to show some of the inconsistencies between the two and suggest some ways to relate Air Force doctrine more clearly to our evolving national security strategy.
Secretary Laird’s Fiscal Year 1972 Defense Budget message, entitled “Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence,” was followed in February 1972 by his FY 73 Defense Budget message, entitled “National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.”6 Together, these two published reports constitute a statement of the national security strategy of the Nixon Administration. Realistic deterrence has as its ultimate purpose to discourage (and ultimately eliminate) the use of military force as a means by which one country imposes its will on another. Although this purpose is not profoundly different from the purposes of previous national security strategies, the plans for implementing the strategy, as well as the attitudes of the planners, are different. To implement the realistic deterrence strategy, the United States seeks to deter conflict at all levels. Secretary Laird described this new strategy in these terms:
The Strategy of Realistic
Deterrence will provide through sufficient strength and full partnership the
indispensable and realistic basis for effective free world negotiation. Most
importantly, it was designed not to manage crisis but to prevent wars.7
This strategy is based on the Nixon Doctrine and reinforces the three pillars of the Nixon foreign policy: strength, partnership, and willingness to negotiate. Secretary Laird set forth the basic criteria for national security planning, and it is from these criteria that the design and structure of the national security forces are molded. The translation of these criteria into forces necessitated some new thinking and new approaches.
In the strategy of realistic deterrence, two new concepts or emphases were introduced: net assessment and total force planning. Each of these concepts is an integral part of realistic deterrence and must be understood in order to appreciate fully the implementation of realistic deterrence.
Secretary Laird described net assessment as
. . . a comparative analysis of
those factors, military, technological, political, and economic which impede or
have a potential to impede our national security objectives with those factors
available or potentially available to enhance the accomplishment of those
objectives. Through this process we are able to determine how to apply our
resources most effectively in order to improve our total capability to
accomplish our national security goals.8
The results of net assessment become the bases for force planning because it is in such analyses that deficiencies and surpluses in force levels are revealed. Net assessment is linked to four realities: strategic, political, fiscal, and manpower. These realities must be a part of any comprehensive analyses relating to national security planning.
Total force planning emphasizes burden-sharing and partnership as it applies to military forces for deterrence. Secretary Laird has described total force planning as meaning
. . . to plan for optimum use of
all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of Free
World security. These Free World Military and related resources include both
active and reserve components of the US forces, those of our allies, and
additional military capabilities of our allies that will be made available
through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance
programs.9
Total force planning is primarily concerned with conventional forces although some total force planning involves the nuclear forces of our allies. Secretary Laird lists a number of guidelines in force planning to achieve the total force concept and breaks the total force planning into four categories, each of which involves a different role and responsibility for U.S. forces. Total force planning must be based on the results of net assessment and must be in terms of both short-term and long-term requirements. These requirements must ultimately be translated into a force structure.
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Secretary Laird views deterrence in terms of the entire spectrum of potential international conflict and has set forth four basic levels of potential warfare. (See chart.) The variables in this spectrum, firepower and crisis, depict a general relationship: as the intensity of the crisis increases, the potential amount of firepower applied to that crisis also increases. Although these warfare levels are somewhat artificial, they do differentiate between the fundamental levels of U.S. interest, responsibility, and potential involvement. Forces adequate for simultaneously deterring conflict at each of these levels should provide a total capability for deterring conflict throughout the spectrum. Equally important, these forces must be adequate to meet the threat should deterrence fail. The role and responsibility of the U.S. military forces and the overall involvement of the U.S. vary within the spectrum. At this point a brief examination of each of these four levels of conflict is in order.
· Strategic nuclear warfare involves the use of nuclear weapons in a direct attack on the United States. The primary responsibility for deterring such warfare rests with U.S. strategic forces. President Nixon has labeled the U.S. nuclear strategy “nuclear sufficiency” and has described it in these terms:
. . .sufficiency means the
maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced.
Thus the relationship between our strategic forces and those of the Soviet
Union must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital security
interests will not be underestimated. . . .10
Particularly significant is the absence of nuclear superiority and the emphasis on the relationship between U.S. and Soviet forces (i.e., net assessment). To implement nuclear sufficiency the U.S. must meet these four criteria:
1. Maintain an adequate second-strike capability to deter
an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.
