Document created: 31 October 2003
Air University Review,
January-February 1973
President Nixon, speaking at Guam in1969, announced a new American foreign policy, a policy based on the premise that peace in Asia would depend primarily on Asian solutions to Asian problems. The United States would honor commitments in Asia and elsewhere by providing technical and economic assistance to its allies when requested and as appropriate, but American military presence was to assume a lower profile. We would look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing manpower for its defense.
This policy had particular significance for the United States Air Force because of the technical requirements for air war. If Air Force assistance was to be effectively provided, technical training of allied air forces would assume even greater importance than it had in the past. With this in mind it is worthwhile to review USAF technical training efforts in Vietnam and examine that experience for methods that are appropriate to the future lower profile of American military presence in Asia and reliance on Asian solutions to Asian problems.
American policy in Vietnam in 1970 and 1971 was aimed at self-sufficiency for the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). Self-sufficiency was understood to mean that after withdrawal of American combat forces the RVNAF could maintain the level of security that had been won jointly by the United States and South Vietnam. The United States would continue to provide materiel support for the defense of South Vietnam, but it was expected that the RVNAF would have the capability to use United States equipment effectively. If that capability could be developed, the RVNAF would be judged self-sufficient.
Training was the key to VNAF self-sufficiency, and the Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) was a major training effort. Training had to meet two essential objectives for the VNAF to become self-sufficient: (1) personnel had to be trained to meet the immediate needs of expansion, and (2) the VNAF had to expand its capability to train replacements for personnel lost through attrition.
In terms of sheer numbers of personnel, the requirements for expansion far exceeded the requirements for attrition, so it was during the expansion phase that USAF assistance would be most necessary. By January 1970 the VNAF had grown to a personnel strength of over 30,000 men, but fully half this number were unskilled. In March 1971 CRIMP authorized a VNAF strength increase of about 50 percent over the 1970 figures. This CRIMP addition of untrained personnel brought the technical training requirement for 1970 and the first six months of 1971 to nearly 34,000, and this figure included only those personnel to be trained to perform at the lowest skill level. Upgrade training also had to be conducted. Massive United States assistance was required to meet these requirements for expansion.
It was in reaching the second essential goal, expanding the VNAF capability to train replacements for attrition losses, that self-sufficiency would have to stand the acid test. The extent of United States assistance required to train attrition replacements after satisfying the initial expansion requirements would provide a subjective measure of VNAF self-sufficiency. The interrelationship between these two training objectives clearly emerged as planning progressed.
VNAF technical training had to be conducted in South Vietnam, rather than in the United States. The most compelling reason for this was the number of personnel who required training and the time available. The increased pace of unit activations and the increased total number of units directed by CRIMP required that more people be trained and trained sooner. To train in the United States, VNAF recruits had to learn English; and the Saigon English Language School, the starting point in the training pipeline to the United States, could not provide enough graduates to meet the quotas. Thus in-country training conducted in the Vietnamese language was the only practical solution to this dilemma.
In 1969 every VNAF technical training requirement was evaluated to determine if the United States or South Vietnam was the more suitable training location. A conference convened at Randolph Air Force Base, Texas, in June of that year identified the courses to be established in South Vietnam and the equipment required to support those courses. Seventeen hard-core aircraft maintenance courses were among those identified. These were new courses specially designed to meet VNAF needs. Instead of general helicopter maintenance, for example, a course was designed to teach UH-1 helicopter maintenance, since the VNAF would not possess the variety of helicopters usually studied in USAF Air Training Command helicopter courses. The creation of these basic courses marked the beginning of a major transformation in the entire VNAF technical training program and forged a closer relationship between the immediate objective of expansion and the long-range goal of self-sufficiency.
Pacer Bravo was the name given to the VNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (VNAF I&M) plan to establish the seventeen basic aircraft maintenance skill courses in South Vietnam. (See accompanying list.) To provide the instructors for these courses, 243 VNAF maintenance technicians were carefully selected for training in the United States on the specific system they would later teach. This training was conducted by basic technical schools and applicable field training detachments. Following this, the VNAF graduates attended the USAF Air Training Command instructor course. Finally, they returned to South Vietnam to establish schools at the VNAF Air Training Center at Nha Trang Air Base and satellite schools at Tan Son Nhut AB and Bien Hoa AB.
VNAF IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION
BASIC
TECHNICAL TRAINING COURSES
AFSC COURSE TITLE
301X1 Navigation Systems Repairman
421X1 Aircraft Propeller Repairman
421X2 Pneudraulics Repairman
421X3 Aerospace Ground Equipment Repairman
422X0 Instrument Repairman
422X1 Mechanical Accessory Repairman
422X2 Egress Systems Repairman
423X0 Aircraft Electrician
424X0 Fuel Systems Repairman
431X0 Helicopter Maintenance Repairman
431X1A Aircraft Maintenance Repairman
(recip)
431X1C Aircraft Maintenance Repairman (Jet)
432X0 Jet Engine Repairman
432X1 Reciprocating Engine Repairman
461X0 Munitions Specialist
462X0 Weapons Specialist
USAF assistance did not stop after the instructors were trained. On 25 January 1970 the first element of two Mobile Training Teams (MTT’s) arrived in South Vietnam to assist the VNAF instructors in establishing the new courses. From then until 7 May 1971, elements of these two MTT’s were in South Vietnam, some for only a few months and others for nearly a year. Many of the MTT members had taught the new VNAF instructors in the United States, so there was real continuity between preparation and application.