2. Provide no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike
the U.S. first in a crisis.
3. Prevent the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to
cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the U.S.
could inflict on the Soviet Union in a nuclear war.
4. Defend against small attacks or accidental launches
from any source.
By developing and maintaining forces capable of satisfying these criteria, the U.S. can deter strategic nuclear warfare.
· Theater nuclear warfare involves the enemy use of nuclear weapons overseas without a direct attack on the United States. The U.S. has the primary role for deterring conflict at this level, but the nuclear forces of our allies do share the role. The critical requirement of our strategy at this level is that we have theater forces capable of deterring or meeting not only a theater nuclear attack but an all-out conventional attack by the Soviet Union on NATO Europe or by China on our Asian allies.
· Theater conventional warfare is a major nonnuclear war involving the Soviet Union or China; at this level of warfare the U.S. and its allies share the responsibility for deterring or meeting conflict. Secretary Laird has described U.S. strategy at this level as
.
. . general purpose forces in peacetime to be adequate for simultaneously
meeting together with our allies a major communist attack in either Europe or
Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with
a minor contingency elsewhere.11
It is at this level that total force planning based on net assessment seems most evident and most critical.
· Subtheater conventional warfare is nonnuclear warfare that does not involve a direct conflict with either the U.S.S.R. or China. It represents the most likely kind of conflict. Responsibility for deterring or meeting conflict at this level rests primarily with our allies, the U.S. providing both economic and military assistance (i.e., Security Assistance Program) where U.S. interests are involved. The U.S. maintains no special forces to deter conflict at this level; rather, it maintains the capability of employing general purpose forces to deter or meet a conflict should U.S. interests dictate.
Although Secretary Laird has presented only four levels of conflict and has described how the U.S. will deter conflict at each of these levels, one must remember that the U.S. objective is to deter conflict at all levels. The force structure and strategy of U.S. military forces, in conjunction with the forces of our allies, are designed to achieve deterrence across the entire spectrum and to meet any threat should deterrence fail. U.S. Air Force doctrine then must, first, provide options to achieve deterrence and, second, provide options to meet any threat should deterrence fail.
In identifying some of the major changes in Air Force doctrine, one may best begin by looking at the changes in overall philosophy. Basic doctrine can essentially be broken down into two categories: dynamic and static. Tasks, characteristics, and capabilities fall into the latter category. Dynamic doctrine, that which is subject to change, is essentially concerned with preventing conflict and, failing that, with pursuing conflict. It is in this area that the major philosophical changes have taken place. Preventing conflict is deterrence and constitutes one major philosophical idea that has evolved markedly. The pursuit of conflict entails what the Air Force is capable of doing should deterrence fail: the options or capabilities that we offer to our national decision-makers. These options have also undergone change to some extent.
Probably the primary shift in the concept of deterrence lies in the condition upon which deterrence is based. Previously this basis was that of strategic superiority. In discussing deterrence, the 1964 manual stated:
Of utmost importance, however, is
that we maintain superior capabilities for the higher intensities of
war. Such a posture makes it evident to an enemy that if conflict escalates the
advantage will become more and more clearly ours.12
Such a status was to give a “clear advantage in the capability to destroy selectively the enemy’s military forces.”13 (Emphasis added.) The crux of the deterrence process was seen to be “dependent on a credible capability to raise the threshold of conflict to a level at which the United States and its allies can hold the advantage.”14 Thus deterrence was based not only on superior capabilities, particularly those at the upper end of the conflict spectrum, but also on a stated credibility of escalation.
How has this idea evolved in seven years? Today, the basis of deterrence is viewed not as superiority but as force sufficiency—a somewhat nebulous yet adequate term that describes the shift in doctrinal thinking. As defined in the new AFM 1-1, sufficiency is
That degree of military power
which can be expected to deter a potential enemy from attacking the United
States and its allies. In addition it is that degree of military power which
provides national leaders with the flexibility to exercise a wide
range of political and military initiatives.15
It is, then, a level of force that will at once deter and provide options. Sufficiency is further broken down into two basic components: assured destruction and damage limitation. Assured destruction is the capability to survive an all-out surprise nuclear attack and respond with sufficient strength to destroy the enemy as a viable society. Damage limitation is the capability to limit, to some extent, the damage an aggressor can inflict on our nation. In addition, sufficiency is presented as being best achieved through a mixed force of manned and unmanned offensive and defensive systems. However, force sufficiency is a concept applicable mainly to the strategic area. In discussing deterrence against hostilities initiated by small powers, Basic Doctrine refers to strategic force sufficiency as being possibly inadequate against small power threats and states:
Deterrence of these
threats comes from the maintenance of sufficient general purpose forces capable
of rapid deployment and sustained operations combined with the national resolve
to deploy and employ these forces.16
A sufficient combination, then, of strategic and general purpose forces is needed to ensure adequate deterrence.
The change involved is more than a matter of semantical substitution of sufficiency for superiority. While remaining a general term in keeping with the fundamental nature of doctrine, sufficiency nevertheless describes a rather profound philosophical break with past thinking. Strategic superiority called for clear-cut advantages: the capability for selective destruction of an enemy’s military forces and a willingness to escalate to higher conflict levels where U.S. superiority would coerce enemy action. Sufficiency, on the other hand, emphasizes forces that are adequate to deter and forces that offer a wide flexibility in possible application. The new manual, when addressing deterrence, leaves out the previous discussion of the capability to selectively destroy the enemy’s military forces and the capability to escalate to a higher level of conflict. This is a tacit admission of retaliatory force structuring focused on enemy urban/industrial areas. Large and small power threats are dealt with in the new manual in a discrete manner. The only real ambiguity lies in the discussion of damage limitation, which is an older concept not totally divorced from the need for clear-cut superiority. This ambiguity will be discussed later.
A second philosophical shift is evident in the discussion of the options and operations the Air Force is capable of should deterrence fail. In the treatment of the role of the Air Force in conflict, the spectrum of potential international conflict is used in both the old and the new manuals to describe what is termed “the nature of modern conflict.” The 1964 manual detailed some general levels of conflict ranging from counterinsurgency to general war. The 1971 manual indicated dissatisfaction with this categorizing and instead chose to group Air Force efforts under four separate rubrics, which outline four general options or operations the Air Force can offer national decision-makers throughout the spectrum of conflict. (See Aerospace Operations Chart.) A separate chapter is devoted to each of these operations. This is perhaps nothing more than a rearrangement, but it does serve to highlight the flexible nature of aerospace operations in dealing with conflict rather than prescribe courses of action in the conflict itself.
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As to substantive changes in the general options themselves, there is
apparently very little divergence from the thinking of seven years ago.
Editorial and organizational changes seem to be the major extent of change,
plus accommodation to various interests within the Air Force. However, some
subtle but nonetheless profound changes exist in the options and operations
presented in Basic Doctrine.
The lowest-level option offered by the Air Force at the lowest level of conflict is special operations. There is a definite change here. Even the switch of terminology, from counterinsurgency to special operations, tells a tale. It suggests a reduction from active effort to one emphasizing support, training, and assistance. The old manual, in contrast, detailed the use of direct air action against insurgents and interdiction of external support. Also joint service, multiagency, and indigenous involvement are stressed in the new version, while the old version seemed to imply that unilateral Air Force effort might be effective.
Conventional operations continue to be divided into three distinct forms: the probing attack and the operations with and without the enemy having adjacent sanctuary. No real changes exist here other than an admission that conventional operations are no longer confined to tactical air operations but have been broadened to include strategic systems.
Low-intensity nuclear operations (formerly tactical nuclear operations) constitute an area of significant development. The major philosophical shift concerns the use of low-yield nuclear weapons and the limited use of larger nuclear weapons. Previously these were viewed to some extent as substitutes for manpower and resources, a point of view prominent during the Dulles era of massive retaliation. Also there was some tendency to treat the use of nuclear weapons as a natural progression of firepower to be used in almost any situation, such as against enemy aircraft and in interdiction and close air support. The new version is more cautious about the introduction of nuclear weapons in a conflict situation and ties them more to the achievement of specific objectives than to particular military advantages:
Employment of nuclear weapons in
any conflict requires special emphasis on command and control procedures to
insure that weapons employment is in consonance with specified
political-military objectives.17
By dividing low-intensity nuclear operations into two categories, namely tactical nuclear operations and operations against a major power, another distinct difference is recognized. Previously, the selected, precise usage of nuclear weapons against a major power was considered to be of such gravity as to be part of a general war situation; now, such operations are considered to be one step back from the abyss of unrestrained nuclear war.