In addition to training VNAF instructors and providing MTT’s, the USAF built training aids for the new courses. In all, 869 training aids were specifically designed and fabricated for VNAF use. These training aids were built at USAF Air Training Command Technical Training Centers.
The Pacer Bravo courses began in March 1970, and by 30 June 1971 there were 5599 VNAF graduates, with an additional 1414 students in training. Pacer Bravo was geared to the immediate requirements of CRIMP; in fact, but for these requirements it might not have been attempted.
Pacer Enhance was a related program established to provide expendable items required to support Pacer Bravo. Such items as paper, pencils, and slide projectors were sent to assure that minor as well as major training materials would be available. By July 1971 it was apparent that the Pacer projects represented one of the most successful training experiments ever attempted as part of a United States military assistance program.
One problem still had not been fully solved and warranted further attention. An initial advantage of Pacer Bravo was that the Vietnamese students need not understand English, since the in-country courses were taught in Vietnamese. However, most of the technical manuals used by the VNAF were in English. To be useful to many of the Pacer Bravo graduates, these manuals would have to be translated into Vietnamese.
The job performance aid (JPA) represented one important effort to overcome this difficulty. JPA’s were maintenance manuals written in both Vietnamese and English, designed jointly by the Air Force Systems Command, the Air Force Logistics Command, and the XYZYX Corporation. Manuals for UH-1, CH-47, and C-123 aircraft had been produced by June 1971. These manuals relied on simpler language, more pictures, and learning by doing, but they were not designed to replace technical manuals needed for guidance in performing the more complicated maintenance tasks.
The Pacer Bravo courses established a substantial VNAF technical training capability in South Vietnam. With this basic experience and with the proven success of the Pacer Bravo courses as encouragement, increased emphasis was placed on employing MTT’s in South Vietnam. These MTT’s covered a wide variety of specialties, including such skills as UNIVAC 1050-II computer operations and counterintelligence. Like the Pacer Bravo courses, the MTT effort made a significant contribution toward increasing VNAF skills and developing training self-sufficiency.
In January 1970 there were eight schools at the VNAF Air Training Center at Nha Trang AB: a liaison pilot training school, an air liaison officer and forward air controller air ground operations school (ALO/FAC-AGOS), a technical school, a general services school, a communications and electronics school, a military training school, an English-language school, and an air base defense school. Together these schools were scheduled to train nearly 4500 students in calendar year (CY) 1970. The Air Training Center actually exceeded that schedule and trained 6800 students in 1970.
By 1969 a command and staff school (equivalent to USAF Squadron Officer School) had been added, and the technical school had been expanded considerably. During CY 1971 over 12,000 students were programmed to graduate from the Air Training Center schools. In 1971, plans were also under consideration to establish T-37 undergraduate pilot training (UPT) as well as helicopter pilot training (HPT) at Nha Trang AB. Navigators were already being trained by the VNAF at Tan Son Nhut by June 1971.
The last VNAF helicopter student pilots programmed to be trained in the United States departed South Vietnam on 25 June 1971. The last students scheduled to enter fixed-wing training left for the United States in early 1972.
The United States had agreed to train a number of pilots for the VNAF, and as that figure was approached in 1972, the need for a VNAF UPT school would increase. In July 1971 the director of training of the Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP) saw the need to provide the VNAF with the capability to replace pilot losses as the greatest challenge to self-sufficiency yet to be met. The planned UPT course, if adopted, would solve this problem. Except for pilot training and a few highly technical skills, the VNAF appeared self-sufficient in training by June 1971.
One development that indicated the technical growth of the VNAF in 1971 was the flight of the TP-001, the first aircraft ever built in South Vietnam. Components of this aircraft were manufactured by hand at various VNAF bases. The engine and the landing gear were the only basic components not built in South Vietnam.
In February 1970 a Seventh Air Force plan provided for integration of VNAF personnel into 7AF units and into some United States Army helicopter units for training. This unprecedented plan complemented the VNAF training program and the USAF MTT training by giving newly trained men experience on the job. By 30 June 1971 over 3000 VNAF personnel had completed this training.
The integrated training program (ITP) required close coordination between the Air Force Advisory Group, 7AF and the VNAF. It was most easily conducted at joint-use bases because there only training was required. At sole-use bases (Cam Ranh, Phu Cat, and Phan Rang) billeting support was also required.