The discussion of high-intensity nuclear operations, or, as previously stated, general war, contains an extension of the ideas developed under deterrence. Gone are old terms such as counterforce, which implies levels of superiority in general war. Also gone is discussion of the requirement for superiority and of U.S. first-strike considerations. In its place is treatment of the two components of force sufficiency—assured destruction and damage limitation—and their relation to nuclear operations against enemy military forces and enemy urban/industrial areas. Curiously, the approach in pursuing this type of conflict is to employ initially “only a military targeting philosophy regardless of relative strength.”18 The purpose is to hold an adversary’s cities hostage. Retaliatory attacks against urban/industrial centers are viewed as most likely to come about through “miscalculation or misinterpretation of the magnitude or intent of an opponent’s attacks against military forces.”19 This appears to be a counterforce strategy without calling for a counterforce capability. It also seems to conflict with the retaliatory countervalue approach outlined in the discussion on deterrence. More will be said about this later.
It should be evident by now that there has been a rather obvious influence of the thinking embodied in Secretary Laird’s defense statements on the new AFM 1-1. This, of course, is not surprising. Defense thinking is an evolutionary process, and while Basic Doctrine may not have been derived from the thinking embodied in realistic deterrence, it was subject to the same contemporary influences.
This is evident particularly regarding the subject of deterrence. Both the Defense Reports and Basic Doctrine view deterrence at the upper levels as being based on the idea of a sufficiency of nuclear strength. Even though the terminology is somewhat different (nuclear sufficiency as opposed to force sufficiency), the basic concepts are somewhat similar. Both decry the need for superiority, and both view as key a retaliatory posture that can survive an all-out surprise attack while retaining the capability to destroy the enemy as a viable society. Both also view mobile, general purpose forces as being important for deterrence at lower levels of conflict.
In the pursuit of conflict, similarities also exist. Basic Doctrine stresses flexibility and the possession of several viable options across the spectrum of conflict as being key to the effective prosecution of war. This need for options and flexibility is also strongly inherent in our evolving national security strategy. An example of this search for options and flexibility lies in the discussion of the role of the Air Force in special operations. Basic Doctrine places small emphasis on active U.S. involvement in such low-level crises, instead placing the main thrust on training, equipping, advising, and encouraging indigenous forces. This is the same approach as indicated in the Laird Defense Report concerning aspects of subtheater conventional conflict. Thus, prescription of military options at even the lowest level of conflict is consistent with policy guidance as stated in the Nixon Doctrine and the realistic deterrence strategy.
While similarities in basic doctrine and realistic deterrence abound, dissimilarities are nevertheless present. In describing changes in the current Basic Doctrine manual, one runs across an apparent inconsistency in what doctrine is supposed to be in the first place. To some, doctrine is literally what we believe, “we” meaning the corporate Air Force. The other view holds to the idea stated by General White, that doctrine must necessarily be linked to our national objectives and national policy. There is actually little inconsistency between these two positions, however. In regard to the tasks, capabilities, efforts, and characteristics of our unique force, we can with little contradiction state what we believe. Yet when we come to articulating our role in deterrence and our role in the pursuit of conflict, the Air Force must operate within the framework of national policy. As stated in AFM 1-1:
Military power is an instrument
of national policy directed by civilian authority, and employed in support of
national objectives. As such military force must be structured to meet the
various objectives of national policy.20
For the civilian authority to view Air Force options as relevant and usable in conflict situations, we must structure our thinking, our plans, and our forces in accordance with national policy; and since thought precedes action, our basic guidance should be the first area to reflect change. It matters little that we prescribe a broad range of capabilities and options if they are outside the framework of our national security policy and strategy. This does not mean that doctrine needs to be completely tied to the language of one particular administration. Yet doctrine must necessarily be consistent with our evolving national security strategy and policy. In this light, certain recommendations for changes to basic doctrine become clear.
Deterrence, being the fundamental military task and the primary aim of our national security strategy, is a good beginning point. A start has already been made in basing the Air Force articulation of deterrence and our role in it on the idea of sufficiency. Two things remain to be done: first, remove the vestiges of an old philosophy that have somehow been tied to today’s view of deterrence; and second, state more clearly what is embodied in the idea of sufficiency.
At present, the Air Force statement of deterrence contains reference to two
basic components of force sufficiency: assured destruction and damage
limitation. Basic Doctrine also indicates that the best way of
implementing force sufficiency is through the mixed force. Assured destruction
is a given: it is a necessary portion of our deterrent philosophy and probably
will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, as a specific
term, it has lost a certain degree of usefulness because of its ties to an
earlier nuclear policy: flexible response. Assured destruction called for the
capability to destroy a fixed percentage of the enemy urban/industrial
areas. President Nixon rejected this somewhat restrictive policy plus the use
of the term assured destruction:
. . . A simple “assured
destruction” doctrine does not meet our present requirements for a flexible
range of strategic options. No President should be left with only one strategic
course of action, particularly that of ordering the mass destruction of enemy
civilians and facilities.21
In essence, President Nixon asks for a broader, more flexible strategic posture.
Likewise, the second basic component of force sufficiency, damage limitation, has ties to an earlier era. It is a term that implies some level of superiority—an ability to destroy enemy forces on the ground (and in the air) while having enough forces left to meet a second-strike requirement against enemy urban/ industrial centers. This concept calls for a force level and an approach that is not acceptable under the new thinking as set forth in the recent Defense Report; Secretary Laird outlined a requirement for only a very low level of ballistic missile and bomber defense.
As an alternative, and more in keeping with the approach embodied in realistic deterrence, sufficiency should be outlined in AFM 1-1 in terms of criteria to be continuously met. One of these criteria is a reliable, survivable retaliatory force posture. In addition, a minimum level of defense is essential to defend against small missile attacks or accidental launches, and a posture that does not provide the Soviet Union with a first-strike incentive is essential also. By casting aside terminology that may no longer communicate clearly and by adopting clearer guidance for sufficiency through specific criteria, the Air Force can definitely improve the enunciation of deterrence in Basic Doctrine and better fulfill its contribution to realistic deterrence strategy.
Related to this is a need to develop the idea of sufficiency in Basic Doctrine more fully. At present, this manual defines deterrence at both the upper and lower ends of the spectrum of conflict. Much like the massive retaliation strategy, Basic Doctrine combines a pervasive strategic nuclear policy with an imprecise conventional force policy to deter war. What is lacking is a coherent expression of how deterrence is to be effected against minor nuclear powers, against a major nuclear power in a theater conflict, and against either in a conventional conflict. In short, Basic Doctrine talks flexibility through the idea of a mixed force but fails to define exactly what the mixed force means in relation to deterrence at all levels and how the idea of sufficiency relates to this. Realistic deterrence calls not only for flexible options but also for deterrent positions in support of our national interest throughout the conflict spectrum. Basic Doctrine needs further clarification and development to explain this role adequately.
The options we possess can be effectively integrated to develop more fully the ideas of sufficiency and deterrence. This must be done clearly and unambiguously to fulfill the basic military task—deterrence—that we have been assigned.
In addition to deterrence, a second area in which doctrine can be more closely related to national policies is in one level of the pursuit of conflict, nuclear operations. It is in these operations that a fundamental inconsistency exists between the current Basic Doctrine and the current national security strategy of realistic deterrence. This inconsistency is both stated and implied. We need to analyze two facets of nuclear operations and strategy: first, we must examine the statements on low-intensity nuclear operations and theater nuclear warfare; and second, we must probe into the statements on high-intensity nuclear operations and strategic nuclear warfare. However, when comparing USAF Basic Doctrine and the strategy of realistic deterrence, we must bear in mind the necessary relationship between the two. Realistic deterrence is designed to deter war and provide adequate forces to meet the threat should deterrence fail; Basic Doctrine offers options and capabilities. The actual force structure of the military must be capable of supporting national objectives.