Two types of integrated training were conducted: familiarization and upgrade. In familiarization training VNAF personnel gained experience but were not awarded a higher skill level. Those successfully completing upgrade training in a 7AF unit, on the other hand, were awarded a higher skill level by the VNAF. Testing by 7AF units was largely subjective. If the Vietnamese trainee performed satisfactorily on the job, he was recommended for upgrade.
VNAF on-the-job training (OJT) effectiveness was initially limited by the small number of experienced supervisors available relative to the mass of people to be trained. During this period the ITP carried the brunt of responsibility for providing experience and job training to recent technical school graduates.
In January 1970 more VNAF students were trained in ITP than OJT, but by May 1971 this condition was reversed. Between January 1970 and June 1971, 4326 VNAF personnel completed either familiarization or upgrade training through OJT, and 1934 of these were upgraded.
During 1970 and early 1971VNAF personnel were allowed to enter OJT and ITP for either familiarization or upgrade because the results were the same—the man gained increased proficiency in a skill. Improved skills without higher skill levels, however, made personnel planning very difficult. It was almost impossible for USAF managers to measure training progress. This was less of a problem for VNAF managers, who relied more on personal contact and less on statistics for personnel management. By March 1971, however, the continued emphasis by USAF advisers on the need for higher skill levels caused a marked shift from familiarization training to upgrade training.
In 1970 and 1971 the VNAF experienced a major reorganization with the activation of five air divisions. One facet of that reorganization was the expansion of the Air Logistics Wing at Bien Hoa AB into an Air Logistics Command (ALC) on the same command level as the air divisions. The thrust of reorganization throughout the VNAF was directed toward absorbing units programmed for activation as part of CRIMP and toward more efficient management and effective employment of all Vietnamese air resources. To that end, the ALC was required to provide depot-level maintenance and logistics support for the entire VNAF. Logistics training was the key to providing the required support, and in 1970 and 1971 considerable effort was devoted to training programs at ALC.
ALC acquired and occupied a new formal training compound in late 1970. The new facilities were a decided improvement and included billets, classrooms, and a USAF dining hall. With the transfer of the dining hall to the VNAF, students began receiving regular meals in the training area for the first time, and morale and performance were measurably improved.
Training literature was ordered and received for all courses taught by ALC, and over eighty 16-mm training films were also ordered. The literature was acquired from USAF ATC Technical Training Centers and was in English; the films were to be made specifically for the ALC training program and would be in Vietnamese.
Formal training, OJT, ITP, and USAF Mobile Training Teams were all employed. In 1970, 454 students graduated from formal training, and 1883 were scheduled to graduate in 1971. Courses included metals processing, corrosion control, supply accounting, and others related to ALC functions, but students were drawn from the air divisions as well as ALC. Many of these courses would eventually be taught by the Air Training Center (ATC) at Nha Trang AB, but until training facilities and instructors were available at Nha Trang, they would be taught by ALC personnel.
Seven MTT’s conducted courses at ALC in 1970 and 1971. Twenty depot personnel were trained as console operators for the UNIVAC 1050-II computer acquired by ALC in March 1970. Two MTT’s helped establish depot-level maintenance on communication systems in late 1970 and early 1971. A supply MTT was scheduled to arrive at Bien Hoa AB in September 1971 to establish four new supply courses and train VNAF instructors.
During the first six months of 1971, 196 ALC airmen and NCO’s upgraded to
five-level skills through OJT, and five airmen upgraded as a result of ITP.
Another 29 received familiarization training through ITP.
Thus, technical training at Air Logistics Command was a significant feature of the Improvement and Modernization Program. As a result, important progress was made toward self-sufficiency during this period.
By June 1971 it was apparent that one critical facet of establishing VNAF self-sufficiency—a sound and viable technical training program—had been achieved. The breakthrough had occurred in 1969 with the initiation of the Pacer Bravo and Pacer Enhance programs. Throughout 1970 and 1971, MTT’s, ITP, VNAF OJT, and the Air Training Center steadily improved the competence of VNAF personnel in a wide variety of skills and qualified the VNAF to perpetuate that competence. Each of the training programs played a significant role in the overall accomplishment. By mid-1971 VNAF self-sufficiency in technical training seemed assured.
But perhaps the most significant result of the USAF role in training the VNAF was yet to appear. The USAF experience emphasized that in the long run the most productive approach to providing technical military assistance is to train allied instructors in the United States, whenever practical, and then assist them in establishing a training capability in their own country and in their own language. The USAF experience in Vietnam confirmed the value of exporting the training rather than importing the students.
United States Air Force Academy
Captain Drue L. DeBerry (USAFA) M.A., University of Oklahoma) is currently an instructor in history at the Air Force Academy. He is a senior navigator with 3500 hours in C-135 and C-141 transports and AC-130 gunships, with one tour in Southeast Asia. A graduate of Squadron Officer School, Captain DeBerry has published civil and military historical monographs.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this
document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic
environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the
U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air
University.
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