Where, then, are the inconsistencies? First, low-intensity nuclear operations, as described in AFM 1-1, are limited nuclear operations by the U.S. against nonnuclear or minor nuclear powers. They also include nuclear operations between the major nuclear powers in which highly selective and limited strikes are employed in an attempt to achieve national objectives at a conflict level below high-intensity nuclear warfare. The four objectives of low-intensity nuclear operations stated in the doctrine manual are limited in scope and reflect a noticeable change from the earlier editions of the manual. The key shortcoming of this treatment of low-intensity nuclear operations lies in the options offered. First of all, realistic deterrence calls for a very limited role for theater nuclear warfare: e.g., deterrence of a Soviet attack on NATO Europe or a Chinese attack on our Asian allies. The options offered by the doctrine manual to deal with nonnuclear or minor nuclear powers are too broad and do not relate to current policy. Part of this problem is no doubt the lack of parallelism between the spectrum of potential conflict as stated by Secretary Laird and aerospace operations used in the doctrine manual. The Secretary’s analysis of nuclear warfare below the level of strategic nuclear war is closely linked with U.S. national interest and objectives; the USAF doctrine manual describes several options in low-intensity nuclear operations that are not closely linked to the national interest and objectives and thus not meaningful options for realistic deterrence.
This inconsistency is even more apparent when one examines Basic Doctrine concerning low-intensity nuclear operations involving two major powers. It is the implication and tone of the following statement that signals a contradiction between current doctrine and current national security strategy concerning theater nuclear warfare and strategic nuclear warfare:
When both adversaries possess
survivable forces having recognizable retaliation capability, there may be
strong incentives to limit initial nuclear action to attacks on selected
targets which would cause grave concern, but not necessarily lead to the
triggering of a massive exchange.22
This contradiction is further bolstered in Basic Doctrine by defining these nuclear attacks as possibly being against targets in the enemy homeland, such as oil refineries, nuclear plants, and hydroelectric facilities.
On the one hand, since both major powers have survivable retaliatory forces,
and given that the U.S. will use its strategic nuclear forces against the
Soviet homeland only in a second strike, the quoted statement can only be
relevant to theater nuclear warfare. However, according to the section of
realistic deterrence concerning theater nuclear warfare, low-intensity nuclear
operations between the Soviet Union and the United States will likely occur
only if there is an all-out attack against NATO Europe by the Soviet Union. And
even then the limited U.S. nuclear response would be against the attacking
Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces and not against the Soviet Union itself. Of what use,
then, is this option offered by Basic Doctrine?
If, on the other hand, one uses the definition of strategic nuclear warfare as stated under “Realistic Deterrence,” low-intensity nuclear operations between the two major powers would be part of strategic nuclear warfare.
But here again, what is stated in the doctrine manual about low-intensity nuclear operations between major powers does not correlate with our current strategic nuclear strategy. Our strategic nuclear strategy is fundamentally a second-strike strategy that emphasizes deterrence. It makes little sense to talk about limiting nuclear attacks when the overriding objective is to deter them. If deterrence fails, it will fail only because the Soviet Union chooses to initiate conflict. If that occurs, the United States offers no guarantee that its response will be limited to the intensity of the original attack, nor does it suggest any automatic escalation. Deterrence must be based on this uncertainty of the U.S. response, or else there is little incentive for the Soviet Union to be deterred in its actions. Hence the options offered by Basic Doctrine concerning low-intensity nuclear operations are not consistent with our current national security strategy for deterring either theater nuclear or strategic nuclear warfare. Such inconsistencies must be corrected so that Basic Doctrine will offer U.S. leaders meaningful options.
A second inconsistency between current doctrine and current national security strategy lies in the area of strategic nuclear warfare and high-intensity nuclear operations. The U.S. strategic nuclear strategy is “nuclear sufficiency” and is based on the four criteria listed earlier. It is basically a second-strike strategy that emphasizes deterrence of high-level nuclear conflict. This emphasis is translated into a force structure primarily designed to be reliable and survivable, yet capable of wreaking such a level of urban/industrial destruction that the Soviet Union will be deterred from initiating a nuclear first strike. In addition, our current national security strategy makes no mention of an all-out damage-limiting effort. In contrast, however, the Basic Doctrine manual states:
Nuclear warfare, initiated by all
enemy surprise or as an outgrowth of ongoing conflict at a lower level, can
assume various forms depending on the targeting and force employment options
pursued by the adversaries. . . . Regardless of the form which the
conflict takes, national leadership must be provided with a continuing credible
capability to attack enemy military forces or his population and industry. At
the same time, defensive forces must be postured to ensure a capability to
limit damage to the US and its allies, and to preserve an assured destruction
capability even after suffering a large-scale attack on the United States.23
The doctrine manual calls for certain offensive capabilities and options which the national leadership has rejected as criteria for nuclear sufficiency and which are fundamentally in opposition to Secretary Laird’s criteria for deterrence. For example, “a continuing credible capability to attack enemy military forces or his population” does not fit the criteria of a second-strike capability. Instead, it hints of counterforce options that exceed the stated sufficiency criteria for deterrence and, in fact, may be destabilizing in the pursuit of a deterrent strategy.
A second criterion of nuclear sufficiency calls for providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the U.S. first in a crisis. Two very clear incentives for such a first-strike would be
—that the Soviet Union believes its first-strike
capability could cripple the U.S. retaliatory forces and that it is in the
interest of the Soviet Union to do so;
—that the U.S. has a viable first-strike capability and
the only chance the Soviet Union has in a conflict is a surprise first
strike.
Our current national security strategy is designed to ensure that the Soviet Union has no such incentives by, first, always having reliable, survivable retaliatory forces, and, second, by not posing a first-strike threat to the Soviet Union. The cited statement from the doctrine manual, as well as other statements therein, illustrates a failure of doctrine to reflect current national policy as expressed by our national security strategy. It is because doctrine must support the national policies and strategies which implement national objectives that these inconsistencies must be addressed and reconciled.
Realistic deterrence strategy and basic doctrine have both complementary and noncomplementary aspects. The complementary aspects need to be reinforced so that our national leaders can always know that the options offered by basic doctrine are appropriate and usable. The noncomplementary aspects, particularly the ones highlighted in this article, need to be addressed by the Air Force, and its Basic Doctrine should be revised accordingly. For as it is defined by General John C. Meyer in the Foreword to the current AFM 1-1, USAF basic doctrine is
. . . the fundamental principles and concepts for employing aerospace forces in support of United States objectives . . . They are based on knowledge gained through experience, study, analysis, and tests and are designed to support the fundamental military employment policies expressed by national leadership.24
How can Basic Doctrine be otherwise?
Squadron Officer School
Notes
1. “USAF Doctrine and National Policy,” speech delivered to the USAF Scientific Advisor Board as published in Air Force Magazine, January 1958.
2. Thomas Carlyle, Latter Day Pamphlets, No. 1 [1850].
3. Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Aerospace Studies Institute, 1971).
4. “Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, “Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget before the House Armed Services Committee, March 9, 1971.
5. Air Force Manual 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 28 September 1971.
6. “National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence,” Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before the Senate Armed Services Committee on FY 73 Defense Budget and FY 1973-77 Program, 15 February 1972.
7. FY 72 Defense Report, p. 2.
8. FY 73 Defense Report, p. 26.
9. FY 72 Defense Report, p. 21.
10. “US Foreign Policy for the 1970’s, The Emerging Structure of Peace,” A Report to the Congress by Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, February 9, 1972, p. 154.
11. FY 72 Defense Report, p. 76.
12. Air Force Manual 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 14 August 1964, par 1-5.
13. Ibid., par 3-7.
14. Ibid.
15. AFM 1-1 (1971), par 1-3.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., par 4-3.
18. Ibid., par 5-3.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., par 1-2.
21. Nixon’s 1972 Foreign Policy Report, p. 158.
22. AFM 1-1 (1971), par 4-5.
23. Ibid., par 5-2.
24. Ibid., Foreword.
Captain Raymond S. Blunt (USAFA; M.A., Central Missouri State College) is a research officer and lecturer on doctrine at Squadron Officer School. His previous assignments were as an instructor and stand-board evaluator in the Minuteman system and as an action officer in the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts and Objectives, Hq USF, under the ASTRA program. He is a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School . . . Captain Thomas O. Cason (B.A., University of Alabama) is a lecturer on national power and military strategy at Squadron Officer School. His previous Air Force assignments were as an electronic counter-countermeasures officer (1963-68) and as data automation officer (1968-70). A graduate of SOS, Captain Cason completes a master’s degree in political science from Auburn University in May 1973.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression,
academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official
position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air
Force or the Air University.
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